
.0* % ^T7^' A 







„ o J <v, 



m o J <>,> 















o > 





^ ^ * ft ^>^ /, * ^ A** 






^V** 








v^ 1 



"W 



^ A^ * -n 




"o^ 




Digitized by the Internet Archive 
in 2011 with funding from 
The Library of Congress 



http://www.archive.org/details/iaccusejaccuse03grel 



ACCUSE 

(J'ACCUSE!) 



I ACCUSE! 

(/' ACCUSE!) 



BY 

A GERMAN 



TRANSLATED BY 

ALEXANDER GRAY 



XlC-i ^ c 5j 



"A pitiable wretch is he 
Who knows the truth and yet can silent btf? 



HODDER AND STOUGHTON 

LONDON TORONTO NEW YORK 

MCMXVI 



I 'Ms 



Copyright, 1915, 
By George H. Doran Comtaot 



By Tmanffcr 
MAY 6 ; |9V9 



PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 



PREFACE 

J 'Accuse, a work recently published anonymously in 
Lausanne, has deservedly attracted much attention on 
the Continent on account of the independent standpoint 
of the author, the penetration shown in his analysis of 
the critical events of last year, and the vigour and 
clarity which characterise his presentation of the case. 

The German edition is prefaced by the following 
note : — ■ 

"The book T Accuse, written by a German patriot, 
and entrusted to me, is herewith presented to the public. 

"I regard this work as an act which can only confer 
a blessing on the German people and on humanity, 
and I accordingly assume responsibility for its publi- 
cation. 

"Dr. Anton Suter. 

"Lausanne, April 20th, 1915." 

A further note is added in the following terms : — 

"Having regard to the situation arising from the 
war and the conditions of the censorship, certain pas- 
sages in the manuscript have for the present been 
omitted. These passages are indicated by blank 
spaces." 

In the present translation the censored passages have 
been indicated in the same way. 

The very few explanatory footnotes added in the 
course of translation are indicated by square brackets. 

I desire to express my indebtedness to Mr. T. Lindsay 
for his assistance in the work of revision and correction 
of proofs. 

July, 191 5. A. G. 



CONTENTS 

i 

GERMANY AWAKE 

PAGS 

Can the Victory of Germany and Austria be expected? — 
The economic position of belligerent countries — The po- 
litical and military position of the belligerent countries— 
The situation in France — Partie Remise — The question 
of guilt 11—34 

II 
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 

Our Imperialists: Bernhardi and Co. — Have we been attacked 
or were we going to be attacked? — The head of the War 
Party — The Imperial War — The place in the sun — The 
chosen people — Germany's brilliant development — In- 
crease of population and the colonies — Our true colonies 
— What advantage has France drawn from her colonies? 
— The Germans abroad: France, England, America — The 
place in the sun for us, the place in the shadow for the 
others — The fear of Germany — Diplomatic success of the 
Triple Alliance — Austria's Balkan policy — The Crown 
Prince and the war party — The policy of encirclement — 
England and Germany: The first Hague Conference — Be- 
tween the first and second Hague Conferences: The 
English Liberal Government — Second Hague Conference: 
England and Germany — English proposals for a political 
understanding and for a naval agreement with Germany 
— What are we fighting for? — The freedom which they 
mean — The end of peace: Security? — Did France mean 
to attack us? — Did Russia mean to attack us? — The 
Triple Entente a defensive alliance — Giolitti's revelations 
— The change of front in Berlin; the war party . 26— 141 



?ii 


i CONTENTS 






III 






THE CRIME 


PAGE 


A. 


Austria 


. 146 


B. 


Germany ....... 


. 170 


C. 


England 


. 245 


D. 


Russia -. 


. 289 


E. 


France 


. 295 


F. 


Appendix : The Austrian Red Book . 


• 315 



IV 
THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEED 

How beautiful to die for the Fatherland! — Prestige — Prole- 
tarians of all countries, massacre each other! — Political 
morality — Moral politics — Quidquid delirant reges, plec- 
tuntur Achivi — Dreams of world power — Who will pay 
the cost of the war? — Quousque tandem ? . . 353 — 385 



THE FUTURE 

What should peace bring us? — The system of armed peace — 
A covenant of peace between free nations — Is this a 
Utopia? — The coercive force — What will peace bring us? 
— Should it happen otherwise — The twilight of the Gods 

386—419 

EPILOGUE ......... 420—423 

APPENDICES 



Speech delivered by Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, August 

4th, 1914 424 

Speech delivered by Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, December 

2nd, 1914 430 

Circular note of Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, December 24th, 

1914 , . 44° 



1 ACCUSE! 



ACCUSE! 



GERMANY AWAKE! 

La verite est en marche. 

If there were in Prussian-Germany a system of minis- 
terial responsibility, such as exists in all other countries 
with effective Parliamentary Government, and such as 
has been held out with many other fair promises to 
the Prussian people for more than sixty-four years, the 
Imperial Chancellor and President of the Prussian 
Council, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, would have to be 
arraigned and 

condemned. 

It might be allowed in his favour, as an extenuating 
circumstance, that he was not the driving force of the 
war, but that he was driven to it — driven from above 
and from below. But a Minister, who yields himself 
as the tool of those who instigate war, who covers those 
who are irresponsible with his responsibility, who ac- 
cepts the despicable task of representing to his nation 
and to all the world as a war of defence the 

offensive war which was prepared long in advance, 
who by this falsehood unchains the most fearful disaster 
which has ever fallen upon our globe, and which is 
inflicting on his Fatherland, whether victorious or de- 
feated, wounds which will be incurable for generations 
to come; who delivers over to death and to mutilation 

ii 



12 I ACCUSE! 

hundreds of thousands of his countrymen in the flower 
of their age, annihilates at a stroke the arduous labour 
of half a century, suddenly wrenches asunder the bonds 
of culture between civilised nations, and transforms 
prosperous regions of Europe into ruinous wastes — such 
a man must bear the punishment which is due to his 
crime. 



In gathering together in the following pages the vari- 
ous points in the indictment which reveal the exclusive 
guilt of Germany and her ally, Austria-Hungary, in 
provoking the universal war, I am well aware of the 
fact that I will expose myself to the disapproving criti- 
cism of a large section of the German public, which 
proclaims it to be a patriotic duty to shut one's eyes to 
the truth, or if the truth be recognised, to conceal it 
in silence for the duration of the war. 

Only by bearing in mind these two points of view is 
it possible to understand the present frame of mind 
of such a highly intelligent people as the German nation. 
The "State of War" {Kriegszustand) , proclaimed on 
the 31st July, which placed the intellectual life of Ger- 
many under the supervision of Generals, and which even 



GERMANY AWAKE! 13 

to-day, after more than six months have elapsed, care- 
fully keeps watch on the frontiers lest there should pene- 
trate into the country so much as a suggestion of the 
intellectual life or of the views of foreign countries 
which might disturb the unity of Germany, or of foreign 
information or evidence which might illumine the Ger- 
man people — this "state of war" has produced the result 
that nine-tenths of the whole German people have blindly 
followed the dexterously coined phrases about the "state 
of defence which is forced upon us," about "the strug- 
gle for our freedom and culture against aggression and 
oppression." "The French and the Russians have al- 
ready pressed over our frontiers" ; "The Fatherland is 
in danger" ; "They mean to humiliate us" ; "In the midst 
of peace the enemy falls upon us"; "The existence Of 
our Empire is at stake"; "We are called upon to de- 
fend our holiest possessions, our Fatherland, our very 
hearths against an unscrupulous attack" ; "We are fight- 
ing for the fruits of our works of peace, for the in- 
heritance of a great past and for our future." These 
and similar phrases (all taken from official documents) 
have been used with the conscious intention of deceiv- 
ing the German people, of inflaming its patriotism, and 
of inspiring it to unutterable and incalculable sacrifices 
in wealth and in life. 

"The few, who here have aught of Truth divined, 
Yet foolishly revealed their inner heart, 
Who showed the mob their feeling and their mind — 
The cross, the stake have always been their part." x 

The few who, after the first days of intoxication, 
gradually returned to their senses, and who were able 

1 "Die wenigen, die was davon erkannt, 
Die toricht g'nug ihr voiles Herz nicht wahrten, 
Dem Pobel ihr Gefuhl, ihr Schauen offenbarten 
Hat man von je gekreuzigt und verbrannt." 



14 I ACCUSE! 

to procure foreign documents and representations behind 
the backs of the military censors, and by careful study 
and comparison of these slowly arrived at the truth, — 
these had to shut the truth within them, since it was 
and is considered unpatriotic to give expression to it, 
since every utterance in word or in writing would be 
suppressed by the military authorities, and the offender 
would expose himself to the risk of punishment. 

It is to escape this fate that those who know the facts 
have kept, and still keep, silence. Those, however, who 
do not know the truth, or do not wish to know it, cry 
out all the more loudly, and as a work of illumination 
scatter broadcast the foolish products of their minds 
throughout the world, where no one believes them, even 
if they were to repeat the German lies a million times. 
What are we to say when Germans of the highest emi- 
nence, from Bode to Dehmel, 1 from Haeckel to Haupt- 
mann, 1 from Liszt to Sudermann, from Laband to Lie- 
bermann, 2 (in all nearly a hundred of them), distribute 
in foreign countries an appeal, which immediately after 
the opening words contains the following sentence : — 



"Germany on the other hand made every effort to avoid 
war. The incontestable evidence in support of this fact 

1 Decorated on the Emperor's birthday 1915, Fourth Class of the 
Red Eagle. 

3 Wilhelm von Bode, General Director of the Royal Museum, Ber- 
lin, a leading authority on art, Richard Dehmel a distinguished poet, 
Ernst Haeckel, the celebrated Professor of Zoology at Jena; Ger- 
hardt Hauptmann, perhaps the most eminent of contemporary 
poets; Franz von Liszt, Professor of Jurisprudence at Berlin, a 
leading criminologist; Hermann Sudermann, the novelist; Paul 
Laband, Professor of Jurisprudence at Strassburg; Max Lieber- 
mann, a distinguished painter. 



GERMANY AWAKE! 15 

are open to all the world. . . . Only when the overwhelm- 
ing forces of the enemy, who had long been lying in am- 
bush on our frontiers, fell into our country from three 
sides ( !), only then did the German people rise like one 
man." 



And with such robber-stories as these about the enemy 
lurking in ambush — one thinks involuntarily of Leder- 
strumpf and Ali Baba — they dare to humbug such highly 
educated, cultured nations as, for instance, the Italians 
(among whom even a street-porter has to-day a better 
knowledge of the historical truth about the war than a 
Harnack has among us), among a people whose Gov- 
ernment, with the approval of the whole country, de- 
clared that the war was an offensive war on the part 
of Germany and Austria, and rightly and of necessity so 
declared unless it wished to charge itself with faithless- 
ness and the breach of its own word. 

It is to these men a self-evident fact that we are the 
leading culture-people of the world, and consequently 
(such is the logic of these gentlemen!) we are called 
upon to impose our culture forcibly on the other inferior 
races and even on neutrals by means of bombs and 
grenades, by fire and devastation. Such is the mission 
which Providence has pointed out to us, as it called 
upon the Crusaders to fight against the Crescent (which 
now we have gained as an ally in the struggle against 
Christian nations), and as it instigated the Catholics in 
the Thirty Years' War to cast out of the Protestants by 
fire and sword their new-won faith. In the view of our 
leading spirits, in place of the wars of religion there has 
suddenly arisen since the ist August, 1914, a culture- 
war, in which the nations are fighting for the equal 
privileges or the supremacy of the various "hostile cul- 
tures." Has ever a greater madness than this been con- 
ceived? In 1870 when France was defeated and crushed, 



16 I ACCUSE! 

did we suppress, did we so much as touch, the culture 
of that country? Did the foreign domination of Na- 
poleon wipe out even a trace of our German spiritual cul- 
ture, which just then had reached an incomparable 
height? When the Romans conquered Greece did they 
at the same time overthrow Greek culture? Precisely 
the opposite took place. The captor was made captive. 
The mind of Greece, the art of Greece, subdued Rome. 
And we find the same thing in the history of Christian- 
ity. In the end was it not the small province of Galilee 
that imposed its spirit on the world-empire of Rome? 
How indeed is it possible for anyone to speak of the 
present struggle as a struggle of cultures when what 
we really have before us is merely a struggle of anti- 
cultures, of barbarisms, against each other, — a struggle 
which from day to day becomes more bitter, more cruel, 
and more murderous, — a struggle in which ail the prin- 
ciples of international law and of humanity are more 
and more forgotten, if indeed it is still possible to speak 
of humanity in face of this inhuman massacre? What 
has all this got to do with culture? Do we intend in 
any way to suppress the culture of England and France, 
of Russia and Belgium? Do we mean to renounce 
Shakespeare, Darwin, Newton, and Spencer, Tolstoy and 
Dostoiewsky, Voltaire, Rousseau, Zola, Goncourt, Ru- 
bens, Van Eyck, Meunier, and Maeterlinck, or do we 
mean to rid the world of their achievements? With 
what right, then, do we impute to the others intentions 
against us which we do not have against them, and to 
which we could not give effect even if we entertained 
them? If we had not read it daily in print, we would 
not have believed that the intellectuals of Germany could 
have persuaded themselves and the German people that 
German culture is in danger, and that it must be de- 
fended with Zeppelins and with 42-centimetre artillery. 
The "neurosis of war" has indeed become epidemic 



GERMANY AWAKE! IT 

like St. Vitus's dance or flagellantism in the Middle 
Ages, As the Dervishes in the East for hours at a time 
utter the same formulae of prayer and go through the 
same contortions with their arms and legs and their 
bodies until at last they fall down foaming at the mouth 
and overpowered, so now we have seen the learned men 
of Germany repeating for months past the same patri- 
otic litanies, the same unproved assertions (assertions 
indeed of which the contrary is proved) ; at all times 
reaching upwards with their arms and their legs and 
indeed their whole body, until in their opinion they and 
their people surpass all other nations of the earth, and 
if they do not become like to God, they at least be- 
come the chosen people of God. They overpower them- 
selves with their own phrases, until they foam at the 
mouth from sheer patriotism and fall down in adoration 
of themselves. . . . But they will in time awake from 
their stupefaction, and the wild intoxication will be fol- 
lowed by the terrible discomfort of returning sobriety. 



The purpose of this book is to hasten this awakening. 
This / regard as a patriotic duty ; for the longer the in- 
toxication lasts, the worse will be the consequences for 
the German people, and the process of awakening will 
be more difficult and more terrible. It is only a better 
knowledge of the origins and objects of this war, a 
recognition of the guilt and responsibility for this war, 
that can bring about a change for the better. 



18 I ACCUSE! 



Can the Victory of Germany and Austria Be 
Expected ? 

the economic position of belligerent countries 

To-day it is no longer permissible to imagine the pos- 
sibility of the victory of the Allied Empires. The finan- 
cial and military superiority of the countries allied 
against them is so great that they cannot be counter- 
balanced by military efficiency on the part of Germany, 
nor even by the greatest sacrifices in life and well-being. 
No declamatory statements about "holding out till the 
last breath," no false and dazzling promises about the 
economic resisting power of Germany can in any way 
alter this fact. The balance of gold in the imperial bank 
is no proof that the economical position is still tolerable; 
for indeed nearly all the gold in circulation has flowed 
to the bank, and the notes for the hundred and fifty 
million pound sterling issued by the loan fund have been 
covered not by gold but by unrealisable goods and ef- 
fects. Manufactures find employment only in so far 
as they are engaged for the internal needs of the coun- 
try and for military purposes. The money required for 
the supply of military stores is, however, raised from 
the German taxpayer, and as it represents an unpro- 
ductive investment it must be entered in the books as 
a pure loss. One class at least has nothing to complain 
of; I mean the agrarian class. It is they who have 
sounded the call to the battle, who have stirred up war, 
the imperialists and the chauvinists, whom the German 
people have to thank for this hideous war. From their 
ranks come the colonels and the generals, the Bernhardis 
and the Frobeniuses, who prescribe to the German Em- 
pire its historical mission, "world-power or downfall," 
and who announce to it its "hour of destiny." These 



GERMANY AWAKE! 19 

are the men who possess the ear of the highest in the 
country, and who instil into them the poison of their 
selfish ideas. These are the men who at the same time 
are making the best profit out of the war. They and 
their comrades must of course also bleed, but what they 
lose in blood flows back to them in gold, gold in the 
form of gold-lace and in glittering coins. They are 
also making a career for themselves, and the more of- 
ficers fall, so much the better for the younger men. They 
are, too, succeeding in business more brilliantly than 
they could ever have done in time of peace. The prices 
of their produce, grain, potatoes, and cattle, would have 
risen immeasurably if the Government had not in the 
end seen the necessity of fixing maximum prices. But 
even these maximum prices are already enormously 
above the prices ever paid in times of peace. 1 

The workmen and the middle classes however perish 
and decay. The longer the war lasts, the more surely 
will German trade, the German system of finance and 
German manufactures, be deprived of their connections 
with foreign countries. The seas of the world are open 
to our enemies, England and France, as well as to 
neutral States, and it would be a surprising fact if they 
did not gradually usurp our place in markets abroad. 
The exports and imports of Italy and of Holland must 
necessarily show an upward tendency after Germany 
is ruled out of account. The longer the war lasts, the 
more successful will be the efforts of England to drive 
our trade out of America, Asia, and Africa, and in any 
case decades will pass before we again reach the position 
we occupied before the war. And while the economic 
life of Germany is thus advancing to a stage at which 
it will slowly bleed to death, this process can only 

1 Bread has meanwhile become constantly scarcer, and the mo- 
nopoly of grain and the distribution of bread by the State has al- 
ready been introduced. 



W I ACCUSE! 

be accelerated by the necessity of producing the enor- 
mous stores of materials required for the maintenance 
of our armies of millions, and for the conduct of the 
war. It has been estimated by an expert that the cost 
of maintenance per man per day may be reckoned at 
10 marks, and this estimate takes no account of the 
wear and tear of materials, the ammunition used up (a 
single shot from our 42-centimetre guns is said to cost 
thousands of marks), or the loss of all kinds of instru- 
ments of war. If we maintain five million soldiers under 
arms, the war will cost us in ready money paid out of 
our pockets two and a half million pounds sterling a day; 
it will cost monthly 75 million pounds, it will cost in a 
year 900 million pounds sterling. If we include in our 
estimate the sums indicated above, for ordinary wear 
and tear, for material used up or lost, it will be impos- 
sible to estimate the yearly cost of the war at anything 
less than 1,250 million pounds sterling, that is to say 
250 millions more than the sum-total of the debts of 
the German Empire and of the individual States in 1912. 

Further, the justice of this calculation is more or less 
confirmed by the war-loans which so far have been 
asked and approved in the German Empire, amounting 
to 500 million pounds, to which the war contribution 
of 19 1 3 amounting to 50 millions must be added. These 
war loans were intended to reach until somewhere about 
the end of the financial year, that is to say until about 
31st March, 19 15, but doubtless they are not intended, 
and are not sufficient to provide for a complete current 
renewal of the material of the war which has been lost 
or used up. If we add the sums necessary for this 
purpose we will arrive more or less at the sum estimated 
above, as that required for the conduct of the war for a 
year, that is to say 1,250 million pounds sterling. 

The countless millions of pounds which the war is 
costing and has already cost our economic life, surpasses 



GERMANY AWAKE! 21 

all estimation. The Exchanges are closed. No one 
knows to-day what he possesses. In any case nearly 
all effects are as good as unrealisable ; and without the 
cunningly devised system of loan- funds, a system in 
essence supported on feet of clay, without the protective 
laws of the 4th August and all the other conceivable 
measures which were passed, intended partly to stave 
off the malady and partly to conceal it, the collapse of 
our German economic life would within a short time 
become an accomplished fact. 

At the same time England is abused in every key 
because she avails herself of the advantages conferred 
on her by her geographical and economical position. 
Had we been in England's place would we have behaved 
otherwise? "A la guerre comme a la guerre." Every- 
one defends himself to the best of his ability, and if the 
English, apart from their land forces and their navy, 
can make use of their economic superiority to defeat us, 
who has any right to reproach them with the fact? 
Are we not speculating on the possibility of Mohamme- 
dan risings in English colonies, behind which we stand 
as spiritus rector? Are we not levying from the 
wretched and desolate Belgium, the prey of penury and 
soon to be the prey of famine, — a country which after 
all is only defending its independence and freedom (a 
war of liberation in the true sense!) — are we not levying 
from this exhausted country and from its wholly or 
partly devastated cities many hundreds of millions of 
marks as a so-called "war contribution"? From my 
own points of view the economic war which England 
is waging against us is far preferable to the warfare of 
blood which we have brought upon the world. The war 
of blood involves the loss both of human life and of 
economic values ; the war' of trade demands only eco- 
nomic sacrifices, but spares that which in the end has 
the greater value, the life of men. In this it to a certain 



22 I ACCUSE! 

extent approaches the conditions of peace which exist 
between countries whose relations are not regulated by 
treaties of commerce ; in this case also we find economic 
struggle without loss of life. Here there is indeed 
opened to our vision a prospect of the form which strug- 
gles will assume in the future configuration of human 
society. It will no longer be a struggle with weapons 
forged of steel and of iron, but a struggle of the nerves 
and of the brain, a more refined struggle between civil- 
ised men, who will become more and more removed from 
the brutal bodily struggle of wild beasts and of barbaric 
nations, among whom Europe to-day assumes the first 
place. 

It is of course a feeble consolation that the other belli- 
gerent countries are also exhausting themselves. A 
country so economically undeveloped as Russia, whose 
exports and imports, in spite of her 180 million inhabi- 
tants, amounted in 19 12 only to 300 million pounds 
sterling, need scarcely be considered in such a compari- 
son. The more developed the economic life of a coun- 
try is, the more extensive its trade and its industries, 
the more sensible is it to the effects of war. So far 
as England and France are concerned, these countries 
are in the first place much more wealthy than Ger- 
many, and in the second place, as we have already ob- 
served, after the disappearance of the few German com- 
merce raiders all the seas of the world are open to them, 
so that they can export their produce and bring back 
again from foreign countries the necessary raw ma- 
terial, the means of subsistence and any other articles 
that may be required. It is at once foolish and per- 
nicious when the German Press and the public opinion 
of Germany seek to deceive themselves and others on 
this point. 

The credit of the countries at war with us, so far as 
France and England are concerned, has so far scarcely 



GERMANY AWAKE! 23 

suffered in any way. In foreign countries French and 
English notes have maintained their rate of exchange 
almost unaltered, whereas German notes are constantly 
sinking in value. A ioo-mark note can already be pur- 
chased abroad for 112 francs (instead of nominally 
125 fr.), whereas English £1 notes cost at the same time 
26 francs (instead of nominally 25 fr.). 

The German 5 per cent, war-loan was issued at 97 
per cent, whereas the English 3^2 per cent, war-loan 
was issued at 95 per cent. If the wealth and credit of 
the German Empire were equal to that of England, the 
German 5 per cent, imperial loan would have been about 
40 per cent, more valuable than the English 3^2 per 
cent., and instead of being issued at 97^ per cent, it 
could have been issued somewhere about 135 per cent. 

In this enormous difference there is clearly revealed 
the comparative economic strength and the power of 
resistance possessed by the two countries. No patriotic 
talk, no stifling of the truth, will help us here. Hard 
facts are the best arguments. The more we ignore the 
facts, the worse will it be for us. We do not succeed in 
throwing sand into the eyes of others, but in lying to 
ourselves, we lull ourselves in hopes impossible of ful- 
filment, we become ever more stiff-necked in the pursuit 
of the unholy struggle, and in the end we will accom- 
plish our own destruction. 

THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY POSITION OF THE 
BELLIGERENT COUNTRIES 

The political and military aspect of affairs is precisely 
similar to the economic aspect. 

The whole of our Colonies, built up by the expendi- 
ture of many hundreds of millions of marks, and tended 
with something of a mother's love, have been lost. Aus- 
tria has lost Galicia and part of Bukovina, and Hun- 



24 I ACCUSE! 

gary is in danger of being overrun by the Russians. On 
the other side, Belgium and the eastern corner of France 
are occupied by the Germans and a small part of east- 
ern Poland is occupied by the allied German and Austrian 
forces. But we must not forget that French troops are 
still in Upper Alsace and that until a few days ago 
Russian troops were still in East Prussia. 1 

Thus we see that both sides have in their possession 
a number of objects of barter which at the end of the 
war should be mutually returned as is done in the case 
of prisoners. The longer the war lasts and the more 
extensive it becomes, the more other countries unite 
themselves to the belligerent parties, the more will the 
number of these objects of barter increase. While the 
Turks are pressing forward towards the Suez Canal, the 
English are making progress in Persia, Mesoptomia, and 
Arabia; here also it may be presumed that territory will 
be seized on both sides, which on the conclusion of peace 
will have to be exchanged. 

The world-war, notwithstanding the fearful daily im- 
pacts and loss of blood, is, as it were, being conducted 
in such a way that the opponents pass each other by, 
and it would be the best, because the most humane so- 
lution, if the impacts were to become constantly less, 
and, on the other hand, the possession of territory be- 
longing to the other side were to become constantly more 
extensive. The result would be the same as now, only 
with less loss of blood. For from the military, just as 
little as from the economic, point of view no one can 
still entertain the illusion that the war may end with a 
victory of the allied empires. 

To-day the possibility of such an issue must already 
be regarded as completely excluded. The battles in the 

1 This book was completed in February, and cannot therefore 
take account of later events; these, however, cannot affect the 
final result of the war. 



GERMANY AWAKE! 25 

East are essentially no more than a defensive, unsuc- 
cessfully conducted so far as Austria is concerned, but 
hitherto maintained with success by Germany after the 
first blows fell. What does the occupation of Lodz, 
and even, so far as I am concerned, the conquest of 
Warsaw mean against such a colossus as the Russian 
Empire? Will Russia be defeated when we get posses- 
sion of the half or the whole of Poland? It will be 
nothing but a new object of barter given into our hands, 
but will it mean the conquest of Russia? Not in the 
slightest. 

And what about the situation in France? What diffi- 
culties have we to overcome to gain possession of even 
the small north-western corner of Belgium! What un- 
speakable sacrifices does that involve ! How many thou- 
sands of poor, deluded, heroic soldiers have miserably 
perished in snow and in ice, in the trenches and in the 
canals, in mud and in mire, on their lips a last whisper 
of farewell to wife and child and mother, in their hearts 
a last thought of peace and home! And why? To gain 
possession of a few square metres of inundated and 
impoverished country with ruined towns and villages, 
and then on to the pursuit of the great illusion: on to 
Calais! on to England! All this reminds me of a pic- 
ture by Spangenberg entitled "The Pursuit of Happi- 
ness," which thirty years ago was rightly the subject 
of much admiration in the Berlin Art Exhibition. A 
beautiful naked woman was represented hovering over 
a shining iridescent ball of glass before a troop of wild 
horsemen who, with gestures of passion, are seeking to 
reach the crown of laurels which she holds aloft in 
her right hand. She entices them on with her ensnaring 
eyes ; her golden yellow hair flutters in the wind, almost 
reaching the horsemen who are nearest to her. But the 
crown, the object of their passionate desires, ever eludes 
their longing grasp. An abyss yawns in front, crossed 



26 I ACCUSE! 

only by a narrow bridge, just broad enough to ensure 
a passage for the Ball of happiness and the goddess 
who hovers above it, but which means inevitable death 
for the warriors in pursuit. The first is already tot- 
tering into the chasm, the others will follow, and the 
vision of happiness dissolves, never to be seen again. 

So will it be, I fear, with the invasion of England, 
which since the beginning of the war has been held out 
to the German people as a seductive magic picture. Near 
as the other side may appear, we will not succeed in 
getting over, "the water is much too deep." Hundreds 
of thousands of men might perish in the effort, were 
the venture risked, and even if we were over there, 
a war of the people would be let loose, and our troops, 
deprived of their connections with the home country, 
would be crushed by the enemy. What every German 
for months back has been whispering to his neighbour 
in desire and in hope appears to me to be nothing but 
a daring flight of the imagination, which will break 
miserably on England's unbroken sea power. 

Notwithstanding all the admiration we may feel for 
the achievements of our heroic navy, it would be foolish 
to close our eyes to the fact that the gigantic superiority 
of the English fleet cannot be equalised by means of 
Zeppelins and submarines — of which latter, be it ob- 
served, England possesses a greater number than we 
do (in 19 12, 85, to which must be added 90 French). 
And in all this we have to bear in mind the fact that 
the English fleet would be the assailant; the German 
fleet would be the fleet assailed, in so far as it man- 
aged to press forward to the Channel. The German 
fleet would, however, have to protect not only itself, 
but also clumsy cargo-boats, incapable of self-defence, 
on which there would have to be transported to England 
a number of army corps, with the appropriate light and 
heavy artillery, cavalry, trains, pioneer troops, automo- 



GERMANY AWAKE! 27 

biles, and air-craft material. Is such an attempt at 
all conceivable? Is it possible that there are human 
beings who are prepared to expose to destruction at a 
blow, on such a scale as this, hundreds of thousands of 
their fellow men, 



It should be enough for us to have those mountains of 
corpses and of mutilated bodies which to-day already 
cover the battle-fields of Europe, Asia and Africa, and 
which for centuries, in virtue of their fertilising proper- 
ties, will be an advantage to agriculture. Must even 
the bottom of the sea also be covered with human 
bodies ? Are the thousands of brave mariners, who have 
already found death in a watery grave, not sufficient? 
Must whole army-corps at one stroke be swallowed up 
in the waves? 

And even assuming that we were on the other side, 
would the war then in any sense be won, would England 
thereby be defeated? Will the English nation allow 
terms of peace to be dictated to them by the Germans 
in London, as one can daily hear from every babbler 
and every seer of visions in Germany? Will the English 
colonies then fall into our possession? Nothing of the 
sort will happen. I should like to see how Canada, 
India, Australia, and New Zealand would acclaim the 
German conqueror, who, as the Chancellor has so beauti- 
fully expressed it to an American journalist, is des- 
tined to bring freedom to the world. Charity begins 
at home. He who imposes bondage in his own house 
cannot bring freedom to the world. What country 



28 I ACCUSE! 

politically is so undeveloped and so gagged as Prussian 
Germany, if we except Russia and our illustrious ally 
Austria-Hungary? What country has as little under- 
standing as Germany of the art of assimilating to itself 
foreign nationalities, of allowing them to live according 
to their own habits and customs, according to their own 
culture and language, of making them happy and there- 
fore making them faithful? Our policy towards the 
Poles and the Danes, and towards Alsace-Lorraine, 
speaks volumes on this point. All opposition to this 
species of Germanisation has exhausted itself without 
fruitful result. Zabern is the illuminating zenith of this 
policy in the West. The Polish laws with their compul- 
sory expropriation of land possessed by inheritance, 
laws which have uselessly cost us hundreds of millions 
of marks, and which have only produced the opposite 
effect of that intended, will remain a perpetual memorial 
of this policy in the East. In the North against Den- 
mark things are no better. At present, of course, in 
the necessity of war, this vexatious policy is being miti- 
gated. The Poles have now suddenly become the good 
child of the family. If formerly they protested that 
they had no sympathy with efforts hostile to Prussia, 
and that they were only urged to join the opposition 
in defence of their speech and of their nationality, their 
protests were constantly answered by new coercionary 
measures, and by an extension of the Polish laws. Since 
there cannot be a Parliamentary opposition in the mis- 
erable Junker-Parliament of Prussia, all warnings of 
the left wing were constantly scattered to the wind, and 
a courageous advance was made along the false and 
the costly path of Germanisation. 

And is it supposed that this Germany, conducted on 
Prussian principles, is endowed with the gifts neces- 
sary to assume England's position as a world-power, the 
position of England which owes its world-power not 



GERMANY AWAKE! 29 

merely to the cold pursuit of her interests in the course 
of the centuries, but above all to her genius in under- 
standing how to link foreign nations to her world em- 
pire, without oppressing them, without even wishing 
to assimilate them? 

The English language does not know the word "An- 
glicisation," because the- idea is absent in English poli- 
tics, as indeed language, at least in politics, ever halts 
behind the "thing," and only gives expression to what 
already is. Here the saying of Goethe does not hold : 

For where the understanding falters 
A word steps in to take its place. 1 

In politics the reverse is the case. The word is dis- 
covered, when the idea exists. The word culture-strug- 
gle (Kulturkampf) arose only when this struggle had 
already broken out. 

And so the English colonies will fly to us and hail us 
as liberators, should we ever succeed in penetrating to 
England? Far from it. They also will defend them- 
selves to the last ship and the last man, before they 
give up English freedom and independence, and sur- 
render to German bondage and oppression. 

THE SITUATION IN FRANCE 

So far as can be foreseen, the war in France also will 
lead to no result which could be regarded as a victory 
for Germany. A war of offence which ends in the 
trenches has in advance failed in its purpose — in trenches 
whose amenities have been enjoyed by our brave troops 
for more than five months, in wind and weather, in rain 

and in snow, in a monotony destructive of the body and 
■ 

*Denn eben wo Begriffe fehlen, 
Da stellt ein Wort zur rechten Zeit sich dm. 



30 I ACCUSE! 

of the soul, a monotony however agreeably interrupted 
from time to time by bombs, shells, and airmen's darts. 
On the eastern frontier of France the line of fortifi- 
cations Verdun, Toul, Nancy, Epinal, and Belfort still 
stands almost unshaken, so little affected by the be- 
sieging German armies that the French ministers and 
the President can undertake continuous tours of in- 
spection from one fortress to the other. Fortunately 
for a long time nothing has been heard of the victor of 
Longwy, the "heroic son," as the Emperor Francis Jo- 
seph called him in his telegram to the Emperor William. 
The famous saying of Count Haseler, passed from mouth 
to mouth in Berlin, that he intended to breakfast on 
Sedan day in the Cafe de la Paix in the Place de l'Opera 
has not proved true. Perhaps the Field Marshal has 
postponed his breakfast until next Sedan day, unless in- 
deed, as I fear, he has had to postpone it ad calendas 
teutonicas. The French Government and the entire dip- 
lomatic circle are back again in Paris, and it does not 
look as if they had any intention of making a speedy 
return to Bordeaux. As every honest observer of the 
situation must admit, the war with France has come 
to a standstill, and here, if anywhere, a standstill 
amounts to a withdrawal. 

The plans of our General Staff, weighed and matured 
for years in advance, contained as the cardinal point of 
the long-intended European war the rapid overthrow of 
France, followed by a violent attack on the Russian 
Colossus, with our liberated forces united with those of 
Austria. Providence — almost involuntarily one falls into 
the jargon of the German despatch — providence has 
ruled otherwise. After seven months of fearful conflict 
France is not overthrown. Our victorious career has 
been unexpectedly checked by the brilliant strategy of 
Joffre, the French Moltke — (the uncle, be it observed, 
not the nephew, who at present is being medically 



GERMANY AWAKE! 31 

treated at Homburg for biliousness) — and our conquer- 
ing army has been forced to a fortification war in the 
trenches. The fluctuations of this fortification war, 
which for the most part oscillate over advances or with- 
drawals of kilometres or half -kilometres, are so insig- 
nificant that a decisive turn of events is scarcely to be 
expected, unless our leaders resolve to throw aside every 
consideration for human life, unless they call our brave 
German soldiers from the trenches and expose them in 
frontal attacks to the devastating fire of the hostile 
rifles, machine-guns, and artillery. In a few places this 
has already happened, 1 and to judge from the views 
and sentiments of those in our leading circles (has not 
the telegram of the German Crown Prince to Colonel 
Reuter, so full of wit and taste, "hammer away," be- 
come the catchword and the watchword of the nation 
of poets and thinkers?) the generals will soon lose all 
patience 



And if these further incalculable hecatombs in human 
blood and human happiness are sacrificed, shall we then 
have gained the victory? In no way. Even if we should 
succeed with all these sacrifices in making a consider- 

x Just before this book went to press I read the official report 
of the General Staff of January 15th, 1915, in which it is pointed 
out with pride that in the battles around Soissons from 4,000 to 
5,000 French bodies had been found on the field of battle. And 
how many German bodies were there? And how many wounded 
on both sides? The Germans as the attacking party will certainly 
have suffered as severely as the defenders. So altogether there 
would be 10,000 dead. To this, as experience has shown, there 
must be added at least three times as many wounded. There 
would thus be 40,000 soldiers sacrificed in one battle! 



32 I ACCUSE! 

able advance, we shall only have gained what in the 
war of 1870 we had achieved in four weeks. Without 
doubt the French have made use of the five months' 
standstill to increase still more the strength of their 
fortifications and their possible lines of retreat. Con- 
stant reinforcements of English and French Colonial 
troops, of which the end cannot be foreseen, fill up the 
gaps and increase the number of the troops in the field. 
With every week which passes in the indecisive trench 
warfare, the difficulties of our victorious advance are 
increased. Even in the Boer war the English showed 
how many troops they could raise in the event of war, 
in spite of their small standing army. Then they carried 
out the long-distance transport of troops to South 
Africa ; to-day they have only to cross the narrow Chan- 
nel. Our opponents continue to increase, and to-day we 
have with luck already got as far as the second levy of 
the Landsturm. 

PARTIE REMISE 

How is it to end? In the most favourable circum- 
stances as par tie remise, — with a conclusion of hostili- 
ties which for both sides will mean a complete exhaus- 
tion in men and in wealth, but which will mean for 
neither side a victory. 

According to my sure and earnest conviction that is 
the most favourable result which Germany can still ex- 
pect. The possibility of an issue which could more or 
less be designated as a victory, I regard as wholly ex- 
cluded. And the longer the war lasts the less chance 
will there be of this relatively favourable issue, the 
greater will be the probability of a development, which 
if not a decisive defeat of Germany, would yet represent 
an overwhelming exhaustion of her resources in com- 
parison with those of her opponents, and which would 
therefore inevitably lead to the conditions of peace being 



GERMANY AWAKE! 33 

framed on less favourable lines than would now be 
granted. 

Austria has already reached the limits of her strength. 
In the case of Germany it is not yet possible to speak 
of any decisive weakening. We still stand erect; we 
can still offer everywhere a bold forehead to the enemy. 
Our resources in men and in money are not yet ex- 
hausted. But this condition of "not yet" cannot now 
endure for long. It is foolish to pursue an ostrich 
policy. No matter how dexterously, following the 
watchword that has been issued, we hide our head in 
the sand, the enemy still sees the weaknesses which 
shake the body of our people, they still see the seeds 
of that malady which must lead to our destruction. 

We can still ask for an honourable peace. If we 
from our side freely ask it we will atone for a small part 
of the wrong which we have committed by conjuring 
up this world catastrophe, the wrong which has drawn 
upon us the hatred and the loathing of the whole civ- 
ilised world, not of our enemies merely, but also of 
neutral nations. 

The Question of Guilt 

That we have forfeited the sympathies of the world is 
not due to malevolence, envy, and lies; our own actions 
must bear the responsibility for this. Foreign countries, 
and above all those which are neutral, know better than 
the German nation the development of events, they know 
who bears the guilt of the world catastrophe. Foreign 
neutral countries know well enough our political con- 
ditions. They know that under a mask of constitution- 
alism we are in fact ruled absolutely. Recently they 
observed how an Imperial Chancellor of Germany, 
against whom Parliament by a three-fifths majority 
passed a vote expressive of its lack of confidence, could 



34 I ACCUSE! 

yet continue to hold office unshaken, secure in the sup- 
port of the Court and the military circles, — an occur- 
rence which, apart from Russia, is no longer possible in 
any other civilised country. They know that the Prus- 
sian people are politically without rights, and that they 
are governed by a small clique of Junkers who have 
taken in fee all the high offices in the Government and 
in the army. 

Above all neutral countries know — and now I come 
to the cardinal points in what I have to say — 

that the plans and the preparations for this war have 
long been made by Germany and Austria not only from 
a military but also from a political point of view; 

that for long it had been resolved to represent this 
offensive war to the German people as a war of libera*- 
Hon, because it was known that only thus could the 
necessary popular enthusiasm be awakened; 

that the object of this war is an attempt to establish 
a hegemony on the continent and, as a later sequel, the 
acquisition of England's position of power in the world 
according to the principle <e 6te-toi de la que je m'y 
mette" 

For these facts and endeavours there is in existence 
evidence of so convincing a character written by our- 
selves in the German language, that it is a task as in- 
fatuated as it is hopeless to try to combat the convic- 
tion of the whole world by the untenable publications of 
those who take it upon themselves to "enlighten" the 
world about Germany. 



II 

HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 

our imperialists: BERNHARDI AND CO. 

The writings of Bernhardi, Germany and the Next War, 
of Frobenius, The German Empire's Hour of Destiny, 
the books of Treitschke, German History and Politics, 
are as well known abroad as in Germany, and they have 
in part been translated into foreign languages. The im- 
perialistic tendencies of a political clique have never been 
more distinctly expressed than in these writings, and, 
in the view of their originators, justified. 

A few quotations from Bernhardi may suffice. This 
man is a Prussian Cavalry General, and, if I am not mis- 
taken, has been entrusted with a command in the East, 
and he has already been decorated with the Iron Cross 
of the First Class. That he is competent and authorised 
to give expression to the views of authoritative German 
circles can scarcely be disputed. 

On page 255 of his book we find 1 : 

"The Government will never be able to count upon a well- 
armed and self-sacrificing people in the hour of danger or 
necessity, if it calmly looks on while the war-like spirit is 
being systematically undermined by the Press and a feeble 
peace policy preached, still less if it allows its own organs to 
join in with the same note, and continually to emphasise the 
maintenance of peace as the object of all policy. It must 
rather do everything to foster a military spirit, and to make 
the nation comprehend the duties and aims of an imperial 
policy. 

1 [References are to the English translation (popular edition). 
Edward Arnold, London.] 

35 



36 I ACCUSE! 

"It must continually point to the significance and the 
necessity of war as an indispensable agent in policy and 
civilisation together with the duty of self-sacrifice and de- 
votion to State and country." 

Page 257 : 

"The soul of our nation is not reflected in that part of 
the Press with its continual dwelling on the necessity of up- 
holding peace, and its denunciation of any bold and com-- 
prehensive political measure as a policy of recklessness. 

"On the contrary, an intense longing for a foremost place 
among the Powers and for manly action fills our nation. 
Every vigorous utterance, every bold political step of the 
Government, finds in the soul of the people a deeply felt 
echo, and loosens the bonds which fetter all their forces. 
In a great part of the national Press this feeling has again 
and again found noble expression. But the statesman who 
could satisfy this yearning, which slumbers in the heart 
of our people undisturbed by the clamour of parties and 
the party Press, would carry all spirits with him." 

Page 258: 

"Such a policy {i.e., a military policy) is also the best 
school in which to educate a nation to great military achieve- 
ments. When their spirits are turned towards high aims 
they feel themselves compelled to contemplate war bravely, 
and to prepare their minds to it: 

" 'The man grows up, with manhood's nobler aims.' "... 

. . . "We Germans have a far greater and more urgent 
duty towards civilisation to perform than the Greek Asiatic 
Power. We, like the Japanese, can only fulfil it by the 
sword. 

"Shall we, then, decline to adopt a bold and active policy, 
the most effective means with which we can prepare our 
people for its military duty?" 

On page 275 : 

"A successful policy, therefore, cannot be followed with- 
out taking chances and facing risks. It must be conscious 



HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 37 

of its goal, and keep this goal steadily in view. It must 
press every change of circumstances and all unforeseen 
occurrences into the service of its own ideas. Above all 
things, it must be ready to seize the psychological moment, 
and take bold action if the general position of affairs indi- 
cates the possibility of realising political ambitions or of 
waging a necessary war under favourable conditions." 

Pages 275-6 : 

" 'Old Fritz' must be our model in this respect {i.e., in 
disregarding historical rights), and must teach us with re- 
morseless realism so to guide our policy that the position of 
the political world may be favourable for us, and that we do 
not miss the golden opportunity. 

"It is an abuse of language if our unenterprising age tries 
to stigmatise that energetic policy which pursued positive 
aims as an adventurist policy." 

On page 2JJ the author points out that the military 
and political preparation for war must go hand in hand 
in order to make it possible to strike at the moment 
which from the military point of view is the most un- 
favourable. 

"The obligation imposed on the General to stand aloof 
from politics in peace as well as in war only holds good in a 
limited sense. The War Minister and the Head of the 
General Staff must be kept au courant with the all-fluctu- 
ating phases of policy ; indeed, they must be allowed a cer- 
tain influence over policy, in order to adapt their measures 
to its needs, and are entitled to call upon the statesman to 
act if the military situation is peculiarly favourable." 

Page 280 : 

"The disadvantages of such a situation (i.e., the war on 
two fronts) can only be avoided by a policy which makes it 
feasible to act on the offensive, and, if possible, to overthrow 
the one antagonist before the other can actively interfere. 



38 I ACCUSE! 

On this initiative our safety now depends just as it did in the 
days of Frederick the Great. We must look this truth 
boldly in the face." 

On the same page our diplomacy is entrusted with 
the task of so "shuffling the cards that we may be at- 
tacked by France." The author then continues : 

"This view undoubtedly deserves attention, but we must 
not hope to bring about this attack by waiting passively. 
Neither France nor Russia nor England need to attack in 
order to further their interests. So long as we shrink from 
attack they can force us to submit to their will by diplomacy, 
as the upshot of the Morocco negotiations shows, and as the 
issue of the Balkan crisis will probably also demonstrate. 

"If we wish to bring about an attack by our opponents, 
we must initiate an active policy, which, without attacking 
France, will so prejudice her interests or those of England, 
that both these States would feel themselves compelled to 
attack us. Opportunities for such procedure are offered 
both in Africa and in Europe." 

That is plain enough, is it not? Not only the ten- 
dencies of German policy are revealed without any dis- 
guise, but the manner in which these tendencies are to 
be realised is prescribed with the minutest detail. The 
Chancellor, it must be admitted, has been an apt pupil 
of the General and has fulfilled in a masterly fashion 
his task of so shuffling the cards that out of the offen- 
sive war there has been created a war of liberation. At 
least that is how it appears in the eyes of the simple 
Michael, 1 for the rest of the world has long ago seen 
through the gigantic fraud. 

But let us hear further how Mr. Bernhardi chatters 
out of school. 

TMichael, a name commonly given to the German people, some- 
what analogous to John Bull. The chief features of the German 
Michael are simplicity and honesty, amounting almost to stupidity.] 



HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 89 

Page 286: 

"The worst result of our Morocco policy is, however, un- 
doubtedly the deep rift which has been formed in conse- 
quence between the Government and the mass of the na- 
tionalist party, the loss of confidence among large sections 
of the nations, extending even to classes of society which, in 
spite of their regular opposition to the Government, had 
heartily supported it as the representative of the Empire 
abroad. In this weakening of public confidence, which is 
undisguisedly shown both in the Press and in the Reichstag, 
lies in my opinion the great disadvantage of the Franco- 
German understanding." 

Bernhardi would naturally have preferred that we 
should even have allowed a European war to break out 
on account of the Morocco dispute, but he consoles 
himself with the thought that all chances are not yet 
past. 

Page 285 : 

"We need not, therefore, regard this convention as defin- 
itive. It is as liable to revision as the Algeciras treaty, and 
indeed offers, in this respect, the advantage that it creates 
new opportunities of friction with France" 

That is the Record: an International treaty which 
has prevented a world-war, meets with the conditional 
approval of the author, only because it offers new sources 
of friction, and so, it may be hoped, will soon lead to 
the world-war which he desires. 

Particularly instructive is his discussion of our rela- 
tions to England and of the negotiations then being 
conducted in Berlin by Lord Haldane. These negotia- 
tions along with the previous and subsequent English 
proposals with a view to arriving at a political and 
naval understanding with Germany deserve a special 
chapter, in which it will be clearly shown that England 



40 I ACCUSE! 

constantly and in the most earnest manner took the in- 
itiative in these negotiations, but that these were al- 
ways wrecked on the refusal of Germany or on the 
impossible conditions which she sought to impose. Per- 
haps on this point also they were following the pre- 
scription of Bernhardi, which runs: 

Page 287 : 

"Even English attempts at a rapprochement must not 
blind us as to the real situation. We may at most use them 
to delay the necessary inevitable war, until we may fairly 
imagine we have some prospect of success." 

In the concluding apostrophe of his book the author 
emphatically exclaims : 

Pages 287-8 : 

"If the Imperial Government was of the opinion that it 
was necessary in the present circumstances to avoid war, 
still the situation in the world generally shows there can 
only be a short respite, before we once more face the ques- 
tion whether we will draw the sword for our position in 
the world or renounce such position once and for all. We 
must not in any case wait. . . . The political situation of- 
fers many points on which to rest our lever. England, too, 
is in a most difficult position. . . . The disturbances in the 
Far East will probably fetter Russia's forces, and Eng- 
land's interests will suffer in sympathy. These are all con- 
ditions which an energetic and far-sighted German policy 
can utilise in order to influence the general political situa- 
tion in the interests of our Fatherland. 

"If people and Government stand together, resolved to 
guard the honour of Germany and make every sacrifice of 
blood and treasure to insure the future of our country and 
our State ... we need not fear to fight for our position in 
the world, but we may, with Ernst Moritz Arndt, raise our 
hands to heaven and cry to God: 



HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 41 

'From the height of the starry sky- 
May thy ringing sword flash bright; 
Let every craven cry 
Be silenced by thy might !' " 

In conclusion I should further like merely to draw- 
attention to the headings of the chapters of Bernhardi's 
book, which afford so clear an insight into the tendencies 
of the author, that it might appear almost superfluous 
to read his work. 

Chapter I. The right to make war. 

Chapter 2. The duty to make war. 

Chapter 3. A brief survey of Germany's historical 
development. 

Chapter 4. Germany's historical mission. 

Chapter 5. World power or downfall. 

Chapter 6. The character of our next war. 

Chapter 7. The next naval war, &c. 

I wish once more in as emphatic a manner as possible 
to draw attention to the fact that Bernhardi expressly 
excludes an offensive war on the part of the Triple En- 
tente, and he indicates that the only method of arriv- 
ing at the desired world-war, and at the same time at 
world-dominion, is that Germany must act as an agent 
provocateur and must so shuffle the cards that the other 
side will be compelled to attack. 

This of course does not prevent Bernhardi and his 
comrades in the faith, especially Frobenius, from speak- 
ing elsewhere of the aggressive intentions of the Triple 
Entente, and from depicting the dangers to which Ger- 
many is exposed, unless she anticipates these intentions. 

HAVE WE BEEN ATTACKED OR WERE WE GOING TO BE 
ATTACKED ? 

This is the same logic as we hear to-day in every 
corner of Germany, if indeed what is heard in Germany 



42 I ACCUSE! 

can still be designated as logic. The official version 
states that the Triple Entente has attacked us. "We 
have to protect our holiest possessions, the Fatherland 
and our own hearths against a sudden ruthless attack." 
(The appeal of the Emperor on the 6th August to the 
German army. "The sword must then decide. In the 
midst of peace the enemy falls upon us, therefore to 
arms! Every hesitation, every delay, would be treach- 
ery to the Fatherland. The existence of our empire 
is at stake — the existence of German power and German 
character." 

Such is the official version which crops up in a thou- 
sand various forms from the Chancellor down to the 
last street-sweeper. 

Semi-officially however and in the confidence of 
secrecy many Germans can be heard asserting that we 
were not, it is true, attacked, but that we would have 
been attacked later, if we had not now begun the war 
at a moment favourable for us. Should we then ask 
for evidence in support of this hypothesis, most of 
those who maintain this view have nothing to say, or 
else they declare that the intention of the enemy to 
attack us was so obvious that any proof would be 
superfluous. "What did they mean by their enormous 
preparations?" is what they most frequently say. And 
what about our preparations? I reply, which were 
certainly greater and more comprehensive than in any 
other country in the world. Did ever any country in 
time of peace act as we did in 19 13 when we suddenly 
raised the strength of our army on a peace footing by 
140,000 men, that is to say, from 720,000 to 860,000, 
and when we rose to an extraordinary war tax of 
£50,000,000? "What was the meaning of the Entente, 
the celebrated policy of 'encirclement' (Einkreisung) , 
if they did not mean to attack us?" is what they next 
**ay. And what, I reply, was the meaning of the Triple 



HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 43 

Alliance which involved even stricter obligations than 
the Entente, and in spite of this, according to our as- 
sertions, was defensive in its nature? "Yes, but think 
of the Pan-Slavs !" is urged as an objection against me. 
And what about the Pan-Germans? I venture to an- 
swer. Are our "Alldeutschen," our national party, our 
Pan-Germans of the school of Treitschke and Bernhardi, 
in any way better or less aggressive than the Pan-Slavs ? 
Such "Pan-tendencies" are to be found in all coun- 
tries. They are harmless, so long as they do not ad- 
vance to action. The decisive act was however taken 
by our Pan-Germans, when they drove us into this 
horrible war — a war desired and openly proclaimed by 
them. 

The Head of the War Party 

And they had and still have friends and patrons in 
high places. They have gradually acquired more influ- 
ence in our authoritative circles than ever the Pan-Slavs 
exercised at the Russian court. I need not mention by 
name the person who for years has been the influential 
head and the battering-ram of this movement against 
the originally peace-loving mind of the Emperor. Every- 
one knows to whom I refer. The Zabern telegram,' 
the message of farewell to the Danzig Hussars, the open 
demonstration from the tribune of the Reichstag against 
our Morocco policy, which was at the time still peaceful 
in intention — these and countless other occurrences and 
suggestions leave not the slightest room for doubt as to 
the quarter and the camp from which the inciters to 
war have discharged their destructive missiles over Ger- 
many. One has but to wander along the streets of Ber- 
lin to see in all bookshops the work of Frobenius en- 
titled The German Empire's Hour of Destiny, with the 
commendatory telegram of the exalted gentleman on 
the outside. In his recommendation he expresses the 



44 I ACCUSE! 

desire that this "distinguished book" which he has "read 
with the greatest interest" will find the widest circula- 
tion among the German people. And this Frobenius is 
a comrade in thought of Bernhardi, and the whole pur- 
port of his book is that we should strike before it is 
too late ; since the others mean to attack us, we must 
anticipate them and attack them. Of course no proof, 
not the shadow of a proof, is advanced in support of 
this premise, which in reality is but a pretext, and which 
is denied by Bernhardi himself in the passage quoted 
above (page 280). 

But that does not inconvenience these great minds; 
they do not recognise the defects of their logic. They 
do not see that of the two assertions only one can be 
true. Either we have been attacked, in which case we 
are conducting a defensive war, or else we were going to 
be attacked, and in that case we are conducting a pre- 
ventive war. If the second statement is true the first 
must be untrue; and in that case all official utterances 
from the Imperial speech from the Palace on the 31st 
July down to the speech of the Chancellor on the 2nd 
December are branded as lies. 

If the assertion that it is a defensive war is true, the 
idea of a preventive war is at once put completely aside, 
and it is superfluous to discuss further whether the 
presuppositions of a preventive war in fact existed, or 
whether such a preventive war politically and morally 
can be defended. Bismarck, who after all knew some- 
thing about politics, emphatically answered this latter 
question in the negative, in stating that "even victori- 
ous wars cannot be justified unless they are forced upon 
one, and that one cannot see the cards of Providence 
far enough ahead to anticipate historical development 
according to one's own calculation." * 

1 Bismarck Gedanken und Erinnerungen [Vol. II. p. 102 of the 
English translation. Smith, Elder and Co.] 



HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 45 

This dictum of the great man of the past appears to 
have fallen into oblivion. While monument after monu- 
ment has been erected to his memory, this sentence might 
have been inscribed in brass and in marble in the walls 
of the palaces of kings and of governments in places 
where it would at all times have been visible; then per- 
haps the German people and the world might have been 
spared this most terrible of evils. Bismarck also after 
1870 was repeatedly urged by Generals and by the in- 
stigators of war to undertake a new campaign against 
France in order to crush once for all and to make harm- 
less for all time the country that was again raising its 
head. All such efforts he constantly rejected with un- 
yielding energy, and the idea of initiating a war because 
it must come sooner or later, he declared to be "criminal" 
and "insane." 

The saying is apposite, and those whom it fits will not 
be able to escape its application. 

The Imperial War 
the place in the sun 

It will be obvious from all that I have so far said 
that I regard the present war neither as a defensive nor 
as a preventive war. This war is purely a war of con- 
quest, born of imperialist ideas and serving imperialist 
ends. It is nothing else. 

It is a war for the celebrated "Place in the sun'' 
which it is supposed is being refused us, and which we 
must take forcibly with the sword in our hand. 

What is the meaning of the "Place in the sun"? No 
one says clearly what it is, and everyone understands 
the phrase in a different sense. 

The idea is so alien to the people that it may be pre- 
sumed that they would not have allowed themselves to 



46 I ACCUSE! 

have been sacrificed, if it had been said to them : "You 
must gain for us a place in the sun." 

For the initiated however it is the magic spell which 
unites their imperialistic desires. "Only thus relying on 
the sword, can we gain the place in the sun, which is our 
due, but which is not voluntarily accorded to us" (Crown 
Prince Wilhelm). With this inscription, and with the 
motto "pro patria et gloria," the photograph of the 
German Crown Prince is sold in German bookshops. 

THE CHOSEN PEOPLE 

The place in the sun is the world-power which is due 
to us, as to the chosen people of God. From the point 
of view of the psychology of the nation it is remark- 
able how the old Jewish idea has mastered the good, 
Christian, Protestant, anti-semitic Empire, and how it 
has ousted the true teaching of Christ, that all men art 
brothers. 

We change our religious ideas, like our uniforms, 
according to our needs and our circumstances. 



The God, whom in war we invoke every day, whom 
we entreat to grant that we may destroy as many of the 
enemy as possible, and to whom we give thanks when 
he fulfils our prayers is the old Jewish God, Jehovah, 
the God of battles and of vengeance, to whom no sacri- 
fice appears too great, if it is to serve the power and 
the dominion of his chosen people. The Christian God, 
however, and his "only-begotten Son," who wandered 
about on earth preaching love and sacrifice, whose king- 
dom is not of this world — they have nothing to do with 
this shedding of blood, which is entirely contradictory 
to the doctrine they taught. 



HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 47 

The observations of Kant in his essay on Everlasting 
Peace are entirely in the spirit of the Christian religion. 

"On the conclusion of peace at the end of the war it 
might not be unseemly for a nation to appoint a day of 
humiliation, after the festival of thanksgiving, on which 
to invoke the mercy of Heaven for the terrible sin which 
the human race are guilty of, in their continued unwilling- 
ness to submit (in their relations with other States) to a 
law-governed constitution, preferring rather in the pride 
of their independence to use the barbarous method of war, 
which after all does not really settle what is wanted, namely, 
the right of each State in a quarrel. The feasts of thanks- 
giving during a war for a victorious battle, the hymns which 
are sung — to use the Jewish expression — 'to the Lord of 
Hosts,' are not in less strong contrast to the ethical idea of 
a father of mankind ; for, apart from the indifference these 
customs show to the way in which nations seek to establish 
their rights — sad enough as it is — these rejoicings bring in 
an element of exultation that a great number of lives, or at 
least the happiness of many, has been destroyed." 1 

That is true Christianity, and at the same time it is 
the true crown of German culture. Those same people, 
however, who profess that they are drawing the sword 
on behalf of this culture trample its finest products in 
the dust, and rattle over it with their cannons. 

If it were known in certain places in Germany how 
educated men and religious people throughout the whole 
world judge these continual blasphemous appeals to God, 



1 [Perpetual Peace. English translation by Miss Campbell Smith 
(George Allen and Unwin), p. 136-7. Later references to Kant's 
essay are also adapted to this edition.] 



48 I ACCUSE! 



Luigi Luzzatti, one of the most distinguished politi- 
cians and most important thinkers in Italy, who, as is 
well known, has more than once been Prime Minister 
(be it observed a strict Jew — this I mention as an ex- 
ample to Germany whose mission is to "bring free- 
dom," although in time of peace it does not go so far 
as to promote a Jew to be a Second Lieutenant), Luigi 
Luzzatti has recently published in the Corner e delta 
Sera a remarkable article bearing the title "The abuse 
of the name of God," from which I quote some sen- 
tences : 

"From the day on which this fearful war broke out 
Princes (not the people, it must be said) have bored every- 
one by the use and abuse of the name of God. In the tele- 
grams which were recently exchanged between the Austrian 
Emperor and the Sultan the Almighty makes his appear- 
ance. The matter would take on an ironical tinge if up in 
Heaven the conquerors and the defeated of Lepanto and the 
soul of John Sobieski were to hear of it. One could have 
wished that at least on this occasion they might have felt 
enough shame to induce them to leave heaven in peace out 
of the question ! . . . Fortunately God has not yet appeared 



HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 49 

in the telegrams exchanged between the monarchs of Eng- 
land and Japan. And indeed it would have been a difficult 
matter to reconcile in the same fearful uproar of war Jesus 
and Buddha, a religion without God and a religion which 
rests on a personal God and Saviour. We are reminded 
of a bitterly ironical saying of Voltaire, who observed 
'Since God created man in his own image, how often has 
man endeavoured to render a similar service to God.' . . . 
Let us save God from such profanation ! Let us leave in 
peace the Father of all mankind who punishes guilt and re- 
wards virtue, and who gives no one the right to represent 
Him on earth, and to claim for himself His omnipotence 
in this tragedy of war." 

Such is the judgment of serious men abroad on certain 
German peculiarities and on the presumption of Ger- 
many to be the chosen people of God. 

The place in the sun which is due to us as the chosen 
people, thus represents the true object of this war, even 
if it is not admitted to the nation that this is the object. 

Germany's brilliant development 

If anyone seeks a place in the sun, and seeks it sword 
in hand, it must be assumed that hitherto he has stood 
in the shadow. Is this so in the case of Germany? I 
maintain that the opposite is the case, and in support 
of this assertion I rely on those very people, who have 
pressed the sword into our hand to enable us to seek 
a place in the sun. In the chapter entitled "Financial 
and Political Preparation for War" (p. 260 et seq.) 
Bernhardi gives a comprehensive view of the brilliant 
and unprecedented economic development of Germany 
since the Franco-Prussian war. He points out, and 
supports his assertion freely with statistics, that the 
increase of wealth continues on an ascending scale, and 
that the advance in trade and industry since the found a- 



50 I ACCUSE! 

tion of the Empire has been extraordinary. He quotes 
a lecture delivered by Professor Dade before a general 
meeting of the Finance and Tax-Reformers held on the 
22nd February, 19 10, from which we gather that the 
value of German imports and exports in the last years 
before 19 10 had increased from 300 million pounds 
sterling to between 725 million pounds and 800 million 
pounds. In 19 12 German imports and exports reached 
a value of approximately 1,200 million pounds sterling. 
The value of the import of raw material for industrial 
purposes rose from 75 million pounds in 1879 to 225 
million pounds; the import of manufactured goods rose 
from 30 million pounds in 1879 to 62^2 million pounds 
in 1908, and the export of manufactured goods during 
the same period rose from 50 million pounds to over 
200 million. The amount of coal raised in 1879 was 
only 42 million tons ; in 1908 it was 148^ million tons, 
and the value of the coal raised increased from 5 mil- 
lion pounds to 75 millions. The production of iron 
ore rose from 6 million to 27 million tons, and in value 
it rose from £1,350,000 to £5,950,000. From 1888 to 
1908 the amount of coal raised in Germany increased 
by 127 per cent., as against only 59 per cent, in Eng- 
land. The production of pig iron in Germany in the 
twenty years mentioned above rose 172 per cent., as* 
against only 27 per cent, in England. Similar figures, 
according to Dade and Bernhardi, can be adduced in all 
other spheres. 

At the same time there took place a continued growth 
in revenue and a progressive capitalisation. From 1892 
to 1905 an increase in national wealth of about 100 mil- 
lion pounds sterling has taken place annually in Prussia 
alone. In the grades of the Property Tax ranging 
from £300 to £5,000 the number of those taxed and the 
number of properties on which taxes are paid has in- 
creased in these fourteen years by 29 per cent., whereas 



HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 51 

from 1905 to 1908 the increase was 11 per cent., that 
is to say, in the first period the yearly increase was 
2 per cent., but in recent years 3 per cent. 

An even greater increase has taken place in the case 
of the large fortunes. In the grades of the property 
tax ranging from £5,000 to £25,000 the increase in the 
numbers paying, and the properties on which payment 
is made has been about 44 per cent., that is, on an 
average of the fourteen years, 3 per cent, annually; in 
the last three years however it has been 4*6 per cent. 
The higher the grades of the tax, the greater is the 
increase; in the grades from £300 to £5,000 the in- 
crease per head of the population has been £32 
10s. ; in the grades from £5,000 to £25,000 there 
was an increase per head of £320, and in the grades 
above £25,000 there was an increase of £3,5223/2 per 
hear per year. 

Emphasis is further laid on the increase of wages, on 
the decrease of unemployment and of emigration as 
signs of our economic prosperity, and statistics are ad- 
duced in support of these contentions. In 1908 only 
20,000 emigrants left our country, whereas in the same 
year 336,000 persons emigrated from Great Britain. 
The investment of capital in State railways amounted 
at the end of March, 1908, in Prussia to £494,400,000 
and at the end of 191 1 to £552,500,000. 

This brilliant picture of our industrial development, 
which could be supported by a series of other figures, is 
naturally of use to General Bernhardi, only in so far as 
it enables him to represent as tolerable a further in- 
crease of military burdens. He forgets, however, that 
in thus demonstrating our continuous increase of na- 
tional wealth, and in particular in emphasising our in- 
creasing advantage over England, he cuts from under 
his own feet the ground on which there should be erected 
the edifice of his Imperialism. If we already have 



52 I ACCUSE! 

such a sunny corner in the sun, what is still lacking? 
What more do we want? 

If in many respects we, the most recent industrial 
State in the world, the growth of scarcely more than 
two generations, are already placing England, the old- 
est industrial State, in the shadow, we certainly cannot 
complain of any deficiency of sunshine. 

What about extension of territory? What about 
Colonies? Does the happiness of nations depend on the 
number of square miles which they possess, or does it 
depend on their Colonies? If that were the case, small 
countries like Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, Denmark, 
Sweden, and Norway would necessarily be poor in com- 
parison with Great States, whereas as a matter of fact 
the opposite is the case. The highest figures for im- 
ports and exports per head of the population are shown 
by Holland, followed by Belgium, Switzerland, and Den- 
mark, and then only after these the great Powers. The 
Belgian 3 per cents, stood at 96 when the German stood 
at 83 per cent. The Norwegian 3^ per cents, stood 
at 102, when the Russian could be had at 81. Similar 
figures may be adduced in every sphere of economic life. 
The greatness of a country, and in particular the extent 
of its Colonial possessions, has no relation to the pros- 
perity of a country. 

The best proof for this fact is found in Germany 
itself. No one, not even the most fanatical nationalist, 
will or can dispute the fact that the increase in pros- 
perity of Germany in the last forty years, and in par- 
ticular in the twenty-six years which have elapsed since 
the present Emperor ascended the throne, has been with- 
out precedent in the history of the world. On the oc- 
casion of the celebration of the twenty-fifth anniver- 
sary of the accession of William II. a compilation ap- 
peared under the title, Social Culture and the Well- 
being of the People during the first 25 Years of the 



HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 53 

Reign of William II. This work describes, and supports 
with statistics, the prosperity of Germany in all branches 
of human culture during this period. It is superfluous 
to reproduce here these well-known figures. Only a few 
need here be cited. The population has increased from 
forty-eight millions in 1888 to sixty-seven millions in 
19 14. The yearly increase due to births amounted in 
191 1 to n°3 per thousand inhabitants, and was only 
exceeded by Russia with 17 per thousand. The produc- 
tion of pig-iron (estimated in thousands of tons) rose 
from 4,024 in 1887 to 17,853 in 1912, that is to say, by 
343*6 per cent., whilst the production of Great Britain 
in the same time only increased by 17*6 per cent., namely, 
from 7,681 to 9,031. The production of America in 
pig-iron increased in the same time by 363*2 per cent., 
that is, from 6,520 to 30,203, and thus America still 
takes the first place in this field of production, while 
Germany has advanced from the third place in 1887 to 
the second place in 19 12, thereby outstripping England 
and attaining a percentage of increase twenty times as 
great. 

A development on exactly similar lines is shown in 
the production of steel, which (also estimated in thou- 
sands of tons) has risen from 1163*9 in 1887 to 17,302 
in 1912. Here also we have advanced from the third 
place to the second in the production of the world, and 
have considerably outstripped England, whose produc- 
tion has only increased from 3,196*8 in 1887 to 6,563*3 
in 191 1. Estimating the increase by percentages, Ger- 
many here takes the first place, and leaves far behind 
both of her competitors, America and England. The 
increase in percentage amounted in the twenty-five years 
mentioned in Germany to no less than 1,377 P er cent., 
in America 835 per cent., and in England only 105 
per cent. 

The net tonnage of our German mercantile fleet has 



54 I ACCUSE! 

increased from 1,240,182 in 1888 to 3,153,724 in 1913, 
and at the same time it is specially to be noted that the 
commercial value of the individual vessels has been 
enormously increased by the transformation from sail- 
ing ships into steamships. The net tonnage of steam- 
ships alone has almost increased six-fold in the period 
mentioned; it has risen from 470,364 in 1888 to 2,655,- 
496 in 1913. 

The increase of the national income and the national 
wealth correspond to the commercial and industrial de- 
velopment of Germany. Dr. Karl Helfferich, Director 
of the German Bank, 1 in his contribution to the compila- 
tion mentioned above, summarises his conclusions in 
the following words : 

"The German national income amounts to-day to 2,150 
million pounds annually as against from 1,150 to 1,250 mil- 
lion pounds in 1895. 

"Of these 2,150 millions about 350 millions, that is to say 
a bare sixth, are applied annually for public purposes ; from 
1,350 to 1,450 million pounds are used privately, and about 
400 to 425 millions, which may be raised by the automatic 
increase in value of wealth now in existence to 500 million 
pounds, grow as an increase of the wealth of the nation as 
against a sum of from 225 to 250 millions 15 years ago. 

"The wealth of the German people amounts to-day to 
more than 15,000 million pounds, as against about 10,000 
million pounds about the middle of the 'nineties of last 
century. 

"These solid figures summarise, expressed in money, the 
result of the enormous economic labour, which Germany 
has achieved under the government of our Emperor." 

That is the place in the sun which we occupy, which 
no one has disputed, can dispute, or means to dispute, a 
place in the sun for which we are indebted to the spirit 

1 Now Secretary of the Treasury. 



HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 55 

of enterprise, the pertinacity and the skilful methods of 
our merchants and our manufacturers, but not to the 
braggart company of our nationalists, and just as little 
to the sword of our Generals or the plans of campaign 
of our General Staff. 

It is exclusively the work of the German merchant 
and his motto "My field is the world," exclusively the 
result of the long-enduring condition of peace, which, 
to judge from the experience of the past, the longer it 
lasted would have more and more promoted the pros- 
perity of the German people. 

INCREASE OF POPULATION AND THE COLONIES 

The objection is advanced that it is indeed precisely 
the increase of the German people, the yearly accession 
to our population of about 800,000 souls, which neces- 
sarily demands such an extension of territory. Where, 
it is asked, are all these new people to find sustenance 
and a home? The objection is as insecurely founded 
as all the others. If Germany were too small to support 
its increasing population, the emigration statistics would 
show a constant rise. The opposite, however, is the case. 
The number of emigrants from 1881 to 1890 amounted 
yearly to 134,200, from 1891 to 1910 to only 52,800 
yearly, and in 19 12 only 18,500 people emigrated from 
Germany. 

On the other hand, the number of immigrants has 
increased. Whereas, formerly, immigrants were con- 
siderably fewer than emigrants, in the last fifteen years 
or so they have exceeded the latter so that the stream 
of emigration is on the point of flowing towards instead 
of away from Germany. 

From these figures it may be deduced that Germany, 
so far from not being in a position to give employment 
and nourishment to its increasing population, offers, on 



56 I ACCUSE! 

the contrary, increasing opportunities of employment 
and nourishment, not only for its own population, but 
also for those persons who stream to it from abroad. 
At the same time wages show a constant, although by 
no means a sufficient, rise. 

And this fabulous development took place at a time 
when other countries, and particularly France, were 
substantially extending their Colonial possessions, while 
our Colonial possessions remained limited to the few 
places in Africa, East Asia, and in the Pacific which 
could still be acquired by a Germany which arrived too 
late on the scene. What has the importance of these 
Colonies been in connection with our economic develop- 
ment in the last forty years? In this they have played 
no part, not the slightest. If we add together the sums 
which our Colonies have cost us directly and indirectly 
(in the indirect cost we must allow for the increase of 
the fleet abroad rendered necessary for their protection), 
and if on the other side we reckon the financial advan- 
tages obtained from these Colonies, we shall find as the 
result that we have made a miserable bargain. 

In this respect also Bismarck saw much further than 
his successors. He resolved on the first steps towards 
a colonial policy, only when subjected to strong pressure 
and almost against his will, and he constantly remained 
aware of the fact that this policy is one that cuts both 
ways; he realised that it would afford our enemies new 
points of attack, while furnishing us with no correspond- 
ing advantages. 

The present occurrences have proved the justice of his 
foresight. Our Colonies have delivered into our ene- 
mies' hands objects of exchange, which are indeed ma- 
terially of no value to us, but in our imagination, seeing 
that we have once possessed them, they have for us 
a certain worth, which our enemies will make us pay dear 
for on the conclusion of peace. 



HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 57 

Materially they have no value for us. Will anyone 
venture to assert that our economical prosperity (which 
I have supported with figures quoted above) would have 
been diminished by one iota if we had never possessed 
either South West or East Africa, Kiao-chau, or Samoa? 
The total white population of our Colonies amounted in 
191 3 to something over 27,000, that is to say, about 
3*5 per cent, of the annual increase of the population 
of Germany. Would there have arisen in our country 
any question of over-population or of a scarcity of food 
if these 27,000 people had remained in Germany? Would 
this increase, or rather this non-withdrawal, have ex- 
ercised the slightest effect on our economic life, on the 
life of 67 million people? 

Further, the entire commercial intercourse of Ger- 
many with her Colonies in imports and exports amounts 
to-day to something over £5,000,000. The total imports 
and exports of Germany in 19 12 amounted in round 
figures to £1,000,000,000. The trade with the Colonies 
thus amounts to 0*5 per cent, of our total foreign trade. 
If this 0*5 per cent, fell away, would Germany economi- 
cally so much as feel the effect? But indeed this per- 
centage would not fall away, if we did not possess these 
Colonies. If the Colonies need our products they would 
buy them just as much if they were not our possessions, 
but were either independent, or were subject to the rule 
of another people. We have indeed no monopoly of 
trade with our Colonies, but they belong to the territory 
of the German Empire, and are bound to the commercial 
treaties concluded by Germany. In spite of the fact 
that we possess our Colonies, we meet within them the 
competition of all industrial countries, regulated by com- 
mercial treaties; it follows that even if we were not the 
owners, they would still buy from us those of our wares 
which we could deliver better and at a cheaper rate than 
others could. 



58 I ACCUSE! 

Our True Colonies 

Our best customers are in fact precisely those conn- 
tries which we have never possessed, and which we never 
can possess: England, Russia, France, Italy, America, 
Brazil, the Argentine — these are our true Colonies ; these 
are the countries which, in the enormous developments 
of exchange in the modern world of trade, make us rich 
by the purchase of our manufactures, while we draw 
from them as an equivalent the raw material which we 
need, as well as manufactures of foreign origin. These 
are the countries which open to the German merchant 
inexhaustible fields of activity, where in free competition 
with the trading nations of the world he can spread 
his pinions and can make his efficiency felt. These are 
the gigantic sponges which absorb millions in the form 
of German produce transferred thither by German mer- 
chants settled abroad, and there distributed through all 
the industrial channels. Throughout the whole world 
huge German trading firms, either enjoying a position 
of independence or acting as the branches of the central 
house, may be seen flourishing and developing their 
strength in the struggle with English and American com- 
petition. That is the biological struggle for existence 
which to-day rules the world, not the armed struggle 
of barbaric times. That is the struggle that will always 
remain, the struggle of efficiency against inefficiency, the 
struggle of skill against stupidity, the struggle of en- 
durance against slackness, above all the struggle which 
in reality produces the flower of the higher modern type 
of humanity, the spiritually higher which on the firm 
basis of a wellbeing embracing all circles of the people 
can rise even to higher levels of morality and of culture. 

Those who speak for our imperialist party naturally 
know nothing of this struggle; for them the merchant 
will always remain a term of contempt, no matter how 



HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 59 

glad they may be to take home in marriage to their 
noble castles the daughters of wealthy merchants. The 
officers and the junkers still remain the highest caste 
in the country. They remain the props of the throne 
and of the altar, of discipline and of morals. They 
would not care a brass button if, as a consequence of 
their militant undertakings, all that the merchant has 
through long generations built up as a result of arduous 
daily labour should perish at a stroke. For them the 
economic prosperity of a country exists only in so far 
as it prepares the means for military undertakings : 
these are the true aims of national existence, and its 
prosperity is of use only in so far as it assists in the 
fulfilment of this end. 



WHAT ADVANTAGE HAS FRANCE DRAWN FROM HER 

COLONIES ? 
| 

Let us however come back to the question of colonies. 
We have seen that the lack of important colonies has 
not injured Germany ; it has not hindered our enormous 
boom of prosperity. What is the position in the case of 
France ? Has the acquisition of her North African 
Colonial Empire, of her East Asian possession, of Mada- 
gascar yielded her any profit or furnished her with any 
advantage over the German Empire? None whatever; 
the reverse is indeed the case. The economic develop- 
ment of France has in some branches remained at a 
complete standstill; on others it has shown a progress 
which is out of all proportion less than in the case of 
Germany. The entire foreign trade of France amounted 
in 19 1 2 to only 580 million pounds sterling, although 
her foreign possessions contain more than four times the 
superficial area of those of the German Empire. Her 
population of about forty millions has, as is well known, 
remained almost stationary. Above all we should ex- 



60 I ACCUSE! 

pect, according to the theory of our imperialists, that 
the establishment of a great Colonial Empire would 
result in an enormous increase in the mercantile navy. 
Nothing of all this has taken place. The tonnage of 
French commercial vessels has indeed fallen (expressed 
in thousands of tons) from 1,492 tons in 1885 to 1,462*6 
in 191 1, whereas in the same period, as shown above, 
the tonnage of German vessels has risen from 1,275*5 
to 3,023*7. 

The production of pig-iron which, as shown above, 
rose in Germany in twenty-five years by 3436 per cent., 
rose in France in the same period only 210*7 per cent. 
The production of steel in the same twenty-five years 
rose in Germany by 1,377 per cent, on 17,302 (estimated 
in thousands of tons), whereas the French production 
rose by only 727 per cent, on 4,078*4 (in thousands of 
tons). 

Similar figures can be adduced in nearly all branches 
of economic life. Where, then, I ask, is the advantage 
which France has drawn from her Colonial Empire? 
She would probably have done better if she had left 
the yellow and the black and the brown inhabitants of 
her Colonial possessions to themselves, and if she had 
kept in her own pocket the enormous expenditure in- 
volved in the military acquisition and the civil admin- 
istration of these wide territories. Above all, she would 
then have had no Morocco dispute, no Agadir incident, 
and in consequence no foaming of the imperialistic beast 
in Germany, and very probably no war to-day. After 
all, the dead Archduke has only had to wipe out the 
"discomfiture" of Agadir. 

The French people were instinctively right when they 
constantly moved their Colonial conquerors on a step and 
threw them into the lumber-room. So it happened to 
Jules Ferry the man of Tonkin, so it happened to Jo- 
seph Caillaux the man of Morocco. This is indeed a 



HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 61 

peculiar irony of history! The French drive away in 
disgrace those who have gained for them their Colonies, 
and in our country the national party spits out fire and 
destruction because France has snapped up these won- 
derful Colonies from under her nose. In this the French 
gentlemen have at least the excuse that they have ac- 
complished their extension of territory without drawing 
the sword in Europe (the modern man scarcely speaks 
of the lives of the natives), whereas we consider these 
same seductive corners of the world of sufficient value 
to pour out on their account oceans of the best blood 
of Europe and to pile up for their sake hecatombs of 
corpses. 

Truly, we may exclaim with Ulrich von Hutten, "It 
is a pleasure to be alive," or better still with Nunne in 
Ulk x : "Nowhere do things happen so funnily as in this 
world." 

THE GERMANS ABROAD: FRANCE, ENGLAND, AMERICA 

When on the occasion of the Agadir incident someone 
observed to a witty Parisian: "Have you heard that 
the Germans are at Agadir?" he replied quite coolly, 
"I don't care; they are in the heart of Paris, at the 
Champs Elysees ; that is what matters." 

And in fact, that is what matters. Not only in 
countries beyond the ocean, but above all even in Euro- 
pean countries, in those now neutral as well as in those 
which are now at war with us, everywhere the Ger- 
mans sat in the heart of trade and commerce 'until the 
outbreak of this fearful war — in Germany it is called the 
"Dawn of the Great Time." Everywhere they conducted 
important undertakings of their own, or represented 
German firms, or they managed banks, manufactories, 

1 [Ulk, a weekly humorous paper, published by the Berliner Tage- 
blat] 



62 I ACCUSE! 

or trading concerns which belonged to foreigners. The 
Paris Bourse, the high finance of Paris, is full of Ger- 
man names; Rothschild, Heine, Seligmann, Porges, 
Schickler, and all the rest of them control the French 
money-market. German breweries have effected a revo- 
lution in the restaurant life of France, and with their 
sumptuous beer-palaces have driven out more and more 
the fine intimacy of the French eating-house in honour 
of which we older people may at least shed many a 
tear of joyful-sorrowful remembrance. The same holds 
good of countless other fields of activity in France, in 
which Germans play an authoritative role. 

This holds, however, with even greater truth in the 
case of England. It is well known how great a section 
of the trade and the industry of Manchester, Liverpool, 
Birmingham and other industrial centres is in German 
hands, and how Germans occupy a leading position in 
leading English firms as well. Anyone who is ignorant 
of this should read the reports of the Parliamentary 
Committee of Enquiry which was appointed to devise 
measures against the threatened dispossession of Eng- 
lishmen in their own country, not forcible measures, it 
is true, for the Englishman is far too much a practical 
man of business not to know that any forcible measure 
would cut into his own flesh. Measures were aimed at 
whereby the young Englishmen would acquire German 
education, German methods, German adaptability — 
qualities which it was supposed would enable them to 
withstand the competition of young Germans in their 
own country. 

not to speak of North or South America. 
The difference between the two Americas consists chiefly 
in the fact that the Germans in the United States to a 
large extent assume a new nationality, whereas those in 
South America for the most part hold firm to their Ger- 



HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 63 

man nationality. Both are of use to the Fatherland, and 
it is one of the many conventional lies to assert, as is 
repeatedly done, that the German who assumes a new 
nationality is a loss for the German Fatherland. The 
opposite is nearer the truth. The German who is nat- 
uralised in the United States does not by any means 
lose his German character. He remains German in 
blood, in language, in culture, and in thought. Who 
will dispute this fact? Are not the artists, writers, and 
learned men of Germany who tour the American towns 
received everywhere with enthusiasm by millions of 
German colonists — indeed, often with most exaggerated 
and unjustifiable enthusiasm? Even the minores gentes, 
who in Germany have fallen more or less out of the 
running, endeavour to rehabilitate themselves by the 
naive undistinguishing national enthusiasm (which of 
course they promptly telegraph home). 

The Germans in North America, whether naturalised 
or not, are politically and economically an enormous gain 
for our Fatherland. The intimate political relations be- 
tween the two countries rest in no small degree on the 
strong percentage of naturalised Germans included in 
the American population. The whole American culture 
may be designated as a German-Anglo-Saxon mixture. 
A section of the American newspapers, which is not 
without influence on public opinion, appears in the Ger- 
man language. The export of German books to Amer- 
ica is enormous. As in democratically-governed coun- 
tries the representatives in Parliament and the Govern- 
ment must consider the views of the electors more than 
in our country, a policy directed in principle against 
Germany would over there be impossible. 

We are ourselves to blame for the fact that we have 
destroyed the favourable attitude of the American peo- 
ple by this war, the blame for which is rightly put upon 
us by all Americans, almost without exception, from 



64 I ACCUSE! 

Roosevelt down to the last newspaper scribbler; and 
this fact represents a new and important entry in the 
negative side of our books, in balancing the results of 
the war. 

The economical advantages which Germanism in 
America creates for us is so obvious and so universally 
known that a more detailed discussion may be regarded 
as superfluous. In the high finance of New York, as in 
that of Paris, naturalised Germans play a distinguished 
part. We need but mention the names of Ladenburg, 
Thalmann, Warburg, Speyer, Ellissen, Kuhn, Loeb and 
Co., Schiff, &c. The enormous imports and exports of 
the two countries, which in union with England occupy 
the leading place in the trade of the world, is to a large 
extent conducted over there by German merchants who 
almost without exception have assumed American na- 
tionality — presumably because the political conditions 
there suit them better than those in our country, a fact 
which indeed is not to be wondered at. The greatest 
American breweries are in the possession of Germans, 
for example, the brewery of Pabst in Milwaukee, and 
of Peter Dolger in New York. In connection with the 
brewery of Pabst there are benevolent institutions on a 
large scale as well as schools in which the children of 
the employees receive, along with the children of the 
proprietors, instruction in the German and English lan- 
guage. The greatest toyshops, for example, those of 
Schwarz in New York, are in German hands and they 
naturally obtain their goods from Germany. A very 
considerable section of American doctors are German 
by birth, and thus they not merely spread German science 
in America, but also obtain from Germany their in- 
struments and their medicinal supplies. 

The greatest warehouses in New York, the American 
Gorringe or Peter Robinson, are in German hands. They 
bear such names as Altmann, Strauss, Gimbel, Blume^ 



HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 66 

daal, &c. It is natural that all these German "captains 
of industry" should make use of their knowledge of 
German sources of supply which they took over with 
them, and should thus take their wares from the Ger- 
man contractor, so long as he is in a position to com- 
pete with the foreigner. The German contractor thus 
learns, in his turn, to know the requirements of the 
market there, he adapts himself to the circumstances, 
and thus there naturally arises from the German origin 
of the American firm a lasting connection between the 
German producers and the German-American customer. 

Whether the latter remains a German or becomes an 
American is naturally a matter of complete indifference. 
It is part of the complete ignorance of our nationalist 
brawlers that they constantly repeat the foolish asser- 
tion — false assertions as is known do not become more 
true by frequent repetition — that Germans who are nat- 
uralised abroad are lost to the Fatherland. 

The exact opposite may be maintained and proved by 
reference to the example of South America. Whereas in 
North America the transition to foreign nationality 
represents the rule, it is in South America the excep- 
tion. The Germans in Brazil, in the Argentine, in Chile 
only in exceptional cases become Brazilians, Argentiners, 
Chilians; in most cases they remain Germans. They 
are thus subject even in times of peace to the disadvan- 
tage that they must return to Germany for military 
training — many of them are officers of the reserve and 
of the Landwehr — and thus they are obliged to interrupt 
their mercantile activities. When however a war breaks 
out as has now occurred, and suddenly calls them with- 
out any preparation to the home country, they have 
frequently to pay for their adherence to German 
nationality by the complete ruin of their business, even 
if they should return alive and unmutilated. This ruin 
is accelerated by the fact that, as is well known, the 



66 I ACCUSE! 

South American people, like the rest of the neutral 
world, brand us as the disturbers of the peace, and 
rightly hold us responsible for the severe blow sustained 
by their economic life, and thus they are without excep- 
tion sympathetic to the other side. Owing to the ex- 
citable temperament of the Spanish population of South 
America this attitude against Germany manifested itself 
so strongly against Germans living there, that frequently 
even those who were not called to arms packed up their 
knapsacks and returned to Europe. 

This judgment is based not on newspaper reports but 
on my personal observations. About the end of August 
while travelling from America to Germany I had an 
opportunity of speaking to many Germans returning by 
Genoa from Brazil, Argentine and Chile. They painted 
to me the condition of affairs in these countries in the 
manner indicated above; they were naturally glowing 
with patriotic enthusiasm (they could not be expected, 
in South America in the month of August, to guess at 
the gigantic lie about the war, which to-day professors 
in Germany have as yet failed to recognise), yet they all 
admitted that everything which they had laboriously 
built up in the course of many years, in many cases in 
the course of decades, had been destroyed at a blow 
by the outbreak of war. Young men, who had crossed 
at an early age, and who had slowly worked their way 
up by industry and efficiency in the great German ex- 
port-houses, had been obliged to leave their situations 
to defend their Fatherland "threatened" by Russians and 
Frenchmen, to defend the freedom and existence of the 
German people. 

But even without the order of recall they would 
probably have lost their situations, since their firms 
under the effects of the war, which in these countries 
has produced an almost universal condition of bank- 
ruptcy, would have had either to close their doors, or at 



HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME* 67 

least to restrict their business as far as possible. Older 
people who through many trials and difficulties had ac- 
quired a position of independence were obliged to give 
up the conduct of their business in consequence of the 
war and the antipathy felt towards them by the popu- 
lation, and had to struggle back to the homeland with 
wife and child. These also were the innocent victims 
of their adherence to their German nationality. On 
the long fifty-two-hours' railway journey from Ala to 
Munich it was moving to listen to all these stories of 
broken existences, of shattered hopes, and to observe the 
quiet spirit of surrender with which all these active 
pioneers of Germanism abroad, yielding themselves to 
the inevitable, laid down on the altar of the Fatherland 
their success and their hopes, built up with so much 
labour. 

The inevitable ! So they believed these good, trusting 
people. If they had but known, and if they only knew 
how little there was of the inevitable in all this! If 
they only knew that they were but the marionettes, di- 
rected by invisible wire-pullers, to pay with their lives 
and fortunes for the selfish interests and the insane 
dreams of world-power and Pan-Germanism which these 
men entertain; if they had but known that all this was 
arranged and prepared by criminal and ignorant men, 
who seek to achieve by fire and blood, by murder and 
devastation, what can only be obtained by the patient, 
peaceful labour continued through generations of the 
merchant and the manufacturer, the man of science 
and the man of knowledge — if these vigorous men had 
but known all that — men who even across the sea had 
not forgotten German dreams and German idealism, 
and who had not lost the confidence that the cause for 
which the German draws the sword must necessarily 
be a just cause — had they but known the truth, they 
would scarcely have crossed the sea; they would not 



68 I ACCUSE! 

have left the soil, which had given to them and their 
families a second home. 

They were all agreed that the thought of rebuilding 
their existence in South America could not be enter- 
tained, and that the years and decades laboriously spent 
by them there were merely thrown away. 

Which German then is of most use to the Fatherland ? 
He who assumes a foreign nationality, as in North 
America, or he whp remains by nationality a German, as 
in South America? The former, in my opinion. If we 
survey the collapse into which our business relations 
with South America have fallen, and if we transfer this 
phenomenon to the gigantic proportions of North Amer- 
ica, we may congratulate ourselves on the fact that the 
Germans of North America have for the most part not 
remained Germans, but have become Americans. What 
would have been the result if the effects of the war had 
revealed themselves in North America in a way similar 
to that in which they have been manifested in South 
America, if nearly all Germans, those subject to mili- 
tary service as well as those exempt from service, had 
had to leave North America, their adopted Fatherland, 
their positions and their business? An irreparable eco- 
nomic disaster for Germany would have resulted. As 
we shall in any case gradually bleed to death if the war 
endures for any length of time, in consequence of the 
breach in our business relations with belligerent coun- 
tries which must remain for many years, such a blow 
from the neutral country of North America might well 
have been for us the finishing stroke. Thank God that 
our German-Americans have always been more sober 
and more reasonable in their thoughts than our Pan- 
Germans. By giving up their German nationality they 
have rendered Germany the best service. 

This again disposes of one of the theories on which 
territorial expansion is supported, one of the theories 



HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 69 

productive of constant friction between civilised peoples. 
Our true colonies lie where we do not possess a square 
metre of territory: in North and South America, in 
England, Prance, Russia, and Italy, in North and South 
Africa, in Canada, and Australia. 1 

Our commercial intercourse with England amounts 
to about 185 million pounds sterling, with France about 
JjYi million pounds sterling, with both countries to- 
gether about 262^2 million pounds sterling, that is to 
say, to more than a quarter of our total foreign trade. 
At the same time we sell more to these countries than 
we buy from them. We sell to them in round figures 
to the extent of 162^ million pounds, and we buy 
from them 100 million pounds. The value of our ex- 
ports thus amounts to more than 50 per cent, above our 
imports. About 44 per cent, of German foreign trade, 
that is to say, about 425 million pounds, is accounted 
for by all our enemy countries taken together. What is 
the significance of these figures when we contrast them 
with the miserable scraps of country — in part wild and 
unfertile, uninhabitable by Europeans — over which 
diplomatists wrangle, nations are incited against each 
other, money is uselessly squandered in gigantic arm- 
aments, and for which in the end, since the bomb must 
explode sooner or later, the bloodiest of all wars has 
been conjured up? 

When will the peoples of the world at last compre- 
hend the madness of this situation? When at last will 
they call aloud to their rulers, and above all when will 
the Germans exclaim to the rulers of Germany: "We 
have indeed already got the place in the sun. Only 
leave us alone in peace and quietness to warm ourselves 
in the sunshine and to do our work. Do not for ever 
oppress us with burdens too grievous to be borne. Free 

1 These ideas are developed in an admirable manner in The Great 
Illusion, by Norman Angell (William Heinemann, London). 



fTO I ACCUSE! 

yourselves at last from the geographical monomania, 
whose ambition is to devour square miles, but which 
has already almost devoured us poor nations." 

THE PLACE IN THE SUN FOR US — THE PLACE IN 
THE SHADOW FOR THE OTHERS 

In reality our imperialists are seeking to achieve some- 
thing quite different. They also know, even if they do 
not say it to the stupid people (and Bernhardt s book 
proves that this is so) that we have indeed the place 
in the sun, that no one seeks to dispute it, and that if 
anyone were to seek to do so, he would necessarily fail. 
But it is something else that they want. They want 
the exclusive place in the sun; they are striving for the 
world-dominion of Germany, and that at any rate is 
what the others are not prepared to yield to them. 
'■ The German Wehr-Verein, in a meeting held in the 
House of Representatives, has quite recently expressed 
this with all the lucidity that can be desired. In this 
manifesto we find the following words: 

"We need room and air for the further development of 
our German nationality. The time for moderation is past. 
Relentlessly thinking only of our interests, we must and we 
will dictate peace. Only one peace can be thought of, a 
peace which assures the permanent leading world-position 
of Germany. . . .The criminal breakers of the peace . . . 
England, France and Russia, must be so weakened that in 
future they will cease to be a danger to the peace of the 
world." 

Thus we find, on the one side, breakers of the peace, 
and on the other a permanent leading world-position! 
Explain this to me, Count Oerindur ! Here we find truth 
and falsehood mingled in a most dexterous manner. 
On the one side the true aims of the war-party are 



HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME !7I 

openly proclaimed, and yet on the other the pretence 
that the peace was broken by the other party is boldly 
maintained. Nevertheless, these gentlemen do not suc- 
ceed in their sommersault over logic. If to extend our 
nationality we must obtain for Germany the permanent 
leading position in the world, that is equivalent to say- 
ing in other words that we must compel the others to 
subject themselves to our leadership, since to-day we 
already enjoy equal privileges with others, but not a 
leadership. If, however, we do this, it is we who are 
the breakers of the peace, and not the others. 

In reality that is the position of affairs, as I will 
point out in the second section of this book. It is none 
the less of great value that these gentlemen, even while 
they attempt to deny this, yet admit it against their will. 

THE FEAR OF GERMANY 

It is leadership that we seek, not merely equal privi- 
leges with others. It would be nonsense to say that 
we seek the latter, since we already possess in the fullest 
measure such equal privileges. If we are not, as a Ger- 
man professor has expressed it, "morally and intellec- 
tually beyond all comparison superior to all other na- 
tions," * there is at least one superiority which has will- 
ingly been granted to our Prussian Germany by the 
rest of the world for a century and a half. I refer to 
our military superiority. While we need only fear God, 
but nothing else in the world, Germany has been feared 
by all — almost more than God Himself. Even Tacitus 
long ago pointed out that the defectiveness of the Ger- 
man frontiers was made good by fear of the Teutons: 
"A Sarmatio Dacisque mutuo metu aut montibus separa- 
tor." The fear of Germany produces the effect that 
our word weighs heavily in th e council of the nations 
1 Professor Lasson. 



!72 I ACCUSE! 

despite all "encirclement," and despite the wretchedness 
of our diplomacy. 

On a certain occasion recently the most important 
conditions of peace were being discussed in a lively con- 
versation. Frenchmen, Germans, and Englishmen living 
abroad were taking part in the discussion seated round 
the common table, and in the end they almost arrived 
at an agreement as to the terms of peace. Then, how- 
ever, the German observed in jest, "One more condi- 
tion; you French must take over en bloc our German 
diplomatists." The Frenchman sprang up in indigna- 
tion and broke off the peace negotiations, exclaiming, 
"Ah ca, non ! Ca c'est trop. Nous continuerons a com- 
battre." And with these words he left the restaurant. 

DIPLOMATIC SUCCESS OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 

The lack of dexterity shown by our diplomacy — 
where could all the high-born Borussen and Saxo- 
Borussen be expected to learn skill in business! — the 
defects of our diplomacy are constantly made good by 
the weight of the army, standing in the background. 
For long the Triple Alliance was indeed only a sham, 
but it looked quite well from the outside, and it worked 
almost like a being of flesh and blood. 

Thus in all the conflicts of recent years Germany, in 
union with Austria and Italy, has come out quite well 
in the end, and her allies, relying on the power of Ger- 
many, have been able to bear home spoil, with which 
it would scarcely be proper to compare the acquisi- 
tions of the Triple Alliance. Was Austria not able in 
1908 to bag Bosnia and Herzegovina, a fat morsel of 
more importance than twenty Moroccos ? Was Italy not 
able to appropriate without a European conflict Tripoli 
and the y£gean islands — acquisitions which it can 
scarcely be expected to disgorge again? In addition to 



HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 78 

the open door in Morocco, which is of more value than 
any costly rights of possession demanding the expendi- 
ture of blood, have we not got into the bargain a con- 
siderable piece of the French Congo — an exchange which 
cost Caillaux, the Minister responsible for it, his pres- 
tige and his position, and which almost cost his wife 
her life? Did we not, acting with our ally Austria, 
achieve in her interests the great feat of gracefully 
turning the Montenegrins out of Scutari, which they 
had purchased with streams of blood, and of introduc- 
ing there an international garrison? Was not the crea- 
tion of that mannikin-kingdom of Albania, that "vile 
abortion of filth and fire," 1 accomplished exclusively in 
the interests of our allies Austria and Italy? Were we 
not able to complete with England and Turkey an agree- 
ment that was favourable to us in connection with Asia 
Minor and the Bagdad line ? 

This list of successes could be considerably lengthened. 
I need not emphasise the fact that, from my point of 
view, many — indeed nearly all — of these diplomatic 
bickerings, these alterations and annexations of terri- 
tory have not the slightest connection with the real 
interests of the nations. When we reflect that a Euro- 
pean war, like that raging to-day, almost broke out in 
19 12 on the question whether Serbia should receive her 
celebrated "window on the Adriatic" — when we reflect 
that nearly every one of the questions mentioned above 
brought Europe for the time being to the verge of an 
armed conflict, while these so-called "vital questions" 
frequently had not in any way decisive importance for 
the well-being, in the true sense of the word, of the 
States immediately concerned, we are constantly con- 
strained to admire anew the lamb-like patience of the 
nations and the craziness of the diplomatists, and to 
concur in the saying of the good Oxenstjerna in con- 
1 Spottegeburt aus Dreck und Feuer — Faust. 



ar* i accuse! 

soling his son who professed himself unfit for the post 
of Swedish Ambassador, "An nescis, mi fili, quantilla 
prudentia mundus regatur?" 

Austria's Balkan policy 

What advantage has Austria derived from her an- 
nexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina? — One more worry 
added to the many by which she was already plagued. 
Would it not have been better for Austria and for the 
whole world if the Empire had remained content with 
an occupation such as had existed since 1878 on the 
basis of the Treaty of Berlin? The Great-Serbian move- 
ment was fanned into more vigorous life than ever be- 
fore by the formal annexation in 1908, and notwith- 
standing the propitiatory declaration of Serbia in March, 
1909, it continued to take its course. National move- 
ments in fact cannot be suppressed. The practical poli- 
tician must deal with them as facts, and if he desires 
to conduct them in the desired direction, he must en- 
deavour as far as possible to satisfy their demands 
which rest on community of race, of language, and often 
of religion, demands which are thus healthy and justi- 
fied. Therein lies the skill of the English, and the true 
basis of the colonial greatness of this people. They 
subdued the South African republics, but almost imme- 
diately after their subjection they gave them self-gov- 
ernment within the framework of the great South 
African Union, and placed at the head of the Union 
General Botha, their most distinguished military leader. 
They have acted in the same way towards all their other 
colonies throughout the world as soon as these were 
sufficiently far developed for self-government. Under 
the flexible suzerainty of Britain, Canada and Australia 
are independent States enjoying merely the advantages 
which spring from their connection with the world- 



HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 75 

empire, while suffering no disadvantage from this con- 
nection. This is the source of the attachment shown 
by all these colonies to the Mother Country, even by the 
one most recently acquired by force of arms. This 
explains the complete failure of Germany's speculations 
on rebellions or secessions, which might create difficul- 
ties for the English, and drive their colonies into the 
arms of the Germans, — these same Germans who even 
to-day, before they have yet annexed Belgium, can find 
nothing better to do than banish the French language 
from the streets of Brussels and Antwerp and from 
public life by command of the military authorities. 

If Austria, instead of annexing Bosnia and Herze- 
govina to the accompaniment of the rattling sabre of 
her German ally, had accepted the Serbian national 
movement as a natural fact, and had made reasonable 
concessions to it on the principle "naturam expellas 
furca, tamen usque recurret," we would to-day — this 
can be definitely asserted — we would to-day have had 
no world-war. But clearly the Austrians understand 
these things better. They consider it right to treat all 
their foreign nationalities, Italians, Croats, Slavonians, 
Rumanians, Serbians, according to the principle: 

"A brother's love, sir, ere too late ! 
Or with this stick I'll break your pate." x 

How far they have got with this we see to-day, not 
only on the Serbian, but also on the Italian side, and 
how long will it be until we see, on the Rumanian 
frontier as well, the effects of this extreme reactionary 
policy of oppression! 

But the worse Austrian policy has been, the more as- 
tonishing are the diplomatic successes which in recent 

1 "Und willst du nicht mein Bruder sein 
So schlag ich dir den Schadel ein." 



76 I ACCUSE! 

years she has everywhere been able to gain, relying on 
the armed force of Germany. Germany and Austria 
have indeed no reason to complain that European 
diplomatists have constantly trodden on their corns. 
Apart from the Morocco question, the questions which 
have cropped up in recent years were all what are called 
"vital questions" for Austria, if indeed it is possible 
to speak of vital questions in the case of a corpse. With 
this corpse the dexterity of German diplomacy has linked 
for weal or for woe (unfortunately more for woe than 
for weal) the German national organism, in itself 
healthy and vigorous. This is in the interest of the 
"Germanic races in central Europe," to use the beauti- 
ful expression of our White Book. Does anyone feel 
inclined to laugh at this? Austria, as is well known, 
consists only so far as a fourth part is concerned of 
inhabitants of the Germanic race, yet with this idea of 
"race-protection" we have fortunately advanced so far 
that these Eastern questions, which to a Bismarck were 
not worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier, are 
likely to cost us the bones of many hundreds of thou- 
sands of our countrymen in the prime of their life, and 
rob us of the labour of many generations. 

This is indeed a sorry transaction, yet it is one which 
would have succeeded brilliantly, if it had been left in 
the field of diplomacy, like all similar transactions in 
recent years, and if it had not been transplanted to the 
battlefield. The diplomatic success which was attained 
on the evening of the 25th July in the Serbian answer 
to the Austrian Note was one of the most brilliant in 
the whole diplomatic history of Europe. Austria had 
gained everything of importance which she had de- 
manded apart from a few points, and these not decisive, 
on which Serbia expressed her readiness to negotiate 
further; moreover, what she had won exceeded anything 
that ever one State had obtained from another inde- 



HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 77 

pendent State by diplomatic means in time of peace. 
Further, the humiliation of Serbia was at the same time 
a humiliation of Russia, and the prestige of Austria 
at the moment when she insolently and without any 
grounds recalled her ambassador from Belgrade, stood 
higher in the Balkans than it had ever done before, 
and certainly higher than it will ever stand hereafter. 
This success she owed entirely to the unflinching sup- 
port of her German ally. 

Why, notwithstanding this, the situation was allowed 
to lead to war, or rather why war was intentionally 
produced, can only be explained by reference to German 
policy and the tendencies in Berlin, as I will demon- 
strate by documentary evidence in the second section of 
this work. For the present discussion it is enough to 
establish the fact that the assertion constantly repeated 
in Germany that the Triple Alliance was always left 
in the cold or beaten over the ears by the diplomacy 
of the Entente, rests on a falsehood, and that on the 
contrary the policy of the Triple Alliance on all occa- 
sions — even at the very last in July, 1914 — was bril- 
liantly victorious. 

THE CROWN PRINCE AND WAR PARTY 

Everyone in Germany constantly speaks about the 
"policy of encirclement" (Einkreisungspolitik) , to which 
the present catastrophe is attributed. Here also we 
naturally meet with the same phenomenon as in the 
whole campaign of justification, which seeks to repre- 
sent Germany as the innocent lamb and England as 
the ravening wolf. Those who are initiated, however, 
know quite well how the matter stands, and if the 
Crown Prince were to meet Bernhardi or Frobenius in 
the field, these comrades in the faith would smile to 
each other like Roman augurs. They know quite well 



78 I ACCUSE! 

that it is no foreign policy but our own will — or rather 
their will — that has urged us into this war, and if they 
were to deny it, now that they see the fearful conse- 
quences, their own writings would rise up against them 
as bloody witnesses. 

What do we find in the introduction to the Crown 
Prince's book, Germany in Arms? 

"To-day, indeed, we live in a time which points with 
special satisfaction to the proud height of its culture, which 
is only too willing to boast of its international cosmopoli-* 
tanism, and flatters itself with visionary dreams of the pos- 
sibility of an everlasting peace throughout the world. This 
view of life is un-German and does not suit us. The Ger- 
man who loves his people, who believes in the greatness and 
the future of our homeland, and who is unwilling to see its 
position diminished, dare not close his eyes in the indul- 
gence of dreams such as these, he dare not allow himself to 
be lulled into indolent sleep by the lullabies of peace sung 
by the Eutopians. . . . Germany has behind her since the 
last great war a period of economic prosperity, which has 
in it something almost disconcerting. Comfort has so in- 
creased in all circles of our people, that luxury and claims to 
a certain style of life have undergone a rank development. 
Now certainly we must not thanklessly deny that a wave of 
economic prosperity brings with it much that is good. But 
the shady side of this too rapid development often mani- 
fests itself in a painful and threatening manner. Already 
the appreciation of wealth has gained in our country an 
importance, which we can only observe with anxiety. . . . 
The old ideals, even the position and the honour of the 
nation, may be sympathetically affected; for peace, peace 
at any price, is necessary for the undisturbed acquisition of 
money. But the study of history teaches us that all those 
States which in the decisive hour have been guided by 
purely commercial considerations have miserably come to 
grief. The sympathies of civilised nations are to-day, as in 
the battles of antiquity, still with the sturdy and the bold 



HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 79 

■fighting armies 1 ; they are with the brave combatants who, 
in the words which Lessing puts in the mouth of Tellheim, 
are soldiers for their country, and out of the love which 
they bear to the cause for which they are fighting. . . . 
Certainly diplomatic dexterity can, and should, postpone the 
conflict for a time, and at times disentangle the difficulties. 
Certainly all those in authority must and will be fully con- 
scious of their enormous responsibility in the grave hour 
of decision. They must make it clear to their own minds 
that the gigantic conflagration, once enkindled, cannot be 
so easily or so quickly extinguished. As, however, lightning 
is an adjustment of the tension between two differently 
charged strata of the atmosphere, so the sword will always 
be and remain until the end of the world the decisive fac- 
tor. . . . And therefore everyone, to whom his country is 
dear, and who believes in a great future for our nation, 
must joyfully do his part in the task of seeing that the old 
military spirit of our fathers is not lost, and that it is not 
sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought. For the sword 
alone is not decisive, but the arm steeled in exercise which 
bears the sword. Each of us must keep himself fit for arms 
and also prepared in his mind for the great solemn hour 
when the Emperor calls us to the standard — the hour when 
we no longer belong to ourselves, but to the Fatherland with 
all the forces of our mind and our body ; for all these facul- 
ties must be brought to the highest exertion, to that 'will 
to victory' which has never been without success in his- 
tory." 

That should be sufficient, but there is something better 
to come. The royal author describes a regimental 
manoeuvre of the guards on the field at Doberitz: 

"The steel helmets glitter in the sunshine ; in the galloping 
exercises every individual horseman endeavours to keep on 
to the man in front, and to keep the right direction — no easy 
matter when there is dust, and the ground is rough. Many 
a one stumbles, and away past him gallops the company of 

1 This has now been shown to be true. 



80 I ACCUSE! 

riders. What does it matter ! When you plane wood, shav- 
ings must fall. . . . And there the call resounds over the 
field, clear and quivering amid the uproar of the galloping 
mass, 'Front !' The reins whirl round, and as if by a stroke 
of magic, the line is formed again, with a front of five 
impetuous squadrons of the guards, — and then comes the 
signal 'Charge.' Then the last ounce is taken out of the 
horses, and with bodies strained forward and with lances 
in rest with a 'hurrah' we ride to the attack. . . . For any- 
one who has taken part in such attacks, there is nothing 
fairer in the world! . . . And yet to the true horseman 
there is one thing which appears more beautiful: if all 
that were the same, but if only at the end of the rapid 
charge, the enemy were to ride out against us, and the 
struggle for which we have been drilled and trained, the 
struggle for life and death, were to begin. How often dur- 
ing such attacks have I heard the yearning call of a comrade 
riding behind : 'Donnewetter! if that were only the real 
thing!' . . . O horseman's spirit! All who are true soldiers 
must know and feel : 'Dulce et decorum est pro patria 
mori.' " 

The same spirit of the attack finds expression in the 
message of farewell to the Danzig Hussars. The young 
war-hero becomes sentimental, because he can no longer 
ride through life at the head of his Hussars. Already 
he is "bearing his youth to its grave," but he is con- 
soled by the thought: 

"It is indeed possible for me to be separated from you ; 
but my heart and my spirit remain yours. If some day the 
King calls, and the bugle sounds the signal 'Charge,' then I 
ask you to think on him whose most ardent wish it has al- 
ways been to be allowed to share at your side this, the su- 
preme moment of a soldier's happiness." 

This moment has now come. It is now, donnerwetter ! 
the real thing. The deathhead-hussars have charged 
into death; they have been mown down like stalks of 



HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 81 

corn. But where at this moment was the gallant colonel 
of cavalry? Why did he, who still to-day wears the 
effective uniform of his hussars, not put himself at their 
head with a "hurrah" against the enemy? Why did 
he allow to pass ungarnered the supreme moment of a 
soldier's happiness? 



"What are the real merits of this young gentleman?" 
asked Bebel in the Reichstag on the occasion of a discus- 
sion on the Crown Prince's demonstration, and this 
young gentleman might be left quietly to himself, to his 
conscience, and to his further self-education, had he not 
unfortunately been advanced to the position of a na- 
tional hero in the course of this war for which he and 
his friends bear the chief load of guilt. 

Kor long he has been the undisputed head of the 
German nationalist party and of the chauvinists, and his 
views give the key to the German National Orchestra. 
Great is the Crown Prince, and Liman is his prophet. 1 
In fighting against him we are fighting against the 
tendency which without any provocation, without any 
practical attainable end, has dragged Germany into this 
unfortunate war, and which, if we do not repent in time, 
will irredeemably lead to our destruction. 

It is the misfortune of kings that they are unwilling 
to hear the truth. But Truth is stronger than they. 
With stern finger it knocks at their doors. With rever- 
berating sound it pierces their ears, and if Germany, 
as the Chancellor says, cannot be crushed, still less is 
Truth capable of being thus dealt with. It tears asunder 
the veil, with which it is sought to shroud it, and in 
triumphant nakedness it advances to meet the light of 
day. 

1 The Crown Prince: Thoughts on Germany's Future by Dr. Paul 
Liman (Wilhelm Kohler, Minden). 



82 I ACCUSE! 

the policy of encieclement (Einkreisungspolitik) 

The policy of encirclement is one of the veils with 
which it is sought to shroud the truth. What do we 
mean by the phrase: a policy of encirclement? Every- 
one uses the expression, and no one connects with it 
any clear idea. If it is supposed to have any meaning, 
it can only mean a policy which seeks to enclose Ger- 
many and Austria, the central Powers, by an opposing 
alliance of the peripheral Powers. That is to say it is 
a geographical idea. 

What specially aggressive tendency is to be found in 
the fortuitous geographical situation of the Powers of 
the Entente? Are aggressive intentions in any way 
determined or proved by geographical situation? Would 
it not have been equally dangerous, or perhaps even 
more dangerous, for Germany and Austria, if Italy in 
place of one or other of the Entente Powers had be- 
longed to the opposing alliance? Or perhaps even 
America might have been a member. In the case of 
Italy or America could we have spoken of an "inten- 
tion to encircle"? At the most we could have done so 
in the sense in which Fusilier Kutschke maintained that 
"he had alone and without assistance surrounded a 
whole company of the enemy." 

It is clear that geography has nothing to do with the 
danger of war or with the intention to make war. Just 
as the Triple Entente is called an encirclement, the 
Triple Alliance could be called an "excirclement" 
(Auskreisung) , since indeed Germany, Austria, and 
Italy form a sort of central block, from which the 
Powers of the Entente are excluded. The one is just 
as much defensive or aggressive as the other. The 
geographical constellation is a mere fortuitous conse- 
quence of the chronological development of the alliance. 
Had Italy still been free when King Edward trans- 



HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 83 

formed the Victorian policy of splendid isolation into 
a policy of alliances, he would probably have introduced 
Italy rather than Russia into his system of alliances. 
Without doubt he would have preferred the democratic 
Italy, with which he had no conflicting interest, but 
merely interests in common, to an ally whose political 
backwardness as well as her conflicting interests in 
Asia must necessarily make her a very unwelcome friend 
for England. The grouping of the six Powers in 
Europe has arisen from historical circumstances and 
from communities of interest. Their geographical 
position is purely accidental, and ha? nothing to do 
with the character and the tendency of these two 
groups. 

It is thus as false as it is superficial to regard the 
circumferential situation of the Powers of the Entente 
as merely in itself a danger for the Empires. He who 
asserts that aggressive intentions exist is under an obli- 
gation to prove their existence, and further to do so 
on grounds other than the geographical situation of the 
Powers concerned. These other grounds, however, are 
completely lacking. In Germany no matter how much 
we inquire, no one is in a position to give a definite 
answer. England is said to have been envious of our 
commercial development. Envy is an attitude of mind, 
but not an action. Just as I can compel no one to love, 
so I cannot forcibly drive out of anyone envy and ha- 
tred. I must rest content if he does not transform his 
evil thoughts into actions, just as I also on my side 
would not submit to be called to account by my neigh- 
bour merely on account of my disposition. Thoughts 
indeed are duty-free, and even in reactionary Prussia 
every citizen, according to the constitution, has the right 
not only to think as he will, but to give expression to his 
thoughts "in word, writing or printing." Criminal law 
punishes not the mere will to do the act, but (with few 



84 I ACCUSE! 

exceptions) only the attempt to do the act, which it 
defines as the "first step in the commission of it." 

Where, how and when has England ever attempted to 
transform her envy of Germany into action? In other 
words, when has she sought to attack Germany ? Never 
at any time. Not one action of England can be pointed 
out, from which the intention to make a military at- 
tack, in common with her Allies, on Germany could be 
deduced. You may say that she gave diplomatic sup- 
port to France on the occasion of the Morocco dispute. 
But England had a right to do so and indeed a duty, 
based on the Anglo-French agreement with regard to 
Egypt and Morocco. And did our ally Austria not 
adhere to us in this conflict? Have we not adhered 
to Austria in all Eastern questions? Why should diplo- 
matic support extended to a friendly or an allied power 
in the one case be defensive, in the other aggressive? 
Is England not free in diplomatic negotiations to judge 
of her own interests and obligations according to her 
own standard, as we ourselves do with regard to our 
interests and obligations ? Again I ask : where is the 
proof of aggressive intentions on the part of England 
against us? 

Objection will be taken to what I have said on the 
ground of the military and naval agreements which Eng- 
land had concluded with France, and which she was 
on the point of concluding with Russia. Have we then 
concluded no military agreements with Austria regulat- 
ing the support to be given on either side in a European 
war down to the last cannon and company? Have not 
visits and conferences constantly been taking place be- 
tween the two General Staffs? If our much stricter 
military agreement with Austria had no aggressive 
character, why should there be an aggressive character 
in the much looser adjustments between English and 
French experts, which scarcely extended beyond the 



HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 85 

scope of a discussion? 1 These discussions were, as 
is documentarily established, entirely of a noncommittal 
character, because they did not rest on any obligation 
imposed by the terms of an alliance to afford to each 
other mutual military support. The Anglo-French En- 
tente did not contain such obligations, but left it to 
each party in any given case to decide freely according 
to her own judgment whether she should or should 
not afford military support to the other. 2 Even in 
the event of an unprovoked attack by a third Power 
this freedom remained, and it was only in the case 
where both Powers freely decided to co-operate that the 
discussions of the military experts were intended to have 
practical consequences. 

The relations between England and Russia were, so 
far as general European politics are concerned, much 
looser even than those between England and France. 
The adjustments between Russia and England were 
concerned exclusively with territorial interests in Asia, 
and contained no obligations with regard to Europe. 
England had so little concern in the Franco-Russian 
Alliance that it was not even acquainted with the word- 
ing of the terms of the Alliance. 3 

Apart from any obligation or intention to attack us 
there was also, so far as England was concerned, a com- 
plete absence of any inducement to do so. What advan- 
tage could England hope to gain from a war against 
usf We who constantly have on our lips "the English 
shopkeeper-spirit," and contrast the cold calculating 
business-sense of the Englishman with our patriotic en- 
thusiasm, should really not attribute to this nation of 
shopkeepers the insanity of desiring to kill their best cus- 

1 See Grey's speech in the House of Commons of August 3rd, 1914. 
'See Grey's letter to Cambon, November 22nd, 1912. English 
Blue Book, No. 105. 
8 See Grey's speech August 3rd, 1914. 



86 I ACCUSE! 

tomer in order to improve their business. Such a hare- 
brained course of action is indeed possible in a nation 
in which cavalry-colonels and generals and the oppo- 
nents of the trading classes have the decisive word, 
but not in a nation of merchantmen in which even the 
leading politicians in part have their origins in the world 
of trade, and in any case are without exception fully 
acquainted with the ideas of the modern commercial 
spirit. 

The fact is that England has never had aggressive 
intentions against us; she has never concluded an al- 
liance with aggressive intentions against us, and she has 
never done anything whatever to urge on others to at- 
tack us. 

Anyone who maintains the contrary is obliged, ac- 
cording to general rules of procedure, to prove it. I 
have hitherto looked in vain in German speeches and 
writings for the submission of this evidence. Every- 
where there is the empty assertion, without the shadow 
of a proof. 

So far, however, as this assertion is advanced in our 
country by official quarters, that is by people who are 
acquainted with the diplomatic history of the last fifteen 
years, the assertion is made against their better knowl- 
edge, that is to say it is a lie. 

These last fifteen years, since the first Hague Confer- 
ence of 1899, are nothing but a continuous series of 
attempts on the part of England to arrive at a political 
entente with Germany, and on the basis of this to effect 
a limitation of naval armaments on both sides — attempts 
which on every occasion have been wrecked on the lack 
of judgment or on the evil will of the German Govern- 
ment. 

It is well known, and does not here require any de- 
tailed demonstration, that England on the occasion of 
the Fashoda incident, when her relations to France were 



HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 87 

becoming ever more strained and were almost impelling 
her to a conflict of arms, endeavoured to give up her 
"splendid isolation," and to conclude an entente with 
us. Our far-seeing politicians, as so often happens, did 
not seize the opportunity. They allowed to slip past 
them the favourable moment in which, without ruinous 
preparations, without drawing the sword, and in the 
enjoyment of a lasting security, they might have pro- 
moted our further prosperity in industry and in culture, 
and gained for the world an enduring peace. 

England and Germany 
the first hague conference 

On the 28th of August, 1898, there appeared in the 
Petrograd Official Journal the celebrated Peace Mani- 
festo of the Tsar. On the mention of this manifesto our 
war-brawlers smile and point in contempt to the "Tsar 
of blood" who has now let loose the second fearful war 
since that message of peace. 

We shall see later how far Russia is concerned in 
letting loose the present war. How far Russia was to 
blame for the Japanese war is a chapter by itself, which 
should scarcely be allowed to end with the condemna- 
tion of Russia alone. The intention of the manifesto 
was in any case correct and honourable, and the aims 
proposed to the nations of Europe : true and enduring 
peace, and the limitation of armaments which even in 
peace slowly lead nations to their economic destruction, 
— these aims will be, and must continue to be, the un- 
alterable rule of conduct governing the efforts of all who 
guide the destinies of European States. Even the pres- 
ent war, unless it is to be nothing but an insane and 
purposeless shedding of blood, can have no other aim 
than this. 



88 I ACCUSE! 

What was the attitude of England towards this mani- 
festo? What was the attitude of Germany ? While in 
England public opinion in harmony with the Govern- 
ment hailed the manifesto with the greatest sympathy, 
and the English Foreign Minister could report to Petro- 
grad this unanimous approval, there developed in Ger- 
many also a popular movement in favour of the ideas 
expressed by the Tsar. But the Government maintained 
a frigid attitude, and only the social democratic party 
recognised the epoch-making significance of these ideas 
— ideas which they had constantly advocated, but which 
now for the first time received expression in high places. 
That the idea was Utopian, that it was but a chimsera 
— these were the least reproaches thrown at the origina- 
tor of the manifesto. In conformity with the customary 
tactics which have since been constantly followed, many 
rose to the crazy heights of asserting that Russia only 
desired to entice other States to a limitation of arma- 
ments in order that she herself might be able to pile 
up in secret still greater armaments and thus with greater 
security pursue her Pan-Slav efforts. 

The record in malicious attacks was naturally achieved 
even then by a German professor, Stengel, the lecturer 
in international law at Munich, who prophesied in ad- 
vance the most dismal results of the Conference which 
at the time had not yet assembled. In recognition of 
this, he was straightway sent by the Foreign Office to 
the Hague Conference as one of Germany's representa- 
tives. 

After the epoch-making memorials of the Russian 
Councillor Von Bloch, the Conference owed its origin 
chiefly to English influences. As early as 1891 the 
English Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury, had had a state- 
ment of the cost of European military preparations com- 
piled, and had transmitted this confidential document to 
the German Emperor without, it is true, achieving any 



HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 89 

success. The efforts of Lord Salisbury met with suc- 
cess only when they were emphasised by the inter-par- 
liamentary conference of 1896. On that occasion Lord 
Salisbury in a remarkable speech in the Guildhall re- 
gretted the ruinousness of constantly increasing arm- 
aments, and in the end, through the instrumentality of 
Count Lambsdorf, laid the whole of the material bearing 
on the question before the Tsar. 1 

The preludes played by Germany and by England were 
in harmony with the performances given by these two 
States at the Conference itself, which in spite of all 
hostility assembled at the Hague on the 18th of May, 
1899, under the participation of twenty-six States. 
Throughout the whole proceedings of the Conference we 
find the same picture, that, namely, of England leading 
in all efforts the aim of which was to diminish the in- 
tolerable burdens of armaments and, in an ever-widening 
degree, to place the differences arising between civilised 
nations on a legal basis. On the side of England there 
were France, Russia, America, and naturally all the 
smaller States. On the other side, however, there con- 
stantly stood Germany with her true ally, Austria-Hun- 
gary. 

The opposition of Germany to all progressive efforts 
Was at times so pronounced that if the others had not 
repressed their desires, the whole Conference would have 
broken up. So it was on the question of armaments ; so 
also on that of arbitration. 

By way of introduction to the discussion on arma- 
ments the German Emperor delivered a speech in 
Wiesbaden in which he declared that the best pledge 
of peace was the "sharp, gleaming sword." In the 
course of this discussion we shall have occasion to ob- 
serve that it is a part of the German system to furnish 
on every occasion an introduction to the conc ert of the 

1 See Fried. Handbuch der Friedensbewegung, Vol. I, p. 204. 



90 I ACCUSE! 

European pipes of peace by blowing a war-fanfare on 
the Prussian bugle. 

The Russian proposal was to the effect that the 
strength of the Army on a peace basis and the military 
estimates should not be increased in the next five years, 
and that in the case of the navy this respite should be 
fixed for three years. This proposal, which was bril- 
liantly defended by the Russian military plenipotentiary 
— (he emphasised above all the incontestable fact that 
the competition in armaments was futile, since the rela- 
tive strength between the various States still remained 
constant) — was energetically rejected by the German 
military plenipotentiary General Gross von Schwarzhof. 
If the French plenipotentiary Leon Bourgeois, who rep- 
resented the restriction of armaments as a requirement of 
civilisation and a duty imposed on all States, had not 
succeeded in uniting the votes of the commission in sup- 
port of a resolution formulated by him (a resolution, it 
is true, wholly without effect in practice) the negotia- 
tions of the Conference on this point would have been 
completely wrecked. 

The resolution ran: "The Conference is of opinion 
that the restriction of military charges, which are at 
present a heavy burden on the world, is extremely desir- 
able for the increase of the material and moral welfare 
of mankind." 

The recognition of this fact has not prevented Euro- 
pean Governments, under the leadership of the German 
Empire, from inflating their armaments to such an extent 
that in the end the balloon, distended to the bursting- 
point, was bound to explode and set the whole world 
in flames. 

Even worse was the fate of the Russian proposal for 
the establishment of international arbitration. This pro- 
posal, indeed, was modest enough in what it contem- 
plated; obligatory arbitration on principle was, it is true, 



HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 91 

to be introduced, but this was to be excluded in all cases 
affecting vital interests or the honour of a State. As 
each State was to remain its own judge as to what it 
should regard as a question of honour or of vital inter- 
ests, the Russian proposal cannot be said to have had a 
revolutionary character, a matter to be regretted, for the 
most important steps forward in the history of mankind 
are achieved by revolutions and not by warfare as is 
maintained by those who pay homage to war. The pro- 
posal, then, secured the approval of almost all taking 
part in the Conference; on this point also Germany alone 
raised objection on the ground that subjection to a court 
of arbitration was not, as Professor Zorn maintained, 
"in conformity with the traditions of the Bismarckian 
policy." 

The opposition of Germany was so violent that nego- 
tiations came to a dead stop, and they had to be post- 
poned for a period of fourteen days to enable Professor 
Zorn to receive new instructions from Berlin. The Con- 
ference very nearly proceeded without the co-operation 
of Germany. But here again, rather than allow the 
whole proposal to be wrecked, it was resolved in the 
end to yield to the will of Germany and in all cases 
to allow optional in place of compulsory jurisdiction. 

Here again Germany had the undisputed merit of hav- 
ing barred the way to a decisive step forward in the 
peaceful organisation of the nations. 

The establishment of a perpetual court of arbitration 
at the Hague was similarly refused by Germany from 
the outset, and it was admitted only when it was made 
optional and not compulsory to summon this court. 
Thus the first Hague conference ended, in spite of Ger- 
many and Austria, and owing to the active exertions of 
France and England in support of the efforts of Russia 
for peace, with a final result which after all represented 
a first important step towards the aim of an organisa- 



m I ACCUSE! 

tion of States based on law and of a gradual liberation 
of the nations from the intolerable oppression of their 
armaments. 

BETWEEN THE FIRST AND SECOND HAGUE CONFERENCES '. 
THE ENGLISH LIBERAL GOVERNMENT. 

Between the first and the second Hague Conferences 
— the second was held from July to October, 1907 — 
the development of events in the different European 
countries was highly characteristic of the attitude of 
these countries and of their governments towards the 
problems of the Hague, and the occurrences during this 
period serve to emphasise in the sharpest manner the 
difference between England and Germany. 

Even before the first Conference was held, Goschen, 
the First Lord of the Admiralty, speaking on behalf of 
the English Conservative Government, made a definite 
declaration on March 9th, 1899, in favour of a regulation 
by treaty of the system of armaments. This declaration 
was confirmed in July, 1903, by Mr. Chamberlain, a 
member of the Government, with the observation that 
it was still regarded as binding on the English Cabinet. 1 

When in 1905 the Liberal party came into power and 
Campbell-Bannerman, a convinced pacifist, became 
leader of the Ministry, the English Government at once 
began to display an energetic and untiring activity on 
the same lines as the efforts which at the first Hague 
Conference had, chiefly in consequence of the opposition 
of Germany, produced only very modest results. 

This activity of the English Liberal Government was 
on so large a scale and was so comprehensive that it 
is impossible within the limits of this work to emphasise 
all their individual acts. In Parliament, at inter-Parlia- 
mentary Conferences, in speeches at clubs and at the 

*See Fried. Handbuch der Friedensbewegung, II, p. 767. 



HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 93 

Guildhall, in diplomatic negotiations with other Powers, 
in newspaper and magazine articles, English Ministers 
never grew weary of laying stress on the perniciousness 
for all nations of the competition in armaments by land 
and by sea, and never flagged in their efforts to devise 
remedial measures for this ruinous situation. These 
same men who are to-day represented to the deluded and 
infatuated German people as men refined in the prepara- 
tion and instigation of war, whose personal honour Ger- 
man historians dare to deny, men like Grey, Haldane, 
Lloyd George, Campbell-Bannerman, Asquith, and the 
others, these men devoted themselves with the utmost 
zeal to these problems, which, as they well saw, affected 
the vital nerve not only of England, but of all European 
states. "A policy of huge armaments," exclaimed Camp- 
bell-Bannerman in his programme, "keeps alive and 
stimulates and feeds the belief that force is the best, if 
not the only, solution of international differences." 1 

"I wish," Haldane, then Minister for War, declared 
in the House of Commons on March 8ch, 1906, "we were 
near the time when the nations would consider together 
the reduction of armaments . . . only by united action 
can we get rid of the burden which is pressing so heavily 
on all civilised nations." 2 

On the occasion of a banquet on September 26th in 
the same year the Prime Minister expressed the hope 
that the understanding then reached with regard to 
Morocco (the Algeciras Convention had been completed 
on April 7th) would lead to a possibility of reducing the 
oppressive military expenditure, and he declared that 
England would put itself at the head in this matter. 

To this intention the English Government gave effect. 
The outline of the Russian programme for the second 
Hague Conference, published in spring, 1906, contained 

1 [Albert Hall speech December 21st, 1905.] 
a [Hansard, 1906, Vol. 153, 8, 674.] 



94 I ACCUSE! 

nothing on the problem of armaments, presumably be- 
cause the Russian Government had gathered from the 
attitude of Germany at the first Conference that any dis- 
cussion of this question would be useless. The English 
Liberal Government now made the most determined 
efforts to secure the inclusion in the programme of the 
Conference of the question of armaments as well as the 
question of arbitration. A proposal on this point, put 
forward in the House of Commons by the Labour mem- 
ber, Mr. Vivian, was accepted unanimously amid ap- 
plause, and the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, 
associated himself with the resolution on behalf of the 
Government. 

"I do not believe," said Grey, "that at any time has 
the conscious public opinion in the various countries 
of Europe set more strongly in the direction of peace 
than at the present time, and yet the burden of military 
and naval expenditure goes on increasing. . . . No 
greater service could it {the Hague Conference) do, 
than to make the conditions of peace less expensive than 
they are at the present time. ... It is said we are wait- 
ing upon foreign nations in order to reduce our expen- 
diture. As a matter of fact, we are all waiting on each 
other. Some day or other somebody must take the first 
step. ... I do, on behalf of the Government, not only 
accept, but welcome such a resolution as this as a whole- 
some and beneficial expression of opinion." * 

When in July, 1906, the Interparliamentary Union, 
including 620 representatives from twenty-three coun- 
tries, met in London, the Prime Minister, Campbell-Ban- 
nerman, made a memorable speech in opening the pro- 
ceedings : "Insist, in the name of humanity," he ex- 
claimed to the members, "that your Government should 
go to the Conference at the Hague with the firm inten- 
tion with which we ourselves are going, with the inten- 
1 [Hansard, 1906, Vol. 156, 78, 1414-5.] 



HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 95 

tion of diminishing the burdens of the Army and Navy 
Estimates." 

The American politician, William Jennings Bryan, 
who also was present, expressed himself in the same 
sense. A resolution, corresponding to the views then 
expressed, was carried unanimously. 

In the following year, some months before the open- 
ing of the Conference, Campbell-Bannerman spoke even 
more strongly in a meeting of the House of Commons 
on March 5th, 1907, in support of the idea of a common 
restriction of armaments. He declared that it was the 
duty of England to bring this matter forward for dis- 
cussion before the second Hague Conference, "holding 
the opinion that there is a great movement of feeling 
among thinking people in all the nations of the world 
in favour of . . . some restraint on the enormous ex- 
penditure involved in the present system so long as it 
exists. . . . We have desired and still desire to place 
ourselves in the very front rank of those who think that 
the warlike attitude of Powers as displayed by the ex- 
cessive growth of armaments is a curse to Europe, and 
that the sooner it is checked, in however moderate a de- 
gree, the better." 1 

The leading men in the other countries of Europe and 
of America also gave expression to views similar to 
those of the English Ministers. Leon Bourgeois in Paris, 
Tittoni, then Foreign Minister in Rome, Roosevelt in 
his message to Congress, all expressed themselves in 
favour of an agreement with regard to armaments, and 
a discussion of this question at the Hague Conference. 

Only Austria and Germany made once again a vain- 
glorious exception. In reply to an inquiry on the sub- 
ject Count Gulochowski gave in the Austrian Delega- 
tions only an evasive answer. In Germany the mere 
idea of an international discussion of these questions 
1 [Hansard, 1907, Vol. 170, 78, 675.] 



96 I ACCUSE! 

was at once enough to let loose the devil of nationalism. 
Behind the efforts of the other Powers they scented, as 
usual, a cunning trick to deprive Germany of her de- 
fences, and they professed to see the danger of war 
threatening them in the inclusion of such a point in the 
Hague programme. "The nearer the Peace Conference 
approaches," so wrote the Tdgliche Rundschau in a lead- 
ing article on April 9th, 1907, "the clearer it becomes 
that it is expressly characterised by tendencies inimical 
to peace." Herr Bassermann, a representative in the 
Reichstag, did not venture to hope for a more peaceful 
situation until after the Hague Conference had been 
safely got over. The Prussian Minister of War osten- 
tatiously emphasised Germany's readiness for war. 
Liebermann von Sonnenberg, a representative in the 
House, concluded a patriotic Pan-German speech in the 
Reichstag with the courageous words : "Let them come." 
And last, but not least, Prince Billow did not allow 
himself to hope for any results from the discussion of 
the problem at the Hague, and publicly expressed his 
intention of "leaving the discussion to be conducted by 
those Powers alone who hoped that any success might 
result from it." 

That was the answer which Germany gave to the Eng- 
lish proposal for an international agreement on arma- 
ments. 

SECOND HAGUE CONFERENCE: ENGLAND AND GERMANY 

The negotiations which took place at the Conference 
corresponded to the very promising way in which it 
began. Matters took pretty much the same course as 
at the first Conference. England wanted a discussion 
of the problem of armaments; Germany, however, de- 
clined it. To avoid a conflict a way out was sought and 
found. The first representative of England, the Lord 



HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 97 

Chief Justice, Sir Edward Fry, delivered a speech in 
which he elucidated the problem from every point of 
view, and proposed a resolution which declared that it 
was eminently desirable that Governments should re- 
sume their study of the question. This resolution was 
unanimously adopted, since according to the arrange- 
ment made no discussion could take place. 

Once more we see that Germany scored a brilliant 
success; once again a pathway to progress was barri- 
caded ! 

When a member of the House, Bebel, interpellated 
Prince Bulow in the sitting of the Reichstag of Novem- 
ber 2 ist, 1907, with regard to the attitude of the German 
delegates, the Imperial Chancellor could truthfully reply 
that the German delegates had taken no part in a dis- 
cussion on the question of armaments, because such a 
discussion had not taken place. But he forgot to add 
that this exclusion of a debate had been dictated by 
Germany. 

In England there was naturally universal disappoint- 
ment over the failure of the noble-minded efforts of 
leading Liberal Ministers. A few months before his 
death Campbell-Bannerman gave expression to this dis- 
appointment in the words : "We had hoped that a great 
step forward might be made in the direction of putting 
a stop to the increasing competition of armaments. We 
were disappointed." 

They were disappointed but not disheartened. After 
this failure to arrive at the desired end along the path of 
international agreement the method of private negotia- 
tions with Germany was adopted. We shall see later 
with what success. 

Apart from the problem of armaments the question 
which chiefly engaged the attention of the second Hague 
Conference was naturally that of international arbitra- 
tion. The problem before them was to give to the torso 



98 I ACCUSE! 

of 1889 a firmer and more harmonious form. It was in- 
tended that the compulsory element, which had miscar- 
ried owing to Germany, should be inserted in the earlier 
resolutions. In order not to encounter once more the 
opposition of Germany a very complicated proposal had 
been prepared, which, it is true, made it compulsory for 
the contracting Powers to submit to arbitration, but only 
subject to the exclusion of all questions which affected 
important interests or the independence of the parties 
to the dispute. 

Even this limited element of compulsion encountered 
the determined resistance of Germany. The proposal 
was remodelled in every direction in order to meet Ger- 
many; but not even this watery proposal gained the ap- 
proval of Germany, which voted against it along with 
Austria, while the great majority of States, including 
England, France, and Russia, accepted the proposal by 
32 votes to 9. 

But even then the path of tribulation of international 
arbitration was not ended. The proposal was put for- 
ward that the agreement accepted by so great a majority 
should be binding at least on those Powers which had 
concurred in it. But the German representative, Frei- 
herr von Marschall, protested against this as a violation 
of the principle of unanimity, and no other course was 
open to the Conference than to be content on this ques- 
tion also with a declaration which, indeed, expressed the 
platonic inclination of the Powers to the principle of 
compulsory arbitration, but, in practice, "preserved for 
each of the Powers represented the maintenance of its 
own standpoint." 

Thus the number of Germany's successes increase! 
Our title of glory, that of being everywhere a drag on 
the peaceful understanding between the nations, will 
remain undisputed, but it can scarcely contribute to mak- 
ing us loved throughout the world. 



HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 99 

ENGLISH PROPOSALS FOR A POLITICAL UNDERSTANDING 
AND FOR A NAVAL AGREEMENT WITH GERMANY. 

Scarcely had the sound of the peaceful concluding 
words of the President of the Conference died away in 
the Rittersaal at the Hague when the English Ministers 
began to turn their attention to devising new ways 
whereby they could attain the object that hovered be- 
fore them — an end equally advantageous to all the na- 
tions. After all outstanding questions between England 
and France had been disposed of by the Convention of 
April, 1904, and the conflicts of interest between Eng- 
land and Russia had likewise been overcome by the 
Agreement of 1907, the Liberal Government, which, 
after the death of Campbell-Bannerman, was now under 
the leadership of Asquith, regarded it as the most impor- 
tant task of its foreign policy to establish its relations 
with Germany on a basis calculated to exclude, as far as 
possible, the occurrence of conflicts. There were no real 
conflicting interests or occasions of friction between 
England and Germany, or at most these only existed 
to a very small extent. The difficulties in East Africa 
had been regulated by the treaty concluded in 1890 by 
Salisbury and Caprivi whereby Heligoland was handed 
over to Germany, and in return concessions were made 
to England in East Africa. Questions arising in Asia 
Minor scarcely offered enough material for a serious con- 
flict, and the treaty concluded in the early summer of 
1914, notwithstanding the tension in the political situa- 
tion, shows that the peaceful demarcation of spheres 
of interest between England and Germany involved no 
particular difficulty where there was mutual good will. 

"What, then, is the object of this competition in naval 
armaments, which constantly grows more fatal for both 
sides?" — this was the question which the English Gov- 
ernment and English public opinion was bound to ask. 



100 I ACCUSE! 

If both countries desired peace, why should they ruin 
each other in armaments? If, however, one side pro- 
poses limitation of armament by treaty, as England did 
at the Hague in 1889 and 1907, and the other side con- 
stantly declines any such limitation, is it not, in these 
circumstances, a justifiable suspicion that the party which 
declines entertains unconfessed intentions against the 
party which makes the proposal? 

The English public were logically bound to propound 
such questions to themselves, and they might quite rightly 
put the further question : What would Germany, what 
would the whole of Europe say, if England, the leading 
Power on sea, were suddenly to begin to create a force 
by land, which sooner or later might become equal to the 
German in strength ? Would not this rightly be regarded 
as a threat against the Power competing against her 
on the Continent? The German naval law and the con- 
stant increases in naval strength effected at short inter- 
vals of time, whereby Germany, in the course of twenty 
years, has become the second naval Power in the world, 
was bound to place the English Government before the 
alternative of either answering Germany's naval arma- 
ments by a corresponding increase in their own or em- 
barking on the attempt to make good, by a private agree- 
ment between Germany and England, the general ar- 
rangements which had been wrecked at the Hague. Mr. 
Asquith's Government chose in the first place the latter 
way, which was thorny enough in view of Germany's 
opposition in principle to restrictions of armaments of 
any kind, imposed by way of a treaty. 

This disinclination must, indeed remain entirely in- 
comprehensible to the ordinary man. It is probably a 
part of the superior insight of those who govern by the 
grace of God to be in a position to dispute the correct- 
ness of the following simple calculations. The English 
say to the Germans : "We consider that the present re- 



HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 101 

lation in strength of our two fleets, sixteen to ten, is a 
suitable one, and in any case, since we do not possess an 
army of any importance, we consider ourselves under 
an obligation to stick to this proportion for the main- 
tenance of our power and for the protection of our 
trade and of our over-sea possessions. If you, Germany, 
agree to this proportion being fixed, so much the better 
for both of us ; further construction will then be useless, 
for the relative strength of the one compared to the 
other will always remain the same. If, however, you do 
not agree, so much the worse for you. We on our side 
will then lay down two ships for every ship which you 
lay down; the relation of sixteen to ten will thus be 
at once changed to your disadvantage, absolutely as 
well as relatively. When you have built ten new ships, 
that is to say, when you have got as far as twenty, we 
will have built twenty new ships, and will have reached 
thirty-six, etc. The absolute distance between our two 
fleets will thus constantly increase, and the relative posi- 
tion will constantly become more unfavourable for you. 
In the end we will ruin each other, and will be like the 
Kilkenny cats which ate each other up until only the 
tails were left. It is for you to choose. If you decide 
on our first proposal, in ten years' time you will be in as 
safe a position as you are to-day, and you will have 
spared your money and your people. If you choose the 
second proposal your security will be diminished every 
year, and at the same time you will be gradually ruining 
yourself; and it will be but a small consolation to you 
that you are at the same time bringing us to the verge 
of ruin also. 

One would have thought that a ragged schoolboy, who 
had just learned the first elements of the multiplication 
table, would have understood this calculation, and would 
have been overjoyed to accept the first proposal. The 
German Imperial Government could not rise to this 



102 I ACCUSE! 

height, and so the wearisome negotiations constantly re- 
newed from the side of England — they might be called 
the seven years' armaments war of 1907-14 — collapsed 
without result. Indeed, it may be asserted that the fail- 
ure of the negotiations, the constant increase of arma- 
ments caused thereby, and the increasing tension in the 
political situation due to the increased armaments, are 
to a considerable extent responsible for the fact that a 
real war has at last grown out of the war of arma- 
ments. 

The responsibility for this is exclusively Germany's, 
as a short account of the relevant events will reveal. 

At the seventeenth World Peace Congress, which met 
in London in July and August, 1908, the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, Mr. Lloyd George, advocated with pas- 
sionate words an understanding between England and 
Germany, and lamented "that it should be necessary in 
the twentieth century of the Christian Era to hold a 
meeting in a civilised country to protest against the ex- 
penditure by Christian communities of 400 millions a 
year upon preparing one nation to kill another." Mr. 
Asquith, the Prime Minister, on the occasion of the Lord 
Mayor's banquet in 1908, gave the assurance that Eng- 
land would "not be reluctant to grasp any hand that is 
extended to us in good will and in good faith." On 
March 16th in the following year Mr. Asquith stated to 
the House of Commons that the question of a mutual 
reduction of expenditure for naval purposes had more 
than once formed the subject of communications between 
the two Governments, but unfortunately without result. 1 
This utterance of the English Prime Minister led, in the 
last days of March, to a discussion in the German Reich- 
stag, in the course of which various speakers urgently 
besought the Government to grasp somewhat more ener- 
getically the hand offered by England. Bassermann, a 
1 [Hansard, 1909. Vol. 72, 8, 1,459.] 



HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 103 

member of the House, felt, of course, all kinds of 
scruples, and prepared the way for Prince Biilow, who 
in the first place denied that any definite proposal had 
been made by England, and on the general question "held 
out no hope of any effective results from negotia- 
tions with reference to the limitation of naval con- 
struction." 

These utterances of Biilow occasioned a new discus- 
sion in the English House of Commons, in the course 
of which the Foreign Secretary, Sir E. Grey, delivered a 
highly important speech on the naval competition be- 
tween England and Germany. For England, declared 
the Foreign Secretary, the Navy was what the Army was 
to Germany. The superiority of the English Navy must 
be maintained, but on the basis of this superiority an 
understanding might very well be arranged between the 
two countries. Grey let it be seen that England might 
be prepared to alter her attitude with regard to the ques- 
tion of the capture of an enemy's private property at 
sea, if this would be accepted as a starting-point for 
a diminution of naval expenditure. 1 

In introducing the Navy Estimates in 1909 Mr. Mc- 
Kenna, then First Lord of the Admiralty, speaking in 
the House of Commons on July 26th, declared that "the 
British Government not only expressed its desire, but by 
something much stronger than words showed its deter- 
mination to give the lead in restricting armaments, and 
for three successive years the British. Government did 
its utmost to convince the world of the futility of its 
race in armaments, and of the desirability of curtailing 
construction." 2 After enumerating all the previous en- 
deavours of England, which unfortunately had proved 
fruitless, Mr. Asquith also declared that even then the 
door was still open and that they were anxious and even 

1 [Hansard, 1909. Vol. 3, 61.] 
* [Hansard, 1909. Vol. 8, 859.] 



104) I ACCUSE! 

eager to come to some arrangement with other Powers. 1 
Every indication that the German Government desired 
to enter into such an agreement would meet with the 
heartiest reception from the English Government. In 
answer to a question of a member Mr. Asquith answered 
shortly and definitely: "We have taken the initiative." 

The more the English Ministers revealed their en- 
deavour to arrive at an understanding with Germany on 
the question of naval armaments, the more did they be- 
come an object of attack and suspicion to the German 
chauvinist press. On July 14th, 19 10, Mr. Asquith was 
obliged to declare that the German Government had 
evaded further inquiries, stating that they were bound 
by a law, and that a modification of this law would not 
have the support of public opinion in Germany. 2 On 
the following day Mr. Lloyd George, speaking at a ban- 
quet, -denounced in passionate words "the epidemic of 
prodigality which seems to be sweeping over the world 
and sweeping to destruction." 

In reply to these earnest and uninterrupted efforts of 
the English Ministry the Imperial Chancellor, Bethmann 
Hollweg, offered in December, 1910, a few platonic ob- 
servations which must have acted like a stream of cold 
water: England, he said, had indeed made suggestions, 
but had submitted no positive proposals ; Germany in the 
pourparlers had constantly started from the idea that an 
open and unrestrained discussion leading to an under- 
standing with regard to their interests on both sides was 
the surest means of overcoming any distrust due to 
their relative strength by land and by water. "The mere 
continuance of a free and unrestrained exchange of 
thought on all questions connected with these matters is 
a guarantee for the friendly intention . . ." &c. 

As Thoas says in "Iphigenie" : 

2 [Hansard, 1909. Vol. 8, 879.] 
1 [Hansard, 1910. Vol. 19, 645.] 



HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 105 

"A flood of words is useless in refusing ; 
The other hears in all the one word : 'No.' " * 

This "No!" resounds again with full distinctness in 
the following year. In the House of Commons on 
March 13th, 191 1, Grey had once more emphasised the 
necessity of arriving at an agreement with Germany and 
of restricting the continuing increase of the expenditure 
on armaments. He foresaw that if this tremendous ex- 
penditure on, and rivalry of, armaments continued, it 
must in the long run break civilisation down. The bur- 
den of armaments was a greater danger than war itself, 
since it involved a bleeding to death in time of peace. 2 

This speech of Grey formed the subject of the debate 
in the Reichstag on March 30th, 191 1, in which the 
Imperial Chancellor — now quite plainly and without any 
concealment — declared that the question of an agreement 
as to armaments was insoluble so long as men were men 
and States were States. 

Thus the decisive word was now spoken, and in view 
of Parliamentary conditions in Germany little signifi- 
cance could be attached to the fact that the Reichstag 
passed a resolution calling upon the Chancellor to enter 
into negotiations with other Powers with regard to the 
limitation of armaments should the occasion arise. Ac- 
cording to German political law of the Bismarckian tra- 
dition the Imperial Chancellor is, as is well known, 
merely the servant of his lord, and is not obliged to pay 
any attention to Parliamentary resolutions. 

But the English did not yet relax their efforts. Events 
in Morocco had led to the dispatch of a German warship 
to Agadir, and to negotiations arising out of this be- 
tween the Powers affected — negotiations which put a 

1 "Man spricht vergebens viel, urn zu versagen 

Der andere hort in allem nur das Nein." 

2 [Hansard, 191 1. Vol. 22, 1,985-6.] 



106 I accuse r 

severe strain on the peace of Europe. In the autumn 
of 191 1, the negotiations at last arrived, through many 
perils, at the goal, with the result that the disputes be- 
tween France and Germany with regard to Morocco 
were finally composed, and as an equivalent for France's 
freedom of action in Morocco a portion of French Congo 
was ceded to the German Empire. Scarcely had this 
cloud passed away from the political horizon when Sir 
Edward Grey emphasised anew, in the English Parlia- 
ment on November 27th, 191 1, England's urgent desire 
for the establishment of better relations with Germany. 
The existing friendships of England did not constitute 
a hindrance to the conclusion of new friendships. Eng- 
land had co-operated in securing a peaceful solution of 
the Morocco crisis, the air was now purified, and he 
would gladly welcome any wish on the part of Ger- 
many for better relations with England. 1 

In the beginning of February, 1912, the English Gov- 
ernment sent Lord Haldane to Berlin, not as an official 
plenipotentiary, but with the task of sounding the ground 
in conversations with the Chancellor and the Emperor, 
with whom Haldane was a persona gratissima, and if 
possible of preparing the way for the political and naval 
agreement which had been so long sought. The prelude 
to Lord Haldane's activity was not exactly encouraging; 
two days before his arrival in Berlin the Emperor, in 
opening the Reichstag, had announced great increases 
both in the Army and in the Navy. The increase in the 
Navy was to extend to no less than three capital ships, 
many submarines, and fifteen hundred men. On this 
Lord Haldane put to the Chancellor and to Admiral 
von Tirpitz the very proper question : What would be 
the use of negotiations aiming at friendly relations be- 
tween the two Powers, if Germany was going at the 
game moment t o increase her battle fleet as a precaution 

1 [Hansard, 191 1. Vol. 32, 43-65.] 



HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 107 

against England, and thereby compel England to a cor- 
responding increase on her side? Negotiations with a 
view to friendly relations accompanied by increases in 
the Navy would provoke worldwide derision. The Ger- 
man representatives indicated that a naval agreement 
without a simultaneous political Entente was purposeless, 
but they also at once emphasised that even in the event 
of a political understanding, there could be no question 
of a reduction in the naval programme, but that at the 
most a certain retardation in carrying it out might be 
approved. 1 The promise of a possible retardation in 
naval construction was even further limited in that it 
was to be an "understanding and not a written agree- 
ment." 

Thus, while on the one hand the aim pursued with un- 
tiring zeal by the Liberal English Government for seven 
years, the aim of arriving at a cessation of naval arma- 
ments on both sides, remained unachieved — since the pro- 
posed retardation, which was not even of a binding na- 
ture, would result neither in such a cessation nor in a 
saving of expenditure — Germany, on the other hand, 
demanded, as an equivalent for these so-called conces- 
sions, political conditions which it was simply impossible 
for England to fulfil. The attitude assumed by the Ger- 
man Government in connection with all Anglo-German 
negotiations is in itself sufficiently remarkable, namely, 
that an equivalent could justifiably be demanded in re- 
turn for a concession, which, after all, did not repre- 
sent a sacrifice on one side, but was a duty implicit in 
the vital interests of both. With just as much right an 
equivalent could have been demanded by England, who 
was equally ready to bind herself. 

1 These and the following facts are taken from Sir Edward Cook's 
pamphlet entitled: How Britain Strove for Peace. A Record of 
Anglo-German Negotiations 1808- 1914. Told from authoritative 
sources. (Macmillan and Co., London, 1914.) 



108 I ACCUSE! 

But, to pursue the question, what was the equivalent 
demanded by Germany? Germany demanded neither 
more nor less — and here it revived a demand already 
formulated in previous years by the Chancellor, Beth- 
mann Hollweg — than the obligation for Britain of un- 
conditional neutrality in the event of any European con- 
flict in which Germany might be involved. England was 
thus to free herself from her engagements to the En- 
tente and was to withhold herself from every co-opera- 
tion in European questions. In view of the close alliance 
with Austria it was scarcely possible to conceive a con- 
flict in which Germany might not be involved, either 
on account of her own interests or on account of those 
of Austria, yet everywhere England was expected to re- 
main an inactive spectator, and to allow Germany and 
her ally full freedom to rule the roast on the Continent. 
Even treaty-obligations to protect neutrals would have 
been abolished had England concurred in the German 
proposal of an unconditional neutrality in all disputes 
affecting Germany. 

It is, therefore, not surprising that this suggestion, 
which had already been rejected between 1909 and 191 1, 
should again have been rejected in 19 12 after Haldane's 
visit; indeed, it amounted to no more than a demand 
that England should simply renounce her position as a 
European great Power. This demand would in any case 
have been monstrous, even if its fulfilment had been 
sought to be purchased at a high price. But what was 
the price offered by Herr von Bethmann Hollweg? An 
unbinding, unwritten, temporary retardation, which in- 
volved no reduction in naval construction on the basis 
of the most recent increase of the fleet in 1912. 

This suggestion was really rather strong, and postu- 
lated a high degree of simplicity on the part of the 
shrewd English men of business. What, indeed, would 
German diplomacy have said if it had been suggested 



HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 109 

that Germany should sell the birthright of her position 
as a great Power in Europe in exchange for the mess 
of pottage of an English retardation in naval construc- 
tion? 

Sir Edward Grey was obliged to decline the German 
proposal; he did not, however, content himself with 
merely declining it, but he repeated again on this occa- 
sion what he had said in previous years in public as well 
as in diplomatic negotiations; that is to say: 

1. That England could not agree to an unconditional 
obligation to observe neutrality, such as Germany de- 
manded, but, on the other hand, she would always be 
ready, as she had hitherto been, to work in common with 
Germany in the interests of the peace of Europe; 

2. That the Triple Entente was not based on general 
political formulae, but on a settlement of specific ques- 
tions affecting the interests of the Entente Powers, and 
that only indirectly by the settlement of these questions 
and by the removal of causes of friction had relations 
of friendship resulted; 

3. That these relations had neither an exclusive nor 
an offensive character against Germany and that there 
was no reason why Germany should not enter into simi- 
lar relations with England. 

In order to give as precise a form as possible to these 
ideas the English Cabinet resolved to express them in 
a short formula, which was handed by Sir Edward Grey 
to the German Ambassador, Count Metternich, and 
which was intended to serve as a basis for further naval 
negotiations. The formula ran as follows : — 

"The two Powers being naturally desirous of securing 
peace and friendship between them, England declares 
that she will neither make, nor join in, any unprovoked 
attack upon Germany. Aggression upon Germany is 
not the subject, and forms no part, of any treaty, under- 
standing, or combination to which England is now a 



110 I ACCUSE! 

party, nor will she become a party to anything that has 
such an object." 

England thus promised that she would, for herself, 
make no unprovoked attack upon Germany and that she 
would not share in any such venture; she further de- 
clared that an attack upon Germany was neither contem- 
plated nor permitted by any treaty or convention to 
which she was a party. Lastly, England promised that 
she would never be a party in any such treaty or agree- 
ment. This was thus a promise of non-aggression in 
the widest sense of the word. What more could Ger- 
many reasonably ask? Germany was secured against 
every attack on the part of England, and with this se- 
curity any reason or pretence for naval competition col- 
lapsed, unless — and there's the rub! — unless Germany 
herself had aggressive intentions against her neighbours, 
England's friends in the Entente, and thus indirectly 
against England. Here we have the salient point, on 
which the year-long negotiations between the two coun- 
tries constantly and necessarily came to grief. 

England offered the assurance that she would not 
attack. Germany, however, asked for security to be 
able to attack undisturbed. The English offer had little 
value for Germany, since the German Government knew 
quite well from the attitude of the English Liberal Cabi- 
net since 1905 that there was no ground to fear an at- 
tack from the side of England. The only point that mat- 
tered to Germany was that she should be able to count 
on English neutrality, under all circumstances, in all 
Continental conflicts, even if they were provoked by Ger- 
many or her ally, and even if they affected the inde- 
pendence of neutral countries, and thereby directly or 
indirectly affected English interests. By isolating Eng- 
land, Germany desired to make her path secure, in the 
first place, to a hegemony on the Continent, in order 
later on to rise from this advantageous position to the 



HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 111 

perpetual leadership of the world at the cost of England. 
This idea also dominates, as we shall see, German's dip- 
lomatic preparations for the war in the last days of July, 
1914. 

"The thought is clever — devilishly so ! 
Apart from that, it might be called damned silly." 1 

Neither at an earlier nor at a later date did the English 
allow themselves to be entrapped by this lime. The 
negotiations of 1912 failed, like all other negotiations 
before and after this, on Germany's demand for neu- 
trality. 

But one last English attempt, again along different 
lines, was still to be made. After the new German navy 
increase of 1912, after Haldane's visit had passed with- 
out results, and after the last negotiations between Grey 
and Metternich, the British Government resumed an at- 
tempt — already undertaken under Campbell-Bannerman 
in 1906 — to induce in the other side a better insight into 
the interests of both parties through the measures actu- 
ally adopted by them in connection with the Navy, with- 
out having recourse to any diplomatic negotiations. Al- 
though in spring, 1906, the German navy programme of 
1900 had again been increased by six large cruisers, the 
English Government announced in July of the same 
year that the programme laid before Parliament in 
March for the construction of new ships would be re- 
duced by 25 per cent, in the case of battleships, by 60 
per cent, in the case of destroyers, and by 33 per cent. 
in the case of submarines. The reason for this one- 
sided voluntary reduction was, as the Government ex- 
pressly declared, on the one hand, to announce to the 
whole world, before the meeting of the second Hague 

1 "War" der Gedank' nicht so verwtinscht gescheit, 
Man war' versucht, ihn herzlich dumm zu nennen." 



112 I ACCUSE! 

Conference, England's firm intention to reduce the bur- 
den of armaments, and, on the other, to induce other 
Powers to follow the same procedure. This second 
object was of course not realised in the case of Germany; 
rather the contrary effect was produced. On three dif- 
ferent occasions — to the English Ambassador, Sir F. 
Lascelles, to the English Under Secretary of State, Sir 
Charles Hardinge, who accompanied King Edward to 
Germany, and to the English Minister of War, Mr. 
Haldane — the Kaiser in the late summer and in the 
autumn of the same year personally expressed strong 
disapprobation of any attempt to bring the question of 
armaments before the Hague Conference, and declined 
to allow the German delegates to take any part in this 
superfluous and futile discussion. There could, as a 
matter of course, be no question of the English example 
being followed on the part of Germany. 

In spite of this failure a similar attempt was made in 
1912-1913 by Mr. Churchill, the First Lord of the Ad- 
miralty. New negotiations with Germany after recent 
experiences appeared futile, but as an alternative method 
Churchill declared, in introducing the estimates in the 
two years mentioned, that he pledged himself that any 
retardation or reduction in German construction should 
be followed by this country in full proportion. If Ger- 
many decided to take a naval holiday and build no ships 
in any given year, England would at once follow suit 
and drop her programme for the year likewise. In this 
way "without negotiations, bargainings, or the slightest 
restriction upon the sovereign freedom of either power" 
relief might be obtained for both nations. 

This declaration of Churchill, which as we have ob- 
served was officially repeated on two different occasions, 
remained unanswered and unreciprocated by Germany, 
presumably because here also she was awaiting "positive 
proposals/' which would then of course have been an- 



HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 113 

swered or reciprocated to no greater purpose than had 
been done on previous occasions. 

This is the history of the Anglo-German negotiations 
extending over many years, of the vain wooing of Eng- 
land for Germany's favour — a wooing which was un- 
attended by success, since the coy beauty would sell 
her favour only at a price which the wooer could not 
pay unless he were prepared to sacrifice himself. Once 
more it appeared, as if in this case also circumstances 
were stronger than the will of man. The work of peace 
pursued in common throughout the Balkan crisis, the 
success achieved in maintaining peace, attributable exclu- 
sively to the co-operation of the two Empires, had quite 
automatically given a more friendly form to the re- 
lations of the two countries to each other. The delimi- 
tation of the spheres of interest in Asia Minor held 
out the promise of a further favourable development of 
these relations, but unfortunately this did not touch the 
kernel of the question; the constantly increasing danger 
involved in the competition in naval armaments, occa- 
sioned by Germany's infatuated refusal of every agree- 
ment. 

What would the world have looked like to-day if Ger- 
many had accepted the last proposal put forward by 
Grey in 191 2? The security from every attack on the 
part of England and her Allies would not indeed have 
diverted Germany from her imperialistic ambitions, 
which in their nature were bound to be aggressive, but 
it would have deprived the German Government of the 
pretext which has enabled them to represent their war 
of prestige and expansion as a war of defence, and with- 
out this pretext it would have been impossible to have 
urged into so fearful a war the German people, the 
great majority of whom are attached to peace. The 
truce in naval armaments would in addition have created 
a more friendly atmosphere between Germany and Eng- 



114 I ACCUSE! 

land, and as a consequence between the Triple Alliance 
and the Triple Entente. It may be presumed that in 
Germany the last enormous increase in the army and 
the measure providing for the raising of millions of 
pounds would not have come into being. France would 
not have introduced her system of three-year service, 
and the Austro-Serbian dispute — which, as we shall see 
later, any child could have solved — would not have led 
to the universal war. 

What Are We Fighting for? 

If Germany really had no other objects than those 
constantly advanced in all Imperial and princely speeches 
and in all speeches by the Chancellor, "Security from at- 
tack, free development for her forces, unhampered at- 
tention to her culture," how could all these possessions 
have been obtained more surely or more cheaply than 
by accepting the English proposals ? 

"We will persevere until we have the assurance that 
no one will again disturb our peace, a peace in which 
we will care for and develop German character and Ger- 
man strength as a free nation," — with these words the 
Imperial Chancellor concluded his speech on the 2nd of 
December. A few days later the Emperor delivered an 
address on the Eastern scene of war to the delegates 
of the German and Austrian divisions : "We are fight- 
ing," he exclaimed, "for a just cause, for freedom, for 
the right of our nation to exist, for a long future peace." 
His Majesty might have been respectfully answered in 
these words, "May it please your Majesty, what we are 
supposed to be fighting for we had before the war began. 
We had our freedom, the right to our national existence, 
which no one disputed, and we had had a long undis- 
turbed peace. Why then, your Majesty, are we fight- 
ing?" And one might have added: If Germany be- 



HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 115 

lieved herself to be imperilled — which is not proved, and 
which cannot be proved — why then did she not gain for 
herself the greater security offered by England? The 
security, which was then offered in peace, can never 
again be achieved by victory on the battlefield. It could 
not only have been obtained at less expense — for then 
it would have cost neither life nor treasure — it would 
also have been more enduring and more tenable. Ac- 
cording to the dictum of Sallust, Kingdoms can only be 
maintained by the means by which they were created, 
and in the same way an international treaty, which is 
intended to regulate the relations of nations in peace, is 
more surely cemented by peaceful than by military 
means. Treaties of Peace after war always contain the 
tacit clause, rebus sic stantibus, which Kant, in his first 
preliminary article of his work On Perpetual Peace, re- 
gards as a hindrance to an enduring condition of peace. 
Treaties of peace, however, established in time of peace, 
which arise out of common interests and which do not 
bear on their forehead the remembrance of death and 
destruction, of hatred and vengeance, like the mark of 
Cain, such treaties hold aere perennius, and like all good 
things carry in them the seeds of further good. 

So I again say that what we are supposed to be fight- 
ing for, we already possessed. We possessed it more se- 
curely than we will possess it for generations even after 
a victorious war, and anything that we lacked we could 
have obtained without war by a treaty in peace. 

The Freedom Which "They" Mean. 1 

But as we have said the -questions at stake are quite 
different from security, freedom, and the right to exist. 
The word "freedom" is to-day very often heard in the 

1 [The title of this section is an adaptation of Max von Schenken- 
dorf's song: "Freiheit, die ich meine."] 



.116 I ACCUSE! 

mouths of men who formerly crossed themselves thrice 
on hearing the forbidden word from any other quarter. 
We have all, without exception, become lovers of free- 
dom over night, — above all those who previously ex- 
tolled the "state of dependence willed by God." We 
have become so enamoured of freedom that we mean to 
bring it not only to our nation, but also to all the other 
nations in the world. (See the explanation of the Im- 
perial Chancellor to the American people.) We simply 
no longer know how far the impulse to freedom will 
carry us. . . . 

"Be embraced, ye countless millions ! 
With the wide world's ardent kiss." l 

Social democrats, clericals, progressives, Poles, Danes, 
Alsatians — all who were formerly enemies of the Empire 
are now pressed by the Prussian Junker to his sensitive 
heart — that is, on the assumption that they keep the 
"peace within" 2 which, as is known, consists in think- 
ing, speaking, and writing as the Junkers think, speak, 
and write. The transaction, however, is not a mutual 
one, it is a societas leonina in the worst sense of the 
word. Anyone who allows himself to think, or write, or 
speak otherwise than is pleasing to the governing class 
is suppressed, punished, or if need be, shot dead. That 
is the freedom which they mean. 

The German people will in time realise to what bond- 
age these apostles of freedom are leading them. After 
every period of exaltation of the German people a period 
of bitterest bondage has always followed. It was so 
after 1813, after 1848, and after 1870, when the first 
years of the intoxication of victory had passed away. 

1 ["Seid umschlungen, Millionen Diesen Kuss der ganzen Welt."] 
2 [Burgfrieden. The jurisdiction of a castle, the peace within the 
castle, hence almost equivalent to the "civil truce."] 



HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 117 

It will be precisely the same after 19 14. The soldiers 
and the Junkers, who in essential matters form one class, 
feel themselves entirely in their element in war! It is 
quite to their liking to suppress the freedom of the Press, 
to suppress the right of free assembly, to throttle trade 
and industry — the representatives of which had already 
taken up too much room at the Imperial Court. "Cer- 
tain barriers of Court etiquette" — we find in Liman, the 
apostle of the Crown Prince — "still make inaccessible 
to wealth certain pathways which are only open to the 
sons of the old agnati of the kingdom and to officers; 
otherwise the millionaire has carried off the victory, and 
the society of the Court jostles in the salons of lucky 
speculators or their heirs. The nobility of wealth grows 
up, a new Junkerdom, which never saw a battlefield; it 
is even spreading to the country, and already the capital 
of the Empire is surrounded with a golden girdle of 
luxurious estates. The list of guests invited to accom- 
pany the Emperor on his northern tours shows the names 
of numerous financial magnates. The new aristocracy 
carries instead of the sword the dividend warrant, in- 
stead of the shield the company prospectus, and it bears 
as its weapon the bill of exchange. The nobility of the 
sword, however, withdraws into the background; the 
sons of those men who once won the battles of the 
Hohenzollerns sit embarrassed on their fathers' acres. 
And capital increases in the hands of a few until it as- 
sumes gigantic proportions, and with it respect for 
money whether it has been inherited or graspingly ac- 
quired." 

These are the thoughts of authoritative circles in 
Prussia and in Germany on the subject of trade and in- 
dustry. The dividend warrant and the bill of exchange 
are for them the contemptible emblems of these ranks 
of the nation on which Germany's greatness and her 
position in the world are built, and which in the end 



118 I ACCUSE! 

must provide the means of satisfying the military mega- 
lomania of her "nobility of the sword." And is it likely 
that those who entertain these thoughts will bring to the 
German people freedom and equal privileges? When 
the Moor has done his duty, he will be allowed to go, 1 
just as after 1813, 1848, and 1870. Even to-day, dur- 
ing the war, the smelling-out of demagogues has begun. 
Everywhere good Prussians are ferreting about for sus- 
picious people who do not think like good Prussians or 
good Germans. This can be seen at home, and even 
more among Germans abroad. A military and a Junker 
reaction will set in after the war such as the present 
generation has never seen. And that is called fighting 
for freedom, for German culture! 

The End of Peace. Security? 

The trend of thought of these circles will be notice- 
able and will make itself felt on the conclusion of peace. 
While German professors are bending over their maps 
at their study-tables and are elaborating international 
plans for the future formation of Europe, these men of 
action are laughing at the crazy ideas of the Utopians, 
just as they described the negotiations of the Hague 
Conference as "chatter about everlasting peace" (Gen- 
eral-Major von Deimling) and the English proposals 
for agreement as lies and deception. For them there 
is only one end of peace : oppression and security — 
security, with the same brilliant success as has been se- 
cured for us by the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine ; that 
annexation which, so far, has brought us only difficulties 
and no advantages either of a political or of an economi- 
cal nature, which has, indeed, from a military point of 
view, been directly injurious to us, since it led to the 

1 ["The Moor has done his work, — the Moor may go." — 

— Schiller, Fiesco.] 



HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 119 

creation of that new, and apparently impregnable, line 
of fortresses, before which we have now been sitting for 
more than five months. Security of our frontiers: be- 
yond this the train of thought of our authoritative cir- 
cles does not go, but with security they include, of course, 
expansion in and outside Europe. They mean security 
at any cost, without respect to the rights of nationalities, 
the free destinies of nations, which after all we pretend 
that we are defending, and without respect to the fact, 
revealed by experience, that such a brutal policy of se- 
curity constantly bears with itself the germs of new wars. 
This security we could have had at a cheaper rate 
and with a better prospect of permanence by an agree- 
ment with England. France and Russia were as far 
from entertaining aggressive intentions against Germany 
as England was. He who maintains that such inten- 
tions existed is bound to produce evidence to prove their 
existence. He who denies their existence is not obliged 
to prove the contrary. 

Did France Mean to Attack Us? 

So far as England is concerned I have been able to 
produce conclusive rebutting evidence. With regard to 
France I may be allowed to deal with the matter briefly, 
since there is scarcely anyone in Germany — apart, of 
course, from the Government — who seriously maintains 
the assertion that France intended to attack us. That 
France is not abused, but that, on the contrary, regret is 
expressed that she was drawn into the war, innocently 
and against her will, is one of the few remaining sympa- 
thetic traits in the public life of Germany of to-day. As 
a matter of fact, anyone who should advance the asser- 
tion that the French Republic of 19 14 entertained even 
the remotest idea of reconquering Alsace-Lorraine by 
force of arms, would merely prove that he knows nothing 



120 I ACCUSE! 

of the history or of the tendency of thought of modern 
France, and that his judgment is based on impressions, 
which may have been correct forty-four years ago, per- 
haps even thirty-rour or twenty-four years ago, but 
which in the last twenty years have more and more 
faded into a phantom. 

In framing this judgment I do not rely on newspaper 
articles, but on personal impressions gained in France 
during many periods of residence there, extending over 
many years. Until about the middle of the 'nineties 
the wound of Alsace-Lorraine still ached ; from that time 
it healed more and more, and about the beginning of 
the new century scarcely a trace of the old wound re- 
mained. The end of Boulangism rang in the end of 
the revanche idea; the worst of the noisy patriots, De- 
roulede at their head, were condemned or banished from 
France. The result of the Dreyfus affair, with the vic- 
tory of the party of illumination, purified the atmosphere 
from the powers of darkness, from the forces of political 
and clerical reaction, which in France were favourable 
to a policy of war, as they are to-day in Germany. Con- 
vinced friends of peace like Jules Simon, Frederick 
Passy, the Senator Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, 
and, above all, Jaures, gained more and more influence 
on serious public opinion, and pressed into the back- 
ground the noisy patriots of the Boulevard. The intel- 
lectual relations between France and Germany constantly 
became more intimate. Politicians, writers, actors and 
actresses of distinction, learned men and artists, brought 
about this exchange in matters of the mind on this side 
and on that, and by the reciprocation of visits succeeded 
in establishing personal relations between the countries. 
Coquelin and Sarah Bernhardt were honoured in Ger- 
many and were received by the Emperor with marks of 
distinction. In the summer of 1901 two French officers 
of high rank paid an official visit to Berlin, and were in- 



HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 121 

vited by the Emperor to a military banquet at which 
one of these officers, General Bonnal, proposed the toast 
of the German Army and their soldier-Emperor. In- 
numerable other phenomena could be cited to show the 
increasing understanding and friendship between the 
two nations. The speech of Jaures in the French Cham- 
ber of Deputies, in June, 1902, was, however, epoch- 
making; in this speech expression was, for the first time, 
given, in clear words and from a responsible quarter, 
to the thought that it was at last time to forget the ideas 
of revanche, to become reconciled with history, and to 
free the nations of Europe from the intolerable burden 
of armaments. The speech of Jaures found almost 
unanimous approval in the French Chamber and in the 
whole of the serious-minded Press. Certain chauvinistic 
rags, of course, which, like similar papers in our coun- 
try, earn their daily bread by stirring up passion, ex- 
pressed their discontent with Jaures, but they could not 
alter the fact that the Socialist leader had given ex- 
pression to the views of the overwhelming majority of 
the industrious and thrifty French nation. In a speech 
in November, 1904, Jaures developed his train of thought 
and held up an alliance with Germany based on a renun- 
ciation of all retaliation by force as an end worthy of 
pursuit. A few months later the Morocco dispute began, 
when, in March, 1905, the Emperor William landed in 
Tangier, and in an address to the Envoys of the Sultan 
ran counter to French policy in Morocco. Was France 
to blame for the tension which now arose? Must France 
be held responsible for the fact that this challenging 
action on the part of Germany produced — as in the case 
of the Kruger telegram previously, and the ship sent to 
Agadir later — the opposite effect from what was in- 
tended? These theatrical coups are indeed no proper 
instrument for use in foreign policy. They are irri- 
tating rather than impressive, and since it is more diffi- 



122 I ACCUSE! 

cult to effect an understanding between people in a state 
of irritation than between people who are not so irri- 
tated, it would be advisable to discontinue such theatrical 
coups and to convey our wishes to foreign Governments 
in a normal, business-like way. The atmosphere of irri- 
tation which since then has almost continuously governed 
our diplomatic relations with France must accordingly 
be attributed to us and not to France. 

Notwithstanding all this it was, as is known, possible 
to arrive at a definite settlement of the Morocco con- 
fusion by means of three treaties in 1905, 1909, and 
191 1. France, again, is not to blame if we came out 
of this worse than France did. Success in diplomatic 
negotiations depends not solely on military strength, 
but even more on the diplomatic dexterity of the Govern- 
ments negotiating. There can be no doubt that, from a 
military point of view, we are stronger than France. 
There can be equally little doubt that we are diplomati- 
cally the weaker. And this, indeed, need cause no sur- 
prise when we consider the manner in which we recruit 
and train the scions of our diplomacy. In the list of 
French representatives at European Courts the names 
which occur are those of middle-class families only; in 
the list of German representatives there are exclusively 
Barons, Counts, and Princes. This, of course, does not 
imply that a nobleman may not be as competent in busi- 
ness as an ordinary citizen. Since, however, the percen- 
tage of the nobility among the German people is quite 
insignificant, whereas the members of the nobility claim 
100 per cent, of the diplomatic representatives, the sus- 
picion is justified that it is not their competence in busi- 
ness, but their title of nobility which is the decisive 
consideration in filling appointments in our diplomatic 
service. Diplomacy is a business, like any other; if it 
differs from others, it differs only in the exceptional re- 
sponsibilities involved, and in the most stupendous con- 



HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 123 

sequences which may be entailed by errors committed. 
If even a merchant chooses a clerk without regard to 
whether he is of high birth or an officer in a cavalry 
regiment, how much more is the State in filling these 
responsible offices under obligation to ignore these qual- 
ities, which may be decoratively beautiful, but which 
are practically worthless. If the German Empire had 
acted from this point of view, the Morocco negotiations, 
which, indeed, in the view of our opponents, were not 
entirely unfavourable to us, might have borne even 
richer fruit. Those who are not satisfied with the result 
should seek for the cause where it really is to be found, 
not in England or in France, or in anyone beyond the 
German frontier. They may beat the breast and cry 
aloud "Mea culpa, mea maxima culpa!" In any case, 
however, the German people does not appear to me 
to be under any obligation to pay for the failures of its 
diplomatists by the sacrifice of its blood and its well- 
being. Here there appears to me to be clearly a lack of 
proportion between the offence and the expiation, espe- 
cially since it is not the guilty but the innocent who is 
called upon to bear the punishment. Let us make bet- 
ter diplomatists, voila tout! That is the only practical 
conclusion which a reasonable nation can draw from any 
diplomatic checks which it may have suffered. There 
is, however, not the slightest occasion for patriotic 
anguish and for bellicose shrieks for revenge. 

Where, then, is the evidence for the assertion that 
France was evilly disposed towards us? What evidence 
is there for supposing that, apart from the alleged dip- 
lomatic defeats, she intended to inflict on us military de- 
feats as well? I seek, but I find none. 

Did Russia Mean to Attack Us? 

The position is similar in the case of Russia. For a 
century and a half there have been no conflicts of in* 



124 I ACCUSE! 

terests between Germany and Russia, and such conflicts 
could, indeed, scarcely arise, since the pressure exercised 
by the two countries follows quite different lines which 
nowhere intersect. As we have no ambitions, or at least 
have hitherto had none, on the Russian Baltic Provinces 
— a Prussian Irredentism fortunately does not exist — 
so Russia never thought of appropriating East Prussia, 
West Prussia, or Posen. Russia is large enough to be 
able to do without our provinces. The pressure of her 
expansion follows a direction which touches neither our 
property nor our interests. 

The tension between Russia and Austria I here leave 
intentionally out of the question. It was we who de- 
clared war against Russia while she was still living in 
full peace with Austria, and was, indeed, still conduct- 
ing her negotiations which held out a rich prospect of 
success. The war between Austria and Russia only 
broke out on August 6th, whereas we delivered the 
declaration of war at Petrograd on August ist. We 
began the war asserting that Russia meant to attack us, 
and we have succeeded in persuading the German people 
that she had already attacked us. 

I am, then, justified in asking: Why did Russia at- 
tack us? What end did she have in view? What did 
she want from us ? It is no sufficient answer to this ques- 
tion to refer to Pan-Slav efforts. Did Russia wish to 
make us Slavonic? Did she wish to suppress German 
culture in favour of Slavonic culture? No one will 
seriously maintain such a foolish assertion. Russian cul- 
ture in the last generations has, quite apart from this, 
exercised a strong influence on our German spiritual 
life; it would be difficult to mention a German poet of 
the last fifty years who has given an impulse to the 
literature and to the intellectual tendencies of Germany 
similar to that received from Tolstoi. On the other 
hand, not merely the intellectual but also the political 



HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 125 

and military life of Russia was everywhere permeated 
by German elements, and everywhere in Russia men 
of German name occupied leading positions. This, 
moreover, need cause no astonishment, for the Romanovs 
are themselves of German blood and their wives have 
nearly always been of German stock. It may, indeed, 
be asserted that there were scarcely any other two Eu- 
ropean countries which were more intimately connected 
than Germany and Russia by means of peaceful pene^ 
tration on both sides, thus constituting a league of peace 
which was crowned by the traditional friendship of the 
two ruling houses, and sealed by the comradeship in arms 
of a hundred years ago. 

What, then, is the source from which there has sud- 
denly sprung "the hatred of Germany nourished on Pan- 
Slav ambitions/' of which the Chancellor spoke on De- 
cember 2nd? Do we suffer from Russophobia? Had 
this hatred of Germany not to be expressly constructed 
in order to give a psychological basis for the alleged 
Russian attack? What facts are adduced in support of 
this hatred of Germany? Out with them! I fear we 
may have long to wait before these facts are produced. 

In any case, the hatred of Germany entertained in 
Russia does not appear to be insuperable. Already we 
begin to hear the views of well-meaning people who 
speak of peace at an early date with Russia, and who 
are anxious to gather all our forces against the chief 
enemy, England. On the other hand, there are those 
who declare that Muscovitism and the absolutism of the 
Tsar are our chief enemies, and who emphasise our com- 
munity of culture with Western Nations. Where is the 
truth to be found? What are we really aiming at? 
Against whom, and for what are we -fighting? These 
are all questions which are answered differently by dif- 
ferent people, producing a gigantic confusion of the 
mind, an ocean of lies and of perversions, an ocean, 



126 I ACCUSE! 

unfortunately, dyed in blood, which threatens completely 
to sweep away German happiness and well-being. 

This confusion is to be attributed to the fact that 
there is, among those who know, a tacit conspiracy not 
to speak the truth, but that they have overlooked the 
necessity of arriving at a complete agreement as to 
what is to be established in the place of truth. So every- 
one tells lies on his own, and the lies impinge on each 
other, like the electric sparks from two stations which 
are differently charged; one saying cancels the other; 
one lie drives another out of the field. Swift, in his 
old age, was indeed right when he said : "As universal 
a practice as lying is, and as easy a one as it seems, 
it is astonishing that it has been brought to so little 
perfection even by those who are most celebrated in that 
faculty." 

The Triple Entente a Defensive Alliance 

Not only is there thus a complete absence of evidence 
in support of the assertion that the Triple Entente in- 
tended to attack Germany, but the exact opposite has 
been proved in the preceding discussion. The leading 
spirit in the Entente was undeniably England. We hear 
this asserted daily in every possible key, and quite re- 
cently it was emphatically advanced by the Chancellor 
in the meeting of the Reichstag on December 2nd; the 
statement, moreover, rests on the truth. If, however, 
this leading spirit has for almost a decade striven only 
for peace and an understanding with Germany, if the 
other two Entente Powers have never in the slightest 
degree shown, by word or by action, their intention to 
hamper or suppress the initiative taken by their political 
friend in the direction of peace, if, on the contrary, they 
also have given unmistakable expression to their desire 
for peace by conciliatory behaviour on great and small 



HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 127 

diplomatic conflicts (Morocco, the Balkan War, the 
Potsdam Agreements of 191 1, etc.), it would not be a 
bold conclusion to infer that the Triple Entente has been 
a defensive alliance, and that it has in no way whatever 
had aggressive intentions. He who asserts the contrary- 
must submit proofs in support of his statement. These 
proofs the Chancellor himself was unable to submit in 
his two speeches in the Reichstag. The Entente Powers 
are reproached on account of their evil disposition 
towards Germany, but no actions are instanced which 
have proceeded from such a disposition. We celebrate 
in our enemies such beautiful qualities of the heart as 
envy, hatred, race antipathy, the lust of vengeance, but 
they cannot be reproached with a single action in which 
they have endeavoured to translate these dispositions into 
deeds. So long as Germany is not recognised as the 
educator of the world — something after the style of 
"Rembrandt as the educator" of the Germans — we must 
be content to leave other people in possession of their 
dispositions, as, indeed, they on their side have neither 
the wish nor the power to suppress ours. 

We must rest satisfied with combating their disposi- 
tions only when these manifest themselves as actions. 
We are not the rulers of foreign nations as Ahlwardt 
was the ruler of all the Germans. We are scarcely 
called upon to give moral instructions to others so long 
as we ourselves need such instruction more than they 
do. The hatred, the envy, and rage for revenge which 
has been produced in our country — 'formerly by a small 
section of the people of no intellectual standing, but 
since the beginning of the war by the greatest and 
best part of the German nation — surpass in volume and 
intensity all that has been produced in the three other 
countries taken together. 

But if there were no aggressive intentions, what was 
it that brought the Entente together and cemented them 



128 I ACCUSE! 

more and more closely to each other? It was the fear 
of Germany and the distrust of Germany's imperialistic 
efforts. It was this fear that united them and gave in- 
creasing compactness to their alliance. The more they 
saw Germany increasing — not our trade nor our well 
being, which indeed benefited their trade and prosperity 
also, but our military power and our warlike dispo- 
sition — the more they saw the danger of German na- 
tionalism raising her head and appearing above the steps 
of the throne, the more distrustful and apprehensive they 
became, and the more closely did they draw together 
for the purpose of common defence. 

Everything combined in recent years to increase their 
apprehensions : the enormous naval armaments which, 
in spite of English proposals for agreement, were piled 
up with constantly increasing acceleration, the sudden 
increase of our land army, quite unprecedented in mili- 
tary history, the policy of the mailed fist, which in all 
international questions affecting the interest of Germany 
or Austria struck on the table and compelled the others 
to give way, above all, however, certain facts, which did 
not take place in public, but which were well known 
to European Governments. These facts have only re- 
cently received publicity, but must, at an earlier date, 
already have received from the Entente Powers the 
attention they merited. 

Giolitti's Revelations 

It is known that, soon after the annexation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, the Austrian Government proposed 
to take military measures against the growing Great- 
Serbian movement, which had been produced as a result 
of the annexation. This was an act of criminal insanity 
on the part of Austria ; it was a crime, because here the 
violator intended to punish the violated because he re- 



HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 129 

sisted violation; it was insane, because national ten- 
dencies cannot be suppressed by force of arms. But the 
wise men of Austria thought otherwise. Serbia was 
threatened with war, and only through the submission 
of Russia and the mediation of England and Germany 
was it possible to prevent, by means of a propitiatory 
declaration on the part of Serbia, the European war 
which even then threatened to break out. That was in 
March, 1909, and is known to everyone. What, how- 
ever, was not known, and has only become known by 
the revelations of Giolitti on December 5th, 1914, in 
the Italian Chamber, is the fact that Austria entertained 
in August, 1913, the same intentions as in 1909, and 
was prevented from giving effect to these intentions only 
by the opposition of Italy. 

These revelations of Giolitti have rightly been re- 
garded in the whole of the foreign Press as epoch-mak- 
ing, because they revealed in an incontestable manner 
the aggressive intentions of Austria. But precisely for 
these reasons the German and Austrian Governments 
have preserved, with regard to these revelations, a silence 
as of death. There is therefore all the more reason 
why I should in this place once more awaken the dead 
to life. 

In midsummer, 1913, after the second Balkan War, 
the relations in the Balkans between those States im- 
mediately concerned were regulated by the Treaty of 
Bucharest. Austria-Hungary was not satisfied with the 
arrangement to which effect was given, since in her view 
Serbia had got too much and Bulgaria too little. She 
aimed at accomplishing a revision of the Treaty and 
in view of Serbia's opposition resolved to give effect to 
her desires by arms. For this purpose she naturally 
required the support of the Powers of the Triple Al- 
liance and above all of Italy, who had always claimed 
the right to make her influence felt in the settlement 



130 i ACCUSE! 

of the Balkan question. The concurrence of the allied 
Powers in military action against Serbia was, however, 
regarded as necessary by Austria chiefly, because the 
Austrian Government was even then fully aware of 
the fact that a war with Serbia must lead to a European 
struggle. Austria consequently addressed inquiries to 
Italy with a view to ascertaining what her attitude 
would be in view of her duties under the Triple Al- 
liance in the event of a Serbian, and, should it arise, a 
European war. As a result of the Austrian inquiry the 
following exchange of telegrams took place between 
the Foreign Minister, Di San Giuliano, and the Prime 
Minister, Giolitti, who was then absent : "Austria has 
communicated to us and to Germany her intention of 
taking action against Serbia, and defines such action 
as defensive, hoping to bring into operation the casus 
fcederis of the Triple Alliance, which, on the contrary, 
I believe to be inapplicable. I am endeavouring to ar- 
range for a combined effort with Germany to prevent 
such action on the part of Austria, but it may become 
necessary to state clearly that we do not consider such 
action, if it should be taken, as defensive, and that, 
therefore, we do not consider that the casus fcederis 
arises. Please telegraph to me at Rome if you ap- 
prove." 

Giolitti replied to this: "If Austria intervenes against 
Serbia it is clear that a casus fcederis cannot be estab- 
lished. It is a step which she is taking on her own 
account since there is no question of defence inasmuch 
as no one is thinking of attacking her. It is necessary 
that a declaration to this effect should be made to Aus- 
tria in the most formal manner, and we must hope for 
action on the part of Germany to dissuade Austria from 
this most perilous adventure (pericolosissima awen- 
iura) ." 

On this occasion success, in fact, attended the task of 



HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 131 

restraining Austria from a war against Serbia, buf 
whether this was due to Germany's efforts or to Italy's 
opposition is not known. What, however, is to-day of 
the highest interest is the fact that, even a year before 
the outbreak of the present war, Austria was firmly 
resolved to initiate, without any urgent reason, a mili- 
tary conflict with Serbia, for there was then no ques- 
tion of the death of an Archduke, nor had a specially 
dangerous Serbian propaganda been developed against 
Austria, since Serbia had been sufficiently engrossed by 
the war against the Turks, and later against her own 
ally, Bulgaria. 

This fact is of the greatest importance in judging the 
question of guilt in the present war. But there is one 
other point which may be learned from the events of 
1913; first, that the danger of a European war as a 
consequence of an Austro-Serbian war was even at that 
time clear to the minds of the politicians of the Triple 
Alliance, and, secondly, that it was possible to exorcise 
this danger by dissuading Austria from the perilous ad- 
venture, and by refusing to furnish her with assistance. 
If these lessons of the past had been observed a year 
later the present war would not have broken out. Italy 
has observed these lessons, and her attitude is morally 
and legally incontestable. Germany, however, did not 
desire to do so, and she cannot, therefore, object if 
her attitude is described in terms which are exactly 
opposite to those applied to Italy. The fact that Ger- 
many in July, 19 14, neglected to exercise on Austria 
the moderating influence which she had successfully 
brought to bear on her a year before is capable of a 
simple explanation. Germany at that time did not de- 
sire a European war, or more correctly expressed, she 
did not yet desire it, whereas in 1914 she did desire 
this war. 



132 I ACCUSE! 

The Change of Front in Berlin. The War 

Party 

The tendencies in Berlin which led to this change of 
front are placed in a most interesting light by the French 
Yellow Book. 1 

If these French Reports were the only sources of in- 
formation available for this period of contemporary 
history they might be regarded with distrust. As, how- 
ever, they are in accordance with all the facts, which 
have been distinctly manifested in the political life and 
in the politico-military literature of Germany, 2 these 
French Reports on the state of opinion in Germany 
must be recognised as entirely accurate, and, indeed, 
the clear analysis of German conditions contained in 
them can only evoke admiration. 

I have already in an earlier passage dealt with the 
dangers involved in the efforts of the war party whose 
exercising ground was exclusively in North Germany 
and whose headquarters were situated at the Court of 
Berlin. The leaders of this party were for the most 
part Generals who devoted the pensioned leisure of their 
retirement to the creation of something approaching a 
military organisation of their forces, and both by the 
spoken and the written word prepared the German peo- 

1 Report of the French Ambassador, Cambon, dated the 17th 
March, 1913, enclosing two reports of the Military and Naval At- 
taches; further, a report of Etienne, the Minister of War, to Jon- 
nard, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, dated the 2nd April, 1913, 
with enclosure; a report of Cambon to Pichon, the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, dated 6th May, 1913, a report to the same Minister 
dated 30th July, and a report of Cambon dated 22nd November, 1913. 

8 After this book was finished a very interesting dissertation came 
to my notice, entitled "Der deutsche Chauvinismus" by Professor 
Dr. O. Nippold, Stuttgart, 1913. The book contains a survey of the 
chauvinistic literature of recent years, and earnestly points out the 
dangers of this movement. 



HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 133 

pie for the war, which they, because they wished it, de- 
clared to be inevitable. In addition to the existing naval 
league they founded, in 1912, a "Wehrverein," the ob- 
ject of which was to combat the tendencies in favour 
of peace to be found in the German nation, to create a 
public opinion in favour of an increase in the land 
forces, and gradually to accustom the nation to the 
thought of a European war. The natural auxiliary 
forces of these gentlemen were their social and profes- 
sional companions, the territorial and the military no- 
bility who from remote times have controlled the Prus- 
sian State, and have regarded the King of Prussia as 
their supreme head. The increasing democratisation of 
Germany, which had already advanced so far as to pass 
a vote of no confidence in an Imperial Chancellor and 
a Prussian First Minister, and to extend protection to 
the civil powers in Alsace against the military authori- 
ties, the constant increase in the vote of the social 
democratic party, and of their representatives in Parlia- 
ment, the increasing industrialisation of Germany, which 
threatened more and more to repress the economic and 
the social importance of the territorial nobility — all these 
phenomena were an abomination to the Prussian 
Junkers, and had produced in the circles which they 
frequented a state of mind which can be expressed in 
the thought: "Things cannot go on like this in Ger- 
many, and since an amelioration in the sense we desire 
cannot be achieved in peace, we must be assisted in our 
need by a lively and jolly war" (ein frischer, frohlicher 
Krieg) . 

At all times the Junkers have formed the kernel of 
the Prussian war-party. More recently, however, they 
have been joined by various auxiliary forces, colonial 
enthusiasts who pursued the foolish madness of terri- 
torial expansion as an outlet for our economic and hu- 
man surplus, ideologists in whose narrow outlook Ger~ 



134. I ACCUSE! 

many marches at the head of civilisation and who there- 
fore consider that German culture has a claim to rule 
the world, diplomatists still grieving over their own 
failures and calling aloud for revenge for Algeciras and 
Agadir, but chiefly, as a matter of course, the cannon 
kings and the manufacturers of armour plate, who with 
the wealth at their disposal can support the venomous 
Press not only at home but abroad. All these elements, 
some of them interested and some deluded, the deceivers 
and the deceived, formed a compact force which, under 
military leadership, fell into line with true Prussian dis- 
cipline on the word of command, and steadfastly ad- 
vanced to the end in view. The war-party formed only 
a minority of the German people. The great majority 
was distinctly devoted to peace. The great mass of the 
labouring population, the industrious middle classes, the 
banking and manufacturing circles, the national groups 
of Poles, Alsatians, etc., the South of Germany not 
yet entirely Prussianised, all these sections of the Ger- 
man people without doubt desired peace and quiet prog- 
ress along the path by which Germany had arrived at 
her present height. But these, the forces of peace, were 
not organised. They were merely individuals; they did 
not form a compact body. They did not consider it 
necessary to organise themselves as a peace-party to 
oppose the war-party, because until midsummer of this 
year the latter were regarded as a quantite negligeable; 
a European war with all its horrors was regarded as 
an impossibility; no one realised how far the instigators 
of war with their powerful patronage had already un- 
dermined the ground of peace. In the middle of July 
any one who had asserted in Germany that on August 
ist we would be face to face with a European war 
would have been in danger of being shut up in an asy- 
lum. The people of rabid views were known, but their 
outpourings were looked upon as harmless, and any 



HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 135 

counter-organisation for the protection of peace was 
regarded as a superfluity. 

It is true that disappointment over the Morocco agree- 
ment had affected even wider circles. The supposed 
diplomatic defeat was regretted, but this was not re- 
garded as a reason for crying aloud for vengeance in 
blood. The diplomatists were criticised, but Generals 
were not demanded. Criticism was naturally directed 
in the first place against the Imperial Chancellor, Herr 
von Bethmann Hollweg, who bore the sole responsibil- 
ity; it did not, however, stop there, but ascended as 
far as the Emperor himself. The policy of peace, which 
the Emperor William had taken as the guiding line of 
his conduct after the first stormy days of his youth, 
had for long ceased to find favour in certain circles. 
He was not merely criticised, but the attempt was made 
— not without success — to procure for him what was 
nothing short of unpopularity. 



A zealous and well-organised Press praised the son at 
the expense of the father and increased the dissensions 
between the two which had found open expression in 
a number of well-known serious disputes. With diabolic 
dexterity they succeeded in playing upon the most sen- 
sitive chords in the Emperor's soul, his personal vanity, 
his thirst for popularity, his ambition to be the first 
amongst his people, living in no man's shadow, the con- 
sciousness he had of his authority, which had led him 
to adopt as his motto the dictum suprema lex regis volun- 
tas. Like the poison poured into the ear of Hamlet's 
father the poisonous thought was instilled into him that 
the times demanded deeds, not words, that only a puri- 
fying war could drive away the sultry heat and restore 



il36 I ACCUSE! 

to the German Empire and to its Emperor the old pres- 
tige within and without. 

In the end a continual dropping will wear out a stone. 
It is interesting to observe the gradual change in the 
Emperor's views during the last three years, from 191 1 
to 19 14. In 19 10 the Emperor William could still dis- 
cuss with the French Minister, Pichon, the idea of a 
union of all civilised States and express his approval 
of the idea. In the previous year, in 1909, speaking 
at Cuxhaven, he emphasised that peace was needed in 
equal measure by all civilised nations "to enable them 
to discharge undisturbed the great tasks of culture in- 
volved in their economic and commercial develop- 
ment." * In 191 1 he emphasised, in a speech delivered 
in Hamburg, that economic competition between nations 
could not be fought out by one party striking at the 
other, but only by each nation straining their capacity 
to the highest point. On New Year's Day, 191 1, in an 
address to the diplomatists, he still eulogised the peace- 
ful understanding existing between the nations, which 
was more in accordance with their interests than the 
conduct of dangerous wars. But in his speech at Ham- 
burg on June 18th, 19 12, a different note is already 
sounded: "Not inconsiderately must we raise the 
standard where we are not sure that we shall be able 
to defend it." This speech was delivered six months 
after the Morocco Convention, and anyone who can 
read between the lines may already detect the influence 
which the criticism of the Emperor's peaceful policy 
had begun to exercise on the thoughts of the Emperor; 
he no longer rejects war under all circumstances, but 
if war must come, it is to be, according to the saying 
of Clausewitz, a continuation of policy by other means 
1 — that is, of course, on the assumption that the stand- 
ard can be defended, in other words, that we are 
1 Fr. Fried : Der Kaiser und der Weltfriede, Berlin, 1910. 



HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 137 

stronger than the other side. In the next year, at the 
boisterous banquets in commemoration of the War of 
Liberation of 1813, this military note more and more 
suppressed the notes of peace. An intoxication ap- 
peared to have seized the whole of Germany — a new 
intoxication of freedom — from what bondage no one 
knew. This drunkenness was artificially produced by 
the fiery beverages which an unscrupulous patriotic 
Press had for many a year and day poured out to the 
German nation. Even those occupying the highest po- 
sitions were unable to escape this condition of intoxi- 
cation. A true epidemic of patriotism broke out, set- 
ting high and low, young and old, in a fever of ecstasy. 
No one any longer inquired as to the grounds or the 
object of this popular movement prepared long in ad- 
vance and skilfully staged by the Nationalist wire-pull- 
ers, a movement in which the Emperor and the Chan- 
cellor were at first victims carried away by the stream, 
a movement in which later they were voluntary partici- 
pators, and of which in the end they became the con- 
scious directing leaders. 

Herr von Bethmann certainly made a long resist- 
ance before capitulating to the war-party. But in the 
end he was obliged to yield, that he might not fall a 
victim to the Camarilla of the Crown Prince and to 
the company of Generals. Even in 1910 and 191 1 he 
vigorously defended himself against his opponents, who 
more and more were digging the ground from under 
his feet. When he was accused in the Mannesmann 
affair of showing excessive pliability towards foreign 
countries he exclaimed to his critics in the Reichstag: 
"I will never make myself a party to a policy of break- 
ing treaties." When the great debate took place in the 
Reichstag on March 30th, 191 1, on the question of arm- 
aments, Bethmann turned almost in supplication to trie 
representatives of the German people and urged them 



138 I ACCUSE! 

to protect the German people against irresponsible Press 
agitations, to which, unfortunately, it often weakly suc- 
cumbed. "A counterpoise against all these and similar 
influences," exclaimed the Chancellor, "cannot be other- 
wise than desirable, and if international labour succeeds 
in creating such a counterpoise, I will be the first to 
extend it a hearty welcome." But, as we have said, 
the elements which might have formed such a counter- 
poise against the war-movement were too few. The 
opposition of the Chancellor, as previously that of the 
Emperor, was soon borne down, and the great military 
law of 19 1 3 was the first beacon-signal of the victory 
of the enemy along the whole line. 

That war was not, in accordance with Austria's de- 
sires, brought about as early as the summer of 191 3, 
rested no longer on grounds of principle, but merely 
on motives of opportunism. The occasion for striking 
the blow which Austria believed, or professed, that she 
had — a regulation of the frontier between Bulgaria and 
Serbia, and similar matters — was too threadbare to jus- 
tify to the German people a murder of the European 
nations, and too little designed to enkindle patriotic 
enthusiasm. "Wars which are not supported by popular 
sentiment are no longer possible in our time" — to this 
extent the political thought even of these reactionaries 
had already advanced. The question whether this or 
that place with an unpronounceable name situated some- 
where in the south-east of Europe should be governed 
by Serbian or Bulgarian officials was of too little im- 
portance for the German people to permit of it being 
stamped as a war for the holiest possession of the 
nation. Thus the word went from Berlin to Vienna: 
"Not yet." 

Moreover, military considerations were clearly de- 
cisive in favour of this "Not yet." We were not yet 
sufficiently prepared. We were, it is true, considerably 



HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 139 

superior to all others, but this superiority had to be 
increased still further by bringing into force the new 
law of defence, which had just received preliminary 
approval from the Reichstag. The extension of the 
Kaiser Wilhelm Canal, which was intended to provide 
unhampered movement from the North Sea to the Baltic 
for even the largest ships of war, was not yet ready. 
The newest instruments of death were probably still 
awaiting the hour of their birth. Zeppelins and sub- 
marines had still to be built, and in many other ways 
our military preparations had still to be carried to the 
stage of perfection. In a word, we were not yet ripe 
for striking the blow, which in principle had even then 
been decided upon. We were only waiting for the next 
favourable opportunity, and for a condition of perfect 
preparedness, to be able to make use of this opportunity 
with success. Meanwhile, the change in the views of 
the Emperor made further progress ; his entourage, with 
von Moltke, the head of the General Staff, as their 
leader, the Minister of War, the Crown Prince, and his 
influential adherents, all laboured — although still to a 
certain extent in opposition to the Chancellor, who had, 
it is true, taken part in the whole development, and 
covered it with his responsibility, but who was now 
still shrinking from the decisive step — all laboured for 
the one end — that of bringing about the "inevitable" 
war as speedily as possible, and of gaining the entire 
support of the Emperor for their efforts. "We must put 
on one side," said General von Moltke on one occasion, 
"all commonplaces as to the responsibility of the ag- 
gressor. When war has become necessary it is essen- 
tial to carry it on in such a way as to place all the 
chances in one's favour. Success alone justifies war." 1 
What success had attended the activity of the War 
Party is seen in Cambon's report of November 2 2nd, 
1 French Yellow Book, No. 3. 



140 I ACCUSE! 

191 3, to the Minister, Pichon. Cambon tells of a con- 
versation which the Emperor William had in the pres- 
ence of the Chief of the General Staff with King Al- 
bert, an account of which was communicated to the 
French Ambassador "from an absolutely reliable 
source." King Albert found a complete change in the 
Emperor, whom he had formerly known as an honour- 
able lover of peace. He had given up his pacific ten- 
dencies, and had made the ideas of the war-party his 
own. War now appeared to him inevitable, and he 
agreed with his Chief of the Staff when the latter de- 
clared that this time the matter must be settled, and 
that the Emperor could be sure that his people would 
follow him with irresistible enthusiasm. The thoughts 
of the Emperor were directed chiefly against France, 
and King Albert made fruitless efforts to convince him 
of the peaceful intentions of the French Government 
and of the French people. Cambon also confirmed from 
his own observation the altered train of thought of the 
Emperor, which he attributed to the increasing impa- 
tience of the soldiers, to the influence of the Pan-Ger- 
manists, and to a certain extent to jealousy at the popu- 
larity acquired by his son in these circles. "The Em- 
peror is becoming used to an order of ideas which were 
formerly foreign to him"; with these words Cambon 
concludes his report. It is impossible to deny that the 
shrewd Frenchman was a careful observer. Scarcely 
eight months later the consequences of the change in 
the views of the Emperor were revealed. But even in 
the critical days which preceded the outbreak of the 
European War, the forces of good and of evil, of 
Ormuzd and Ahriman, still struggled with each other 
in the soul of the Emperor. Now that the portentous 
decision had to be taken which was to set the world in 
flames and bring upon mankind unprecedented evils, 
now that the project which had been so long prepared 



HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 141 

and resolved upon was at last to be transformed into 
an act, the Imperial hand shrank from the decisive stroke 
of the pen, and as in a mist the old ideals of peace and 
of the happiness of nations once more arose in the soul 
of the monarch. To this must be attributed the oscil- 
lations of the last days, the continual change in the 
actions of the Emperor, fluctuating to and fro between 
the desire for peace and the threat of war, between 
intimidation and sincerity, pursuing so long the policy 
of the mailed fist, until gradually all policy disappeared 
and only the mailed fist was left. 



Ill 

The Crime 

The detailed discussion in the previous chapter of the 
antecedents of the war was necessary in order to un- 
derstand the rapid development of events which in the 
ten short days from July 23rd to August 1st, 1914, led 
to the greatest war in the history of the world. 

The whole attitude of Germany from the first Hague 
Conference onwards, her consistent refusal of all restric- 
tions of naval or military armaments, her opposition to 
the formation of a court of compulsory arbitration, her 
constantly renewed efforts to secure for herself the neu- 
trality of England, without on her part giving up in any 
way her own freedom of action, the gigantic increase 
in her land and naval forces, the toleration shown for 
years to a criminal chauvinist movement, and the ap- 
proval extended to this movement at a later date — these 
all indicate that for long Germany had reckoned on the 
European war as a matter of fact, and that she had re- 
solved to bring about the "inevitable" in the moment 
most favourable for her. 

The antecedents of the war down to 1914 must give 
rise to what in criminal proceedings would be called a 
prima facie case, that Germany, in common with her 
ally Austria, desired a European war sooner or later — 
Germany, in order to give effect to her plans of world 
power; Austria, in order to improve her position in the 
Balkans. 

Such a prima facie case, however, does not amount 
to a certainty. The probability which may be inferred 

142 



THE CRIME 143 

from the antecedents of the war is not in itself a proof 
of guilt. This proof of guilt can only be deduced from 
the circumstances of the case, that is to say, from the 
diplomatic documents which place before us the histori- 
cal origins of the war. 

The indictment to be brought against the Empires of 
Germany and Austria is that in the summer of 19 14 
they intentionally brought about the war which they 
had long prepared and desired, because they thought 
that the moment was specially favourable for striking 
the blow. This time the occasion of the dispute was 
not, as in previous years, a paltry territorial question 
in the Balkans, a squabble about a harbour or a stretch 
of sea-shore, questions which could neither arouse public 
interest nor kindle the enthusiasm of nations. The issue 
raised on this occasion related to the murder of an Arch- 
Duke and his Consort, a tragic event which was bound 
to awaken the indignation of the whole world, and, so 
they calculated, could not fail to enlist universal sym- 
pathy on behalf of the Powers who appeared as the 
avengers of such a crime. 

Thus, in the first place, the moral advantage was on 
their side. But they believed that they could also rely 
on a similar military advantage. Certain matters just 
about this time had come to light which were regarded 
as proving the disorganisation of the French and the 
defective preparation of the Russian army. The revela- 
tions of Senator Humbert had just made public the ex- 
istence of serious defects in the French Army, and it 
was believed that the Russian Army, quite apart from its 
defective equipment, was still required to cope with in- 
ternal unrest and weakened by civil dissensions. Eng- 
land's neutrality was still hoped for, in spite of previous 
failures in this direction, and the Italians were thought 
to be foolish enough to draw the chestnuts out of the 
fire in the Balkans for the hated Austrian, and to risk 



144 I ACCUSE! 

their whole national existence "pour le roi de Prusse." 
All this was a complete miscalculation. But as the 
art of calculation was not understood in Berlin and 
Vienna, it was thought that the moment was favour- 
able for striking — and they struck. 

This is the accusation which is now to be proved. 



The events connected with the assassination of the 
Arch-Duke Franz Ferdinand and his Consort are in 
their main features universally known, and do not here 
require any detailed discussion. For my purpose it will 
be sufficient to examine critically the diplomatic trans- 
actions, and to emphasise those points which are of de- 
cisive importance in considering the question of the guilt 
and the responsibility for this war. The demonstra- 
tion which I will submit will rest only on official docu- 
ments, and reference will chiefly be made to the five 
volumes of diplomatic correspondence which have been 
published in white, blue, yellow, orange, and grey by 
Germany, England, France, Russia, and Belgium re- 
spectively. A book in red has not yet appeared; it is 
left to the nations to write this volume in blood. 

Other diplomatic documents which have appeared 
apart from these books will also be considered. 

At the very outset surprise is occasioned by the meagre 
contents of the German White Book and b)^ the fact 
that Austria, unlike all the other belligerent countries, 
has not considered it advisable to publish a volume of 
diplomatic correspondence. The telegrams exchanged 
between the German and the Austrian Governments are, 
further, almost completely absent from the German 
White Book, whereas those between the Entente Powers 
are reproduced in their publications with the utmost 
detail. The German White Book contains only 36 docu- 
ments ; the English Blue Book, on the contrary, contains 



THE CRIME 145 

161; the Russian Orange Book, 79; the French Yellow- 
Book, 161 ; and the Belgian Grey Book, 79. The state- 
ments of our opponents are thus far more detailed than 
those of the two allied Empires, one of which has until 
to-day maintained a complete silence. This fact is in 
itself very illuminating. 1 

The historical investigator is frequently obliged to 
complete the gaps revealed in the German White Book 
by reference to the comprehensive accounts of the En- 
tente Governments. There is, however, general agree- 
ment between the various publications in their reports 
as to fact, and it is only from the spirit of the narrator 
that they assume varying complexions. In my critical 
discussion I will completely ignore these different com- 
plexions. It will be sufficient if I restrict myself to the 
bare facts reported by all parties alike, facts which 
indeed are in themselves eloquent enough. One cannot, 
of course, assert that of the various publications some 
are more deserving of credence than others. Diplomatic 
documents are merely documents, and they are all 
equally credible. Moreover, they are mutually supported 
by each other, and taken together they form so complete 
a chain, each link so fits into the other, that the truth 
appears clear and incontestable. 

I will deal in succession with the various points which 
are decisive on the question of guilt, and I will take 
each State separately. Each State will receive its own 
debit and credit account, and each account will be closed 
with a balance which will show the guilt or the inno- 
cence of the State in question. 

1 An Austrian book has just appeared in the beginning of Febru- 
ary when this work was in the press, that is to say, six months after 
the beginning of the war. I will discuss this book in a separate 
appendix. 



146 I ACCUSE! 



AUSTRIA 

At 6 o'clock on the evening of July 23rd the Austro- 
Hungarian Government handed to the Serbian Govern- 
ment a Note, in which the Government presented a 
series of demands, with reference to the Great Serbian 
propaganda which it was suggested had reached its high- 
est point in the assassination of the Grand Ducal couple, 
intended to bring about the suppression of these ef- 
forts which, as was alleged, were tolerated by the Ser- 
bian Government. There were contained among the 
ten demands made by Austria some (and, indeed, a con- 
siderable number) of a character such as had never be- 
fore been presented to an independent State, and such 
as hitherto had only been imposed on subject nationali- 
ties. The Serbian Government were required to pub- 
lish on a certain day on the first page of their official 
journal a declaration, the wording of which was pre- 
scribed. This declaration had in view the most rigor- 
ous suppression of every form of Great Serbian prop- 
aganda, and threatened with severe punishment the 
whole population, but more particularly those officers 
and officials who should in future take part in this move- 
ment. This threat was simultaneously to be communi- 
cated by the King to the Army as an order of the day, 
and published in the official bulletin of the Army. A 
series of detailed demands followed : the suppression of 
publications; dissolution of societies and the prevention 
of the formation of similar societies; elimination from 
school-books of all statements hostile to Austria; re- 
moval of all officers and functionaries guilty of the prop- 
aganda mentioned; arrest of certain persons compro- 
mised by the inquiry into the assassination; prevention 



THE CRIME 147 

of illicit traffic in arms across the frontier; explanation 
regarding unfriendly utterances of high Serbian officials, 
&c. Under numbers 5 and 6 of the Austrian Demands 
it was exacted of the Serbian Government that they 
should "accept the collaboration in Serbia of represen- 
tatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government for the 
suppression of the subversive movement directed against 
the Territorial integrity of the Monarchy," and further, 
that they should "take judicial proceedings against ac- 
cessories to the plot of June 28th who are on Serbian 
territory." "Delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Gov- 
ernment," it is further stated, "will take part in the in- 
vestigation relating thereto." 

A memorandum on certain conclusions of the inquiry 
at Serajewo on points 7 and 8 was added to the Note, 
and an answer was required within forty-eight hours, 
that is to say, before 6 o'clock in the evening of July 
25th. 

The Note was communicated to the European Powers 
on July 24th — without the addition of the evidence in 
support of the accusations — and on July 25th it was 
published in the European Press. It is well known that 
the unusual contents and the abrupt form of the Note 
created excitement everywhere, not only in Govern- 
mental circles, but also among the general public. Every- 
one expected an abrupt refusal on the part of Serbia, 
followed by a war between Austria and her neighbour- 
ing kingdom, the intervention of Russia in the conflict, 
and in further sequence a European war. Ever since a 
Balkan question had existed the close relations between 
Russia and Serbia were known to everyone. From time 
immemorial community of race and religion, political 
traditions and interests, had united the two countries, 
and had created a kind of relationship extending far 
beyond the framework of the usual "spheres of in- 
terest." Russia had during and after the Balkan War 



148 I ACCUSE! 

officially declared that any attack by Austria on Serbia 
would lead to her intervention. 1 On this occasion also 
it was announced in the official journal that Russia 
could not remain indifferent to military action on the 
part of Austria. 2 

At the same time, however, Russia, England, and 
France made the most urgent endeavours: 

( i ) To induce Serbia to go as far as possible in meet- 
ing the demands of Austria. 3 

(2) To obtain an extension of the time limit from 
Austria, which would enable the Powers to study the 
documentary material promised by Austria, and thus to 
exercise a moderating influence in Belgrade. 4 

The extension of the time limit was sharply refused 
by Austria, 5 although England and Russia rightly 
pointed out that the communication of the Note to the 
Powers was purposeless and contradictory to interna- 
tional usages if they were not allowed time and oppor- 
tunity to study the documents, and to intervene at Bel- 
grade. Herr von Jagow had from the beginning ex- 
pressed "doubts" as to whether Austria could concur 
in the extension of the time-limit. 6 Count Berchtold 
was at Ischl. No grounds were given for the refusal. 

Nevertheless, Anglo-Russian influence in Belgrade 
succeeded in obtaining from the Serbian Government an 
answer which caused throughout Europe even greater 
astonishment than the Austrian Note itself. Serbia con- 
curred in nearly all the demands of the neighbouring 
monarchy. She declared herself ready to hand over for 

1 Blue Book, No. 139, and p. v. [popular edition.] 
* Orange Book, No. 10. 

8 Blue Book, Nos. 12, 15, 22, 30. Orange Book, Nos. 4, 25, 40, 92. 
Yellow Book, No. 26. 
4 Blue Book, Nos. 13, 17, 26. Orange Book, Nos. 4, 16. 
6 Orange Book, No. 12. 
6 Orange Book, No. 14. Blue Book, No. 18. 



THE CRIME 149 

trial, without regard to his situation or rank, anyone 
whose complicity in the assassination should be proved. 
She pledged herself to publish the desired declarations 
in the official journal and to the Army, to introduce 
new criminal laws and an amendment of the Constitu- 
tion to facilitate the prosecution and confiscation o*f 
hostile utterances in the Press. She promised to dis- 
solve hostile societies, to revise the instruction in schools 
in the sense desired by Austria, to punish guilty officers 
and officials, to prevent the illicit traffic of arms, &c. 

Only on two points did the Serbian Government per- 
mit itself in all submissiveness — the tone of the whole 
Note is, in fact, that of a subject to his over-lord, not 
that of one independent State to another — only on two 
points (5 and 6 of the Austrian Note) did the Serbian 
Government permit itself to raise a few modest objec- 
tions. In reply to point 5 it observed*. 

"The Royal Government must confess that they 
do not clearly grasp the meaning of the scope of 
the demand made by the Imperial and Royal Gov- 
ernment that Serbia shall undertake to accept the 
collaboration of the organs of the Imperial and 
Royal Government upon their Territory, but they 
declare that they will admit such collaboration as 
agrees with the principle of international law, with 
criminal procedure, and with good neighbourly re- 
lations." 

In reply to point 6: 

"It goes without saying that the Royal Gov- 
ernment consider it their duty to open an inquiry 
against all such persons as are, or eventually may 
be, implicated in the plot of the 15/28 June, and 
who happen to be within the territory of the king- 
dom. As regards the participation in this inquiry 



H50 I ACCUSE! 

of Austro-Hungarian agents or authorities ap- 
pointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal 
Government, the Royal Government cannot accept 
such an arrangement, as it would be a violation 
of the Constitution and of the law of criminal pro- 
cedure; nevertheless, in concrete cases, communi- 
cations as to the results of the investigation in 
question might be given to the Austro-Hungarian 
agents." 

The conclusion of the Serbian Note runs as follows : — 

"If the Imperial and Royal Government are not 
satisfied with this reply, the Serbian Government, 
considering that it is not to the common interest 
to precipitate the solution of this question, are 
ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding, 
either by referring this question to the decision 
of the International Tribunal of The Hague, or to 
the Great Powers which took part in the drawing 
up of the declaration made by the Serbian Gk>v- 
ernment on the 18th (31st) March, 1909." 

The Serbian Note was handed to the Austrian Am- 
bassador at Belgrade on the afternoon of July 25th. 
Two hours later the Ambassador with his staff had left 
the Serbian capital. The Serbian answer appeared to 
the Austrian Government to be insufficient. Diplomatic 
relations with the neighbouring country were broken off 
by Austria. 

Why? European diplomacy — apart, of course, from 
that of Germany — was confronted with a riddle for 
which only one solution was possible, the assumption 
that Austria, under all circumstances, desired war with 
Serbia. And as the Austrian Note was unique in its 
exorbitant demands, both in form and substance, so the 
Serbian Note also was unique in its essential and formal 



THE CRIME 151 

submissiveness. Never in time of peace had an inde- 
pendent State allowed itself to be dictated to in this way; 
never had an independent State submitted to similar 
intrusions in its internal life. Education, the army, ad- 
ministration, justice, the Press, the right of association 
— all were to be trimmed to meet the wishes of Austria, 
and even where it was not possible to comply with these 
wishes to the last iota without being debased to the 
position of a vassal State — even then Serbia did not re- 
solve on a bare refusal, but humbly asked for further 
explanations, and professed herself ready to go to the 
limits permitted by international law, and in these few 
points still in dispute she submitted herself to the de- 
cision of the International Tribunal at the Hague or of 
the Great Powers. 

What more could Austria desire? Why did she refuse 
to give the explanations asked for? Why did she not 
accept decision by arbitration in questions which, ac- 
cording to the transactions and the resolutions of the 
Hague Conference, were in a peculiar sense suitable for 
reference to the Court of Arbitration — questions, 
namely, of law and of interpretation? 

On July 27th the Austrian Government published the 
Serbian answer with observations in such a form that 
the text of the Serbian Note is throughout broken up 
by the Austrian observations. Even the Norddeutsche 
Allgemeine Zeitung only published the text broken up 
in this way. The intention of this mutilation was obvi- 
ously to preclude an appreciation of the submissive form 
and the extremely conciliatory contents of the Serbian 
answer by the insertion of the Austrian observations. 
The pedantic nature of these observations was described 
by the Italian Minister, Di San Giuliano, as "quite child- 
ish." x The expression is indeed much too mild, when 
one reflects that the fate of Europe, and indeed of the 
"Blue Book, No. 64. 



152 I ACCUSE! 

world, depended on these discussions. A hedge-lawyer 
would be ashamed to produce in the paltriest case quib- 
bles such as those to which Austria descended in order 
to find grounds to justify her dissatisfaction with the 
Serbian answer. It is not worth while to discuss the 
details of this composition, which is miserable even 
in style. In part, the Austrian observations amount to 
an assertion that misunderstandings, more or less inten- 
tional, existed on the side of Serbia. Point 5, for ex- 
ample, was said to have nothing to do with international 
law or criminal procedure ; it was rather "purely a mat- 
ter of State police which must be settled by way of a 
separate agreement." Point 6, it was stated, was con- 
cerned only with the collaboration of Austrian officials 
at the preliminary police investigations, not in the ju- 
dicial proceedings. In these two points then, the only 
ones in which Serbia had made any reservations — all 
the other points were in essence agreed to — in these, 
the only points still at issue, there were, according to 
the assertion of the Austrian Government itself, mis- 
understandings (due to the want of clearness in the 
Austrian Note), but these misunderstandings were of 
such a nature that they could have been removed in 
half-an-hour's discussion between experts, or, at the 
worst, they could have been submitted to the decision 
of a court of arbitration. Why did Austria not take 
steps to bring about such a discussion or such a decision? 
Why did she at once have recourse to a measure as 
sharp as any that could have been adopted in the event 
of a flat refusal of her demands — to a rupture of diplo- 
matic relations? 

This was the third incomprehensibility in the course 
of three days — an incomprehensibility, that is to say, 
except on the assumption that Austria intended under 
all circumstances to begin a war against Serbia, even 
at the risk of a European war. The Note itself was in 



THE CRIME 153 

reality nothing but a declaration of war in disguise. No 
one, least of all Austria herself, could have expected 
from Serbia that she should give to demands so humili- 
ating as those contained in the Note more careful at- 
tention than she did in fact devote to them. That Ser- 
bia, nevertheless, considered these suggestions, and, in- 
deed, concurred in most of the Austrian demands, was 
a sign of an extraordinary devotion to peace on the 
part of this country, exhausted by two wars, and was at 
the same time the effect of the energetic summons to 
assume a compliant attitude __ issued by the Entente 
Powers with Russia at their head. The appeal for help 
which Alexander, the Prince Regent of Serbia, addressed 
on July 24th to the Czar Nicholas emphasised the readi- 
ness of Serbia to accept everything that was compatible 
with her position as an independent State, and asked 
Russia for advice as to the course to be pursued. 1 The 
advice thus elicited led to the Serbian Note of July 25th, 
that is to say, to a humiliation unprecedented in the 
history of diplomacy. This in itself is enough to prove 
beyond all doubt the desire for peace which animated 
Serbia and Russia. On the other hand, the facts that 
Austria regarded the Serbian Note as a negligible quan- 
tity, and that she did not even consider it of sufficient 
value to be accepted as the basis of further discussion, 
and flatly broke off diplomatic relations, prove that Aus- 
tria under all circumstances desired war. Her inten- 
tion to provoke a war is manifest in the first three acts 
of the tragedy: in the Austrian Note, in the refusal to 
extend the time-limit, and in the recall of the Ambas- 
sador. 

The compliance of Serbia which the whole world 
longed and hoped for, and which the diplomacy of 
Europe — again, of course, with the exception of Ger- 
many — had endeavoured to bring about by all possible 
1 Orange Book, No. 6. 



£154 I ACCUSE! 

means, was for Austria the greatest of disappointments. 
In Vienna they had desired and hoped for a flat refusal, 
which would have justified a breach of diplomatic re- 
lations and a declaration of war. It was precisely for 
this reason that the Note had been couched in such 
sharp terms, in order that it might provoke a refusal. 
These expectations were disappointed because the love 
of peace on the part of Serbia and Russia was greater 
than the desire for war on the part of Austria. The 
authorities in Vienna thus found themselves in straits, 
since the expected ground for war had failed, and they 
saw themselves obliged to construct artificially a ground 
for war by seeking to transform the patent submission 
into a refusal by means of pettifogging and sophistical 
quibbles. 

Until the Serbian Note was known to the public, 
everyone believed in a Serbian refusal, which was uni- 
versally regarded as the only possible answer to the 
veiled declaration of war made by Austria. When, how- 
ever, the European chancellories and the general public 
became acquainted with the Serbian Note on the 26th 
and 27th of July everyone was amazed at the attitude 
of Austria, for which no other explanation could be 
found than that she intended unconditionally to provoke 
a war, and everyone looked with horror to the approach- 
ing danger of a European war. 

Sir Edward Grey was the first who sought to meet 
this danger. He proposed a conference of the ambassa- 
dors of Germany, France, and Italy under his presi- 
dency in London with the object of devising ways and 
means of arriving at a settlement of the differences be- 
tween Austria and Serbia. France and Italy at once 
accepted the proposal of Grey with great alacrity, and 
Russia also declared without hesitation that she regarded 
a conference of the ambassadors of the four Powers not 
directly concerned as the best method of maintaining 



THE CRIME 155 

peace, and that she herself would accept the decision of 
this conference. 1 In fact, the composition of a confer- 
ence consisting of two representatives of the Alliance 
and two of the Entente guaranteed an impartial exami- 
nation of the questions at issue, which, in view of the 
Serbian answer, were reduced to a minimum, and were 
easily capable of solution in the shortest possible space 
of time. If it is borne in mind how incomparably more 
difficult problems had been successfully solved by the 
Conference of Ambassadors at London during the Bal- 
kan crisis, it must be admitted that a settlement be- 
tween the Austrian demands and the Serbian conces- 
sions in July, 19 14, was child's play compared with the 
previous achievements of the London conference, which, 
apart from arriving at a decision on many other ques- 
tions affecting land and sea, race and nationality, had 
to undertake the task of bringing into the world nothing 
less than a whole kingdom. 

But the idea of a conference of ambassadors encoun- 
tered the opposition of Germany and Austria, precisely 
because it would have been such an easy matter to ar- 
rive in this way at a solution of the questions at issue. 
If the representatives of the four Powers not directly 
affected had sat down round a table in London to com- 
pare the verbal differences of the two Notes and to 
explain the misunderstandings, it was absolutely certain 
that they would have been successful in arriving at a 
solution, and Austria could not then have withdrawn 
from the proposals decided on by the ambassadors when 
Russia, speaking both for herself and on behalf of Ser- 
bia, had in advance expressed her readiness to accept 
these suggestions. Such a course would have frus- 
trated the war, and for this reason it was unaccept- 

1 Blue Book, Nos. 17, 24, 35, 36, 42, 51, 53 (Russia would be quite 
ready to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, 
France, Germany, and Italy). 



156 I ACCUSE! 

able to Austria. For this reason Germany was in the 
first place entrusted with the task of stepping forward 
with the objection that they "could not call Austria 
before a European tribunal." * And when this objection 
was reduced by Grey to an absurdity with the observa- 
tion that "it would not be an arbitration, but a private 
and informal discussion to ascertain what suggestion 
could be made for a settlement," 2 Austria came out 
with the flat declaration that she must decline the Eng- 
lish proposal. 5 

This was the fourth action within five days whereby 
Austria, with the support of Germany, had brought to 
failure the efforts of the other Powers to preserve peace. 
The Austrian refusal was all the more glaring inasmuch 
as it was expressly intended that the conference should 
only discuss those points which affected Serbian sov- 
ereignty and independence, and since Austria had from 
the very beginning given assurances that she did not 
desire to touch the sovereignty or the independence of 
Serbia. The proposal thus, in fact, related only to an 
investigation from the point of view of public law into 
the question of the extent to which the Austrian de- 
mands, especially those in Articles 5 and 6 of the Note, 
were compatible with the sovereignty of the neighbour- 
ing State. The voluntary acceptance of the result of 
such an inquiry — which was not in any way an arbitra- 
tion — could have done as little damage to the prestige 
of Austria as is done to the honour of a private citizen 
when in a civil action he accepts a compromise on ex- 
pert advice. But Austria did not desire any settlement, 
and thus the idea of a conference failed. 

1 White Book, p. 409 [The references to the White Book are 
adapted to the reprint in the Collected Diplomatic Documents relat- 
ing to the outbreak of the European War], 

2 Blue Book, No. 67. 
"White Book, p. 409. 



THE CRIME 157 

Simultaneously with her objections to the conference 
of ambassadors, Germany had proposed direct discus- 
sions between Austria and Russia as the best method of 
preventing the Serbian question from developing 1 to a 
European conflict. This proposal was readily concurred 
in by England, Russia, and France, and Grey was at 
once prepared to withdraw his proposal for a confer- 
ence of the four Powers until the direct discussions 
between Vienna and Petrograd had led to a result, 
whether positive or negative. 2 If the result were posi- 
tive, the conference would then be superfluous. If it 
were negative, the conference could still seek to attain 
what direct discussions had been unable to achieve. 

So here again there was a new ray of hope! But 
unfortunately here again they reckoned without Aus- 
tria. It is scarcely credible, yet it is true — the docu- 
ments incontrovertibly prove it — Austria declined the 
direct discussions with Russia, proposed by her ally 
Germany, and Count Berchtold declared to the Russian 
ambassador Schebeko, who had impressed upon him 
in the most friendly manner the desirability of a free 
discussion in Petrograd, that Austria could neither "re- 
cede nor enter into any discussion about the terms of 
the Austro-Hungarian Note." 3 

Here there is either a lack of harmony between Berlin 
and Vienna, or else we have an instance of preconcerted 
collusion. Since a lack of harmony, for the existence of 
which there is no evidence, cannot be accepted, there 
only remains the other alternative, that of preconcerted 
collusion. The matter is all the more suspicious because, 
as already observed, the correspondence between Berlin 
and Vienna has not so far been published, and may 

1 Blue Book, No. 43. White Book, p. 409. 
2 Blue Book, No. 45. 

a Blue Book, Nos. 61, 74, 75, 78, 81, 93. Orange Book, Nos. 45, 50. 
White Book, p. 409. 



158 I ACCUSE! 

therefore be presumed to contain things which it is de- 
sired to keep silent. Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, who 
every day of his life publishes all possible kinds of un- 
official documents — extracts from the archives of Brus- 
sels, intercepted letters, and so on — would certainly have 
published long ere now his correspondence with Vienna 
if it had contained any confirmation of the truth of 
his ever-repeated but ever-unproved assertions, that he 
earnestly pressed for moderation in Vienna and car- 
ried this labour to the "utmost point." 

In any case the fact remains that the direct under- 
standing between Austria and Russia, proposed by Ger- 
many, came to nothing in consequence of Austria's re- 
fusal. On July 28th, the same day as that on which 
the decisive conversation between Berchtold and 
Schebeko took place, Austria declared war against Ser- 
bia, and on the next day the bombardment of Belgrade 
began. 

This declaration of war made the European situation 
almost desperate. Austria's intention to crush under all 
circumstances the inconvenient neighbouring State, re- 
gardless of the European conflagration which must re- 
sult, had now revealed itself in action, and it appeared 
that all further attempts to quench the fire or to prevent 
its extension would be void of any prospect of success. 
Austria had mobilised, not only against Serbia, which 
could be regarded as a matter of course, but against 
Russia as well. The views vary as to the extent of her 
mobilisation towards the north and north-east. The Rus- 
sian reports maintain that more than half of the Aus- 
trian army had been mobilised, 1 whereas the Chancellor, 
von Bethmann-Hollweg, in his speech of August 4th 
admits the mobilisation of only two army corps "against 
the north/' 2 In any case it is clear that on July 28th 

1 Orange Book, No. 49. 

a The Collected Documents, p. 937. 



THE CRIME 159 

Austria was the only great Power which had mobilised, 
and that its mobilisation was directed, not only against 
her small neighbour, but also against the great Russian 
Empire. 

This fact was bound to compel Russia to take counter- 
measures, the necessity for which was based not merely 
on the military measures taken by Austria, but even 
more on her systematic frustration of all attempts to 
bring about an understanding. The Russian Govern- 
ment on the 29th of July officially communicated to 
foreign Governments that they had ordered mobilisation 
in the army districts of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow, and 
Kasan, and that this was designed as a protective meas- 
ure against Austria's mobilisation and without any ag- 
gressive intentions against Austria or Germany. 1 

Simultaneously with these events, renewed efforts 
were being made by Russia and England to find a for- 
mula whereby a settlement could be arrived at between 
the conflicting interests .of Austria on the one hand 
and of Russia on the other. War had now broken 
out. The question to be discussed was no longer that 
of inducing Austria to withdraw, but only that of bring- 
ing about a cessation of military operations, of leaving 
to Austria as a pledge any Serbian territory which she 
had meanwhile occupied, and of making an attempt on 
this basis to satisfy as far as possible the demands of 
Austria. 

In this direction Grey and Sazonof showed indefati- 
gable activity, and were most energetically supported by 
Viviani, the French Prime Minister. The first formula 
in this sense was proposed on July 29th by Grey to the 
German Ambassador, Prince Lichnowsky. It amounted 
to the suggestion that Austria should express herself as 
satisfied with the occupation of Belgrade and the neigh- 
bouring Serbian territory as a pledge for a satisfactory 
^White Book, p. 409. Orange Book, No. 51. Blue Book, No. 78. 



160 I ACCUSE! 

settlement of her demands, and should allow the other 
Powers time and opportunity to mediate between Aus- 
tria and Russia. 1 

This proposal of Grey was insistently urged on the 
Emperor in the telegram despatched on July 30th by 
King George to Prince Henry of Prussia, and the hope 
was expressed that the Emperor would apply: — . 

"his great influence in order to induce Austria to 
accept this proposal. In this way he will prove that 
Germany and England are working together to 
prevent what would be an international catastrophe. 
Please assure William that I am doing all I can, and 
will continue to do all that lies in my power, to 
maintain the peace of Europe." 

The Secretary of State, Sir E. Grey, exerted himself 
with the same zeal as the King to move the Powers to 
the acceptance of his proposal, which, in fact, offered 
satisfaction to all, and a way of escape from the dan- 
gerous confusion which had resulted. 

Meanwhile the Russian Minister, Sazonof, had also 
dictated to the German Ambassador, Count Pourtales, a 
formula as the basis of a settlement, which was directed 
to the same objects as Grey's proposal. The formula 
runs : — 

"If Austria, recognising that the Austro-Serbian 
question has assumed the character of a question of 
European interest, declares herself ready to elimi- 
nate from her ultimatum points which violate the 
sovereign rights of Serbia, Russia engages to stop 
her military preparations." 2 

This proposal of Sazonof dates from July 30th, that 
is to say, two days after the Austrian declaration of 

1 Blue Book, Nos. 76, 88, 90, 98. White Book, 410. 
a Orange Book, No. 60. 



THE CRIME 161 

war against Serbia, and after the bombardment of Bel- 
grade and the invasion of Serbian territory had already 
begun. The proposal contained no obligation on the part 
of Austria to cancel the military action taken by her; 
it merely imposed on Austria the requirement that she 
should leave untouched the sovereign rights of Serbia, 
that is to say, an obligation which could well be accepted 
by Austria, if she desired honourably to observe the 
declaration given by her at the beginning of the crisis. 

What, however, took place? The Russian Ambassa- 
dor at Berlin, Swerbeiev, on July 30th handed to von 
Jagow, the Foreign Secretary, the proposal made by 
Sazonof, which had simultaneously been telegraphed to 
the Foreign Office through the German Ambassador, 
Count Pourtales. The answer of Jagow was a Hat re- 
fusal: "it was impossible for Austria to accept the pro- 
posal." 1 This refusal, be it noted, was given at once,' 
without any previous inquiry in Vienna. Herr von 
Jagow obviously regarded himself as the guardian or 
man of business of the Austrian Government, which, 
since the declaration of war against Serbia and her 
refusal of any kind of discussion, no longer stood in 
any direct relation with Petrograd. 

One more attempt thus ended in failure! But even 
this further failure did not deter the English and Rus- 
sian Governments from making renewed attempts to 
bring about an understanding. There were two formulas 
in the field, that of Grey of the 29th of July and that of 
Sazonof of the 30th of July. The latter had been re- 
fused by Jagow without any reasons being given, 
whereas the former was still awaiting an answer. The 
English Ambassador in Berlin constantly pressed for 
an answer, and was repeatedly put off with empty 
phrases. Owing to the Austrian refusal of all direct 
discussions, diplomatic intercourse was rendered ex- 
1 Orange Book, No. 63. 



162 I ACCUSE! 

traordinarily difficult. All inquiries had to go via Ber- 
lin, and Berlin was never able to give a positive answer, 
since, as was professed, an answer had not been received 
from Vienna. Whether the agent in this case was hon- 
est or dishonest cannot be proved with full certainty. 
But in any case the suspicion in favour of the second 
alternative is overwhelming — a point with which we 
shall deal in greater detail later in stating the grounds 
for the indictment against Germany. The peacemakers 
were put off from day to day. On one occasion Jagow 
had received no answer from Vienna; on another, Beth- 
mann regrets that he had pressed the button so vigor- 
ously in Vienna that he had perhaps gone too far and 
produced the opposite effect from what was intended. 
On a third occasion, when Goschen was still urging that 
an answer should be given and was recommending that 
an even more violent pressure should be applied to the 
button in Vienna, the only answer which he got from 
Bethmann was that Count Berchtold would take the 
wishes of the Emperor Francis Joseph in the matter 
next morning. 1 

Thus three complete days, from the 29th to the 31st 
of July, glided unprofitably into the past without any 
answer being received from Austria in reply to Grey's 
proposal which the English King had so fervently urged 
on the Emperor William. Three days glided unprofit- 
ably into the past while Europe in suspense and in horror 
watched the approach of the dreaded catastrophe. The 
diplomatists of Germany and Austria were in no haste. 
They knew what they wanted, and with complete com- 
posure they prepared the drama behind the scenes, while 
in front everyone was running to and fro in agitation, 
calling aloud in terror for the fire brigade. 

Grey, Sazonof, and Viviani persevered, notwithstand- 
ing all their failures, in the earnest endeavour to prevent 
''Blue Book, Nos. 98, 103, 107, ua. 



THE CRIME 163 

the outbreak of the conflagration. Scores of telegrams 
flew backwards and forwards between London, Paris, 
and Petrograd. Night and day men laboured in the 
Chancellories of the Entente Powers to preserve peace. 
Since Sazonof's proposal had been declined, and no 
answer had been sent in reply to Grey's proposal — even 
to-day no answer has been received — an attempt was 
made to devise a third formula which would represent 
a middle way between the first two formulae. This third 
formula — the result of the zealous action taken by Vi- 
viani in the cause of mediation 1 — went even further to 
meet the wishes of Austria than the first proposal of 
Sazonof, and thus appeared to offer every prospect of 
a favourable result. It was communicated by Sazonof 
to the Great Powers of Europe on the 31st of July, 
and runs as follows: — 

"If Austria consents to stay the march of her 
troops on Serbian territory, and if, recognising that 
the Austro-Serbian conflict has assumed the char- 
acter of a question of European interest, she admits 
that the Great Powers may examine the satisfac- 
tion which Serbia can accord to the Austro-Hun- 
garian Government without injury to her rights 
as a sovereign State or her independence, Russia 
undertakes to maintain her waiting attitude." 2 

This formula, which now represented the utmost ex- 
tent to which it was possible to go in meeting Austria's 
wishes, and could only have been suggested by Russia's 
decisive desire for peace, has never received an answer 
from Austria or Germany. While Sazonof in a des- 
patch to London still expressed the hope that a peaceful 
issue to the situation had been found, 3 while Grey in 

1 Yellow Book, No. 112. 
8 Orange Book, No. 67, 
'Orange Book, Nos. 69, 71. 



164 I ACCUSE! 

his despatches to Berlin most urgently recommended 
the acceptance of the second formula of Sazonof, 1 Ger- 
many and Austria maintained an unbroken silence. In 
place of the Serbian question, which was in danger of 
being amicably settled, another question was put for- 
ward, which was bound to lead inevitably to war — the 
question of the Russian mobilisation. Germany ap- 
peared no longer as Austria's man of business, but took 
her place as a party to the case in her own name. The 
understudy assumed the leading role. Austria's book of 
guilt was closed, and a new book of guilt for Germany 
was opened. 

The Russian general mobilisation undoubtedly took 
place on July 31st. On this all the diplomatic publica- 
tions agree. 2 It was, however, occasioned by the previ- 
ous Austrian general mobilisation. This fact requires 
to be decisively emphasised, since in Germany an in- 
tentional silence has been preserved on this point of- 
ficially and unofficially. This silence is only natural, for 
the guilt of Russia would hopelessly collapse like a house 
of cards if it were proved that the Russian mobilisation 
not only followed the Austrian in point of time, but was 
also its necessary consequence; not merely because of 
the military measures of Austria, but equally because 
of the whole diplomatic attitude of the two Empires in 
the days between July 23 rd and 31st. 

I have already shown that the first of all the mobilisa- 
tions was the Austrian partial mobilisation against Ser- 
bia and against the Russian frontier. This mobilisation, 
according to Russian and French reports, comprised 
against Russia more than a half of the entire Austrian 
army, and according to Bethmann's admission at least 
two army corps. The precise time of the complete 
mobilisation of Austria is differently given; according 

1 Blue Book, Nos. in, 120, 121, 131, 132. 
8 White Book, p. 412. 



THE CRIME 165 

to the report of the Russian Ambassador in Vienna it 
had already taken place on July 28th. 1 According to 
French and English reports it took place at 1 o'clock 
in the morning on July 31st. 2 To be on the safe side, I 
will assume that the latter date only is proved. Of the 
correctness of this date there can be no doubt in view 
of the reports of Dumaine, the French Ambassador in 
Vienna, of de Bunsen, the English Ambassador in Vi- 
enna, and Bertie, the English Ambassador in Paris. 

The Russian general mobilisation was ordered, at the 
earliest, towards midday on July 31st, that is to say, 
after the Austrian mobilisation. 

On the same day — the exact hour is unknown — the 
"threatening danger of war" (drohende Kriegsgefahr) 
was proclaimed in Germany. In the evening about 7 
o'clock the ultimatum to France was delivered in Paris, 
and about midnight the ultimatum to Russia was de- 
livered in Petrograd. 

An eventful day! But the most remarkable occur- 
rence was contributed by Austria, when, in the course of 
the same day, unperturbed by general mobilisation, the 
state of war (Kriegszustand) , and ultimata, she sud- 
denly gave simultaneous expression in Paris and Petro- 
grad to her readiness to enter into negotiations with 
Russia and the other Powers with regard to the contents 
of her ultimatum to Serbia. Austria thus at last de- 
clared herself ready at the eleventh hour to do some- 
thing which up till then she had most energetically re- 
fused to do, that is to say, "to discuss the grounds of 
her grievances against Serbia with the other Powers." 3 
In Paris, London, and Petrograd this final apparent con- 
version of Austria was received with feelings of in- 
tensely pleasant surprise. Everyone hailed what was 

1 Orange Book, No. 44, 47. 

'Yellow Book, No. 115. Blue Book, Nos. 113, 118, 126, 134. 

"Yellow Book, No. 120. Orange Book, No. 73. 



166 I ACCUSE! 

regarded as a new ray of hope. Grey and Sazonof at 
once seized the opportunity of guiding the apparent 
goodwill of Austria into paths which held out the guar- 
antee of a happy, issue. 

As a shopkeeper spreads out before a fastidious cus- 
tomer all his available wares in the hope that she will 
in the end find something to suit her taste, so Grey and 
Sazonof submitted to Austria, even at the eleventh hour, 
every possible proposal in the hope that at least one 
would gain the approval of this fastidious customer. 
Grey promised to support in the capitals of the other 
Powers any reasonable proposal of peace put forward 
by Germany and Austria. He offered to support in 
Petrograd a proposal which would satisfy all Austrian 
demands without exception, in so far as the sovereignty 
and integrity of Serbia were not thereby impaired. 1 In 
answer to the Austrian overture, Sazonof not only de- 
clared himself ready to discuss with Austria the sub- 
stance of the Austrian ultimatum, but he made the fur- 
ther proposal — in order to guarantee as far as possible 
that the discussion would have a chance of success — that 
the proceedings should take place in London under the 
"participation" of the Great Powers. He added that 
it would be very important if Austria, during the nego- 
tiations in London, were to put a stop provisionally to 
her military action on Serbian territory. 2 "It would 
be very important," be it observed; it was not made a 
conditio sine qua non. This represents a further sub- 
stantial concession to Austria as compared with previous 
proposals which had made the cessation of military 
action a condition. 

But all these proposals made in the last hour re- 
mained without success. They were bound to be fruit- 
less, because the assumption underlying them, namely, 

*Blue Book, No. in. 

'Blue Book, No. 133. Orange Bopk, No. 69. 



THE CRIME 167 

that Austria was honestly prepared to come to an un- 
derstanding, was illusory. Why did Austria in the criti- 
cal days between the 23rd and 31st of July refuse all 
discussions on the facts of the Serbian dispute? Why 
did she with unyielding obstinacy constantly declare only 
what she did not intend against Serbia, but never fur- 
nish any explanation as to what she really did intend? 
She did not intend to touch the integrity and inde- 
pendence of Serbia. This negative declaration she con- 
stantly repeated. But what did she mean to do posi- 
tively? Even to-day we have no information on this 
point. The German Emperor himself did not know 
when he telegraphed to the Tsar on July 29th: — 

" According to my opinion the action of Austria- 
Hungary is to be considered as an attempt to re- 
ceive full guaranty that the promises of Serbia are 
effectively translated into deeds." 

Herr von Schoen also, the German Ambassador at 
Paris, knew just as little as his Imperial Master how to 
furnish Viviani with a positive answer to the question 
as to what Austria really did want. 1 

What precisely was the nature of the guaranties of 
which the Emperor William speaks, and of which the 
German White Book is constantly making mention? 
Were they contained in the Austrian Note, or did they 
go beyond the Austrian Note? If they were contained 
in it, then they were conceded, apart from the demands 
contained in Articles 5 and 6, with regard to which 
Serbia was prepared to negotiate. If, however, they 
were not contained in the Note, then they extend still 
further the scope of the Austrian demands, which apart 
from this were in all conscience sufficiently far-reaching. 
If this extension of the Austrian demands were to be 

1 Orange Book, No. 55. 



168 I ACCUSE! 

made the subject of negotiations, it should clearly have 
been stated in precise language; but until the evening 
of the 31st of July this had not been done, and even 
to-day we are no further forward. 

How then, I ask again, are we to explain this suddeH 
change on the part of Austria f I can find no other 
explanation than this, that the readiness of Austria to 
negotiate, which if expressed at an earlier date would 
without doubt have led to a peaceful settlement, was, in 
the moment when it was finally expressed, completely 
harmless. A peaceful solution was no longer to be 
dreaded; by the independent lead assumed by the Cabinet 
of Berlin war was already completely assured. 

Here, again, the question arises whether there was a 
divergence between Berlin and Vienna, or whether the 
events which took place are to be attributed to precon- 
certed duplicity. The paths followed by the two Cabi- 
nets apparently led in opposite directions on the evening 
of July 31st. Austria, in virtue of her readiness to 
negotiate, was moving in the direction of peace. Ger- 
many with her "threatening danger of war," with her 
Imperial speeches,^ and the speeches of the Chancellor 
to the people of Berlin, advanced consciously and in- 
tentionally in the direction of war. It is impossible to 
believe that there was any divergence between the two 
Cabinets. Had such a divergence existed it must have 
revealed itself at an earlier date than the 31st of July. 
The coincidence in time between the two apparently 
opposed actions, the sudden overnight conversion of 
Austria as though by an illumination — in individuals 
as in States such sudden illuminations are highly sus- 
picious, and only slow conversions inspire confidence 
— the conversion of Austria calculated to take effect at 
the moment when it could no longer lead to salvation — 
all these circumstances raise to a certainty the suspicion 
that here there was preconcerted duplicity between the 



THE CRIME 169 

two Governments intended to shift the guilt of the war 
from themselves to Russia. 

It must and had to come to war. The further discus- 
sion of the question will completely convince anyone 
who has so far been able to entertain doubts of the truth 
of this assertion. All diplomatic negotiations were thus 
bound to remain fruitless even if they resulted in the 
whole of Europe being forced to her knees before Ger- 
many and Austria. It was not enough to achieve a 
diplomatic victory; a military victory had to be added 
in order to assure the supremacy of Austria in the Bal- 
kans and to pave for Germany a path to the stars where 
she dreamed that her destiny was written. 

The indictment which I bring against Austria may be 
summarised in the following sentences: 

(i) Austria, after having already planned an attack 
on Serbia in August, 19 13, presented to Serbia in July, 
19 14, a Note containing demands of such an exorbitant 
nature that a war with Serbia, and as a further conse- 
quence a European war, was to be expected. 

(2) She refused the prolongation of the forty-eight 
hours' time-limit which was sought for by the Entente 
Powers. 

(3) She recalled her Ambassador, and declared war 
against Serbia, although the Serbian Government had 
submissively conceded nearly all the Austrian demands, 
and so far as the others were concerned declared her- 
self ready to negotiate and to submit the outstanding 
points to arbitration. 

(4) She flatly refused every discussion with Russia 
and with the other Powers on the contents of the Ser- 
bian Note, and only expressed her readiness to take 
part in such discussions on July 31st when it was too 
late. 

(5) She refused the proposal of Grey to accept media- 
tion, or at least advice, from the four Powers not di- 



170 1 ACCUSE! 

rectly concerned, although Russia had agreed to this 
proposal. 

(6) Notwithstanding repeated urgent requests from 
England, she left unanswered the formula of agreement 
proposed by Grey. 

(7) She declined, through Herr von Jagow, the first 
formula of agreement proposed by Sazonof. 

(8) She gave no answer to the second formula of 
agreement proposed by Sazpnof. 

(9) The last proposals for an agreement made by 
Grey and Sazonof were also not considered worthy of 
an answer by Austria. 

(10) In so far as she furnished any explanations, she 
restricted herself to saying what she did not wish, but 
she never said what she did wish. 

(11) She was the first of all the Great Powers to be- 
gin mobilisation and military operations ; she preceded all 
the other Powers, first with her partial and then with 
her general mobilisation. 

These points in the indictment are proved, and jus- 
tify the judgment: 

"Austria is guilty, either alone or in common with 
others, of having provoked the European war" 

We shall now see who the others are. 



B 

GERMANY 

The guilt of Germany is even easier to prove than that 
of Austria, since Germany has composed her own bill 
of indictment. Properly read, the German White Book 
contains almost the whole of the accusations which can 
be brought against Germany, and I will undertake to 



THE CRIME 171 

produce overwhelming proof of guilt by means of the 
contents of the German White Book taken along with 
the complementary official documents, so that it will be 
unnecessary for me to do more than emphasise her self- 
accusations. 

These confessions are, of course, unintentional. They 
do not have the purifying intention and the force of 
self-accusations as known to Christianity, and as repre- 
sented on the stage by the most Christian of all mod- 
ern poets, Tolstoi. They are confessions arising from 
imprudence; he who is confessing believes that he is 
justifying himself, whereas he is really accusing him- 
self. He believes that he is defending himself, and he 
delivers into the hands of his accuser priceless material 
for his condemnation. 

Let us begin at the very opening passage in the White 
Book. After depicting the position of the Austrian 
Government towards the Serbian agitation and the 
impossibility of "viewing any longer this agitation across 
the border," the White Book continues: — 

"With all our heart we were able to agree with 
our ally's estimate of the situation, and assure him 
that any action considered necessary to end the 
movement in Serbia directed against the conserva- 
tion of the monarchy would meet with our ap- 
proval. We were perfectly aware that a possible 
warlike attitude of Austria-Hungary against Serbia 
might bring Russia upon the Held, and that it might 
therefore involve us in a war, in accordance with 
our duty as allies. We could not, however, in these 
vital interests of Austria-Hungary, which were at 
stake, advise our ally to take a yielding attitude 
not compatible with his dignity, nor deny him our 
assistance in these trying days. . . . We, therefore, 
permitted Austria a completely free hand in her 



172 I ACCUSE! 

action towards Serbia, but have not participated in 
her preparations." 

What does this amount to ? It means : — 
(i) That the German Government gave the Austrian 
Government a completely free hand to take against Ser- 
bia whatever action might appear to her to be suitable 
in the circumstances, whether the means adopted were 
diplomatic or military in their nature. 

(2) That Germany intentionally refrained from par- 
ticipating in the preparations for action in either of 
these ways; that is to say, she was prepared, in conse- 
quence of her duty as an ally, to follow blindly the 
lead taken by Austria. 

(3) That Germany was perfectly well aware that mili- 
tary action on the part of Austria against Serbia might 
bring Russia into the field, and might therefore involve 
Germany also in the war, which, in consequence of the 
obligations imposed by alliances on both sides, was 
bound to assume the character of a European war. 

Thus the German Government acknowledges that it 
bears the responsibility (dolus) for the European War, 
the ultimate responsibility {dolus eventualis) which, ac- 
cording to juridical and moral ideas, is placed on the 
same footing as the direct responsibility {dolus purus). 

At the same time she further admits that she herself 
from the beginning regarded her effort to localise the 
military conflict between Austria and Serbia as having 
had no prospect of success. It follows that, in reject- 
ing the promising proposals for arriving at an under- 
standing put forward by the other Powers and in seeking 
to substitute for them one for localisation, Germany 
was proposing an expedient which, in her own view, 
could not lead to a successful issue. In other words, 
her desire was to produce the appearance that she was 
anxious to prevent the European conflict, but she re- 



THE CRIME 173 

fused every method calculated effectively to prevent it, 
and in their place proposed a method which in her own 
opinion was completely unfitted to achieve this end. 

The view that Russia would be brought into the field 
by an Austro-Serbian war, to which free expression is 
given in the White Book, was but too well founded. 
One can only be amazed that Germany did not credit, 
or pretended not to credit, the other Powers with the 
foresight with which she was herself endowed. Had it 
not become a commonplace in European diplomacy, and 
indeed a commonplace to everyone in Europe who 
thought about politics, that Russia, in view of the in- 
timate bonds of blood and of faith and of the two 
hundred years of history by which she was linked with 
Serbia, could never be a silent witness of the establish- 
ment of an Austrian hegemony over that country, that 
she could never consent to it being crushed by arms, 
but would come to the assistance of her weaker 
brother? 1 Russia's interest in the Balkans was known 
to all, and had been confirmed by the Russian Gov- 
ernment in countless declarations and actions. After the 
first and the second Balkan War the opposition between 
the interests of Austria and Russia had once more, as 
on so many previous occasions, stood out in full relief. 
Russia's interest on behalf of Serbia and Austria's in- 
terest against Serbia had come into such violent col- 
lision that even then they almost occasioned a European 
war. The same danger existed in August, 19 13, when 
Austria planned the attack on Serbia which has been 
disclosed by Giollitti. Even at that time the interven- 
tion of Russia was looked upon as a matter of course; 
otherwise the inquiry addressed by Austria to her ally 
Italy would have had no meaning. As late as May, 
1914, the Russian Foreign Minister, Sazonof, in a speech 

1 See Blue Book, p. v. Grey called this "a commonplace in Euro- 
pean diplomacy" in a speech in Parliament in March, 1913. 



174. I ACCUSE! 

in the Duma, professed his adhesion to a policy of "the 
Balkans for the Balkan people," that is to say, to a 
policy which opposed any intention on the part of Aus- 
tria to establish a hegemony, and which promised the 
support of Russia in the maintenance of the indepen- 
dence of the Balkan peoples. The question here was 
not a political one pure and simple ; it was rather a ques- 
tion of national sentiment and of blood-relationship. 
This link between Russia and Serbia was an ancient his- 
torical fact, with which European diplomacy was bound 
to reckon, and with which it always had reckoned. 1 Ger- 
many and Austria also reckoned with it, as the White 
Book testifies. 

And was it now supposed that these bonds were sud- 
denly to be wrenched asunder? Was it expected that 
Russia would be a placid spectator while Austria crushed 
the small State connected with Russia by blood? Was 
Russia baldly to renounce her interests in the Balkans 
and her prestige among the Balkan nations in favour 
of Austria? This was a strong suggestion to make, 
if it were seriously meant. But the suggestion was in- 
deed so strong that it cannot have been seriously 
meant. 

Germany herself never believed, and never could have 
believed, in the possibility of localisation from the mo- 
ment the conflict assumed a military aspect. My little 
brother annoys a strong man, who is on the point of 
striking him dead. I intervene to protect the little one 
against the superior strength of the big man. A third, 
who is even bigger, bars my way, saying that the conflict 
between the small boy and the big man must remain 
localised. Would I therefore restrain myself from 
protecting my brother? This was Russia's position. 

Certainly it would have been a good thing if the con- 
flict could have remained localised, and this would also 
1 See Blue Book, p. v. 



THE CRIME 175 

have been quite possible if it had remained on a diplo- 
matic basis. On this basis the great man had already- 
obtained a complete victory over the small But it was 
really too much to ask that the little one should be 
crushed after he had tendered copious apologies, and 
had humbly promised to behave better in future. It 
was impossible to ask this of Russia, and if such a 
demand were made it was known from the outset that 
it could not be satisfied. 

Thus the only title to glory which Germany claims 
for herself in this diplomatic tragi-comedy falls to the 
ground. No one believed in the possibility of localises 
tion, least of all Germany herself. 

After this, the only proposal made by Germany, a 
proposal advanced by her in the full knowledge that it 
had no prospect of success, had, as a matter of course, 
failed, Germany's whole attitude during the critical days 
was one of perpetual passivity; if in any way she aban- 
doned this attitude, she restricted herself to the frus- 
tration of all attempts to arrive at an understanding. 
The more the German Government assures us that it 
earnestly laboured "shoulder to shoulder with Eng- 
land" in the interests of mediation, the less support do 
these assurances find in the facts. The impartial in- 
quirer sees only the one shoulder, that of England, press-- 
ing in the direction of peace, while the German shoulder, 
butting against the English, is seen pushing in tha 
opposite direction. 

Why did the German Government allow the Austrian 
Note to be despatched without being acquainted with 
its contents, without previously submitting these to ex- 
amination? Among foreign Governments the suspicion 
had made itself manifest that Germany had already 
had a hand in the game when the Note was drafted. 
In particular, the Italian Government adduced as one of 
the grounds for her resolution to remain neutral that she 



176 I ACCUSE! 

had not been informed of Austria's intentions and of 
the contents of the Note — in contrast to Germany, the 
other member of the Triple Alliance. The German 
Government promptly denied this. It assured foreign 
Governments that it had received no information with 
regard to the Note before the time of its delivery, and 
this assurance is repeated in the White Book. 1 It is 
open to anyone to believe or disbelieve this assurance. 
If it is true, it reveals an unprecedented levity, for which 
there is no adjective in the German language sufficiently 
severe. Here we have a Note which in itself almost 
amounted to a declaration of war, which would almost 
certainly lead to a Serbian, and in the sequel to a Eu- 
ropean war; are we to suppose that the German Gov- 
ernment did not require such a Note as this to be laid 
before it previous to its delivery that it might have 
the opportunity of examining it, and of abating any ex- 
cessive harshness which it might contain? If, however, 
Herr von Bethmann had knowledge of the Note, and 
notwithstanding allowed it to be delivered without de- 
mur, this affords proof that he saw clearly the possibil- 
ity of war, and intentionally did nothing to prevent it. 
Thus levity, irresponsible levity, or the commission of 
a crime, are the alternatives which must be placed before 
Herr von Bethmann. It may be left to him to make the 
choice. 

At the other stages of the negotiations the same alter- 
natives have to be placed before him. 

Why did the German Government not support the re- 
quest of England and Russia for an extension of the 
time-limit? Why did Herr von Jagow content himself 
here, as on so many other occasions, with the platonic 
promise that he would transmit this request to Vienna, 
without being able to support it? Why did he at once 
express doubt whether Austria would be able to meet 
1 White Book, p. 406. 



THE CRIME 177 

this request? 1 Was it not entirely reasonable that the 
Powers concerned in the cause of peace, who only re- 
ceived knowledge of the Austrian Note on July 24th, 
should have sought for a somewhat longer time-limit in 
order that they might be able successfully to exercise 
their influence on Serbia in the direction of securing 
compliance ? Was it not reasonable that they should 
first of all desire to become acquainted with the Austrian 
documentary evidence, which was not annexed to the 
copy of the Note communicated to them, and which was 
only made accessible to the English Government on 
August 7th, that is to say, long after the outbreak of 
war? 2 What objection could Germany raise against 
the extension of the time-limit, a course which could 
only be serviceable to the interests of peace, if like the 
others she also desired peace? 

If the Serbian answer, as up to the evening of July 
25 th there was reason to fear had amounted to a re- 
fusal, would not Germany have had to reproach herself 
with the fact that her failure to support the request for 
an extension of the time-limit had in part to bear the 
responsibility for the unfavourable answer? 

The Serbian answer became known, and the whole 
world breathed more freely. No one had expected that 
Serbia would have so humiliated herself. Whereas the 
Austrian Note is rightly characterised in the English 
Blue Book in the statement that "No independent na- 
tion had ever been called upon to accept a greater hu- 
miliation," 3 the Serbian answer is accorded the well- 
merited testimony that "The reply went far beyond any- 
thing which any power, Germany not excepted, had ever 
thought probable." 4 Russia and France were equally 

1 Blue Book, No. 18. 

2 Blue Book, p. v. 

3 Blue Book, p. vi. 

4 Blue Book, p, vii. 



178 I ACCUSE! 

satisfied with the attitude assumed by Serbia. In a cir- 
cular telegram of July 27th Sazonof describes the Ser- 
bian answer as follows : — 

"It exceeds all our expectations in its modera- 
tion and in its desire to afford the fullest satisfac- 
tion to Austria. We do not see what further de- 
mands could be made by Austria, unless the Vienna 
Cabinet is seeking for a pretext for war with 
Serbia." 1 

All were agreed that just as the Austrian Note had 
surpassed the limits of what was permissible and had 
violated all precedents, so the Serbian answer surpassed 
in its spirit of compliance and submissiveness every- 
thing of which there was previous record. Germany 
alone was of a different opinion. The Austrian demands 
appeared to her moderate and justifiable; the Serbian 
answer, on the contrary, appeared insufficient, as it 
"showed in all essentials the endeavour through pro- 
crastination and new negotiations to escape from the 
just demands of the Monarchy." 2 The German Gov- 
ernment undertook to "pass on" to Vienna the request of 
Grey that Germany would use her influence in Vienna 
in support of a favourable reception of the Serbian Note, 
but they did not see their way to identify themselves 
with the request. 3 

Why was it impossible to support this request? Why 
was it not possible for Germany to exert her whole influ- 
ence in Vienna in order to secure that negotiations on the 
basis of the Serbian answer would at least take place? 
Were the few reservations made, in the most conciliatory 
form, by Serbia of so great importance that on their 
account the whole answer had to be rejected, diplomatic 

1 Orange Book, No. 33. 

•White Book, p. 406. 

' Blue Book, p. viii and No. 34. 



THE CRIME 179 

relations broken off, and a war declared, the further con- 
sequences of which were distinctly foreseen by Germany? 
Did the Serbian answer really have the appearance of 
quibbling and procrastination? Was it not full of posi- 
tive promises, the non-fulfilment of which had first to 
be waited for before the answer could be rejected as in- 
sufficient? What else could Serbia do within forty-eight 
hours than promise everything — everything with a few 
exceptions — asked of her? The intention to procrasti- 
nate could only manifest itself later, in the event of there 
being an undue delay in giving effect to the promises. 
Why, then, did Germany tolerate the recall of the Aus- 
trian Ambassador, and later the Declaration of War? 

If the objection is raised that Germany could not have 
prevented it, I answer that she could, but that she 
was unwilling to do so. That she was unwilling to do 
this, or indeed anything else, in the service of peace 
may already be inferred from the preceding events, and 
is confirmed by all that follows. To assert, however, 
that she was unable to exercise a decisive influence on 
Austria's action is so ridiculous an evasion that it does 
not need to be seriously contradicted. With regard to 
Austria, Germany was in a position to give effect to 
her every wish. Austria was a cipher in the European 
international concert, in which Germany played the first 
fiddle. Only if Germany stood behind her could Austria 
run the risk of a conflict with Russia, which was bound 
to arise out of the Serbian conflict. A nod from Ger- 
many would have been enough, and Austria would have 
left her Ambassador in Belgrade, and continued to dis- 
cuss the Serbian Note. It was unnecessary for Beth- 
mann to say a word. A frown would have been enough 
to restrain Austria from declaring war against Serbia, 
an action which no Austrian statesman could have taken 
unless he had had in his pocket the previous concurrence 
of Germany. 



180 I ACCUSE! 

All that England might have prevented by a timely 
declaration of neutrality in Petrograd and in Paris is 
constantly emphasised in the German Press, as also 
in the Chancellor's speech of December 2nd. This ques- 
tion I will deal with later in discussing the attitude of 
England. The other question, which lies nearer home, 
is, however, never raised: What might not Germany 
have prevented if at the right time she had checked the 
impetuosity of her Austrian ally, if she had moderated 
the terms of the Note, required that negotiations should 
take place on the basis of the Serbian answer, and had 
thus prevented the declaration of war? This is the 
crucial point in the whole question. Here lies the germ 
of the whole tragedy. Austria, blindly and without so 
much as the quiver of an eyelash, did whatever Germany 
wished. All the sugary phrases used by Bethmann and 
Jagow, that they could not expect this or that of Austria; 
that they feared that they had already gone too far in; 
their suggestions; that they had pressed the button too 
violently, and that in so doing the opposite from what 
was intended might be produced ; that they had gone to 
the utmost limit in Vienna, and so on, all these state- 
ments are but empty falsehood and deceit. I repeat, a 
frown would have been enough to restrain Vienna from 
measures not desired in Berlin. The question again re- 
duces itself simply to this : What was and what was not 
desired in Berlin? I have already given the answer to 
this question. 

Thus with Berlin's concurrence matters advanced to 
a declaration of war for which, as has been shown above, 
not the slightest ground could be advanced; with Ber- 
lin's concurrence, also, all the further developments took 
place. The attitude of Germany in the days between 
July 28th and August 1st was in conformity with that 
during the preceding days. The English proposal for 
a conference of Ambassadors in London was, as we have 



THE CRIME 181 

already seen, rejected by Germany on formal grounds 
without any inquiry being addressed to Austria. 1 The 
direct negotiations between Austria and Russia, proposed 
by Germany, in which Sazonof was ready to participate, 
were rejected by Austria with the observation that the 
suggestion, "after the opening of hostilities by Serbia 
and the subsequent declaration of war . . . appears be- 
lated." 2 Here, again, is another charming expression: 
"Serbia had opened hostilities," and not Austria. The 
declaration of war against Serbia which had wantonly 
proceeded from Austria prevents this same Austria from 
negotiating with Russia in the interests of the mainte- 
nance of European peace! All this Germany passively 
endures, except in so far as she herself abandons her 
passivity in favour of an attitude of active rejection, as 
in the case of the conference of the four Powers. In 
essential matters Germany contents herself with the role 
of a postman, merely handing on the English proposals 
to Vienna, and with the muteness proper to a postman 
takes no further interest in the fate of these proposals. 
"We further declared ourselves ready ... to transmit 
a second proposal of Sir Edward Grey's to Vienna." 3 
"We even as late as July 30th forwarded the English 
proposal to Vienna" 4 — such are the expressions we find 
everywhere in the White Book. It is indeed in general 
maintained that the proposals which were handed on re- 
ceived support, but nothing is adduced to prove the as- 
sertion. The correspondence between Berlin and Vienna 
on which the proof of this rests is lacking. The luke- 
warm observations uttered by Messrs. von Bethmann and 
von Jagow to Goschen, the English Ambassador, on the 
reception of each new English proposal do not indicate 

1 White Book, p. 409. 

2 White Book, p. 409, and Exhibit 16. 
B White Book, p. 409. 

* White Book, p. 410. 



182 I ACCUSE! 

that they felt any very lively interest in these proposals. 
The negative results achieved in Vienna, however, in- 
controvertibly prove that they not only did not support 
the English proposals, but that in all probability they 
thwarted them. Any course which they earnestly sup- 
ported in Vienna was bound to have been accepted there. 
If it was not accepted, this affords proof that they did 
not earnestly support it. 

The evil intention of the German Government is clearly 
shown by the following occurrence. When on July 27th 
Sir Edward Goschen laid before von Jagow, the Foreign 
Secretary, Grey's proposal of the conference of the four 
Powers, Herr von Jagow, as is well known, at once de- 
clined this "court of arbitration," and persisted in his 
refusal, even when Goschen explained to him that the 
question was not one of "arbitration," but that the object 
was merely "to discuss and suggest means for avoiding 
a dangerous situation." * But Grey refused to be dis- 
couraged. He inferred from Jagow's answer and from 
a declaration made by Lichnowsky that Germany did not 
in principle refuse his proposal, but that difficulties were 
being advanced only against the form of a Conference. 
He therefore commissioned his Ambassador to request 
Herr von Jagow himself to suggest the form which 
would be agreeable to the German Government. 2 Viviani 
made the same suggestion to Baron von Schoen, and 
Sazonof to Count Pourtales. All three Governments ex- 
pressed themselves as ready to accept any form of medi- 
ation which Germany might propose, and Viviani, as 
well as Grey, emphatically added that the European situ- 
ation had now become so serious that they dared not 
allow formalities or quibbles to wreck the peace of Eu- 
rope. 3 

^lue Book, No. 43. 

2 Blue Book, Nos. 46, 60, 68. Yellow Book, No. 81. Orange Book, 
No. 54. 
"Blue Book, No. 78. Orange Book, No. 55. 



THE CRIME 183 

To-day Europe is still waiting in vain for Jagoitfs 
answer. Grey did not desist ; he reminded Mr. von 
Jagow of the matter, and returned to it again and again, 
urging on him the desirability of at length suggesting 
the form agreeable to him, which had already been ac- 
cepted by all in advance. It was all in vain. No answer 
came from the Wilhelmstrasse. The White Book ex- 
pressly confirms the fact that the idea of Grey's proposal 
was approved. 1 It intentionally passes over in silence 
the fact that this idea could have been realised in any 
form desired by Germany, if Germany had put forward 
any proposals on the subject. These proposals were 
never made. Is not this an overwhelming proof of 
guilt? The fact is that the diplomatists of Germany, as 
I have already pointed out, had no wish to sit round 
a table in London with the diplomatists of other coun- 
tries. It was known how easy it would be to find a solu- 
tion of the Serbian question, and how much more diffi- 
cult questions had been solved in London in 19 12 and 
1913. It was feared that a peaceful solution might again 
be arrived at in London, and for this reason, whatever 
might happen, the London Conference had to be pre- 
vented. 

We now come to the history of the various formulae 
proposed by Grey and Sazonof which aimed at bring- 
ing about a peaceful understanding between Russia and 
Austria with or without the participation of the Powers. 
I have already dealt with the fate of these proposals in 
the previous section relating to Austria, and I have also 
pointed out the role played by Germany in these nego- 
tiations. In the German White Book only one of all 
these proposals and negotiations, that of Grey, is men- 
tioned, and this is done in such a superficial and ambigu- 
ous manner that without reference to the telegram from 
the English King to Prince Henry of Prussia one could 
1 White Book, p. 409. 



184 I ACCUSE! 

scarcely realise how far-reaching and how rich in pros- 
pect was the peace proposal in question. Here, again, 
Germany restricted herself to the discharge of a post- 
man's duties. She handed on the English proposal to 
Vienna. The White Book contains not a word of recom- 
mendation, nor even of criticism. 1 It contents itself with 
adding, "we had to assume that Russia would accept this 
basis," and in another place it speaks of a proposal of 
mediation "whose tendencies and basis must have been 
known in Petrograd." 2 That is all that is said. Noth- 
ing is told us with regard to the fate of the proposal, 
and it is only from the English Blue Book that we learn 
that Grey's proposal, like so much else that was calcu- 
lated to serve the cause of peace, was simply buried in 
silence. In this case also events took exactly the same 
course as had previously been followed with regard to 
the question of the form of the conference of the four 
Powers, the only difference being that on that occasion 
Germany alone was responsible for the failure to give an 
answer, whereas here the responsibility for the absence 
of an answer was pushed on to Vienna. "He has up 
till now received no reply"; "they had not had time to 
send an answer yet" ; "no answer had yet been re- 
turned." 8 Such were the answers given by Jagow to 
Goschen in the critical days in which the fate of Europe 
depended on hours, and indeed on minutes. 

The sentence in the White Book which speaks of the 

1 White Book, p. 410. [The translation of the White Book used 
in the text is that officially published by the German Government, 
reproduced in the Collected Diplomatic Documents. There is, how- 
ever, a slight difference in the meaning between the official transla- 
tion of this passage: "We thought that Russia would accept this 
basis," and the original German which has here been followed in 
the text : "Wir mussten annehmen dass Russland diese Basis akzep- 
tiren wiirde."] 

2 White Book, p. 411. 

*Blue Book, Nos. 28, 107, 112. 



THE CRIME 185 

consent of Russia to Grey's proposal as an indefinite 
assumption only, and which is thereby designed to make 
it appear as if the fate of this proposal was uncertain on 
the other side also — this sentence can only rest on mala 
fides. The German Government knew quite well that 
Sazonof also, as well as Grey, had energetically sought 
for a formula to serve as the basis of agreement, that a 
first formula of this kind, as I have already stated, had 
been dictated by Sazonof himself to Count Pourtales on 
July 30th, 1 that Germany had refused this proposal on 
the ground that it was "impossible for Austria to accept 
it," 2 and that Sazonof, at Grey's suggestion, had for- 
warded to the German Government an even more con- 
ciliatory formula. 3 All this was, and is, known to the 
German Government. It is, however, hidden in silence 
from the German public. It may be said generally that 
the German Government has, consciously and inten- 
tionally, maintained silence with regard to all the ef- 
forts for peace made by Russia and France, because these 
do not suit their case and would lead to the collapse 
of the whole of the laboriously constructed edifice of the 
Russian-French attack. The second formula of Sazonof 
experienced the same fate as Grey's proposal. No answer 
has in fact been given. And the last desperate efforts of 
Russia and England on July 31st and August 1st have 
also not been considered worthy of any kind of an an- 
swer from Germany. 4 

Germany acted according to the principle : 
"Words, words, enough have now been bandied 
At last the time has come for deeds." 5 

1 Orange Book, No. 60. 
3 Orange Book, No. 63. 
3 Orange Book, No. 67. 

* Blue Book, Nos. 111, 120, 121, 131, 132, 135, 137, 138, 139. Orange 
Book, Nos. 69, 71, 73. 

6 Der Worte sind genug gewechselt 
Nun lasst uns endlich Taten sehen. 



186 I ACCUSE! 

The decision to act had already been taken on July 
29th, on the third day after the return of the Emperor 
from his tour in the north. To judge from the telegrams 
exchanged between the Emperor and the Tsar there ap- 
pears to me to be no doubt — justice requires that this 
should be placed on record — that the Emperor at the mo- 
ment of his return had not yet personally resolved on 
war. His first telegrams to the Tsar despatched on July 
28th and 29th, 1 and especially the former, strike a tone 
of friendship and of an inclination to peace which scarcely 
leaves room for doubt that they were honourably in- 
tended. I have already shown that a large and powerful 
party at the Court and in the country had for long 
striven for war. I have also endeavoured to prove that 
the Emperor had in principle been won over to these 
efforts. But there is a long step between entertaining a 
conviction on principle and translating this conviction 
into action. The step is greater the more responsibility 
attaches to the act, the more serious the consequences 
to which it may give rise. It need, therefore, cause no 
surprise that days of inner and of outer struggle had to 
pass before the resolution to act came to fruition. The 
inner struggles are reflected, easily recognisable by the 
psychologist, in the telegrams which were sent by the 
Emperor between July 28th and August 1st to the Tsar 
and the King of England. 2 

At the outset the Emperor recognises the difficulties 
for the Tsar and his Government of "stemming the tide 
of public opinion in Russia." Oh the other hand, he 
defends the action taken by Austria against Serbia, and 
promises to use all his influence in bringing about a direct 
understanding between Austria and Russia. As the ex- 
change of telegrams advances we see more and more the 

1 White Book, Exhibits 20 and 22. 

a White Book, pp. 412, 413, pp. 431, 432; Collected Documents, pp. 
539, 540. 



THE CRIME 187 

original subject of negotiation — the substantial difference 
between Austria and Russia — disappear, and the formal 
question of the menace involved in military prepara- 
tions takes its place. In the telegram sent by the Em- 
peror on the afternoon of July 29th there can be heard 
the first ominous notes of the menace of military prepa- 
rations. 1 References to this question constantly increase 
until in the end the only subject of discussion is that of 
military preparations. On July 30th all discussion of the 
*It is surprising that in the German White Book there is no 
answer from the Tsar to this telegram. The White Book inserts 
immediately after the Emperor William's telegram of the 29th July 
(Exhibit 22), a further telegram of the Emperor of the 30th July 
(Exhibit 23). This gap has now been filled by an official publica- 
tion of the Russian Government. The Tsar, in fact, answered on 
the 29th of July, in reply to the Emperor's telegram of the same 
day, in the following words :— "Thanks for your telegram which is 
conciliatory and friendly whereas the official message presented 
to-day by your ambassador to my Minister was conveyed in a very 
different tone. I beg you to explain this divergency. It would be 
right to give over the Austro-Serbian problem to the Hague tri- 
bunal, I trust in your wisdom and friendship." This telegram of 
the Tsar was omitted by the German Government, obviously because 
it contains the simplest and most natural proposal in the world— 
already made by Serbia in her reply— namely, that the question at 
issue should be submitted to the Hague Tribunal. The excuse put 
forward by the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, that the telegram 
had been omitted on account of its unimportance, is adapted to the 
present intellectual level of the German newspaper reader. It was 
omitted because, along with many other things, it was of decisive 
importance for the formation of a judgment on the attitude of the 
Tsar. The acceptance of the Tsar's proposal would doubtless have 
led to peace, and for this reason it was declined. As, however, it 
was impossible to give reasons for this refusal, the Emperor Wil- 
liam was induced simply to ignore the Tsar's proposal, and to put 
forward in place of the Austro-Serbian problem the question of 
military preparation by means of which war could be brought about 
at will. The German Government is led by evil conscience to omit 
from the White Book the Tsar's telegram of the 29th of July. The 
telegram itself and its suppression affords a new proof that Russia 
desired peace, but that Germany desired war. 



188 I ACCUSE! 

substantial issue had already completely ceased, and 
everything turned on the question as to which of the 
three Emperors had been compelled to mobilisation by 
the others. On July 30th the Emperor William main- 
tains that Austria had only mobilised against Serbia — in 
opposition to the Chancellor, who admits that there had 
also been a mobilisation against Russia. The Emperor 
Nicholas, on the other hand, maintains that the partial 
mobilisation of Russia which took place on July 29th 
was only decided upon "for the reason of defence against 
the preparations of Austria." He promises to send 
"Tatisheff with instructions to-night to Berlin." 1 In his 
telegram of July 31st the Tsar announces that the discon- 
tinuance of military preparations "made necessary by the 
Austrian mobilisation" was "technically impossible," but 
he gives his solemn word that no provocative action will 
be taken so long as negotiations continue. The Em- 
peror William again demands unconditional discontinu- 
ance of the military preparations of Russia, whereupon 
the Tsar submits that he may take the same measures 
without war necessarily following. The Emperor Wil- 
liam, however, mobilises, and declares war. 

This rapid development of events can only be ex- 
plained by the fact that there must have taken place in 
the authoritative circles in Berlin a change of front lead- 
ing from the oscillation which characterised the earlier 
days to a firm resolution to embark on war. In all prob- 
ability this change of front took place on the evening of 
July 29th, on the occasion of the interview which the 
Chancellor had with the Emperor in Potsdam. The in- 
fluences which drove the still-hesitating Emperor to re- 

1 What happened to this mission of Tatisheff? Did he arrive in 
Berlin? What message did he bring? Why did Berlin not delay 
her ultimatum until the arrival of the special envoy of the Tsar, 
who could not arrive at the earliest until the 1st of August? These, 
among other questions, will suggest themselves to the reader. 



THE CRIME 189 

solve on war cannot be proved, but it is possible to guess 
at them. People who are in a position to know say that 
those occupying the leading military positions, supported 
by the Crown Prince and his retainers, threatened the 
Emperor with their resignation en bloc if war were not 
resolved on. 1 

What is certain is that the Chancellor on the same eve- 
ning, after his return to Berlin, summoned Sir Edward 
Goschen, the English Ambassador, and fervently sub- 
mitted to him a proposal that England in the event of 
a European conflict should under certain conditions re- 
main neutral. 2 The conditions which Herr von Beth- 
mann offered were as follows : — 

(i) Germany in the event of a victorious war would 
aim at no territorial acquisitions in Europe at the ex- 
pense of France. The Chancellor said he was unable 
to give a similar assurance with regard to the French 
Colonies. 

(2) The neutrality of Holland would be respected by 
Germany so long as it was respected by Germany's ad- 
versaries. 

(3) With reference to Belgium it would depend on 
the action of France what operations Germany might 
be forced to undertake against Belgium, but in any case, 

1 We have less difficulty in understanding these events in Berlin 
when we bear in mind an observation which Count Pourtales made, 
in passing, to Sazonof : measures of mobilisation were, he said, 
highly dangerous nowadays, "for in that event the purely military 
consideration of the question by the general staffs would find ex- 
pression, and if that button were once touched in Germany the situ- 
ation would get out of control." The German Government takes 
very good care not to include in its White Book this self-confession, 
which throws a very characteristic light on the occurrences in Berlin 
in the last day before the outbreak of war. The Austrian Govern- 
ment, however, with less prudence reports the observation of Pour- 
tales in No. 28 of the Red Book. 

2 Blue Book, No. 85. 



190 I ACCUSE! 

when the war was over, Belgium's integrity would be 
respected if she had not sided against Germany. 

This proposal for neutrality made on July 29th is in 
the highest degree surprising, and is very illuminating. 

What so far had happened, we may ask, to awake in 
Herr von Bethmann this urgent fear of a European war? 
Austria had opened hostilities against Serbia, and had 
partially mobilised against Russia. Russia had there- 
upon answered with a mobilisation of four southern 
army districts. At that time there was absolutely no 
question of a mobilisation against Germany. The White 
Book itself only dates this from July 31st. All the diplo- 
matic forces of Europe — at any rate, with the exception 
of Germany and Austria — were active in endeavouring 
to relieve the tension between Austria and Russia. The 
proposal of the conference of the four Powers was still 
hanging in the air. Grey's formula of agreement had 
just been proposed to Lichnowsky, the German Ambassa- 
dor. Russia was then, as she had been previously, ready 
to treat directly with Austria, and was waiting to begin 
negotiations. France was supporting in the most ener- 
getic manner the efforts for peace made by Grey and Saz- 
onof. In short, all forces were labouring at the task 
of maintaining peace, and it only required that Germany 
should energetically intervene to move Austria to adopt 
the conciliatory attitude demanded by the European situa- 
tion, and peace would have been assured. And in such 
a moment as this, when everything depended on the 
peaceful intentions of Germany alone, the Chancellor 
was thinking merely of how best to make his position se- 
cure in the event of war! There is only one explana- 
tion for this bid for neutrality made at this juncture. 
The Chancellor regarded peace as in danger, and could 
not do otherwise than regard it as in danger, because 
he knew, as the other Governments could not then know, 
that war had been decided on in Berlin. The war was 



THE CRIME 191 

bound to come, since this was the wish of Germany. And 
since it was bound to come, only one thing gave Herr 
von Bethmann cause for anxiety, the task, namely, of 
fashioning the chances of war as favourably as possible 
for Germany, and of excluding England for the present 
from the ranks of her enemies, in order to be in a more 
secure position to defeat her on the next favourable 
opportunity. The "policy of the free hand on the Con- 
tinent" which the Chancellor had unsuccessfully pur- 
sued with regard to England in 19 12 forms the basis of 
the bid for neutrality of July 29th, 19 14. 

The English answer was as negative in its nature as 
that given two years previously. The significant impor- 
tance of Bethmann's overtures were at once realised in 
London. In return for the prospect of a future agree- 
ment of neutrality with Germany, vaguely held out, the 
English Government refused to allow itself to be elimi- 
nated for the present from European politics and to be 
obliged to stand aside an inactive spectator while France 
was crushed or Belgian neutrality violated. In the opin- 
ion of Grey (and it must be admitted that in this he is 
right) such a bargain would be bound to break the 
friendly relations existing between England and France, 
would be inconsistent with the duty of protecting Bel- 
gium imposed on every signatory of the guarantee of 
neutrality of 1839, and would imperil, not merely the 
interests, but also the good name of England. Grey in- 
structed his Ambassador to add most earnestly to this 
refusal of the German proposal that the one way of 
maintaining the good relations between England and 
Germany was that they should continue to work to- 
gether to preserve the peace of Europe; if this were 
successful, the relations between the two countries would 
be, ipso facto, improved and strengthened. The English 
Government in any case was ready to work in that way 
with all sincerity and goodwill. It is impossible to omit 



192 I ACCUSE! 

reference to the concluding paragraph in Grey's instruc- 
tions to his Ambassador, a passage which must be re- 
garded as of the deepest significance in arriving at a 
judgment with regard to the attitude of England and 
Germany in this struggle. The Ambassador was to com- 
municate with the Chancellor in the following sense : — 

"If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the 
present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will 
be to promote some arrangement to which Germany 
could be a party, by which she could be assured 
that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pur- 
sued against her or her allies by France, Russia, 
and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired 
this and worked for it, as far as I could, through 
the last Balkan crisis, and, Germany having a cor- 
responding object, our relations sensibly improved. 
The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the 
subject of definite proposals, but if this present 
crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe 
has gone through for generations, be safely passed, 
I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will 
follow may make possible some more definite rap- 
prochement between the Powers than has been pos- 
sible hitherto." 1 

The significance of this declaration of Grey is obvious. 
It contains a moving appeal to common action in the 
cause of peace, such as had been maintained throughout 
the Balkan crisis to the advantage of the world and of 
the two countries, who in pursuing the same high aim 
had without compulsion approached each other and be- 
come more intimately connected. The vision of the 
future outlined by the English Minister nevertheless 
went far beyond anything attained in the past ; an agree- 
ment was to be concluded, with the participation of Ger- 

1 Blue Book, No. 101. 



THE CRIME 193 

many, which would afford Germany and her alHes formal 
guarantees against any aggressive or even hostile policy- 
on the part of the Entente Powers — in other words, 
a Treaty which would guarantee the peace of Europe, 
which could draw together the Triple Entente and the 
Triple Alliance, and would have substituted for the dan- 
gerous system of the balance of power a general alliance 
of peace. 

How did the Chancellor receive this proposal? When 
Goschen had read to him Grey's words in the form of a 
memorandum he received the communication "without 
comment," and only expressed a desire to receive a copy 
in order that he might reflect upon the matter at leisure. 
The copy was handed to him. No answer has ever been 
given. 1 

What would Europe have looked like to-day if Herr 
von Bethmann had concurred in Grey's proposal? It 
is superfluous, and indeed too painful, to allow our 
imagination to conjure up such a picture to-day. Every- 
thing that Germany is supposed to be struggling to 
achieve in this war — the security of her existence, free- 
dom for her development, unhampered progress in cul- 
ture and wellbeing — all these things were magnani- 
mously offered. In reality these possessions had never 
been in danger, but Grey's offer destroyed every possi- 
bility of believing that they were in danger and every 
pretext for persuading others to this belief. The alliance 
of peace proposed by Grey was merely a first step out of 
the atmosphere of enmity, distrust, and tension towards 
that of friendship, confidence, and composure. This 
first step would certainly have led to other advances. 
The feeling of confidence thus revived and strengthened 
would have rendered it possible to diminish the costly 
precautionary measures, which based merely on uni- 
versal and mutual distrust. Agreements on t he subject 
^lue Book, No. 109. 



194 I ACCUSE! 

of the cessation and gradual diminution of armaments 
would have become possible on the basis of an agree- 
ment of friendship. In short, the way was opened to a 
new and a better Europe, if Germany had but grasped 
the hand offered by England. 

But Herr von Bethmann thought otherwise. Having 
placed the memorandum in a pigeon-hole, he quietly 
chuckled to himself at the stupidity of the Englishman 
who, with his insular restricted vision, still believed in 
the peaceful intentions of Germany. We have over 
again the same performance as in 1912. England desires 
the peace of Europe; Germany, however, desires the neu- 
trality of England, in order to be able to disturb this 
peace at her own sweet will. And this same Chancellor, 
who knows this and innumerable other similar occur- 
rences of an earlier and of a later date, dares to burden 
the English Government with the "inner responsibility 
for the European war" ! We shall see later that in mak- 
ing this statement he comes into violent conflict, not 
merely with facts, but also with his own official publica- 
tions. For the present inquiry it is sufficient to make 
it clear that the resolution to go to war had already been 
taken in Berlin on the evening of July 29th. Only on 
this assumption is it possible to explain Bethmann's bid 
for English neutrality and his failure to take any notice 
of Grey's proposal. 

On the same day on which Herr von Bethmann re- 
ceived without comment Grey's proposal for a perma- 
nent European state of peace, the "threatening danger 
of war" was proclaimed in Germany, and the Am- 
bassadors in Petrograd and Paris were instructed to 
deliver ultimata to the Governments to which they were 
accredited. From Russia it was demanded that she 
should "stop every measure of war against us and 
against Austria-Hungary within twelve hours, and notify 
lis definitely to this effect." From France a declaration 



THE CRIME 195 

was required within eighteen hours "whether she would 
remain neutral in the event of a Russo-German war." 
The ultimatum was delivered in Petrograd about mid- 
night; that in Paris about 7 o'clock in the evening. 

When the news of these ultimata became known in 
and outside Germany, the report was at first generally 
disbelieved, since no one could adduce any ground for 
such drastic action at that precise moment. The diplo- 
matists were even more astonished than the public. 
What, then, could have taken place to drive Germany 
to this extreme step, which without doubt would inevit- 
ably lead to war? Was it not just on July 31st that the 
diplomatic negotiation between the Powers had appar- 
ently reached so favourable a point that the whole world 
once more began to entertain hope, and looked forward 
to a peaceful settlement at an early date? On July 30th 
Count Berchtold had expressed in the most friendly tone 
to the Russian Ambassador, Schebeko, his willingness 
to agree to a resumption in Petrograd of the negotia- 
tions which had for some time been discontinued between 
Austria and Russia. 1 These negotiations had, in fact, 
begun on July 31st between Sazonof and the Austrian 
Ambassador, Szapary, and this time they promised a 
greater measure of success than on any previous occa- 
sion, since Austria for the first time had professed her 
readiness to submit for discussion the contents of the 
Note addressed to Serbia. Sazonof himself, in a com- 
munication addressed to London, expressed the hope 
that a peaceful issue out of the crisis might yet be 
found. The French and the English Governments were 
agreeably surprised at the final change in the attitude 
of Austria, and Grey expressed the hope that it "may 
lead to a satisfactory result." 2 In Grey's despatch to 

1 Yellow Book, No. 104. Blue Book, No. 96. 
3 Blue Book, No. ill. Orange Book, Nos. 66, 69, 73. Yellow 
Book, Nos. 114, 120. 



196 I ACCUSE! 

Goschen it is possible to trace in every word the sincere 
satisfaction which he felt in consequence of the new 
turn of events. He at once redoubled his efforts to 
shorten the pains of childbirth, and to bring speedily into 
the world a healthy child of peace. Austria was to 
receive "full satisfaction of her demands on Serbia," 
all Powers were at once to suspend further military 
preparations, Germany and Austria had only to make 
"any reasonable proposal," and he would support it. 
If, however, Russia and France would not accept such 
a reasonable proposal, the British Government would 
have nothing more to do with the consequences. Saz- 
onof at once outlined a formula of agreement which 
went further to meet Austria than that first formu- 
lated. 1 He proposed a discussion in London, under the 
participation of the Powers, in which he represented 
a cessation of Austrian operations in Serbia, not as a 
condition, but merely as "very important." 2 Every- 
where there was activity, hope, and the zeal to save. 
Then suddenly the German ultimata exploded like a 
bombshell, and at a stroke all hopes were annihilated. 

What induced Germany to take this step? Profes- 
sedly it was due to the Russian mobilisation. What 
are the facts bearing on this point? I have already 
pointed out that the Russian mobilisation was merely 
the consequence of two facts ; firstly, the Austrian mob- 
ilisation which had preceded it, and secondly, the more 
than equivocal attitude assumed by Germany and Aus- 
tria throughout the crisis. 

Both grounds were completely sound, as I believe that 
I have proved. The Russian mobilisations were in no 
way kept secret; they were carried out with complete 
publicity, the partial mobilisation in the four southern 

1 Orange Book, No. 67. Blue Book, No. 120. Yellow Book, Nos. 
113, 120. 
'Yellow Book, No. 120. Blue Book, No. 133. 



THE CRIME 197 

Governmental districts on July 29th, the general mobi- 
lisation on the morning of July 31st. 1 The Austrian 
partial mobilisation had already taken place before the 
declaration of war against Serbia, that is to say before 
July 28th. The general mobilisation was ordered at the 
latest at 1 o'clock on the morning of July 31st; in- 
deed, according to the report of the Russian Ambas- 
sador at Vienna, it took place as early as July 28th. 2 
The Russian partial mobilisation was officially communi- 
cated to Berlin on July 29th, and the general mobilisa- 
tion was publicly proclaimed in Petrograd on July 31st. 

The story of the false Russian words of honour is 
itself a falsehood. According to the account given in the 
German White Book, no fewer than two Russian gentle- 
men are assumed to have broken their word of honour, 
the Russian Minister of War and the Chief of the Gen- 
eral Staff. In addition to these, it is known that the Rus- 
sian Emperor, the "most sincere and devoted friend and 
cousin" of the Emperor William, also broke his word 
("betrayed Germany's confidence," as it is expressed in 
the official English edition of the German White Book). 
These insinuations of broken words constitute, along 
with many other features, a pleasant method of distin- 
guishing between the German publication and those of 
other countries. This also provides for people abroad a 
"culture-barometer" indicating a position which is in 
no way specially favourable for Germany. 

But if only the assertions were at least true! They 
are, however, untrue. The Russian Minister of War 
declared on July 27th to the German Military Attache 
that no order to mobilise had as yet been issued, but 
that preparatory measures only were being taken; if 
Austria were to cross the Serbian frontier the four mili- 
tary districts directed towards Austria would be mobi- 

1 White Book, pp. 409, 412. 

3 Yellow Book, No. 115. Orange Book, Nos. 47, 49. 



198 I ACCUSE! 

lised, but not those on the German frontier, since "peace 
with Germany was desired very much." 1 This com- 
munication of the Minister for War was in full accord- 
ance with the truth. The alleged "declaration of the 
state of war" in Kovno referred to in the telegram 
from the Imperial Consulate on July 27th, 2 is not the 
same as mobilisation. This should be known in Ger- 
many at least, since we also expressly distinguish be- 
tween a "state of war" and "mobilisation." 

The mobilisation of Kiev and Odessa, which is pre- 
sumed to have taken place on July 26th, is reported by 
the German military attache only in a very vague form, 
and cannot therefore be regarded as established. The 
military attache "deems it certain that mobilisation has 
been ordered" in the two districts. 3 His assumption 
may, however, be false, and may be based on the re- 
ceipt of erroneous information, not an improbable oc- 
currence in view of the great distance between these 
two districts and Petrograd. Nevertheless, it is possi- 
ble (and indeed it would have been more than reason- 
able) that Russia on July 26th, that is to say, on the 
day after the rupture of diplomatic relations between 
Austria and Serbia, should have made preparations for 
mobilisation. The Minister for War expressly acknowl- 
edges this. It is thus as audacious as it is unjust to 
reproach the Russian Minister of War with a breach of 
his word of honour on the ground of such evidence. 

The second guilty person is the Chief of the General 
Staff, and the accuser is again the military attache. In 
this case the conversation took place on July 29th, and 
the statement made by the Chief of the General Staff 
is reported to have been to the effect that "everything 
had remained as the Secretary had informed me two 

1 White Book, Exhibit 11. 

2 White Book, Exhibit 8. 
'White Book, Exhibit 7. 



THE CRIME 199 

days ago," that nowhere had there been mobilisation. 
For this he gave his word of honour in the most solemn 
manner, but he "could not assume a guarantee for the 
future." * 

The Chief of the General Staff did not say this, and 
cannot have said this, for on the same day, July 29th, 
the Russian Government officially informed Berlin that 
they had mobilised four army districts. It will be seen 
how much the love of truth is involved in the composi- 
tion of the German White Book. On the same page, 
page io, 2 there is printed, at the top the official com- 
munication of the mobilisation, and below the official 
denial. What purpose is the Chief of the General Staff 
supposed to have had in view when he uttered this lie, 
seeing that at the same moment the Russian Ambassa- 
sador was informing Berlin of the truth? What, on the 
other hand, must we think of a Government which in a 
matter of life and death manifests such levity in the 
compilation of official documents? 

What the Chief of the General Staff really said is 
indeed quite clear. He confirmed the mobilisation 
against Austria, and denied that against Germany. This 
agrees with the official communication made in Berlin, 
and also with a report despatched on July 30th by 
Paleologue, the French Ambassador. 3 The military at- 
tache had either failed to understand the Chief of the 
General Staff, or else he intentionally reported what was 

not true. 

Notwithstanding a diligent study of the evidence it is 
not clear to me in what point the Russian Emperor is 
supposed to have lied. The whole of these questions of 

1 White Book, p. 410. 

■ [Pages 409 and 410 in the collected English correspondence.] 

"Yellow Book, No. 102: "gave him his word of honour that the 

mobilisation ordered this morning was exclusively directed against 

Austria." 



200 I ACCUSE! 

mobilisation and of mutual recrimination stand for the 
most part on such an uncertain foundation that it is 
hazardous to utter censorious judgments in this matter. 
The Emperor William, for example, telegraphs on July 
30th to the Tsar: "Austria has mobilised only against 
Serbia." In opposition to this, the Imperial Chancellor 
admits in his speech of August 4th that Austria had 
also mobilised against Russia. It is impossible to as- 
certain the truth with regard to this or that mobilisa- 
tion, since measures of mobilisation are different in dif- 
ferent countries, and, since further, even without an 
official mobilisation it is possible to carry out a secret 
mobilisation. In French reports, for example, it is 
maintained, and the assertion is supported by facts, 
that Germany had begun to mobilise as far back as the 
recall of the Austrian Ambassador from Belgrade. 1 The 
proclamation of the "danger of war" is a German spe- 
cialty, which, as a matter of fact, conceals the most 
serious measures of mobilisation. 

Where and when, however, is the Russian Emperor 
supposed to have lied on the subject of his mobilisa- 
tion? In his telegram of July 30th he acknowledges 
"the military measures now taking form," which were 
being carried out "for the reason of defence against 
the preparations of Austria." In his telegram of July 
31st he declares that a discontinuance of his military 
preparations was "technically impossible" — an expres- 
sion which it is remarkable to note occurs in almost the 
same words in the telegram of the Emperor William to 
the King of England on August 1st: "For technical 
reasons the mobilisation which I have already ordered 
this afternoon on two fronts — east and west — must pro- 
ceed according to the arrangement made." In his last 
telegram of August 1st the Tsar in no way denies the 
mobilisation on the German frontier, with which he is 
1 Blue Book, No. 105 (Enclosure 3). 



THE CRIME 201 

reproached by the German Emperor, but, on the con- 
trary, he leaves it open to the latter to mobilise also, ask- 
ing only that the Emperor should give the same guar- 
antee as he himself had given, namely, that "these meas- 
ures do not mean war" and that both rulers should 
continue to negotiate in the interests of peace. 

I do not find anything in these telegrams which can 
even in the slightest degree throw doubt on the honour 
of the Russian Emperor. On the contrary, I see in 
the whole exchange of telegrams — above all, in the sup- 
pressed telegram of July 29th — the most honourable in- 
clination to peace on the part of the Tsar, as contrasted 
with the ultimatum-policy of Germany which, in spite 
of all the German Emperor's peaceful assurances, was 
necessarily bound to lead to war. 

The conclusion at which I arrive is, then, that the 
Russian mobilisation was justified, since it was occa- 
sioned by the Austrian mobilisation. It was not kept 
secret, but was officially communicated to foreign coun- 
tries, and was publicly proclaimed within the country. 
There is no manner of proof for the assertion that it 
was aggressive in character. With as much reason, and 
indeed with more reason, an aggressive character could 
be ascribed to the previous Austrian mobilisation and 
the German mobilisation concealed under the name of 
the "State of War." The attitude of the various Gov- 
ernments up to the moment of mobilisation, and their 
subsequent behaviour, can alone show these military 
acts in their true character. From this point of view 
the Austro-German mobilisations which were in full 
swing even before the proclamation of the "state of 
war," have a much more aggressive character than the 
Russian, because the Austro-German mobilisation served 
an aggressive policy, whereas the policy which called 
forth the Russian mobilisation was defensive in its na- 
ture. 



202 I ACCUSE! 

The aggressive character of the German attitude is 
in particular confirmed by certain events which took 
place on the wesiern frontier against France, before the 
despatch of the two ultimata. As early as July 30th 
German troops were concentrated at Thionville and 
Metz. Garrison troops from Metz were pushed up to 
the frontier, reinforced by troops from Treves and 
Cologne. The frontier-defences were strengthened and 
fortified. From July 25th railway stations were occu- 
pied by the military classes of the reserve (1903-1911) 
recalled by individual summons, roads on the frontier 
were barricaded, and the circulation of motor-cars for- 
bidden. Most important of all, as early as July 29th 
German patrols had in two instances penetrated into 
French territory. The French Government had officially 
announced that, in order to avoid collisions on the fron- 
tier, a zone of territory extending to 10 kilometres 
would be left unoccupied. The German Government 
did not issue a similar declaration, but pushed forward 
their advance-posts to the French frontier. We shall 
later have occasion to notice other occurrences, even 
more provocative, which took place between the 1st and 
3rd of August. 

From the political and military events previous to 
the despatch of the ultimata one thing emerges with 
certainty, namely, that the Franco-Russian military 
preparations furnished no support for the view that ag- 
gressive intentions existed on the part of these States, 
and that if aggressive intentions existed anywhere it 
can only have been on the side of Germany. 

What right, then, had Germany to demand that Rtts- 
sia should demobilise? This demand was in itself un- 
justified, and, when addressed to a Great State, was 
a departure from the conventions usually governing in- 
ternational relations; the situation was, however, ren- 
dered more difficult by the conditions imposed by Ger- 



THE CRIME 203 

many, specifying the manner in which it was to be car- 
ried out. The discontinuance of Russia's military 
measures was to take place: — 

(a) Within twelve hours, and 

(&) not only against Germany, but also against Aus- 
tria. 

The first request was "technically impossible," since 
a great State covering an enormous superficial area 
cannot within twelve hours put a stop to measures of 
mobilisation which have been initiated (see the telegrams 
of the Emperor Nicholas of July 30th and 31st, and 
that of the Emperor William to the King of England 
of August 1st). 

The second demand, however, that demobilisation 
should take place against Austria as well, was so mon- 
strous that one is almost tempted to doubt the sanity 
of the people who dared to propose it. Was Russia 
really expected to cancel her mobilisation against 
Austria, while Austria herself had been partially mobi- 
lised for over eight days, and had been completely 
mobilised against Russia and against Serbia since the 
early morning of July 31st, perhaps even from July 
28th? Could Russia be expected to lay down her arms 
before Austria? This suggestion is all the more remark- 
able inasmuch as Austria herself had no idea of ad- 
dressing such a suggestion to Russia, but, on the con- 
trary, she renewed negotiations with Russia on July 
31st, the same day on which both States carried out a 
general mobilisation. 

Germany thus was "more Austrian than the Aus- 
trians." Speaking generally, what right had she to 
make demands on behalf of Austria? Did she intervene 
as Austria's guardian, was she clothed with the powers 
of a plenipotentiary, or on what other legal title did 
she rely? In any case, the situation which arose from 
this arrogant tutelage was — I can find no other word 



204 I ACCUSE! 

for it — an abortion of madness. Austria found noth- 
ing to astonish or inconvenience her in carrying on 
negotiations with Russia under arms. And, as a mat- 
ter of fact, it was not the first time that negotiations 
had taken place between the two countries under these 
circumstances. During the Balkan crisis both Powers 
had remained mobilised for months at a time, and never- 
theless negotiations had been successfully carried on. 
Germany, however, whose interests were not involved 
in the present negotiations, who participated in the 
whole dispute merely as the ally of Austria, believed it 
to be her duty to afford more protection to Austria 
than Austria herself considered that she required, and 
she demanded from Russia a demobilisation to which the 
Double Monarchy attached no importance whatever. 

The complete madness of the whole situation may be 
gathered from the following hypothesis. If Russia — 
as, indeed, theoretically might have happened — had 
agreed to demobilise so far as Germany was concerned, 
but had declined to do so with regard to Austria — what 
would have been the position? The German ultimatum 
would then have partially complied with and partially 
declined, and Germany would have declared war against 
Russia because Russia had not demobilised against 
Austria. But Austria had in no way asked her to de- 
mobilise ! 

We see by what kind of men Germany is governed. 
How long will the people still submit to this condition 
of affairs? 

But to go further. Is then mobilisation in itself a 
hostile or a threatening act against which a neighbour- 
ing country is justified in taking action by means of an 
ultimatum? In no way. Mobilisation in itself is noth- 
ing else than the process by which the military forces 
of a country are prepared against the contingency of 
a conflict arising with another country. It is a meas- 



THE CRIME 205 

ure of security and foresight, which can only assume 
a threatening character by simultaneous or antecedent 
political measures taken by the Power mobilising. What 
political measures had Russia taken which could attach 
to her mobilisation the suspicion of aggressive inten- 
tions? None. The aggression, the general initiative 
to the whole conflict had issued from Austria, with the 
approval and support of Germany. Russia was politi- 
cally acting on the defensive when she gave expression 
to her legitimate interests in the Balkans. She was 
bound to support this political defensive by military 
measures of security, since the aggressor also had made 
military preparations. 

This is the situation viewed from the abstract stand- 
point of international law. In the concrete case before 
us we have seen that Russia up to and even beyond 
the day of her general mobilisation had, in union with 
England and France, done everything to maintain peace, 
whereas Austria and Germany had done everything to 
disturb it. Thus the concrete circumstances of the case 
also prove that the Russian mobilisation — which in the- 
ory was no menace to Germany — could also in this prac- 
tical case contain no such menace. To this must be 
added that Russia, as we have already seen, had no 
recognisable interest in attacking Germany or Austria. 
Her interest was exclusively confined to guarding her- 
self against being checkmated by Austria in the Bal- 
kans; the question was one of defence, not defiance. 

That mobilisation in itself is in no way a hostile act 
can be proved even from the testimony of an Austrian 
witness. Count Forgach, the Austrian Foreign Under- 
Secretary, declared, on July 31st, to de Bunsen, the 
English Ambassador, that "mobilisation was not to be 
regarded as a necessarily hostile act on either side" l 

Nevertheless, it suited Germany to represent the Rus- 
"" 'Blue Book, No. 118. 



206 I ACCUSE! 

sian mobilisation as a menace, and, indeed, as a menace 
against Austria and Germany alike. What was an- 
nounced as the consequence which would fall upon Rus- 
sia if she did not comply with the demands contained 
in the ultimatum? Mobilisation in Germany was also 
to take place. In the telegram sent by the Chancellor 
to Count Pourtales on July 31st we read: "On ac- 
count of these Russian measures we have been forced, 
for the safety of the country, to proclaim the 'threat- 
ening state of war,' which does not yet imply mobilisa- 
tion. Mobilisation, however, is bound to follow if Rus- 
sia does not," 1 &c, &c. Up to this point the matter 
is still quite logical if it is admitted that the despatch 
of the ultimatum was justifiable or necessary (which is, 
however, an erroneous assumption). * 

If this is madness, there is, at any rate, method in it. 
Germany says to Russia: "You have mobilised; if you 
do not draw back, I will mobilise also." This is, in- 
deed, the course which the Tsar advised the Emperor 
William to adopt: that there should be mobilisation on 
both sides, but without war or intention to make war, 
and that negotiations with the view of arriving at a 
peaceful understanding should go quietly forward. That 
such a course is possible requires no proof. That it 
has happened countless times is a historical fact. What 
reason was there for supposing that it could not hap- 
pen on this occasion? Indeed, there were now stronger 
reasons than ever before, since greater interests were 
at stake, and greater composure and prudence was there- 
fore required on the part of all concerned. If Germany 
had remained content with the mobilisation which she 
threatened, and had given full scope to the apparently 
hopeful negotiations taking place in Vienna and Petro- 
grad, if she had only waited for a day or two — mobilised 
like the others — it is certain that Europe would have 
* White Book, Exhibit 24. 



THE CRIME 207 

been preserved from the gravest of all catastrophes. 
As de Bunsen, the English Ambassador, states in his 
report to the English Government 1 : "A few days' 
delay might in all probability have saved Europe from 
one of the greatest calamities in history." 

The mobilisation of Germany would indeed have given 
a new impulse to the negotiations; for everyone feared 
us. Up till then there was no one who had seen us 
in arms; no one would have dared to quarrel with a 
Germany ready for battle. 

The fact that it is possible to be mobilised and that 
negotiations may nevertheless be carried on without war 
resulting is confirmed, quite apart from countless his- 
torical incidents, by the events which took place in the 
beginning of August, 19 14. Germany and France mobi- 
lised on the afternoon of August 1st; notwithstanding 
this, the Emperor William and the Chancellor in their 
telegrams to London on August 1st expressed their 
readiness to delay crossing the French frontier until 7 
o'clock in the evening of August 3rd. 2 As a matter 
of fact, war was only then declared against France; 
the two countries were thus mobilised for three days 
without being at war with each other. 

A much more striking and even humorous example 
of this kind is presented by the relations between 
Austria and Russia. These, the two leading parties in 
the quarrel, had been mobilised since July 31st, and 
war did not break out between them until August 6th, 
when the state of peace was ended by the declaration 
made by Austria. For days after the outbreak of the 
war between Russia and Germany the Austrian and 
Russian Ambassadors remained quietly in the capital 
of their enemies, and, who knows, may even have con- 
tinued negotiations. In any case the mobilised condi- 

1 White Book, No. 161. 

' Collected Diplomatic Correspondence, p. 54a 



208 I ACCUSE! 

tion of their armies did not disturb them in the enjoy- 
ment of the comforts of peace. Surely nothing equally 
insane — I can again find no other expression which is 
applicable, and there is no reason why I should refrain 
from calling a spade a spade — has ever occurred in 
diplomatic history. The two chief duellists have not 
yet crossed swords, but the second of one party has 
already attacked the other. If in the six days between 
the ist and the 6th of August Austria and Russia had 
after all succeeded in arriving at an agreement — a con- 
summation which at the time was still hoped for by the 
whole of Europe, and which could easily have been 
realised but for the provocative intervention of Germany 
— where in that case would have been the sense of 
Germany's war against Russia? It would have been a 
sort of war in the air, a tilting against windmills in the 
manner of Don Quixote, a war without any substantial 
ground. I will again merely ask : How long will the 
nation continue to tolerate such a Government? 

An answer to this peculiar ultimatum does not appear 
to have been received from the Russian Government, 
although a reply was received personally from the Tsar 
in the telegram despatched by him about noon on 
August ist, and received in Berlin about 2 o'clock in 
the afternoon. 1 This is the telegram quoted above, in 
which the Tsar states that he regards the German coun- 
ter-mobilisation as reasonable, but expresses anew the 
desire and the hope that it will not lead to war, but that 
"with the aid of God it must be possible to our long- 
tried friendship to prevent the shedding of blood." 

Three hours later the declaration of war was handed 
over in Petrograd by the German Ambassador, Count 
Pourtales. 

Never in the history of the world has a greater crime 
than this heen committed. Never h as a crime after its 

1 White Book, p. 413. 



THE CRIME 209 

commission been denied with greater effrontery and hy- 
pocrisy. 

"The Russian Government destroyed through its 
mobilisation, menacing the security of our country, the 
laborious action at mediation of the European Cabinets, 
just as it was on the point of succeeding. The Russian 
mobilisation, in regard to the seriousness of which the 
Russian Government was never allowed by us to enter- 
tain a doubt, in connection with its continued denial 
shows clearly that Russia wanted war" (see the German 
White Book, page 412). 

Nothing of this is true: 

The Russian Government did not menace the security 
of the German Empire by its mobilisation. 

It did not destroy the action at mediation of the Euro- 
pean Cabinets just as it was on the point of succeeding. 

It did not deny its measures of mobilisation. 

It did not want war. 

Everything that is here flung as a reproach at the 
Russian Government was, in fact, committed by Ger- 
many. 

Germany wanted war, and brought it about by her 
ultimatum and by her declaration of war. 

This declaration of war is a Cabinet paper in a class 
by itself, both in substance and in style. We have 
already considered the view that must be taken of the 
"part of mediator" played by Germany, and of "the 
grave and imminent danger" threatened from the side 
of Russia. The contents of the document would not 
merit any special discussion, if it were not necessary to 
emphasise a point which is as yet completely unknown 
in Germany. Germany — it is incredible, but true! — 
delivered the declaration of war with an alternative text 
in the passage of most importance, leaving it to Russia, 



210 I ACCUSE! 

so to speak, to choose which she preferred, and thus 
acknowledging that she herself did not know why she 
declared war against Russia. In the German White 
Book the words in question run: "Russia having re- 
fused to comply with this demand, and having shown by 
this refusal," &c. On the other hand, in the declara- 
tion of war as delivered in Petrograd the words run: 
"Russia having refused to comply with (not having 
considered it necessary to answer) this demand, and 
having shown by this refusal (this attitude) that her 
action," &c. You can see how they must have sweated 
in the Wilhelmstrasse in the dog days to concoct a 
formula for the declaration of war which would sound 
fairly well. As it was not known whether Russia would 
have to be reproached with a direct refusal or only with 
having ignored the demands contained in the ultimatum, 
as obviously no one knew very definitely by what name 
they were to call the gorgon child with snakes for hair 
and breath of fire, whom they were bringing into the 
world, they left it to the addressee to whom the monster 
was despatched to make the choice of his "name and 
description." 

Why was war declared against Russia ? According 
to the words used in the declaration of war, it was be- 
cause Russia had declined or ignored the demands con- 
tained in the ultimatum. According to the memorial 
contained in the White Book it was because Russia had 
begun the war against us. 1 This last point is particu- 
larly to be noted because the assertion that Russia and 
France had attacked us forms the basis on which has 
been constructed the flimsy edifice of German popular 
enthusiasm. "Gentlemen, we are now in a state of 
defence (Notwehr)," exclaimed the Chancellor on 
August 4th, "and necessity (Not) knows no law." It 
is not only the war against ou r real opponents that is 

1 White Book, p. 413. 



THE CRIME 211 

justified on the grounds of necessity, but also the vio- 
lation of the neutrality of Luxembourg and Belgium. 
"He who is menaced as we are, and is fighting for his 
highest possession, can only consider how he is to hack 
his way through." 1 

Menace and defence; these, then, are the watchwords. 
It is indeed quite true that even the highwayman is in 
a certain sense menaced, and in a state of defence, when 
he attacks a traveller and suddenly becomes aware that 
other well-armed men are hurrying to help the traveller 
who had looked so lonely. In such a case the highway- 
man also is fighting a life and death struggle for his 
freedom and his existence. In this sense Germany also 
was in a state of defence. She would not, however, 
have found herself in such a position of constraint if 
she had not herself begun the attack. To get rid of 
this disagreeable fact and to construe for the use of the 
people a real state of defence other facts were adduced 
which were supposed to fulfil this end, apart from the 
menace involved in mobilisation — which it was realised 
was insufficient to serve as a basis for this purpose. 

It is asserted with regard to Russia and France alike 
that they had begun the war, that they had "opened 
hostilities." 2 

How did Russia begin the war? One single fact is 
cited in the memorandum. Russian troops had "already 
in the afternoon of August ist" crossed our frontier 
and "marched into German territory." Be it observed; 
already on the afternoon of August ist. Is there any- 
thing remarkable about this? Did we not at 5 o'clock 
on the same afternoon hand over a declaration of war 
in Petrograd? Was there not in consequence a state 
of war between Germany and Russia as from 5 o'clock 
in the afternoon? Were not Russian troops, therefore, 

1 Collected Documents, p. 438. 
'White Book, p. 413. 



212 I ACCUSE! 

perfectly entitled to cross our frontiers after 5 o'clock? 
If the Chancellor wished to construe an attack which 
would have been in violation of international law he 
should at least have been sufficiently astute to insert 
after the words "in the afternoon of August 1st" the 
further words "before 5 o'clock." Only in such a case 
would it have been possible to speak of an attack, and 
consequently of a state of defence. If the frontier was 
crossed only after the declaration of war, it was no 
longer an attack, but a natural and justifiable conse- 
quence of the state of war which we had brought about. 

On this point also we can again dispose of the Chan- 
cellor by means of his own memorial. What he asserts, 
even if it were true — which is still to be proved — in no 
way supports the conclusions which he draws, and the 
theory of defence collapses miserably like a house of 
cards. 

And in arriving at this conclusion I have left com- 
pletely aside the question whether it is in any way pos- 
sible from such collisions on the frontier to draw the 
conclusion that attacks have been intentionally made by 
the neighbouring State. Such inferences cannot, of 
course, be drawn. When nations are opposed to each 
other in arms, and, indeed, even in time of peace without 
mobilisation when there is merely a state of tension 
between neighbouring States, experience shows that 
crossings of the frontier, collisions between advance- 
posts, and similar incidents constantly take place. These 
are occurrences which reasonable men view as they de- 
serve to be viewed, as unimportant incidents for which 
neither of the States concerned can be held responsible. 
The supreme military command is, in such a case, in 
no way responsible, for incidents of this nature invari- 
ably arise through the arbitrary action of subordinate 
officers without — indeed in most cases contrary to — the 
instructions of their superior officers. This is, indeed, 



THE CRIME 218 

the first occasion in the history of war in which such a 
frontier incident has been interpreted as an intentional 
attack by a neighbouring State and the people have 
been deluded into the idea that they are in a state of 
defence. The most remarkable feature in the whole 
business is, however, as we have said, that there was 
not even an illegitimate passage of the frontier, if this 
only took place after 5 o'clock on the afternoon of 
August 1st. 

Equally threadbare are the assertions which are ad- 
vanced with the object of construing an attack from 
the side of France. 

The declaration of war against France took place on 
August 3rd at 6.45 p.m. The letter from Herr von 
Schoen, containing the declaration of war, bases it on 
the following grounds : "A certain number of flagrantly 
hostile acts committed on German territory by French 
military aviators, several of these have openly violated 
the neutrality of Belgium by flying over the territory 
of that country; one has attempted to destroy buildings 
near Wesel; others have been seen in the district of the 
Eifel, one has thrown bombs on the railway near Carls- 
ruhe and Nuremburg." x 

French military aviators who had "openly" passed 
over Belgium are thus in this case alleged to be the 
guilty persons. In the case of France it was impossible 
to suggest that the mobilisation amounted to a menace, 
since the White Book itself is obliged to admit that 
France mobilised at the same time as we did. 2 Since 
it was then of no avail to assert here, as in the case of 
Russia, the existence of a menace, it was necessary for 
the Government to restrict themselves, in the case of 
France, to saying that Germany had actually been at- 
tacked. According to the declaration of war, the actual 

bellow Book, No. 147. 
2 White Book, p. 413. 



214 I ACCUSE! 

attack was effected by military aviators, who were fur- 
ther perceived to have crossed over Belgium. How 
anyone can tell by looking at an aviator who drops 
bombs on Wesel, Carlsruhe, or Nuremburg that he came 
from Belgium remains a secret locked in the breasts of 
the gentlemen in the Wilhelmstrasse. It is, however, 
very interesting to observe how Herr von Schoen's 
bomb-throwing aviators are transformed by Herr von 
Below-Saleske into "dirigibles" (see the memorandum 
of his interview on August 3rd with the Belgian Foreign 
Office 1 ), and how further in the Chancellor's speech 
of August 4th they become "cavalry patrols and French 
infantry detachments" breaking into the territory of the 
Empire. 2 

What, we may ask, really took place? Did the French 
merely send across aviators, as Herr von Schoen main- 
tains, or dirigibles as Herr von Below-Saleske says, or 
companies and cavalry patrols as the Chancellor asserts ? 
An English proverb which the Empress Frederick was 
in the habit of quoting tells us that "A liar should 
have a good memory." The German diplomatists lie, 
but unfortunately they have a bad memory. The con- 
tradiction between the statements of these three gentle- 
men is sufficient to prove that all these French attacks 
are imaginary. It is, in fact, the Germans who were 
the aggressors, not merely because they declared war 
against France — which even if a crime was, at any rate, 
within their rights under international law — -but also 
because they had violated French territory days before 1 
the declaration of war. This fact is proved, not only 
by French assertions, the credibility of which might be 
disputed, but also by German confessions, which are 
of course unintentional. As early as July 30th and 
again on August 2nd the French Government lodged 

1 Grey Book, No. 21. 

8 Collected Documents, p. 438. 



THE CRIME 215 

complaints in Berlin with regard to quite definite oc- 
currences of this nature 1 : at Delle, near Belfort, the 
French custom house was twice fired upon by German 
soldiers; north of this town two patrols of mounted 
Jagers crossed the frontier and advanced as far as the 
villages of Joncherey and Baron; their officer shot a 
French soldier in the head, and his men carried off some 
French horses. On the same day, August 2nd, German 
troops violated French territory at Ciry and Longwy, 
and marched against Fort Longwy, &c. 

These are some of the French complaints. That there 
must be some truth in all this is clear from the Chan- 
cellor's speech of August 4th. Herr von Bethmann ex- 
pressly admits one of the French complaints (crossing 
of the frontier by a patrol, and the occurrence of a con- 
flict) on the ground of the report of the German General 
Staff. 2 One may reasonably suspect that other viola- 
tions of the frontier "against express orders," as Herr 
von Bethmann puts it, also took place. This suspicion 
appears all the more reasonable, and indeed becomes a 
certainty, when we read the concluding sentence of the 
telegram sent on August 1st by the Emperor William 
to King George : "I hope that France will not be nerv- 
ous. The troops on my frontier are at this moment 
being kept back by telegraph and by telephone from 
'crossing the French frontier." 3 This telegram proves 
two things : — 

(1) that France on August 1st had not yet become 
nervous ; 

(2) that the German troops on August 1st, that is 
to say two days before the declaration of war, would 
have crossed the French frontier, if they had not been 
kept back by telegraph and by telephone. 

1 Yellow Book, Nos. 106, 136, 139. 

2 Collected Documents, p. 438. 
s Collected Documents, p. 510. 



216 I ACCUSE! 

The fact that they were thus kept back was caused 
by the negotiations which took place at the last hour 
with England. Thus had it not been for these negotia- 
tions German troops would have penetrated into France 
en masse forty-eight hours before the declaration of war. 

What then becomes of the assertion of the Chan- 
cellor that France broke the peace, and that, in fact, 
she attacked us? The statement does not deserve 
credence because of the triple contradiction between the 
various statements constituting the charge, and in any 
case it remains unproved. On the other hand, the coun- 
ter-assertion of France, that we were the aggressors 
and the violators of the frontier, is credible because it 
is in itself free from contradiction, because it specifies 
in the most detailed manner the time, the place, and 
the circumstances of the cases cited, because the Ger- 
man General Staff itself admits one of these frontier 
violations, and because the telegram of the Emperor 
admits that even violations of the frontier en masse were 
contemplated. 

The French Government, on the other hand, have 
strictly denied the charges brought against them, and, 
above all, by fixing the ten-kilometre zone they gave 
proof of their sincere intention to avoid violations of 
the frontier. 

In my opinion the objective investigation of the facts 
can lead only to the acquittal of France and to the 
condemnation of Germany. And this view is strength- 
ened if the previous course of diplomatic negotiations 
and the attitude of the two parties is taken into con- 
sideration. May we not assume that perhaps the doc- 
trine of Bernhardi was followed in the measures taken 
by Germany, that the cards had to be so shuffled that 
their opponents would be so provoked that a declaration 
of war was bound to come from their side? May it 
not be assumed that it was hoped in this way to achieve 



THE CRIME 217 

the double advantage of moving the odium on to the 
shoulders of their opponents, and of bringing the case 
under the terms of the alliance with Italy? 

One thing, at any rate, is certain: the assertion that 
we were attacked by France, and were therefore in a 
state of defence, is an invention fit to be placed along- 
side of the corresponding assertion made with regard 
to Russia. No one attacked us. No one placed us in 
a state of defence. This war is but a pseudo-war of 
liberation. 

What took place now, after the outbreak of war with 
Russia and France, has no connection with the central 
question: "Who is responsible for the European^ war?" 
The European war was there, as soon as Germany and 
Austria on the one side stood opposed to France and 
Russia on the other. No one can become guilty of an 
act after it is committed. Guilt can, however, be in- 
creased in so far as the act committed may involve in 
its train the commission of other acts. The more por- 
tentous these further acts are, the greater and heavier 
will be the load of guilt. 

THE VIOLATION OF BELGIAN NEUTRALITY AND THE 
PARTICIPATION OF ENGLAND IN THE WAR 

After having presented to Belgium on the evening of 
August 2nd an ultimatum in which a free passage 
through this neutral country was demanded and receiv- 
ing a refusal, Germany invaded Belgian territory on the 
morning of August 4th. 

The neutrality of Belgium was established by the 
Treaty of London of 1839, and guaranteed for all time 
by England, France, Austria, Prussia, and Russia. 
Article 7 of the Treaty of London provides that Belgium 
shall be an independent and perpetually neutral State, 
and that it shall maintain its neutrality against all other 



218 I ACCUSE! 

States. The first and most obvious duty of a neutral 
State is to refuse to belligerent parties a right of passage 
through its territory. This is one of the fundamental 
principles of international law, and it has been again 
formally confirmed, with the concurrence of all the 
Powers, by the Hague Conference of 1907. Article 5 
of the Hague Convention on the rights and duties of 
neutral States prescribes that "A neutral State ought 
not to allow on its territory any of the acts referred to 
in Articles 2 to 4." Article 2 provides that "Belligerents 
are forbidden to move across the territory of a neutral 
Power troops or convoys, either of munitions of war or 
of supplies." Lastly, Article 10 of the same Convention 
declares that the fact of a neutral Power repelling, even 
by force, attacks on its neutrality cannot be regarded 
as a hostile act. 

This is the legal position. Herr von Bethmann seeks 
to avoid the consequences which flow from the legal 
position by constructing in this case also the case of 
Defence, which he has already advanced against France 
and Russia. 

I believe that I have proved that as against France 
and Russia the state of defence did not arise, but that 
it is merely a German invention. If this is correct, then 
there can also have been no state of defence against 
Belgium, for here at least it is not asserted that Belgium 
had attacked us by military aviators, infantry, and 
cavalry. The state of defence against Belgium stands 
and falls with the state of defence against the other 
countries already mentioned, and is thus to be denied 
on grounds of fact. 

But even if Germany had in fact been in a state of 
defence against France and Russia, the wrong done to 
Belgium would not thereby have been diminished. The 
state of defence (Notwehr) against enemies in war 
would, it is true, in general justify an act of defence 



THE CRIME 219 

(Verteidigung) , but under no circumstances would it 
justify an act of defence involving injury to a third 
party, that is to say, a breach of neutrality. 

The criminal code defines a state of defence as "that 
defence (Verteidigung) which is necessary to ward off 
from oneself or from another an actual attack in viola- 
tion of the law." A transgression of the limits thus 
indicated can only claim immunity from punishment if 
the actor "in consternation, alarm, or terror exceeded 
the limits of defence (Verteidigung)." As this defi- 
nition of the state of defence is the only one which we 
possess in our laws, and as, moreover, it corresponds to 
all logical requirements, we may be permitted to apply 
the principles so enunciated to the actions for which 
the German Chancellor bears the responsibility. Thus 
even if we assume that Germany was in a state of de- 
fence, it was nevertheless open to her to take only such 
actions in her defence as were unconditionally necessary, 
not, however, such actions as were convenient or advan- 
tageous for her. Under no circumstances can the pas- 
sage through Belgium be said to have been necessary 
for her, for indeed the whole of the eastern frontier 
of France from Verdun to Bel fort stood at the dis- 
posal of the German army. It was, of course, more 
advantageous and convenient to avoid this strong line 
of fortresses, and to fall into France from the north. 
But advantage and convenience do not form the stand- 
ard by which the limits of the state of defence are de- 
termined; on the contrary, the only test is necessity. If 
anyone wishes to maintain that we were in a condition 
of consternation, alarm, or terror, then the transgres- 
sion of the limits of the state of defence would be for- 
given to us. But I was under the impression that 
we Germans fear only God, and not the French. So 
that even this objection does not excuse us. 

To this there must be added the further ground al- 



B20 I ACCUSE! 

ready pointed out, which must unconditionally lead to 
our condemnation: the state of defence never excuses 
the violation of the rights of a third party. The state 
of defence against France could not excuse the viola- 
tion of the rights of Belgium. 

From every point of view then we are in the wrong, 
on grounds both of fact and of law. Viewed from the 
political point of view, the matter is even worse for 
us. What is the meaning and the purpose of the neu- 
tralisation of a small State which an unrighteous Provi- 
dence has planted in the middle of great States and made 
the natural cock-pit for their struggles? The purpose 
can only be to protect this State in war, not in peace, 
when it needs no protection. If, however, when war 
comes each of the neighbouring States is justified in 
falling into the neutral State, on the ground that it is 
in a state of defence — in a general sense, although not 
in a juridical sense, every war is a state of defence — 
then the whole process of neutralisation has no longer 
any purpose, and is, in fact, nothing but a "scrap of 
paper," as the Chancellor said to Sir E. Goschen. The 
dictum that "necessity knows no law" may be used to 
justify any crime. The precise purpose of a treaty 
of neutrality is, however, that of making necessity sub- 
ject to the commands of law. Its object is to replace 
the maxim: "La force prime le droit" by the contrary 
maxim: "Le droit prime la force." 

Now it is true that the attempt has been made to 
justify the violation of Belgian neutrality on two 
grounds. It is maintained : — 

(i) that France would have invaded Belgium if we 
had not anticipated her, and 

(2) that Belgium long ago concluded military agree- 
ments with France and England with the view of tak- 
ing common action against Germany. 

Both these arguments are entirely unsupported. There 



THE CRIME 221 

is a complete absence of any proof that France intended 
to invade Belgium. 

Sir Edward Grey is known to have addressed on July 
31st an inquiry in identical terms to France and to Ger- 
many with a view to ascertaining whether, in the event 
of a war, they would respect the neutrality of Belgium 
so long as no other Power violated it. 1 The answer of 
France was received without delay, and was an uncon- 
ditional affirmative. 2 The answer of Herr von Jagow, 
on the other hand, was one of the many awkward ex- 
cuses which this child of misfortune had throughout 
the whole affair to produce by command from above. 
He had to consult the Emperor and the Chancellor 
before he could possibly answer. He was very doubtful 
whether they would return any answer at all, since any 
reply they might give could not but disclose a certain 
amount of their plan of campaign in the event of war 
ensuing. 3 Herr von Jagow did not neglect even on this 
occasion to draw attention to a presumed hostile act 
of Belgium, namely, an embargo on a consignment of 
corn for Germany — an incident which is explained as 
perfectly correct by the Belgian Government in their 
Grey Book. 4 

This early hint on the part of Jagow of the hostility 
of Belgium was merely the prelude to the campaign 
which was later systematically pursued, and which 
reached its culminating point in the assertion of the 
Chancellor that a violation of neutrality had not in fact 
taken place, since Belgium, in consequence of military 
conventions with England and France had already sacri- 
ficed her neutrality before the German invasion. This 
campaign was opened after the conquest of Belgium, 

1 Blue Book, No. 114. 
2 Blue Book, No. 125. 
8 Blue Book, No. 122. 
4 Grey Book, No. 79, Enclosures. 



222 I ACCUSE! 

and even to-day it is being continued with unabated 
energy. 

On what is this charge based? It is, in the first 
place, a matter for surprise that the Chancellor in his 
speech in the Reichstag on August 4th had not the 
slightest information about the sale of Belgium's soul. 
In this speech the violation of Belgian neutrality was 
explained exclusively by reference to the intended in- 
vasion on the part of France, and against Belgium her- 
self not the shadow of a reproach was raised. On the 
contrary, Herr von Bethmann declared that the invasion 
of Belgium was a "wrong" which they would endeavour 
to make good later on. If the facts now asserted were 
true, is it not remarkable that they so completely escaped 
the notice of our Ambassador in Brussels? At least a 
suspicion ought to have arisen, and should have been 
conveyed to Berlin through the Brussels Embassy. Had 
this happened, the Chancellor would certainly not have 
failed to bring forward as early as August 4th this 
weighty argument in favour of our violation of Bel- 
gian neutrality; for in other matters he was certainly 
free enough with unproved assertions. 

We may then assume as a certainty that in Berlin 
nothing was known of treacherous agreements of this 
character. It was necessary to ferret about among the 
Belgian archives after the capture of Brussels before it 
was possible to get on the track of the treachery of the 
Belgians. The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung was 
then in a position to publish some documents from the 
archives of the Belgian General Staff which, in the view 
of the German Government, were supposed to reveal 
the fact that a plan of war against Germany had been 
concluded between Belgium and England. If the docu- 
ments are authentic and complete — which has yet to be 
proved — it is true that they show that certain conver- 
sations took place between Belgian officers and English 



THE CRIME 223 

military attaches on the co-operation which might ulti- 
mately take place between England and Belgium; on 
the other hand, they incontestably prove that this co- 
operation would only take place in the event of Ger- 
many violating Belgian neutrality. The Norddeutsche 
Allgemeine Zeitung does not publish in extenso the 
documents which were found, in itself a suspicious cir- 
cumstance, but only gives extracts from their contents. 
But even these extracts cannot conceal the fact that 
the disembarkation of English troops in Belgium was 
only to take place after the violation of her neutrality 
by Germany. An official Note of the Belgian Govern- 
ment issued from Le Havre on December 9th, 19 14, 
incontrovertibly establishes the truth of this assertion. 1 
The same procedure is thus adopted in this case as was 
done with reference to the military discussions between 
England and France ; discussions to meet the case of an 
attack from Germany are denounced as a conspiracy for 
a common attack, defensive intentions are falsely repre- 
sented as offensive. Germany, whose plans were known 
and feared by all, is represented as the innocent victim 
of the evil designs of others, whereas in fact the others 
were only concerned that they themselves should not 
fall a victim to German plans of aggression. 2 

1 This note, which has been passed over in complete silence by the 
German Press, has been published everywhere in the press of for- 
eign countries. The document of April 10th, 1906, published in the 
Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, is entirely consistent with the 
contents of this note. It contains the express remark: "The entry 
of the English into Belgium would only take place after the viola- 
tion of our neutrality by Germany." This in itself at once con- 
futes all reproaches to the effect that an offensive agreement against 
Germany existed between England and Belgium. 

3 The Dutch "Agence Van Diaz" of November 17th, 1914, quotes 
the words of a speech which Broqueville, the Belgian Minister for 
War, delivered in January, 1913, in a secret session of the Belgian 
Chamber, and in which the German plans for the invasion of Bel- 



824 I ACCUSE! 

Why did similar discussions not take place between 
Belgium and Germany to provide for the case of a 
French attack? The answer is quite simple. It was 
confidently felt that there was no need to fear a French 
attack. Experience has proved that the view so formed 
was correct, and that a just estimate both of France 
and of Germany had been framed. 

The English Foreign Office has published a letter of 
Sir Edward Grey's addressed to his Ambassador at 
Brussels on April 7th, 19 13, in which Grey dismisses 
every idea of being the first to violate the neutrality of 
Belgium. No British Government would do so, and 
public opinion in England would never approve of this 
step. The violation of Belgian neutrality by England 
would be not only a wrong, but a great folly, since it 
would afford Germany a motive and a justification for 
following the same procedure. So long as the neutral- 
ity of Belgium or any other neutral countries was not 
violated by any other Power, England would never send 
troops into their territory. This letter was written 
fifteen months before the outbreak of war, and was 
therefore not written with the express purpose of cre- 
ating a favourable position for England in the present 
controversy. It therefore deserves credence in every 
respect, and is, moreover, confirmed by the events of 
the last months. 1 

After the German ultimatum had been handed to 
the Belgian Foreign Minister at 7 o'clock in the evening 
of August 2nd, the French Government on the morning 

gium were revealed in full detail and put forward as the ground 
for new military requirements. 

1 For this and for all other matters affecting the Belgian question 
reference should be made to the work written by M. Emile Wax- 
weiler, Member of the Royal Belgian Academy, La Belgique neutre 
et loyale — a volume distinguished both by its detail and its scientific 
objectivity. (Lausanne. Payot, 1915.) 



THE CRIME 225 

of August 3rd offered to the Belgian Government, 
through her military attache, the support of five French 
Army Corps. Belgium, nevertheless, declined this otter 
of support, although she had already rejected the de- 
mands of Germany, and must have been expecting every 
moment the violent entry of German forces. Particular 
interest attaches to one passage in the answer of Belgium 
to Germany. The German Government had explained 
their demand for a free passage by reference to the 
intention of France to attack Germany through Bel- 
gian territory. The Belgian Government decisively re- 
jects the reasons thus assigned, and adds thereto: 

"The intentions attributed to France by Germany 
are in contradiction to the formal declarations made 
to us on August 1st in the name of the French 
Government. m 

"Moreover, if, contrary to our expectation, Bel- 
gian neutrality should be violated by France, Bel- 
gium intends to fulfil her international obligations, 
and the Belgian army would offer the most vigorous 
resistance to the invader" (Belgian Grey Book, No. 
22). 
Belgium thus declares that she is prepared to defend 
her neutrality against France with the same resolution 
as against Germany, but that she considers that the 
possibility of a French attack is excluded in view of the 
tormal declaration given by France. Does that sound 
like a secret alliance? Further, on August 3rd King 
Albert addressed to the King of England a telegram in 
which he made an appeal for diplomatic, not for mili- 
tary intervention. Does that sound like a secret mili- 
tary' convention ? * Sir Francis Villiers, the English 
Ambassador, handed on August 4th to Davignon, the 
Belgian Minister, a Note, in which England declared 
1 Grey Book, No. 25. 



226 I ACCUSE! 

herself ready in the event of a German attack to render 
Belgium joint assistance with France and Russia, 
"should Belgium so desire." 1 

Should Belgium so desire! In making this limitation 
England indeed fell short of her international rights 
and duties. It is a recognised principle in international 
law, and is, moreover, a principle based on logic, that 
in the case of a collective guarantee, such as the Belgian 
treaty, each guarantor, in the event of neutrality being 
violated by another State, is at once entitled, in her 
own right, to assume protection of the neutral State, 
and indeed has a duty towards the other guaranteeing 
Powers to adopt this course (Bluntschli, Vblkerrecht, 
VI., Nos. 432 and 440). Even without awaiting an 
expression of the desire of Belgium, England was en- 
titled to intervene with armed force for the protection 
of the violated neutrality. In making her intervention 
dependent on the desire of Belgium, England manifested 
a measure of circumspection to which she was not 
pledged in international law, and she proved beyond 
dispute that there was no kind of previous agreement 
between England and Belgium directed against Germany. 

It was not until August 5th that the Belgian Govern- 
ment issued to the Great Powers a formal appeal which 
led to their actual intervention. 2 

The weakness of the German reproach that Belgium 
had already sold her neutrality is thus completely proved. 
But even if the reproach were in itself justified, it would 
furnish no manner of excuse for Germany. The defence 
of the German Government is suggestive of that of a 
thieving murderer who seeks to excuse his action by 
asserting that the murdered man was a bad lot who 
had himself gained by theft the property which he had 
stolen. True, if he was aware of the depravity of his 

J Grey Book, No. 28. 
'Grey Book, No. 43. 



THE CRIME 227 

victim before he committed the murder he might be 
allowed, not immunity, but the benefit of mitigating 
circumstances. But if he only learns afterwards what 
sort of a man he has murdered, his act morally remains 
the same, whether his victim was a devil or an angel. 
Germany invaded a neutral country. Later, she pro- 
fesses to have learned that this country was no longer 
entirely neutral ; she cannot on these grounds be allowed 
the advantage of mitigating circumstances. 

This is the moral aspect of the question. Let us now 
consider the practical side. Let us for the moment as- 
sume that Belgium, so far as the obligations of neu- 
trality imposed upon her are concerned, had been "a 
child, no angel is so pure" ; let us assume that she had 
never entered into even the slightest military defensive 
discussions with her neighbours. Would this in any 
way have prevented our invasion of Belgium f Would 
this have induced us to leave in their despatch-boxes 
the plans of our General Staff which had been ready for 
years? Would we in this case have felt constrained to 
take up our position in front of the impregnable line 
of fortresses from Verdun to Belfort? No one will 
venture to maintain this. All the declamations and pub- 
lications on the crimes committed by Belgium thus 
merely represent so much waste of paper and printer's 
ink. We were resolved to overrun Belgium, either in 
kindness or by force of arms, whether she behaved well 
or ill towards us. That is the essential point. From this 
reproach no rain will ever wash us clean, and the more 
we blacken our victim after the event, the more damning 
will be the judgment which the world will pass upon us. 

It would appear that the effect which our behaviour 
towards Belgium has exercised on the public opinion of 
the whole world, and is still exercising in a daily in- 
creased measure, is not yet properly realised in Ger- 
many. It is necessary to live abroad in order to see 



228 I ACCUSE! 

and grasp this effect. It shows itself even more strongly 
in neutral foreign countries than in those countries 
which are at war with us. In particular, the small coun- 
tries which are adjacent to great States, Switzerland, 
Holland, and Denmark, feel that the fate which befel 
the unfortunate Belgium might have been, or may in 
future be, theirs. The great neutral countries, how- 
ever, throughout every rank of society, are seized with 
deep commiseration when they read of the devastations 
brought upon this prosperous small country, on these 
ancient and glorious homes of art, on these diligent and 
laborious centres of industry, when they see in their illus- 
trated papers the fearful pictures of fire and destruc- 
tion, of misery and homelessness, of smoking villages 
and towns, when they see families wandering about on 
the streets, who in hunger and penury beg for bread 
from the German soldiers. The innocent country has 
fallen a victim to the barbarians. That is how the world 
views the facts, and it only becomes more incensed 
when the authors of all this horror seek to excuse their 
actions by saying that once upon a time a Belgian officer 
had a consultation with an English military attache 
with regard to the steps which might ultimately be taken 
to defend the country in the event of a German in- 
vasion. 

And to commiseration there is added admiration — ■ 
admiration for this small, heroic nation who, with sword 
in hand, courageously defends her independence and 
her honour against the superior forces of the intruder. 
"Belgium," we read in the answer to the German ulti- 
matum, "has always been faithful to her international 
obligations ; she has carried out her duties in a spirit of 
loyal impartiality, and she has left nothing undone to 
maintain and enforce respect for her neutrality. 

"The attack upon her independence with which the 
German Government threaten her constitutes a flagrant 



THE CRIME 229 

violation of international law. No strategic interest jus- 
tifies such a violation of law. 

"The Belgian Government, if they were to accept the 
proposals submitted to them, would sacrifice the hon- 
our of the nation and betray their duty towards Europe. 

"Conscious of the part which Belgium has played for 
more than eighty years in the civilisation of the world, 
they refuse to believe that the independence of Belgium 
can only be preserved at the price of the violation of 
her neutrality. 

"If this hope is disappointed, the Belgian Government 
are firmly resolved to repel, by all the means in their 
power, every attack upon their rights" (Belgian Grey 
Book, No. 22). 

These are the proud words with which a free nation 
defends its honour and its independence. 

Even Germany is not without an understanding of 
such heroism when it shows itself against the other side. 
When, on the same day as that on which German troops 
invaded Belgium, the Swiss Government informed the 
Governments of belligerent countries of its resolution 
to defend by all possible means its neutrality and the 
inviolability of its territory, the German Government 
in their acknowledgment expressed their sincere satis- 
faction and their confidence that the Confederation, 
"thanks to its strong army and the unconquerable de- 
termination of the whole Swiss people, will repel any 
violation of its neutrality." 1 What in the case of Bel- 
gium was a crime worthy of death, because it was di- 
rected against Germany, was in the case of Switzerland 
a highly meritorious proposal, because if ever the mo- 
ment should come to give it effect, it could only be 
directed against France. 

The attitude of the Belgian Army and the Belgian 
people was in conformity with the proud words in which 
1 Waxweiler, p. 52. 



230 I ACCUSE! 

the Belgian Government had rejected the dishonouring 
suggestion of Germany. 

The Belgians have defended their country and their 
fortresses with unconquerable courage and with gigantic 
sacrifices. To-day in the extreme west corner of Flan- 
ders they still continue to offer a desperate resistance, 
under the personal leadership of a King of German 
blood, married to a German princess — a King who ex- 
poses himself to all the dangers of the struggle. It is 
not surprising that such heroism should enkindle the 
admiring enthusiasm of the whole world. This is the 
true struggle for freedom and independence; not the 
counterfeit struggle which is instilled into the deluded 
German people. 

To what has this German nation come — a nation 
which in the past, before the present corruption, had 
some understanding and enthusiasm for noble and heroic 
actions? Did not the work of liberation achieved by 
the Swiss franc-tireur William Tell inspire our greatest 
poet to his noblest drama? Were we not brought up 
in the admiration of the courage of the small against 
the great, of the struggle of the Spartans against the 
Persians, of the struggle against the Spaniards carried 
on by the Dutch, whose rising Schiller described with 
such deep sympathy and whom Goethe immortalised in 
Egmont? And what are we doing now, we Germans 
of 19 14, who see and experience the same heroic strug- 
gle of the same people against us the oppressors? Not 
a word of sympathy is heard, not a word of admira- 
tion, not even of understanding. Instead of this we 
utter slanders and accusations intended to justify our 
crime. Let any one read the appeal issued to the civil- 
ised world signed by all Germans of distinction. Apart 
from the falsehood that Belgium had entered into a con- 
spiracy with France and England, there is nothing but 
purely unproved assertions about the acts of franc- 



THE CRIME 2S1 

tireurs, the mutilation of the wounded, the murder of 
doctors, and so on. 

In the eyes of those gentlemen who, a few years 
ago, were stirred to enthusiasm — and rightly so — at the 
sight of the heroic struggle of the small Boer nation 
against the might of England, those Belgians who are 
now defending their Fatherland, if they do not happen 
to have uniforms, are but common criminals, who may 
be shot like mad dogs. 1 Have you quite forgotten, 
you leaders of the German spirit, our heroes of 1813 in 
whose honour you were still holding banquets and de- 
livering enthusiastic speeches a year ago? Were not 
the men whom you celebrated like the Belgians of to- 
day, the nation in arms throwing themselves with and 
without uniforms against the intruder? Who will ex- 
plain to the man from among the people the difference 
between a soldier and a defender of the Fatherland, 
between civilians and men in uniform, when the enemy 
is in the land, devastating farmyards and crops, driving 
away cattle and provisions, making women and children 
roofless? The man of the people sees only the enemy, 
the housebreaker, and when he seizes his rifle he does 
not care a brass farthing whether he is wearing a coat 
with shining buttons or the blue smock of a peasant. 
This is a point one ought to understand, and it is a 
point which we did understand in the past while we 
were still capable of enthusiasm in a good sense, so long 
as our enthusiasm had not been diverted into the cor- 

1 Cardinal Mercier, the Archbishop of Malines, in his pastoral 
letter addressed to the Belgian people on Christmas, 1914, states 
after "careful investigation" that in his diocese 13 priests, and in 
the dioceses of Namur, Tournai, and Liege, 30 priests were shot, 
and in all cases he gives their names, and their place of residence. 
In Aerschot, according to the findings of Cardinal Mercier, 91 civil- 
ians, and in Louvain and the surrounding district, 176 civilians were 
shot or burnt These include men and women, people of advanced 
years, as well as children. 



232 I ACCUSE! 

nipt morass of national pride and megalomania, which 
is constantly associated with contempt and barbarism 
towards others. Especially must this point be kept in 
view in thinking of a people like the Belgians who had 
never anticipated a war, had never believed themselves 
menaced by a war, and for a hundred years had never 
witnessed a war within their frontiers. These facts 
have to be grasped, bearing in mind that men are men, 
and that our actions must be framed accordingly. 

The German soldiers were certainly free to protect 
themselves against underhand attacks, but they should 
have kept constantly before them the fact that their as- 
sailants were defending the highest things on earth, 
their house and their hearth, their home and their 
Fatherland. It was on this fact that they ought to have 
based their counter-measures, not on the so-called law 
of war, which they fashioned for themselves, which is 
nowhere committed to writing, and nowhere recognised. 
If in a village of a few thousand inhabitants and a few 
hundred houses some shots are fired from the windows, 
perhaps by concealed soldiers and not by civilians, by 
what right do we burn down the whole village, and 
place a number of the male inhabitants, innocent and 
guilty, against the wall and shoot them dead? If you 
believe it necessary for your protection — I cannot ad- 
mit in this case a right of punishment — burn down if 
you like the individual houses, punish the individual 
civilians whom you recognise as guilty, but spare the 
village and spare the innocent. That is the least de- 
manded by justice, if indeed we can speak of justice, 
in favour of the assailant and against the defender. 
What they are opposing to you is the true state of de- 
fence, the state of defence of the French and the Bel- 
gian citizens against the German, against the German 
intruder — the state of defence of Belgium and France 
against Germany. Here it may be said with justice, 



THE CRIME 233 

"Necessity knows no law. He who is fighting for his 
highest possession can only consider how he is to hack 
his way through." This sentence of the Chancellor, in 
itself correct, but wrongly applied to Germany, is ap- 
plicable to our opponents. Only, when applied to them, 
it is unfortunately inverted : he who is fighting for his 
highest possession is placed against the wall and shot 
dead. 

I was able to observe in a picture palace in Berlin 
shortly after the outbreak of war the unspeakable con- 
fusion of thought which has spread throughout Ger- 
many. Since the military censor allowed only patriotic 
subjects, two war dramas were thrown on the screen 
one after the other. The first represented the rising of 
the Tyrolese in 1809 under Andreas Hofer, and the 
second franc-tireur scenes from the war of 1870. In 
the Tyrolese drama the whole nation was in arms against 
the French conqueror. Andreas Hofer himself, the 
leader and the hero (no general, but an innkeeper), and 
all the others were peasants, craftsmen, and servants, even 
the wives and daughters were armed, playing their part 
in the struggle, the whole nation kindled to a war of 
liberation. The sympathies of the author of this drama 
were, of course, entirely on the side of the Tyrolese. 
The French were shot down from hiding places, from 
behind houses, trees, and blocks of rock. And it ended, 
of course, with a victorious liberation of the nation. 
Then there followed the franc-tireur drama of 1870, 
and behold "the scene was changed!" The French de- 
fenders of the Fatherland have now suddenly become 
knaves and criminals. Their very visages reveal their 
evil instincts. They also shoot from ambuscades as did 
the Tyrolese in 1809, but what was then a fight for free- 
dom is now crime and treachery. Punishment, conse- 
quently, does not fail to be meted out. German re- 
inforcements rush into the village, fire is laid to the walls, 



284 I ACCUSE! 

and amidst the lamentations of the women and children 
a dozen men and boys are placed against the church wall 
and, as it is beautifully expressed, shot according to 
martial law. Yes, indeed, that was quite a different 
story! Against the French we are shown a nation in 
arms ; against the Germans they are gallow-birds ! The 
same confusion of ideas is met everywhere from the 
highest summits of German intelligence down to the 
last producer of cinema films. 

The effect of this intellectual perversion abroad may 
be imagined; it is the reverse of what is intended. In 
these six months of war the German professor has be- 
come a comic figure abroad, or rather a figure of tragi- 
comedy as the Prussian Junker and lieutenant have been 
in the past. The sympathies which were formerly ours 
have been buried under ridicule and aversion, and have 
turned to our opponents, above all to the unhappy Bel- 
gians. Karl Spitteler, who is certainly not anti-German 
in sentiment, writes in his pamphlet Our Swiss Stand- 
point 1 : "Belgium in herself does not concern us, but 
her fate concerns us very intimately. That a wrong 
was done to Belgium was originally openly confessed by 
the perpetrator. As an afterthought, in order to ap- 
pear whiter, Cain blackened Abel. In my opinion it 
was a spiritual blunder to rummage for documents in 
the pockets of the quivering victim. It was amply suf- 
ficient to throttle the victim. To calumniate her in ad- 
dition is really too much." These are the words of a 
Swiss. And everyone abroad, everyone without excep- 
tion, writes and thinks to- the same effect. Belgian ar- 
tists, poets, and politicians are received with enthusi- 
asm in Italy and America, in Switzerland and in Hol- 
land. They are acclaimed in gigantic assemblies such as 
we accorded in 1902 to Oom Paul and the Boers who 
accompanied him. Belgium to-day i s trump through- 

1 Published by Rasher & Co., Zurich, 1915. 



THE CRIME 235 

out the world. And woe to us if, after the war, we so 
much as touch a hair of a Belgian head! This trump 
card in the hands of our enemies will defeat us morally, 
even if we gain the victory in arms. 

A part of the devastation we have accomplished in 
Belgium we explain by reference to the state of defence. 
The state of defence meets us everywhere; there is a 
state of defence when we invade Belgium, a state of 
defence when we set fire to the ancient cities of art. I 
will accept it as proven that shots were fired on German 
soldiers from the houses in Louvain. Does that justify 
us in destroying whole districts of the city by fire? Does 
that justify us in exposing the celebrated Town Hall 
and the Cathedral to the flames, and in doing them at 
least serious damage? Where is it written that shots 
from a rifle must be answered by arson? Where and 
when was such a law of war codified? That is the 
Prussian law of war, but it is not international law. 
When the Cossacks act in this way in East Prussia we 
speak of wild Muscovite hordes, but these hordes have 
at least this excuse, that in Stalluponen and in Neiden- 
burg no centres of culture and of art are ruined. What, 
however, is the world to say of our handiwork in Bel- 
gium, the ancient land of culture and of art — in Belgium 
where every hamlet contains artistic jewels, Gothic 
cathedrals and town-halls and market-places surrounded 
by gorgeous patrician houses, with luxurious old-Ger- 
man Renaissance facades, adorned with gold? All these 
flowers of the creative power of man, which have af- 
forded instruction and enjoyment to unnumbered gen- 
erations and which should have served as a glory and 
as an example to generations yet to come — these have 
been ruined, destroyed, burned, because, owing to a state 
of defence, Germany was obliged to invade Belgium, 
and owing to a state of defence was obliged to apply 
the torch to the walls. 



236 I ACCUSE! 

But let that pass. Let us assume that these things 
had to be. But is it also due to the state of defence 
that we have imposed contributions amounting to more 
than £25,000,000 on the State, the towns and the 
provinces of Belgium? How are we to excuse this act 
of violence? How are we to justify the enormous fines 
recently imposed on Belgian citizens, who, availing them- 
selves of their right of free locomotion, preferred resi- 
dence abroad to life under the. German occupation? 
What justification have we for burdening the exhausted, 
impoverished country with further exorbitant sacrifices 
in money? What crime on the part of Belgium has 
merited this punishment? Was it the crime of having 
defended themselves against us, or, so far as I am con- 
cerned, even the crime of having prepared this defence 
with others? In either case we can allege only defence, 
not attack, for that Belgium meant to attack us no one 
in Germany has yet maintained. 

I therefore ask again how do you expiain and justify 
the contributions, amounting to a sum which you keep 
concealed in the silence of shame, but which, when every- 
thing is taken into account, considerably exceeds half a 
milliard marks (£25,000,000). Here your pretext of 
the state of defence no longer holds good. The accused 
who pleads in excuse a state of defence, but is found 
to be in possession of his opponent's purse, will plead 
in vain for immunity. Give back the contributions! 
That is the least that can be required of you, and is 
without doubt, when peace returns, the least that will be 
required of you. 

The objection will be raised, and has in fact been 
raised: Why did Belgium not allow us a free passage, 
for then she would have been spared all the horrors of 
war? This is a noble question, worthy of the new Ger- 
man national psychology. "Why did you not submit to 
the insult?" exclaims the slanderer to the slandered; 



THE CRIME 237 

"now you get in addition a blow on the head." Why- 
did not Germany submit to the Napoleonic occupation? 
If she had remained quiet she would have been spared 
much bloodshed and the horrors of war. Why did not 
Leonidas and his Spartans allow the Persians to pass 
through Thermopylae? If they had done so they would 
all have remained alive. These and similar qucestiones 
DomitiancB might be asked without number. They 
are not more foolish than the reproach which is raised 
against Belgium in Germany to-day. Belgium defended 
herself for the quite simple reason that her honour, 
her independence, and her international obligations com- 
pelled her to offer a defence. In summoning Belgium 
to allow Germany a free passage, the demand addressed 
to her was that she should sacrifice her honour and 
her independence, and scatter to the wind her inter- 
national obligations. 

These obligations rested on a basis not merely moral, 
but also to a very considerable extent practical. As 
soon as Belgium, by showing preference to Germany, 
took sides on her behalf, she would have destroyed for 
ever her neutral position, and would never again have 
been in a position to regain it. The other Powers could 
never again have trusted Belgium to remain neutral if 
on this occasion she had light-heartedly been faithless 
to the duties imposed by neutrality. Belgium would 
thus have fallen into a kind of dependence on her great 
neighbour Germany, who, it is true, promised to respect 
her independence, but certainly offered less security for 
the observance of this independence than was furnished 
by the guarantee of the collective Great Powers. Ger- 
many's designs on Belgium were not unknown in the 
world. Our politico-military literature had copiously 
contributed to the dissemination of this knowledge. Gen- 
eral von Bernhardi expressed in general terms the view 
that the "conception of permanent neutrality is entirely 



238 I ACCUSE! 

contrary to the essential nature of the State," and in 
particular he was of the opinion that Belgium, in adding 
to her small territory the vast Congo State, had al- 
ready violated her own neutrality. 1 There was therefore 
a certain danger involved in trusting her voracious neigh- 
bour, in confiding in her grace alone, and in pushing 
aside all other protectors. The lamb can indeed feel 
no great confidence when the wolf promises to respect 
his independence. 

Thus the attitude assumed by Belgium is attributable 
not merely to an idealistic point of view, but to extremely 
tangible and practical interests, and for these at least 
there should be some understanding in Germany, even 
if the nose is turned up in scorn at the idealism — of 
other people. 

Precisely the same considerations which were bound 
to lead to Belgium's refusal to accord Germany a free 
passage through her territory would have caused her 
to reject any suggestion made by France or England 
that she should make common cause with them against 
Germany. No one in Germany takes the trouble to re- 
flect for a moment what could have induced Belgium 
to give up her neutrality, and to sell herself body and 
soul to the Entente Powers. What advantage could she 
expect from such behaviour? Did Belgium entertain 
any designs to conquer the Rhine provinces? Did she 
wish to round off her territory towards Aix-la-Chapelle 
or Treves ? What in the world could she gain by assum- 
ing a hostile attitude towards Germany? Clearly she 
could gain nothing. On the contrary, by siding with the 
Entente Powers she would have exposed her position in 
Europe to the gravest danger. So long as Belgium con- 
tinued neutral and discharged the duties imposed by her 
neutrality, she would have been quite independent of 
the issue of the war, and could have awaited the result 
1 Bernhardt Germany and the Next War, pp. no, ill. 



THE CRIME 239 

with composure, indifferent whether Germany or France 
emerged as victor from the struggle. The moment she 
sided with one of the parties, her whole future fate be- 
came dependent on her ally's success in war, and her 
fate would have been sealed With this ally's defeat. Why 
should Belgium have run this risk? Why should she 
have exposed herself to the vengeance of her powerful 
German neighbour, and make herself liable in the event 
of a defeat to be the first to pay the piper? For there 
could be no doubt that if Belgium were the ally 
of France, with obligations imposed on her by treaty, 
she would certainly have been annexed by Germany 
in the event of a defeat — a fate which, even as things 
are, is held over her head on the ground of her merely 
imaginary alliance. I therefore again ask : What reason- 
able ground could Belgium have had to expose herself 
needlessly to this danger, instead of awaiting the issue of 
events with a calm conscience under the sure shield of 
neutrality? No one can give a plausible answer to 
this question. Thus by the application of the simplest 
logic it is possible to demonstrate how weak is the 
foundation of the German accusations against Bel- 
gium. 

As against Germany, Belgium has exercised her rights, 
fulfilled her duties, and protected her interests as she 
would have done had a breach of her neutrality been 
demanded from any other quarter. It is Germany that 
has acted wrongly, contrary to her duty, and against 
her true interests. 

The imponderabilia which a Bismarck kept in mind in 
all his political measures count for naught with the lead- 
ers of the Germany of to-day, who "have exactly caught 
his manner of clearing his throat and spitting," * but 
have not caught even a breath of his spirit. The im- 
ponderabilia in the case of Belgium were the respect due 
t 1 Schiller. Wallenstein's Lager.] 



240 I ACCUSE! 

to the rights of others and regard for the moral judg- 
ment of the world. The neglect of these imponderabilia 
will be bitterly avenged on Germany. It has already 
been avenged in so far as it has influenced the atti- 
tude of England in this war, and has thereby increased 
the coalition of our enemies to our disadvantage. 

After this section was finished a manifesto of the 
Chancellor, von Bethmann Hollweg, issued on Decem- 
ber 24th, came to my notice. This document, written 
in answer to a speech of Viviani, once more achieves the 
utmost limits in perversion and in falsification, in order 
to shift the clearly-proven guilt of Germany on to the 
Entente Powers. 1 We should be doing this production 
too much honour if we were to bestow upon it any 
special consideration. Everything contained in it is con- 
tradicted by the diplomatic correspondence, by the Ger- 
man White Book itself, and by the earlier speeches of 
the Chancellor. The great feat whereby Herr von Beth- 
mann endeavours to wash himself clean consists in con- 
fusing the sequence of events in time, in suppressing 
everything that does not suit his case, in advancing as- 
sertions which are in contradiction with the proved facts, 
and in ascribing to the Entente Powers motives which 
are inconsistent with their actions. 

A few test examples may illustrate the love of truth 
which inspires Herr von Bethmann, and may at the same 
time indicate the shortness of his memory. He now 
maintains that, to begin with, Austria had only mobilised 
against Serbia, whereas on August 4th he himself ad- 
mitted that a partial mobilisation — and that before the 
Russian partial mobilisation — had taken place against 
Russia as well. To take a further instance, this time 
of his tactics of suppression : he admits that Germany 

1 See Appendix III. 



THE CRIME 241 

raised objections only against the form of a conference, 
but passes over in silence the important fact that Ger- 
many, notwithstanding repeated pressure from the En- 
tente Powers, did not consent to suggest a form in 
which the Conference would be agreeable to her. 
Amongst much more that is ignored, he keeps silence 
with regard to the fact that up to the last moment (July 
31st), when in consequence of the German ultimatum 
it was then too late, Austria declined the direct negotia- 
tions with Petrograd which Germany herself had recom- 
mended in place of the Conference. The whole of the 
document is thus, as is shown by these examples, nothing 
more than a continuous series of falsifications and sup- 
pressions of the truth. 

I should only like to draw attention to one more asser- 
tion, which also deserves no other designation — an asser- 
tion which now appears for the first time, and which, for 
the sake of variety, ascribes to England the guilt of 
being the first to mobilise, a guilt which has hitherto 
been supposed to fall on Russia alone. What is the 
ground for this terrible accusation, which, even if it were 
true, would not dispose of Grey's continuous efforts for 
peace ? It is based on the fact that the English Fleet was 
not disbanded on the conclusion of their normal ma- 
noeuvres near Portland, but was kept together (July 
27th). As a matter of fact, this had nothing to do with 
a "mobilisation," a "collection of the Fleet at Portland," 
a "military preparation on a great scale," as Herr von 
Bethmann asserts against his better knowledge; it was 
merely a keeping-together, a non-dispersal of the ma- 
noeuvre-fleet, caused by the state of tension in the Eu- 
ropean situation, by the recall of the Austrian Ambassa- 
dor from Belgrade, and the refusal of Austria and Ger- 
many to enter with the other Powers into any negotia- 
tions on the Serbian question. 1 Grey openly communi- 
"Blue Book, p. xi. No. 48. Yellow Book, No. 66. 



242 I ACCUSE! 

cated to Count Mensdorff, the Austrian Ambassador, the 
reason for not dispersing the Fleet, adding that there 
was no menace in what had been done but that it was 
merely a measure of security owing to the possibility that 
a European conflagration might be brought about by the 
incomprehensible manner in which Austria treated the 
conciliatory answer of Serbia as a blank negative. Eng- 
land took no other measure of security on sea or on 
land. Herr von Bethmann, however, makes out of this 
a "mobilisation on a great scale," which aimed at a "hu- 
miliation of the two Powers in the Triple Alliance," and 
which produced a militant frame of mind in France and 
Russia. Who is deceived by this? No one, Herr von 
Bethmann. 

Turn over the Yellow Book and the Blue Book, 1 and 
you will find that from the morning of July 26th — that 
is to say, immediately after the expiration of the Aus- 
trian ultimatum — Germany had prepared her mobilisa- 
tion, the garrisons of Alsace-Lorraine were concentrated, 
the fortresses on the frontier were put in a state of de- 
fence, reservists were called in by individual summons, 
German ships were called back from Norway, officers 
on leave were summoned from Switzerland, and private 
automobiles were reserved in Baden for military pur- 
poses, &c. You will there find that Germany in Alsace- 
Lorraine, in Strassburg, and in Metz, and that Austria 
in Hungary and Galicia were already fully, if secretly, 
engaged on mobilisation as early as July 29th. 

Read further on July 30th — that is to say, before the 
official announcement of the "state of war" — the German 
provinces on the frontier were already in fact in the last 
stage before mobilisation; how on the previous day the 
frontier had already been crossed by German patrols; 
how the whole 16th Army Corps, reinforced by part of 

1 Yellow Book, Nos. 58, 59, 60, 88, 90, 91, 106, 108. Blue Book, No. 
105 (Enclosure 3). 



THE CRIME 243 

the 8th from Treves and Cologne, had already occupied 
the frontier from Metz to Luxemburg. 

All this took place on July 30th, although France had 
voluntarily given an obligation to keep her own troops 
ten kilometres from the frontier, 1 and had observed this 
condition to the detriment of her own strategic interest. 
Compare these German military measures with the assur- 
ances of peace which the hapless Herr von Schoen had 
daily to deliver at the Quai d'Orsay. Read and compare 
all these things, and then on the strength of this soli- 
tary fact of the non-dispersion of the English Fleet, 
openly acknowledged by the English Government, dare 
if you still can, to draw the conclusion that England in- 
tended to break the peace. No, Herr von Bethmann, 
you would have shown greater wisdom if you had kept 
silent: si tacuisses, philosophus mansisses. You would 
have shown more consideration for your reputation as a 
"philosopher" if you had patiently borne the fate which 
you have brought upon yourself and your country in- 
stead of clutching nervously at straws which, after all, 
will not save you from plunging in the depths of uni- 
versal damnation. Keep silence — for your own sake 
and for our sake — and rest content with the well-sound- 
ing testimonial which Professor Lasson has bestowed 
upon you, that you are "by far the most eminent among 
living men, knowing no motive other than those of 
truth, fidelity, and right." 

The points in the indictment against Germany I sum- 
marise in the following sentences : — 

1. Germany gave Austria a free hand against Serbia, 
although she was well aware that a European conflict 
must arise out of that between Serbia and Austria. 

1 Yellow Book, No. 106. Chancellor's Speech, 4th August. Blue 
Book, No. 105. 



244 I ACCUSE! 

2. She allowed Austria to address to Serbia an ulti- 
matum with exorbitant demands and, notwithstanding 
an almost complete compliance with these demands, she 
allowed her to recall her Ambassador and to declare 
war. 

3. By suggesting a localisation of the war she sought 
to create the appearance of mediating in the interests of 
peace, but that this proposal had no prospect of success 
must have been known to her from the history of diplo- 
macy, and from the recent evidence of the Balkan crisis ; 
that as a matter of fact it was known to her is clear 
from the confessions contained in the White Book. 

4. She declined the proposal for a conference of the 
four Powers. 

5. She herself then advanced the proposal for direct 
discussions between Vienna and Petrograd, but at the 
same time she suffered Austria to decline to take part in 
these discussions, and instead to declare war against 
Serbia. 

6. She left unanswered the frequently repeated re- 
quest of the other Powers that she should herself pro- 
pose an alternative method of mediation in place of 
the proposal of a conference which she had declined. 

7. She left unanswered and undiscussed the various 
formulae for agreement proposed by Grey. 

8. In part she refused and in part she left unanswered 
the formulae of agreement proposed by Sazonof. 

9. In spite of all inquiries, she never said what Aus- 
tria wanted, but constantly restricted herself to saying 
what Austria did not want. 

10. She made to England a bid for neutrality, and 
thus announced her intention of making war at a time 
when the Entente Powers were still zealously labouring 
in the interests of peace. 

11. When at last negotiations on the Serbian Note 
were opened with a prospect of success in Petrograd 



THE CRIME 245 

between Austria and Russia, she upset these negotia- 
tions by her ultimata to France and Russia, and made 
war inevitable. 

12. In the ultimatum to Russia she demanded that 
demobilisation should also be carried out as against 
Austria, although Austria herself had mobilised the 
whole of her forces. 

13. In place of the counter-mobilisation which she 
had threatened to carry out, she at once declared war 
without any ground, first on Russia and then on 

France. 

14. As an afterthought she based these declarations 
of war on the fact that the powers opposed to her had 
begun the war, whereas, on the contrary, the first acts 
of war were committed by Germany. 

15. She violated the neutrality of Belgium, and thus 
in addition brought about war with England. 

These points in the indictment are proved, and justify 
the judgment : Germany is guilty, along with Austria, 
of having brought about the European war. 



ENGLAND 



The attitude of England, up to the moment when the 
question of Belgian neutrality arose, is so clear from 
what I have already said that it would be a vain repeti- 
tion to deal with it again in this connection. From the 
beginning of the conflict Sir Edward Grey, the English 
Foreign Minister, took the leading part in all efforts to 
preserve peace, and did everything within the power of 
man to prevent war: — 

1. He urged the Serbian Government to assume an 



246 I ACCUSE! 

attitude of moderation, and in this succeeded in his 
efforts. 1 

2. He endeavoured, although in this case without 
success, to obtain from the Austrian Government an 
extension of the time-limit. 2 

3. He thereupon put forward the proposal for a con- 
ference of the four Powers, which was accepted by 
France, Italy, and Russia, but was declined by Austria 
and Germany. 3 

4. He repeatedly called upon the German Govern- 
ment to propose, in place of the conference declined by 
them, any other form of co-operation of the four Powers 
not directly concerned. His request, however, remained 
unanswered. 4 

5. He endeavoured to promote the direct conversa- 
tions between Vienna and Petrograd which were pro- 
posed by Germany, but which, after the declaration of 
war against Serbia, were declined by Austria. 5 

6. He then proposed a formula of agreement, accord- 
ing to which Austria should occupy Serbian territory, 
including Belgrade, and should from there dictate her 
conditions. These conditions were to be communicated 
to the Powers, and in so far as they did not affect the 
integrity and sovereignty of Serbia, they were to be 
recommended to Serbia for acceptance. To this pro- 
posal no answer was ever received either from Austria 
or from Germany. 6 

7. He supported the first proposal of agreement ad- 
vanced by Sazonof, and as it was declined by Ger- 
many as unacceptable, he obtained the consent of Saz- 

1 Blue Book, Nos. 12, 15, 16, 22, 27. 
"Blue Book, Nos. 13, 26. 

3 Blue Book, Nos. 17, 35, 36, 37, 42, 43, 51, 53, in. 

4 Blue Book, Nos. 60, 68, 8o, 84, 88. 

5 Blue Book, Nos. 45, 74, 75, 78, 93, 106. 
"Blue Book, Nos. 88, 98, 103. 



THE CRIME 247 

onof to a second formula of agreement, which went 
even further to meet the views of Austria. This pro- 
posal remained unanswered. 1 

8. On July 31st he promoted with the utmost energy 
the negotiations which had begun between Austria and 
Russia, and sought to guide them to a successful issue 
by further proposals which contained full satisfaction 
for Austria. All his proposals contained the stipulation 
that further military preparation should be stopped on 
all sides. 2 

9. He ultimately declared himself ready to support in 
Petrograd and Paris any reasonable proposal of Ger- 
many or Austria which might serve to preserve peace, 
and, in the event of such a proposal not being accepted 
by France or Russia, he declared that he would withdraw 
from the negotiations. No such proposal was made, 
since in the meantime Germany had despatched her two 
ultimata and declined further negotiations on the sub- 
ject. 3 

10. On August 1st, the day of the German declara- 
tion of war against Russia, he despatched proposals, 
representations, and warnings to all the capitals in order 
to arrive at an agreement between the Powers even at 
the last moment before the outbreak of hostilities. 4 The 
English Blue Book contains no fewer than seventeen 
telegrams from and to the various capitals dated August 
1st, sixteen of July 31st, and thirty-three of July 29th 
and 30th. 

Sir Edward Grey deserves more than any other the 
name of the "peacemaker of Europe," if there is still 
any meaning in the saying in magnis voluis.se sat est. 

*Blue Book, Nos. 97, 103, 120, 131, 132, 139. Orange Book, Nos. 
60, 63, 67. 

'Blue Book, Nos. no, in, 131, 133, 135, 137. 

8 Blue Book, Nos. in, 112, 121. 

*Blue Book, Nos. 126, 130, 131, 132, 133, 135, 137, 138, 139, 141. 



248 I ACCUSE! 

His efforts were in vain, but his merit in having served 
the cause of peace with indefatigable zeal, with skill and 
energy will remain inextinguishable in history. 

Even Herr von Bethmann Hollweg will be unable to 
contradict this judgment of history. I mean the Herr 
von Bethmann of August 4th, not him of December 2nd. 

What did he of August 4th say? Let us hear the 
White Book : 

"On July 26th Sir Edward Grey had made the pro- 
posal to submit the differences between Austria-Hun- 
gary and Servia to a conference of the Ambassadors of 
Germany, France, and Italy under his chairmanship" 
(p. 408). 

"We further declared ourselves ready, after failure 
of the conference idea, to transmit a second proposal of 
Sir Edward Grey's to Vienna in which he suggested 
Austria-Hungary should decide that either the Serbian 
reply was sufficient or that it be used as a basis for 
further negotiations" (p. 409). 

"Shoulder to shoulder with England we laboured in- 
cessantly and supported every proposal," &c. (p. 411). 

"We even as late as the 30th of July forwarded the 
English proposal to Vienna, as basis for negotiations, 
that Austria-Hungary should dictate her conditions in 
Serbia, *. e., after her march into Serbia" (p. 410). 

"During the interval from July 29th to July 31st 
whilst these endeavours of ours for mediation were 
being continued with increasing energy, supported by 
English diplomacy," &c. (p. 411). 

"Nay, even before the reply from Vienna regarding 
the Anglo-German mediation . . . could possibly have 
been received," &c. (p. 411). 

"In the meantime, Great Britain tried to mediate be- 
tween Vienna and Petrograd," &c. (Chancellor's speech 
of August 4th, p. 436). 

These quotations from the German memorandum are 



THE CRIME 249 

in agreement with the telegrams annexed to it, and in 
particular to the exchange of telegrams between the 
King of England and Prince Henry and the Emperor 
William. The most interesting point, however, is that 
even the solemn declaration of war against Russia con- 
tains an equally solemn testimony to the efforts for peace 
made by England in the following words : — 

"His Majesty the German Emperor had under- 
taken in concert with Great Britain the part of 
mediator between the Cabinets of Vienna and Pet- 
rograd." * 

So spake and so thought Herr von Bethmann Hollweg 
on August 4th. 

But how did he speak and what were his thoughts — 
or, rather, what did he pretend that his thoughts were — 
on December 2nd ? 

"Where the responsibility rests for the greatest of all 
wars is to us clear. The external responsibility is borne 
by those men in Russia who inspired and carried out 
the mobilisation of the entire army. The inner responsi- 
bility lies on the Government of Great Britain. The 
Cabinet of London could have made this war impossible 
by declaring without ambiguity in Petrograd that Eng- 
land was not prepared to allow a continental war in 
Europe to develop out of the conflict between Austria 
and Serbia. . . . England did not do so. . . . England 
saw how things were moving, but did nothing to spoke 
the wheel. In spite of all protestations of peace Lon- 
don gave it to be understood in Petrograd that she was 
taking her stand on the side of France and Russia." 

As many lies as words! 

In the first place the Chancellor is contradicted by 
himself. In the case of Bethmann v. Bethmann the 
Chancellor of December 2nd is knocked out by the Chan- 

1 White Book Exhibit, 6. 



850 1 ACCUSE! 

cellor of August 4th. All the events which preceded the 
outbreak of war had taken place before August 4th, that 
is to say, before the day on which Herr von Bethmann 
laid his documentary evidence before the Reichstag. If 
England had in fact played the role which is ascribed to 
her by the Bethmann of December 2nd, the Bethmann 
of August 4th was bound to have known of it, and he 
could not have delivered his eulogies on England's serv- 
ices in the cause of peace. He praised England because 
she was worthy of this praise. He knew that she was 
worthy of this praise, because as the supreme conductor 
of foreign policy he had personally taken part in all 
that had happened. The account he gave on August 4th 
corresponded to the truth, and the only reproach, if any, 
which can be urged against it is that it does not disclose 
the truth in its full extent, and that it expresses in too 
moderate a form the praise due to the English Govern- 
ment. 

Is it possible that the man who, under specious pre- 
tences, declined all the proposals for agreement ad- 
vanced by England, or failed to answer them, or did not 
even send them on to Austria, who on July 31st when 
agreement between Austria and Russia appeared to be 
at hand, forced war by despatching ultimata to Russia 
and France, who on July 29th had already resolved on 
war, and gave expression to this resolution in his bid 
for England's neutrality, who, however, received from 
Grey in reply that noble manifesto of peace which would 
have brought to the nations of Europe a sure prospect 
of a lasting condition of peace — is it possible that this 
man had the effrontery in contradiction of his own 
printed testimony to hold England responsible for this 
world-catastrophe, for which he alone bears the fearful 
responsibility? It is possible, for it has happened. But 
the world knows what view to take of his statements, and 
the lie goes home to roost. 



THE CRIME 251 

According to the assertion of the Chancellor the Eng- 
lish Blue Book itself proves the guilt of the English 
Government. It is supposed to show that England sup- 
ported the war party in Petrograd, and that she declared 
at the outset that She was taking her stand on the side 
of Russia and France." 

What, in fact, does the Blue Book prove? The exact 
opposite. 

What is true is merely that Russia and France, cor- 
rectly recognising Germany's aggressive intentions, en- 
deavoured to induce Sir Edward Grey to assume, in 
the event of the conflict becoming acute, a decisive at- 
titude in favour of her friends in the Entente. It was 
hoped in Paris and in Petrograd that by such an atti- 
tude on the part of England Germany would be re- 
strained from her intentions to make war. 

It was thus intended that England, in assuming this 
attitude, was to use her influence, not in promoting war, 
but in preventing war. Sir Edward Grey declined the 
suggestion, and in reply to their repeated endeavours he 
emphasised afresh that England was, and desired to 
remain, free from obligations. He even went further; 
he most earnestly warned his friends in the Entente 
not to rely on England making a declaration of solid- 
arity with them. 

As early as July 24th Sazonof, along with the French 
Ambassador in Petrograd, had represented to Sir G. 
Buchanan, 1 the British Ambassador, that in view of the 
provocative attitude of Austria, which could only be 
explained by assuming that she was supported by Ger- 
many, a declaration of solidarity of England with France 
and Russia was the best and the only means of prevent- 
ing a European conflict ; the tone of the Austrian Note, 
the exorbitant demands, the short period of time allowed, 
everything indicated that Austria desired war against 
"Blue Book, No. 6. 



252 I ACCUSE! 

Serbia, and this in itself constituted a danger that a 
European conflict would arise. Only by England tak- 
ing common action with France and Russia could the 
European war which was threatening be prevented. The 
English Ambassador at once replied that, while reserving 
until a later date the official declarations of his Govern- 
ment on the subject, he personally saw no reason to ex- 
pect any declaration of solidarity from England; direct 
British interests in the Serbian question were nil, and a 
war on account of such a question would never be sanc- 
tioned by British public opinion. The only promise which 
Buchanan made was to endeavour to induce Austria to 
extend the time-limit. 

Sir Edward Grey in his telegram of July 25th sent 
in reply to Buchanan 1 fully approved the declaration 
of his ambassador: "I entirely approve what you said 
as reported in your telegram of yesterday, and I cannot 
promise more on behalf of the Government." In place 
of the desired declaration of solidarity, Grey at once 
proposed the exact opposite, namely, mediation by the 
four Powers not directly concerned — England, Germany, 
France, and Italy. During the whole of the further 
negotiations the English Government emphatically main- 
tained this attitude against all wishes that they should 
act otherwise. On July 27th Buchanan explained the 
English point of view to M. Sazonof as follows 2 : It 
would be a mistake to assume that the cause of peace 
could be promoted if England placed herself on the side 
of France and Russia against Germany. The attitude 
of Germany would merely be stiffened by such a menace; 
only in the capacity of a friend who was anxious to pre- 
serve peace could England approach Germany, and en- 
deavour to exercise a moderating influence in Vienna 
through Germany. 

J Blue Book, No. 24. 
2 Blue Book, No. 44. 



THE CRIME 253 

On July 27th Grey declared to Prince Lichnowsky 
(still with reference to the four-Power proposal) that so 
long as Germany would work to keep the peace he would 
keep closely in touch with Germany. 1 

On July 29th Grey had a lengthy discussion with the 
French Ambassador, Cambon, 2 in which he clearly 
pointed out the difference between the Morocco ques- 
tion and the existing Serbian difficulty. In the Morocco 
question the dispute was one in which France was pri- 
marily interested, and the dispute turned about mat- 
ters which were regulated by a special treaty between 
England and France. None of this applied to the con- 
flict between Austria and Serbia. Even if this conflict 
should extend to one between Austria and Russia, Eng- 
land would not feel called upon to take a hand in it. 
The question whether Teutons or Slavs should hold su- 
premacy in the Balkans had always been of so little in- 
terest to England that she had never allowed herself 
to be drawn into a war on account of it. But Grey went 
still further in refusing an expression of England's 
solidarity; even if France and Germany became involved 
in the struggle the fact still remained that it was not 
France's own interests, but in the first place her duties 
under her alliance towards Russia which had been de- 
cisive in determining her action. Even in this case Eng- 
land was free from any engagement, and her action 
would only be decided by what British interests re- 
quired her to do. 

As the European situation, notwithstanding all the 
efforts for peace made by the Entente Powers, became 
constantly more strained, President Poincare himself in 
a discussion with Bertie, 3 the British Ambassador, on 
July 30th, returned to the proposal that England might 

"Blue Book, No. 46. 
8 Blue Book, No. 87. 
"Blue Book, No. 99. 



254, I ACCUSE! 

avert the danger of war by an unambiguous declaration 
to the effect that she would support France in the event 
of a conflict with Germany. France was pacific, and 
did not desire war ; Germany, however, could only be re- 
strained from her intention to go to war if England were 
to assume a decisive attitude. 1 Even Di San Giuliano, 
the Italian Minister, shared the opinion of Poincare, and 
also suggested the effectiveness of an intervention by 
England on behalf of the Entente Powers. 2 

Once more Grey decisively rejected every obligation 
to intervene on behalf of Russia and France. In view of 
the importance of the declarations of Grey in forming a 
complete judgment on the attitude of England, I give 
at length a few sentences from the telegrams addressed 
by Grey on July 31st to Bertie, his Ambassador in 
Paris : — 

"Nobody here feels that in this dispute, so far as it 
has yet gone, British treaties or obligations are involved. 
Feeling is quite different from what it was during the 
Morocco question. That crisis involved a dispute di- 
rectly involving France, whereas in this case France is 
being drawn into a dispute which is not hers. . . . We 
cannot undertake a definite pledge to intervene in a war. 
I have so told the French Ambassador, who has urged 
His Majesty's Government to reconsider this decision." 3 

1 Poincare advanced the same reasons for a declaration of solidar- 
ity of England with France and Russia in a letter addressed directly 
to the King of England on the 31st July, and only published in 
February, 1915. Even this step of Poincare was without success. 
The answer of King George avoided giving any precise answer on 
the chief point in the French letter, and the attitude of England, 
which was still continuously striving for peace, was made contin- 
gent on the development of events. The most sincere pacific inten- 
tions of the two Powers appear in both the letters, even if there 
were a divergency of opinion as to the path by which the goal could 
be reached. 

2 Blue Book, No. 106. 
■Blue Book, No. 116. 



THE CRIME 255 

"Mr. Cambon referred to-day to a telegram that had 
been shown to Sir Arthur Nicholson this morning from 
the French Ambassador in Berlin, saying that it was 
the uncertainty with regard to whether we would inter- 
vene which was the encouraging element in Berlin, and 
that, if we would only declare definitely on the side of 
Russia and France, it would decide the German attitude 
in favour of peace. ... I said that we had come to the 
conclusion in the Cabinet to-day that we could not give 
any pledge at the present time. . . . Up to the present 
moment we did not feel, and public opinion did not feel, 
that any treaties or obligations of this country were in- 
volved. . . . Mr. Cambon repeated his question whether 
we would help France if Germany made an attack on 
her. I said that I could only adhere to the answer that, 
as far as things had gone at present, we could not take 
any engagement." x 

On the same day, July 31st, Grey, as he had already 
so frequently done in the preceding days, directed to 
Prince Lichnowsky an urgent request that if Germany 
and Austria "could get any reasonable proposal put 
forward" he would support it at Petrograd and Paris, 
and if Russia and France would not accept the proposal, 
he would have nothing more to do with the conse- 
quences. 2 

This is the documentary evidence found in the Eng- 
lish Blue Book, which according to Herr von Beth- 
mann's assertion is supposed to prove "clearly and in- 
controvertibly" that London had given it to be under- 
stood that "she was taking her stand on the side of 
France and Russia." The assertion of the Chancellor is 
exactly the reverse of the truth, and we can but admire 
the courage of a man who asserts in the face of the 
whole world facts which, as is clear to everyone, are 

a Blue Book, No. 119. 
'Blue Book, No. 1 11. 



256 I ACCUSE! 

diametrically opposed to the truth, and who appeals to 
documents which prove the reverse of his assertions. 

Everything contained in the English Blue Book with 
regard to the attitude of England during the diplomatic 
negotiations is confirmed by the Russian and French 
publications. The refusals of Grey were directed, as 
we have seen, simultaneously to France and to Russia. 
The declarations made to the one Power held good as a 
matter of course for the other, and through the Em- 
bassies were conveyed to the other capital. 

Parallel with Grey's line of conduct towards the En- 
tente Powers was the attitude he assumed towards Ger- 
many. It is highly interesting to study this double ac- 
tion of Grey's which bears testimony to as much skill 
as integrity and true love of peace. When I read this 
series of documents, so dramatically tense, there always 
comes before me the picture of the old councillor of the 
district court, F., who thirty years ago used to preside 
in a court of minor jurisdiction in the Jiidenstrasse, in 
Berlin. As it was highly distasteful to him to proceed 
to a judgment he sought in every way, in season and out 
of season, to effect compromises, which would reduce 
his work. He used the most diverse means to attain 
this end. If he did not succeed in moving the parties 
to a pliable attitude by keeping them waiting for hours 
beside a baking fire in his office, he had resort to the fol- 
lowing stratagem : he dismissed the defendant for a few 
minutes, and pointed out to the plaintiff the weakness 
of his case, which could only be expected to lead to its 
dismissal. Then he called the defendant before him and 
pointed out to him the weakness of his reply, and im- 
pressed upon him that he would almost certainly lose 
the case. When he had worn each of them out in this 
way by separate advice, he called them both before the 
bench, and, presto ! in nearly every case a compromise 
was arrived at. Precisely similar was the course pursued 



THE CRIME 257 

by Sir Edward Grey with regard to the European par- 
ties with the object of moving them to a peaceful com- 
promise, and of preventing an armed conflict. He said 
to the French and the Russians: "Give way; do not 
count on my help !" And he said to the Germans and the 
Austrians : "Give way, do not count on my neutrality !" 

As the former expected his help — not, be it observed, 
for war, but against war — so the latter sought his 
neutrality, the consideration of which naturally postu- 
lated the outbreak of war. 

Grey never wearied in the task of warning the German 
Government against the delusion that England would, 
in any circumstances, remain neutral in a European con- 
flict. He warned Prince Lichnowsky; he warned Herr 
von Bethmann and Herr von Jagow through Sir E. Gos- 
chen, the English Ambassador. The English Blue Book 
is full of proofs for these statements. 1 The warnings 
continued throughout the whole of the critical days be- 
tween July 27th and 31st, and reached their culminat- 
ing point in the answer of Grey on the 30th of July, 
already mentioned on several occasions, a distinguished 
document which will always remain a title to glory for 
English diplomacy and an ignominy for German diplo- 
macy. "We will have nothing to do with a neutrality 
which would only increase your lust for war, since it 
would make it more easy for you to succeed in war* 
Instead of this we propose a joint-labour in the cause of 
peace, now and for ever, a labour directed to the protec- 
tion of Europe against all further catastrophes. We will 
have nothing to do with guarantees such as you offer; 
even if these guarantees were more far-reaching than 
'they really are, England will have nothing to do with 
such guarantees, which would only protect you in your 
delight in war. England wants peace for all, and if 
you break the peace, do not count on our standing aside!" 
^lue Book, Nos. 87, 89, 101, 102, 111, 116, 119, 123. 



£58 I ACCUSE! 

Such are the thoughts which Grey in his Note of July 
30th expressed so passionately and so convincingly. 
' * Even on July 31st, immediately before the outbreak 
of war, he threatened both sides ; he called on both sides 
to make reasonable proposals, and threatened each of 
them that he would leave them in the lurch if they de- 
clined the reasonable proposals of the offer. 1 

We know that all his efforts were in vain — not through 
any blame attaching to France and Russia, but owing to 
Germany and Austria. The European war was there, 
as soon as Germany had declared war against Russia. 
All further developments were bound to follow mechani- 
cally according to the treaties of alliance. 

The assertion of the Chancellor that England bears 
tiie responsibility for the European war is not supported 
by the English publication, as Herr von Bethmann be- 
lieves, but is flatly contradicted by it. But there is an- 
other piece of evidence which the Chancellor has at his 
disposal: the celebrated letter from the Belgian charge 
d'affaires in Petrograd to the Minister Davignon, which 
was seized in Berlin on July 31st and was opened at a 
later date. This letter is supposed to contain incon- 
trovertible proof of the guilt of England. What does 
it really show? 

The history of this letter and of its discovery is so 
remarkable, and there is such an air of Sherlock Holmes 
about the whole story, that some doubts as to its au- 
thenticity may well be allowed. It is extraordinary that 
the Berlin Government has always the luck to get pos- 
session at the right moment of documents which are 
compromising for others ! The Belgian charge d'affaires 
in Petrograd writes to his Minister under a covering ad- 
dress, and posts the letter, not in Petrograd, but through 
an intermediary in Berlin. All this is strange, passing 
strange! There is no official confirmation of the au- 
^lue Book, No. ill. 



THE CRIME 259 

thenticity of the letter. The signature of the letter- 
writer has neither been acknowledged nor proved to be 
genuine. In a civil action at law this document would 
not be admitted to have any force as evidence. 

But let us assume for the moment that the letter is 
genuine; it contains the observations of the charge d'af- 
faires of a small State on events in which he played 
no part, and which he only knows from hearsay. The 
fact that the witness only reports de atiditu, and not 
from his own direct observations, deprives his testimony 
of any value as evidence as against those witnesses 
who report de facto, that is to say, in the case now under 
consideration, against the official documents which give 
an account of the diplomatic events themselves. If the 
man who has been robbed testifies before the judge 
to all the details of the theft, and confirms his evidence 
by oath, the judge will from the outset refuse to listen 
to any witness who proposes to report from hearsay that 
the theft never took place at all. He refuses to accept 
his evidence, let alone give it credence. 

From this it follows in the case we are considering 
that the facts proved by the diplomatic publications of 
England, France, and Russia, and also by those of 
Germany, cannot be disposed of by the evidence of the 
Belgian charge d'affaires. Where there is a contradic- 
tion between the official publications and the Belgian 
report we must decide in favour of the former and 
against the latter. 

Are there, however, contradictions of such importance 
between the official books and the Belgian report that 
the whole edifice consistently constructed out of the dip- 
lomatic publications may thereby be at once overthrown ? 
No such contradictions exist. The report gives her due 
to each of the States concerned, like an old gossip who 
abuses everyone. The writer himself offers his apologies, 
so to speak, in saying at the very outset that the most 



260 I ACCUSE! 

contradictory reports were circulated without it being 
possible to distinguish what was true and what was 
false as regards the intention of the "Imperial (Rus- 
sian) Government." He then praises Germany, which 
has indubitably laboured in Petrograd as in Vienna to 
find some means of avoiding a general conflict. He 
then blames Austria, which has shown the firm deter- 
mination "not to draw back a step" ; he refers to the 
declaration of Sazonof that the mobilisation of Russia 
was not directed against Germany; he mentions that 
the Reservists have been called to the colours only in 
certain governmental districts, but maintains "quietly" 
as his own personal impression that mobilisation is go- 
ing on everywhere. England, he says, has proposed 
arbitration; Sazonof has done the same. Austria, how- 
ever, has rejected both proposals. To the proposal for 
a conference Germany had answered by a counter-pro- 
posal for a direct understanding between the Cabinets. 
With all these proposals and counter-proposals "one 
might in truth ask whether the whole world does not 
wish for war, and is not merely attempting to postpone 
the declaration of war to some extent in order to win 
time." England had at first openly declared that she 
would not allow herself to be drawn into a conflict. To- 
day, however, people in Petrograd were convinced, in- 
deed they had assurances, that England would stand by 
France. "This support has an extraordinary influence, 
and has done not a little to gain the upper hand for the 
war-party." The Russian Army felt itself strong, but 
her navy could hardly be counted; this was the reason 
why the assurance of English support has acquired such 
great importance. 

This document, to which greater importance is at- 
tached by the German Government than to their own 
White Book, was published by the Norddeatsche All- 
gemeine Zeitung with particular passages emphasised 



THE CRIME 261 

by heavy type. As a matter of fact, in appraising this 
document the result is entirely dependent on the pas- 
sages chosen for emphasis in heavy type; according to 
the emphasis attached to the various phrases, this hotch- 
potch of tittle-tattle, which the writer must have^gathered 
in the corridors of the various embassies, for he him- 
self stood apart from all the negotiations, can be used 
to incriminate any of the great Powers. If we emphasise 
with heavy type that the Cabinet of Vienna had shown 
the firm determination not to draw back a step, that 
Austria and Germany had rejected ail proposals for a 
conference, arbitration, &c, that apparently the whole 
world wished for war and only sought to gain time for 
preparation, Germany and Austria will be revealed as the 
guilty parties. If, on the other hand, we rely on the ob- 
servation that England had assured France that she 
would stand by her, and had thereby strengthened the 
war-party in Petrograd, the responsibility will fall at 
least in part upon England. The document thus proves 
as much against one side as against the other — only with 
the great difference that the observations directed against 
Germany and Austria are confirmed by all the diplo- 
matic publications, and, above all, by the German White 
Book itself, whereas the observations against England 
are contradicted by all the publications of the European 
Governments, and especially by the German White Book. 
I have already collected elsewhere the meed of praise 
which the German White Book accords to England's love 
of peace, and the efforts by her in the cause of peace. 
The White Book was closed on August 2nd, and contains 
all the diplomatic occurrences up to that date — only, of 
course, in so far as their publication was considered ex- 
pedient. If England had comported herself in Paris and 
in Petrograd as the Belgian letter-writer reports from 
hearsay on July 30th, Germany as the party chietly con- 
cerned was bound to have known this on August 2nd, 



I ACCUSE! 

and could not have maintained the contrary in the White 
Book. If there had been so much as a grain of truth 
in these Belgian back-stair stories the German Govern- 
ment would have seized upon it with joy, and would have 
mentioned the relevant facts in their memorandum. 
England's participation in the war was directly immi- 
nent when the Chancellor on August 4th laid his White 
Book before the German Reichstag. We were at war 
with England the same evening. The Chancellor had 
every interest in saddling the responsibility in advance 
as far as possible on England, of whose participation in 
the war there could no longer be any doubt on the morn- 
ing of August 4th after the violation of Belgian neu- 
trality. If he did not do so, but contrariwise lavished 
praise on England, and indeed even emphasised in the 
declaration of war against Russia the efforts made by 
England in the cause of peace, we may regard it as fully 
proved that he Iiad nothing before him which could in- 
criminate England. The proof of this, as we have seen, 
can also be incontrovertibly deduced from the diplo- 
matic publications of the Entente States, and it can never 
be disposed of by the unauthenticated gossiping tales of 
a charge d'affaires who took no part in the proceedings. 
What Grey in fact did to preserve peace before and after 
July 30th, the date of this Belgian letter, is a historical 
fact proved by public documents; he promised support 
neither to France nor to Russia, but, on the contrary, 
in reply to repeated invitations from these Powers, he 
definitely and decidedly refused to give any promise on 
the subject. The Chancellor knows this as well as we 
do, and if, disregarding all authentic diplomatic occur- 
rences and rejecting his own previous utterances, he 
cites a non-authentic, highly suspicious document in order 
unjustly to incriminate England, he is not acting like 
a gentleman, and speaks against his better knowledge. 
The truth is contained in the sentences in the Eng- 



THE CRIME 263 

lish Blue Book * : "Sir E. Grey had consistently de- 
clined to give any promise of support to either of our 
present allies. He maintained that the position of Great 
Britain was that of a disinterested party whose influence 
for peace at Berlin and Vienna would be enhanced by 
the knowledge that we were not committed absolutely 
to either side in the existing dispute. He refused to 
believe that the best road to European peace lay through 
a show of force. . . . We gave no pledge to our present 
allies, but to Germany we gave three times — on the 30th 
July, the 31st July, and the 1st August — a clear warning 
of the effect which would be produced on our attitude 
and on the sentiment of the British people by a violation 
of the neutrality of Belgium." 

That England acted as is here represented, and not in 
accordance with the knowledge professed by the writer 
of the Belgian letter, is proved by all the diplomatic docu- 
ments. That, however, Germany, as is equally asserted 
in the letter, exerted herself in Vienna in the cause of 
peace, is not proved by anything since, as I have already 
pointed out, no correspondence between Vienna and Ber- 
lin has been published. We are referred to the unproved 
assertions of Germany, which deserve no belief, if only 
because the sincere intention of Germany to move Vienna 
to moderation was bound to have been unconditionally 
successful. 

The Chancellor in his speech of December 2nd stated : 
"The Cabinet of London could have made this war im- 
possible by declaring in Petrograd without ambiguity 
that England was not prepared to allow a Continental 
war in Europe to develop out of the conflict between 
Austria and Serbia. . . . England did not do this. . . . 
England saw how things were moving, but did nothing 
to spoke the wheel. In spite of all protestations of peace, 
London gave it to be understood in Petrograd that she 
1 Blue Book, p. xi. 



£64 I ACCUSE! 

was taking her stand on the side of France and Russia." 
These sentences are untrue from beginning to end. 
They become true if everywhere in place of England 
we read Germany, and in place of Petrograd we read 
-Vienna. The truth then runs as follows : — 

The Cabinet of Berlin could have made this war im- 
possible by declaring in Vienna without ambiguity that 
Germany was not prepared to allow a continental war in 
Europe to develop out of the conflict between Austria 
and Serbia. . . . Germany did not do this. . . . Ger- 
many saw how things were moving, but did nothing to 
spoke the wheel. In spite of all protestations of peace 
Berlin gave it to be understood in Vienna that she was 
taking her stand on the side of Austria." 

The events between the ist and 4th August, between 
the German declaration of war against Russia and the 
English declaration of war against Germany, require a 
special discussion. The question to be answered in this 
discussion is no longer "Who brought about the Euro- 
pean War?" For this already had broken out with the 
German declaration of war against Russia, which neces- 
sarily entailed a war between France and Germany and 
a war between Russia and Austria. In these cases there 
were binding treaties of alliance which made war inevit- 
able between the four Powers mentioned. 

I have already indicated the attitude assumed by 
Italy. The obligations of this country extended only to 
participation in a defensive war, and she declined to 
take part on the express ground that this war was on 
the part of Germany and Austria an aggressive war — ■ 
a reason, be it observed, to which special weight must be 
attached in the mouth of an ally, and precisely for this 
reason it appears to have been taken very airily by Herr 
von Bethmann ; for in his writings and speeches he glides 
over it in silence. 



THE CRIME 265 

England was the only country which was not con- 
strained by any kind of treaty obligations to take part 
in a war. I have already indicated in an earlier passage 
that England, it is true, had concluded special treaties 
with France and Russia on definite questions affecting 
their interests, but that she had not concluded any gen- 
eral treaty of alliance with either of these parties, and 
that consequently she was also not a party to the Franco- 
Russian Alliance. On the basis of these special treaties 
which had overcome the friction existing between Eng- 
land and the two other States, a political approximation 
had arisen which established a relation of friendship 
without treaty obligations. 

England was thus free, and had to decide according 
to her own point of view whether she would or would 
not take part in the European War. The question of her 
participation or non-participation had not the slightest 
connection with the other and far more important ques- 
tion, both from a moral and historical point of view, 
the question of the responsibility for this war. In this 
respect, as in so many others, the logic of the German 
people, and especially of its leading men, has completely 
disappeared; they will not, or cannot, understand that 
what England did after the outbreak of war has nothing 
to do with what she had done previously. The one is en- 
tirely distinct from the other, and must be measured by 
an entirely different standard. 

I will prove that, just as England before the outbreak 
of war had done everything to prevent it, so afterwards 
she did nothing to extend the war by participation in it, 
but rather that she was compelled to do so, owing to the 
action taken by Germany. But even supposing, as I 
will assume for the moment, that this could not be 
proved, it would not be demonstrated in the slightest 
degree that England was responsible for the outbreak 
of the European War. It is theoretically quite possible 



266 I ACCUSE! 

that England may have caused the war and nevertheless 
later remained neutral, and, on the other hand, it is 
equally possible that she did not cause the war and yet 
later on took part in it. There is no logical connection 
between the two points involved in causing and parti- 
cipating in the war. 

This private lecture on logic is directed in the first 
place to the Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, 
who in his speech of December 2nd treats all these things 
as being identical. An assurance given by England to 
France on August 2nd, that is to say, after the outbreak 
of war, a reason advanced in explanation of the English 
declaration of war on August 4th, these subsequent 
occurrences are for him so many proofs that the war 
was intentionally instigated by England. These proofs 
are defective, if only because they are contrary to the 
simplest logic. Acts which prove guilt can never be 
subsequent in time to the decisive event; they must 
precede it, or at least happen contemporaneously 
with it. 

For this reason it is difficult to understand the purpose 
of these interminable and constantly repeated discus- 
sions in Germany on the ground which moved England 
to take part in the war. These grounds are exclusively 
England's own business. They may be more or less 
tenable, they may be more or less hypocritical, but they 
will not because of that remove one jot of the guilt and 
the responsibility which rests on Germany for having 
provoked the war. The question whether England should 
take part or should remain neutral in the war only arose 
in consequence of the war. The party then which bears 
the blame for the war is also responsible for its conse- 
quences, that is, for the participation of England in the 
war, even if he did not directly provoke this participa- 
tion. This responsibility is, however, doubled if it can 
be proved that in addition to being the prime originator 



THE CRIME 267 

of the war this party is also the originator of the par- 
ticipation of England in the war. 

I summarise, then, as follows : — • 

(i) Germany and Austria are responsible for the 
world war; their guilt has been proved. 

(2) Their guilt cannot be lessened by actions taken 
by England after the outbreak of war. 

(3) Their guilt will be increased if they themselves 
provoked these actions. 

Let us examine the facts in the light of these guiding 
principles. 

England declared war against Germany on the evening 
of August 4th because Germany had furnished a negative 
reply to her demand to refrain from a further violation 
of Belgian neutrality. On the morning of August 4th 
German troops penetrated into Belgian territory after 
Belgium had refused to comply with the German request 
for a free passage. 1 England, as one of the guarantors 
of the Treaty of London of 1839, had the right and the 
duty to intervene, on the appeal made by the Belgian 
King on August 3rd, on behalf of the neutrality of Bel- 
gium, which it had guaranteed in common with Prussia 
and other Powers. Such a step on the part of England 
could surprise no one who had even a superficial knowl- 
edge of the history of Belgian neutrality. Herr von 
Bethmann was, however, so enraged at the action of 
England that on the last visit of the Ambassador, Sir E. 
Goschen, on August 4th, he was unable to control his 
agitation, and spoke in a contemptuous manner of the 
word "neutrality," which is so often disregarded, and of 
the "scrap of paper" on account of which England was 
about to begin a war. 2 

Herr von Bethmann appears to be badly informed in 
the history of his own country. Was he not aware of 

1 Grey Book, No. 22. 

2 Blue Book, No. 160. 



268 I ACCUSE! 

the fact that Belgian neutrality had in 1870 been the 
subject of one of the finest diplomatic manoeuvres of the 
Bismarckian statecraft? Did he not know that then 
also England intervened at the beginning of the war 
as the protector of Belgian neutrality, just as on the 
present occasion, only with the different result that Bis- 
marck not only promised that he would respect Belgian 
neutrality, but also denounced the intended disregard of 
it by France, and thus brought England on to his side? 
Shortly before the beginning of the war, as is well 
known, he published an outline of a treaty drawn up by 
Benedetti, the French Ambassador, in which France 
claimed the annexation of Belgium as a return for com- 
pensation to Prussia in North Germany. The result of 
this astute move was nothing more nor less than the neu- 
trality of England, and the conclusion of identical trea- 
ties between England on the one hand and Germany 
and France on the other (August, 1870), in which Eng- 
land expressly declared that, if either of the belligerent 
Powers violated Belgian territory, she would associate 
herself with the other in defence of Belgium. The treaty 
was so strictly observed and interpreted that Ger- 
many after the Battle of Sedan was obliged to give 
up the idea of transporting wounded troops through 
Belgium. 

Is Herr von Bethmann completely ignorant of all these 
events? Or, if he knows anything of them, does he 
believe that he, the dwarf on whose shoulders the mantle 
of the mighty has fallen, can scatter to the winds the 
considerations to which his great predecessor, the giant 
Bismarck, willingly and profitably submitted? Was he 
not bound to have said to himself, when he allowed the 
General Staff to include in their plans the march through 
Belgium, that there would result from this strategic ad- 
vantage political and military disadvantages for Ger- 
many incomparably greater? Had he learned nothing 



THE CRIME 269 

from the past? Did he not know, as Bismarck knew 
quite well, that it had been from time immemorial one 
of the elementary principles of English policy to main- 
tain and to protect the inviolability of the neutral small 
States in Northern Europe? Did no one remind him 
of the passionate words with which Granville and Glad- 
stone — Liberal Ministers like those now in power — had 
intervened in August, 1870, for the inviolability of Bel- 
gium, and had described an attack on this country as 
"the direst crime that ever stained the pages of his- 
tory"? 

Herr von Bethmann appears to have been ignorant 
of all this when, in his speech in the Reichstag on De- 
cember 2nd, he described the violation of Belgian neu- 
trality, as not the ground, but the pretext for the Eng- 
lish declaration of war. It was, in fact, the real ground 
to such an extent that England would have declared war 
against us forty-four years ago if we had dared to vio- 
late Belgium. What is not permitted to a Bismarck is 
certainly not allowed to a Bethmann — or else we must 
invert the well-known phrase, and say : "Quod licet 
bom, non licet Jovi." 

What purpose is served by inquiring— as the present- 
day German professors love to do — whether the protec- 
tion of Belgium was for England a moral question or a 
question of interests? Probably it is simultaneously a 
question of morals and of interests; in observing her 
pledged word England is at the same time protecting 
her own interests, which, as has always been openly ad- 
mitted, imply in the nature of things that the coast of the 
North Sea lying opposite England should be in the pos- 
session of small neutral States. The man who acts hon- 
estly is not obliged to render to anyone an account of 
the extent to which his action corresponds to his own in- 
terests. Qui jure suo utitur, neminem laedit. We can- 
not scrutinise the souls of men, much less the souls of 



270 I ACCUSE! 

States, which, indeed, as collective bodies, do not possess 
souls. 

In any case, having regard to historical experience as 
well as to the earnest and repeated warnings communi- 
cated to the German Government, there could not be the 
slightest doubt that a violation of Belgian neutrality 
would so strongly affect the feelings of the English 
people and English interests that England could not 
stand aside in silence. In the course of his conversa- 
tions Sir Edward Grey repeatedly drew the attention of 
Prince Lichnowsky to the consequences which would 
follow the violation of Belgian neutrality which had 
been brought into ominous propinquity by the evasive 
answer which Herr von Jagow gave to the English in- 
quiry of July 31st. Grey had particularly drawn atten- 
tion to the fact that "the neutrality of Belgium affected 
feeling in this country." 1 The German Government 
then endeavoured to assure the English Government 
that they had in no circumstances any intention of an- 
nexing Belgian territory 2 — a soothing pill which, as a 
matter of course, England could not swallow; for neu- 
trality is not the same as "not being annexed," but signi- 
fies that the country which is neutral shall be spared the 
effects of war in every respect, and shall not be used 
even as a passage for troops. The demand for a right 
of passage as an innocent act was, in fact, more than 
naive; the passage of German troops would also have 
justified France in entering the country, and Belgium 
would thus have fallen into as evil a plight as can be con- 
ceived; if she had yielded to the German ultimatum she 
would have run the risk of being obliged to surrender her 
country as a battlefield for the combatant Powers, and 
she herself would not have been in a position to do any- 
thing for the protection of her soil. She would have 

x Blue Book, No. 101, 123, p. x. 
2 Blue Book, No. 157. 



THE CRIME 271 

been crushed between the two armies, and would have 
been lost, no matter which side had been victorious. 

It need therefore cause no surprise that England was 
not satisfied with the soothing assurances of Germany, 
but demanded unconditional respect for Belgian neutral- 
ity. Germany, however, was not in a position to give an 
assurance in this sense, since the long-prepared plans 
of the General Staff made the passage through Belgium 
an imperative requirement. 

As late as August 4th, when the German troops had 
already crossed the Belgian frontier, Sir Edward Gos- 
chen, acting on the instructions of his Government, in- 
quired of Herr von Jagow whether it was not possible 
even then to desist from breaking into Belgium and to 
withdraw the troops. When this inquiry was answered 
in the negative, the English Ambassador entreated the 
Secretary of State to consider the matter further, and to 
give him a satisfactory answer before 12 o'clock at mid- 
night. Herr von Jagow replied that his answer must 
remain the same, even if twenty- four hours or more were 
given him for reflection; thereupon Goschen asked for 
his passports. 

If we survey the whole behaviour of German diplo- 
macy in this question of Belgian neutrality, there is 
only one possible explanation of the inexplicable, namely, 
that diplomacy had completely resigned in favour of the 
chiefs of the army. The military situation was without 
doubt improved by marching through Belgium; the dip- 
lomatic situation, however, and in consequence of this 
the military also in its turn, was enormously worsened 
by the danger that to the two enemies in the field there 
might be added a third, the most dangerous. Taken al- 
together, the disadvantages greatly outweighed the ad- 
vantages. It was the duty of the statesman who was 
controlling the destinies of the Empire to balance these 
advantages and disadvantages against each other, and if 



272 I ACCUSE! 

the calculation yielded an unfavourable result, he should 
have preferred to give up his office rather than bring his 
country into a deeper danger. 

In the Germany of to-day it is not, however, possible 
to find men capable of decisions such as these demand- 
ing such strength of character. The Chancellor has 
failed either in character or in insight; either he failed 
to recognise the consequences which would flow from the 
violation of Belgian neutrality, or he did not possess the 
energy to give effect to the political point of view against 
the view of the military authorities, if need be at the 
sacrifice of his office. Now that the disaster has occurred 
he endeavours, supported by his faithful followers, to 
excuse himself with many "ifs" and "buts." "If we 
had not violated Belgian neutrality, France would have 
done so." I have already shown that there is nothing 
to indicate that this is the case. If, however, France in 
fact also intended to enter Belgium-, the best course 
which Germany could have adopted was to wait for this 
to happen and allow the fatal consequences to ensue for 
France. There can be no doubt that England would 
have opposed an invasion of Belgium by France just as 
she did in the case of Germany; this may be definitely 
inferred from the treaties concluded in August, 1870, 
and from the identical inquiry addressed to France and 
Germany on July 31st. The situation of France with re- 
gard to England would have been morally still more un- 
favourable than ours, since France on July 31st had 
given a definite promise, whereas Germany had declined 
to do so. If a few days later France had broken her 
word, England, if she had not sided with Germany, 
would, at any rate, have remained neutral. 

If, further, it is maintained in exoneration of our 
diplomacy that England would have taken the field 
against Germany, even apart from the violation of Bel- 
gian neutrality, it can only be observed that this asser- 



THE CRIME 273 

tion is so completely untenable and unsupported that it 
does not even deserve consideration. What England 
did to maintain peace is a historical fact. What England 
would have done if this or that had happened or had not 
happened, is a mere supposition, which is not amenable 
to serious discussion. 

To prove that it was not on account of the violation 
of Belgian neutrality that England took part in the war, 
but in order that she might under all circumstances lend 
assistance to France, the Chancellor invokes in his speech 
of December 2nd an occurrence which took place in Lon- 
don on August 2nd between Sir Edward Grey and Cam- 
bon, the French Ambassador. 1 What is the object of 
this demonstration? It is supposed, as Herr von Beth- 
mann explains, to prove that England was now, as al- 
ways, the perfidious Albion, and under the mask of moral 
action was pursuing only her naked interests. These in- 
terests, however, were said to be comprised in the de- 
struction of the vital nerve of her greatest industrial 
competitor : "Thus England and Russia bear the respon- 
sibility for this world war." 

A similar jumble of defective logic and of the perver- 
sion of truth has seldom been emitted in so pregnant a 
moment by anyone in such an authoritative position. 
tWe clutch our heads and seek in vain to follow the 
meanderings of this mind. What does it all mean? 
England is responsible for the world-war because she 
adhered to one of the two combatant parties after the 
outbreak of the war, which she did not cause, but which, 
on the contrary, she sought to prevent by all the forces 
at her disposal. Even if this adhesion took place with- 
out any reason, out of mere caprice on the part of Eng- 
land, it would be impossible to deduce any responsibility 
for the war. To make the antithesis comprehensible, 

x Blue Book, No. 148. 



274 I ACCUSE! 

even for the dullest intellect, I formulate it in six Latin 
words : — 

Culpa — ante bellum : 

Participatio — post bellum. 

England was in no way obliged to adduce to anyone 
grounds for her participation in the war. The grounds 
which she has adduced may be believed or disbelieved; 
in any case they are, and must remain, grounds for the 
participation of England after the war was begun; in 
no case can they be reasons which lay on England's 
shoulders the responsibility for beginning the war. 

Certainly there was, as the Chancellor rightly empha- 
sised, "no fraternal duty, no compulsion, not even any 
menace of their own country." No fraternal duty! So, 
then, fraternal duties justify an intervention in the 
struggle! Why, then, Herr von Bethmann, did you not 
recognise the fraternal duties of Russia to intervene on 
behalf of Serbia? Why did you seek to prevent Russia 
from fulfilling such a fraternal duty by advancing your 
proposal for localisation? Now that you recognise that 
fraternal duties may constrain to armed intervention, 
will you still try to persuade us that your attempt to keep 
back the big brother from the protection of the small was 
intended to be seriously taken ? 

There is said to have been nothing which compelled 
England to war. True, there was no material compul- 
sion. But in what case is there really material com- 
pulsion except in a true, genuine war of liberation, not 
the counterfeit presentment of it? On the other hand, 
there was a moral compulsion, a solemn duty imposed 
by treaty, to which greater importance attached, inas- 
much as its object was the protection of the small against 
the great, a treaty signed by all the Powers, the ag- 
gressor included, and at a later date sealed again by a 
new treaty. A duty imposed by treaty — a scrap of 



THE CRIME 273 

paper! says Herr von Bethmann. Indeed, what has in- 
duced us to intervene on behalf of Austria in a con- 
flict as remote from our own interests as any Albanian 
kingdom? Only a treaty, a scrap of paper, which im- 
posed upon us obligations as allies. What is right for 
us must surely be allowed in the case of England. If 
in our case the scrap of paper was enough to justify 
us in setting the whole world in flames with this paper- 
lighter, why should it not be enough in the case of Eng- 
land to justify her in bringing further combustible ma- 
terial to extend the fire which had already broken out? 

If, however, anyone urges against me the arguments 
in the White Book : "Yes, but our interests also were 
at stake — the Germanic races in Central Europe. . . . 
(please don't laugh!). — We dare not allow Austria to 
be weakened, &c." — I reply that England also had her 
own interests to safeguard, for England also the Treaty 
of London of 1839 was not only a moral tie, but also a 
guarantee of her interests, a hundred times more impor- 
tant for England than all south-eastern questions taken 
together are for us. 

We also could have remained neutral in a war be- 
tween Austria and Russia. Had we remained neutral 
the war would have been really localised, localised be- 
tween Russia and Austria, and neither France nor Eng- 
land would have been drawn into the struggle. 

We could not remain neutral, and did not wish to do 
so, because we were bound by a Treaty of Alliance, and 
the fulfilment of our duties under the Treaty was at 
the same time in agreement with our interests. 

The position was precisely the same in the case of 
England. England could not remain neutral, and did 
not wish to do so when confronted with a violation of 
Belgian neutrality, because she was by the treaty obliged* 
to the protection of Belgium, and this protection was at 
the same time in agreement with her interests. The role$ 



276 I ACCUSE.' 

are thus equally shared. Germany and England from 
the standpoints proper to each adopted the same course 
of action for the same reasons. The fundamental dif- 
ference is to be found merely in the fact that England 
intervened on behalf of an innocent small State, whereas 
Germany took under her wings a guilty great State ; that 
Germany thus provoked the world- war, whereas Eng- 
land sought to prevent it by every possible means. 

But let us just make the attempt to follow the logic 
of Bethmann and examine the fact which is supposed to 
prove that Belgium neutrality was only a mask. Sir 
Edward Grey on August 2nd gave to Cambon, the 
French Ambassador, the following assurance based on a 
resolution of the Cabinet : — 

"If the German Fleet comes into the Channel or 
through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations 
against French coasts or shipping, the British Fleet will 
give all the protection in its power. 

"This assurance is, of course, subject to the policy 
of His Majesty's Government receiving the support of 
Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His Maj- 
esty's Government to take any action until the above 
contingency of action by the German Fleet takes place." 1 

In explanation of this declaration Grey expressly 
pointed out that even in the event of a war breaking out 
between France and Germany England could not bind 
herself to declare war upon Germany. Only in the case 
expressly foreseen, that is, if the German Fleet should 
come into the Channel or through the North Sea and 
undertake hostile operations against French coasts or 
shipping, only in this case would the British Fleet come 
to the help of France — all this, of course, being depen- 
dent on the approval of Parliament. 

This is the latest missile by means of which Herr von 
Bethmann endeavours to despatch English statesmen 
x Blue Book, No. 198. 



THE CRIME 277 

from life to death (moral death, that is to say). He 
attaches special importance to the fact that this declara- 
tion of Grey's was given before the ultimatum was sent 
to Belgium, and he infers from this that England, even 
before the violation of Belgian neutrality, had taken the 
field as a belligerent, and in consequence that this viola- 
tion was not the true ground for England's participa- 
tion in the war. To all this I answer in popular phrase- 
ology : "I don't think." 

Even if the whole of this deduction were just, it would 
be entirely superfluous. The decisive question, "Who is 
to blame for the European war?" is neither answered 
nor influenced by the events of August 2nd. On August 
2nd the war was there, owing to the guilt of Germany 
and Austria and against the will of England. It could 
no longer be prevented. Its extension to France was in- 
evitable, and in fact had already taken place, even if 
the declaration of war was not delivered at Paris until 
the following day. The ultimatum to France had expired 
at 1 o'clock on the afternoon of August 1st, and had been 
answered by France by a refusal. The declaration of 
war between Austria and Russia was a formality which 
was bound to take place at any moment, but which — ■ 
mirabile dictu! — to increase the madness of the whole 
affair, was delayed until August 6th. In short, the war 
-between the four Powers had come, and England was 
free to act as her interests required. If her interests 
required her to support France in general or in certain 
cases, well and good, she was free to act in accordance 
with these interests. If her interests required her to 
take part in the war only in the event of the violation 
of Belgian neutrality, she was free to act in this way 
also. In either case not the slightest reproach can be 
made against England. If we took our stand beside 
Austria, England also could stand by France. 

The fact that there existed between England and 



278 I ACCUSE! 

France no alliance which imposed obligations did not pre- 
vent England from promising assistance to France on 
the ground of the friendly relations between them, and, 
above all, on the ground of her own interests. We also 
acted exclusively in accordance with our own interests, 
which, when occasion required, following the celebrated 
example of Austria, we designated as "questions of life 
and death." Thus the invasion of Belgium was for us 
a question of life and death (see the despatch of Jagow 
to Lichnowsky of August 4th x ), or, more modestly ex- 
pressed, a question of our military interest. So also the 
neutrality of England, if not a question of life and death, 
was at any rate for us a question of far-reaching impor- 
tance, and for this reason we endeavoured in every pos- 
sible way to secure this neutrality both before and after 
the outbreak of war. And earnestly as we desired peace 
with England, with equal earnestness and persistence 
we sought for war with Russia and France. In the first 
place, our desire was to be lords on the Continent, and 
then — everything else would follow. 

What, then, I again ask, is the object of this entirely 
superfluous discussion as to this or that reason which 
may have moved England to war ? Is Europe a court of 
moral jurisdiction to pass condemnation on hypocrites 
and Pharisees? Woe to us, if such a court existed! 
How should we stand before such a tribunal? We 
should be unmasked, the conquerors in the mask of lib* 
erators, the aggressors in the mask of the attacked, the 
wolf clothed in sheepskin! 

Yes, indeed, if we had only enough honesty to con- 
fess the unspeakable crime! If like the great conquerors 
of the past who took the world by storm, like Alexander 
the Great, or the Romans, or Napoleon the First, we 
openly proclaimed our. right to possess and to rule the 
world, because we were better, more valiant, and stronger 
^lue Book, No. 157. 



THE CRIME 279 

lhan the others? There would be something great in 
that, something fascinating, something which would com- 
pel respect, for everything that is great captures the 
imagination, even if it is in the service of pernicious ends. 
A Rinaldo Rinaldini, a Richard III., a Cesare Borgia 
are monsters, but they are great in their kind, and awake 
admiration like every human type which has achieved 
perfection. But we, how petty we are! In our writings 
and our speeches at home we preach a policy of world- 
power, of conquest, and of world-dominion — of course, 
only among the initiated — but to the stupid people and 
to foreign countries we profess that it is we who have 
been attacked and fallen upon, that we are the victims 
of treacherous enemies. We also ''secretly preach wine 
and publicly drink water." In the intimate circle of our 
Junkers, our courtiers, and our Generals we raise the 
intoxicating wine of enthusiasm for war, but in public 
before the people and beyond the frontier we drink 
the water of peacefulness, of meekness, and of inno- 
cence. 

It therefore does not become us to reproach the Eng- 
lish Government with double-speaking and with hypoc- 
risy. In this case also we seek the mote in another's 
eye and do not see the beam in our own. 

How complete a master Germany is of all the arts 
of hypocrisy is proved, apart from the events of 19 14, 
by a series of declarations made by German diplomatists 
between the years 191 1 and 19 13 on the subject of Bel- 
gian neutrality. As far back as 191 1, in connection with 
the discussion of the Dutch scheme for the fortification 
of Flushing, the fear was frequently expressed in the 
Belgian Press that Germany would violate Belgian neu- 
trality in the event of a Franco-German war. In the 
interests of good neighbourly relations with Germany 
the Belgian Minister gave expression in Berlin to the 
desire that the Imperial Government might dispel these 



I ACCUSE! 

fears by a public declaration in the Reichstag. Through 
Herr von Flotow, who was then Ambassador, Herr von 
Bethmann conveyed his warm thanks for the friendly 
sentiment of the Belgian Government, but replied that he 
could not make the desired public declaration for fear 
of weakening the military situation of Germany with re- 
gard to France. If she were assured against an attack 
from the north, France could concentrate all her energy 
on the eastern frontier, and thereby render invasion by 
Germany a more difficult undertaking. 1 This evasive 
answer of Bethmann is to-day comprehensible. It is 
clear that even then the plans for the invasion of Bel- 
gium were ready, and the Chancellor had in consequence 
scruples about declaring publicly in the Reichstag that 
he would respect a neutrality, the violation of which had 
already been decided upon. 

Less prudence was, at any rate, shown by Herr von 
Jagow, who, in the financial committee of the Reichstag 
on April 29th, 19 13, did not shrink from making the 
untrue declaration that the neutrality of Belgium was 
established by treaty, and that Germany intended to 
respect this treaty. 2 The utmost limit in unscrupulous- 
ness was, however, reached by Herr von Below-Saleske, 
who, as late as August 2nd, some hours before handing 
over the German ultimatum, gave to Davignon, the Bel- 
gian Foreign Minister, the most quietening assur- 
ances with regard to the intention of her German neigh- 
bour. When M. Davignon expressed his satisfaction 
on this point, but notwithstanding stated that, for the 
purpose of reassuring his country, he would be glad to 
receive from the German Government an official declara- 
tion such as France had already formally given on July 
31st, Herr von Below contented himself with declaring 
that he had not yet received any instructions in this 

*Grey Book, No. 12. 
'Grey Book, No. 12. 



THE CRIME 281 

sense. 1 On the same evening about 7 o'clock he handed 
over the ultimatum. This certainly is a model of "fair 
play" which cannot be excelled ! But it is only in keep- 
ing with the whole. 



In this chapter mention should also be made of a fact 
which is still quite unknown in Germany. In the sum- 
mer of 19 1 3 the Belgian King and Queen with their 
children paid an official visit to Liege on the occasion of 
some celebration or other. The Emperor William — ■ 
— made use of this opportunity to send 
a special envoy to greet the royal couple and to convey 
to the Royal Family an assurance of his sincere friend- 
ship. The envoy was not, as is usual in such cases, a 
General attached to the Court, but General von Emmich, 
who was later the conqueror of Liege. 



Let us, however, return to the reproaches directed 
against England. England, it is suggested, by the assur- 
ance given on August 2nd had already abandoned her 
neutrality, and had placed herself on the side of France. 
The violation of Belgian territory is, in consequence, 
supposed to have been a negligible factor in moulding 
her decisions. What, then, in reality was the assurance 
given to the French Government? It did not extend be- 
yond a conditional and restricted protection. The pro- 
tection was linked to the condition that the German 
Fleet should come into the Channel or through the North 

1 Grey Book, No. 19. 



282 I ACCUSE! 

Sea to undertake hostile operations against French 
coa'sts or shipping. The protection was further subjected 
to the restriction that it should be given only by the Eng- 
lish Fleet. It was expressly pointed out that this protec- 
tion was not to be taken as being equivalent to a declara- 
tion of war against Germany. 

This conditional and restricted promise on the part of 
England did not issue from the free will of the English 
Government, but from a treaty obligation which she had 
assumed with regard to France. The two countries had 
for a long time agreed that France should concentrate 
almost the whole of her Fleet in the Mediterranean for 
the protection of the common interests of France and 
England, and that England in return for this should as- 
sume the protection of these interests in northern waters. 
This agreement was not based upon any kind of military 
designs against any other Power, least of all against 
Germany. Had any aggressive tendency against Germany 
been influential in forming this naval agreement, the two 
fleets would probably not have been separated, but at 
least the greater part of their combined forces would 
have been united in northern waters. The Anglo-French 
agreement had as its exclusive object the protection of 
the commercial interests of the two countries. 

The actual position, however, now was that the French 
Fleet, with the exception of a few units, was in the 
Mediterranean, where it was of service, not only to 
French interests, but also to the interests of England. 
The north and west coasts of France were consequently 
unprotected. In these circumstances it was the duty of 
England, in the imminent war between France and Ger- 
many which had already become inevitable on August 
2nd, to take over the protection of the French coast, 
which France with her Fleet tied to the Mediterranean 
could not in fact assume. This was the meaning and 
the reason of Grey's promise of August 2nd. 



THE CRIME 283 

In making this promise, England had not in the slight- 
est degree departed from her neutrality, for it depended 
on the free will of Germany to refrain from attacking 
the coasts and the shipping of France, and thereby to 
avoid any ground for an intervention on the part of the 
British Fleet. It was open to the German Government 
to make the English promise to France ineffective, and 
Prince Lichnowsky, in fact, negotiated in London on 
August 3rd on the question whether England would re- 
main neutral should Germany refrain from attacking the 
northern coasts and the shipping of France. 1 Had this 
been the only question which concerned England these 
negotiations might perhaps have been completely success- 
ful, but England had other and more important interests 
to defend which Germany could not, or would not, sat- 
isfy. These interests were of two kinds : — 

1. the maintenance of France as a great Power in 
Europe and as a Colonial Power, and 

2. the non-violation of Belgian neutrality. 

On the question whether these English interests were 
legitimate or not, no one apart from England herself 
has the right to pronounce judgment. As we made it 
our task to maintain Austria-Hungary, so it was open 
to England to consider the maintenance of France and 
her Colonies as serviceable to her interests. Every great 
Power has the right to form an independent judgment 
as to what course it may or may not be expedient for 
her to adopt, and she is entitled to reject any tutelage 
from any other quarter. The interests of States also 
are in no way static, but vary according to time and 
circumstance. What to-day appears profitable may 
appear to-morrow to be disadvantageous or indifferent. 
Until the agreement of 1904 the maintenance of France 
as a Colonial Power was, at any rate, not more than a 
matter of indifference to England. After that agree- 
1 Grey's speech of 3rd August. 



284 I ACCUSE! 

ment it became an element in English policy, and formed 
the central point in the Anglo-French agreement. This 
explains the question put by Goschen to the Chancellor 
when the latter made, on July 29th, his well-known bid 
for the neutrality of England, and offered in return for 
this to guarantee the integrity of French territory — the 
question whether this guarantee also extended to the 
French Colonies. From the negative answer of Beth- 
mann it appeared that Germany intended to make Co- 
lonial acquisitions at the expense of France. 1 But even 
apart from any such intention England could not but 
fear that the crushing of France from a military point 
of view would profoundly shake her position as a great 
Power, her well-being, and independence. 

If even in this case England's interests were imperilled, 
they were still more deeply involved in the question of 
Belgian neutrality. From the beginning of the negotia- 
tions the English Government had never left room for 
the slightest doubt that the violation of Belgian neutrality 
would be a casus belli for England. This was the only 
question which was bound certainly, unconditionally, 
and completely, to lead to a war between Germany 
and England, whereas the French question admitted of 
accommodation up to a certain point. In the Belgian 
question popular sentiment in England played a decisive 
part, whereas in the French question this was not the 
case. // Germany had respected Belgian neutrality, and 
had at the same time refrained from an attack on the 
coasts and on the shipping of France, peace between 
Germany and England would have been maintained. 
These conditions, however, Germany would not and 
could not fulfil, since in order to comply with them she 
would have had to renounce a naval war with France, 
and would have encountered insuperable difficulties by 

land. ^ 

* Blue Book, No. 85. ' 



THE CRIME 285 

War became inevitable when German troops crossed 
the Belgian frontier, and the German Government re- 
jected the English summons to withdraw them. That 
was on the evening of August 4th. 

The war, however, could still have been avoided when 
the English Government on August 2nd gave the well- 
known assurance to the French Government. It could 
have been avoided by the passivity of the German Fleet 
against the coasts and the shipping of France, as this 
course would have excluded any intervention by the 
English Fleet. It is therefore untrue, as is maintained 
by the Chancellor, that England had already departed 
from her neutrality on August 2nd. England's res- 
olutions had at that time not yet crystallised, and 
depended on circumstances which, it is true, were 
then immediately imminent, but which had not yet oc- 
curred. 

How prudent the English Government was, and how 
imprudent the German, appears clearly from a consider- 
ation of the situation on August 2nd. England could 
have definitely decided as to her course of action on 
August 2nd had she not, up to the very last moment, 
clung to the hope that she would not be involved in the 
war ; for there was then no longer the slightest possible 
doubt that the German Army would invade Belgium. 
The Chancellor attaches special importance to the fact 
that the assurance of August 2nd was given on the 
afternoon of that day, whereas the ultimatum to Belgium 
was only delivered in Brussels at 7 o'clock in the evening. 
Still starting from the false assumption that the English 
assurance amounted in itself to a participation in the war 
— which is not the case — the Chancellor draws the 
naive conclusion that expression had already been given 
to this participation in the war at a time when noth- 
ing was or could be known in London of the intended 
violation of Belgian neutrality. This is indeed the 



286 I ACCUSE! 

height of naivete! Ever since July 31st, when Jagow 
so evasively answered the English inquiry, indeed ever 
since July 29th, when Herr von Bethmann made his 
bid for English neutrality, ever since the tortuous decla- 
rations of German diplomatists in Berlin and London, 
a blind man must have seen how matters stood with re- 
gard to the neutrality of Belgium. In addition to this, 
there was the entrance of German troops into Luxem- 
burg early in the morning of Sunday, August 2nd, which 
put beyond all doubt the further advance towards Bel- 
gium. 

When the English Government gave its assurance to 
France, it could therefore no longer have any doubt that 
the neutrality of Belgium would be infringed by Ger- 
many, as indeed was done a few hours later by the de- 
livery of the ultimatum. If Germany regarded Russian 
mobilisation as in itself a casus belli, how much more 
justification was there for England regarding the posi- 
tion existing on August 2nd as a menace to Belgium. 
Had England sent an ultimatum to Germany as early as 
August 2nd her behaviour would not have been different 
from that of Germany on July 31st with regard to 
Russia. Instead of the sentence of Bethmann: "No 
mention was made of Belgian neutrality," we ought, if 
we are to conform with the truth, to say : "Belgian neu- 
trality was even then mortally menaced." 

From this it follows — in opposition to what is said 
by Herr von Bethmann — that even an unconditional 
promise of English assistance by land and by sea would 
at this moment have been already justified by the menace 
to Belgian neutrality; much more then was there justi- 
fication for the conditional promise of assistance by sea 
to which Sir Edward Grey restricted himself. 

I summarise, then, as follows : — 

1. It is untrue that England had already departed 
from her neutrality on August 2nd. The promise given 



THE CRIME 287 

on August 2nd is not equivalent to a declaration of war 
against Germany. 

2. It is, on the contrary, true that England only de- 
parted from her neutrality on August 4th after the actual 
violation of Belgian neutrality. 

3. Even if the assurance given on August 2nd had 
connoted a departure from English neutrality, this would 
have been justified by the certainty then existing that 
the neutrality of Belgium would be violated by Ger- 
many. 

If England then asserts that it was the violation of 
Belgian neutrality which caused her to take part in the 
war, she merely speaks the truth. 

The truth of this is in particular confirmed by the 
fact that Sir E. Goschen, the English Ambassador, asked 
on August 4th merely for the withdrawal of German 
troops from Belgium, and it was only when this was 
refused that he declared that England must take those 
steps imposed upon her by her treaty obligations. It 
was thus possible for Germany as late as the evening of 
August 4th to avoid war with England. This is the best 
proof which can be furnished that she cannot already 
have been in a state of war with England on August 2nd. 

All the conclusions which the Chancellor believes that 
he can deduce from the incident of August 2nd are thus 
refuted. On the contrary, there is another conclusion 
which is justified, and which / will take the liberty of 
stating: the conditional and restricted promise of con- 
tingent naval support is a convincing argumentum e 
contrario in support of the fact that up to August 2nd 
more extensive promises of military support had not been 
given to France by England. For this reason the Eng- 
lish declaration was greeted with great satisfaction in 
Paris as "a first assistance which is most valuable to 
us." 1 The first promise of assistance was thus the con- 
" 'Yellow Book, No. 138. 



288 I ACCUSE! 

ditional and restricted promise given on August 2nd! 
This is a striking proof that the assertion of the Chan- 
cellor that England had promised France her assistance 
even before the outbreak of war is a lie. 

In concluding these observations I again desire to point 
out with the utmost emphasis that all these discussions 
on the participation of England in the war and the causes 
for her action do not touch the centre of the question, 
which is: "Who is guilty of the European war?" The 
object of these discussions is precisely to divert atten- 
tion from the central question. The participation of 
England is a consequence of the war, with its own spe- 
cial reasons. It could not have occurred if war had 
not broken out. He who provoked the war is also re- 
sponsible for its consequences. We are thus led back 
to the question : Who did provoke the war ? and to this 
question there can only be one answer: Germany and 
Austria. 

I am unable to frame any points in an indictment 
against England, because there are none. I can only 
summarise her defence in the sentences which I formu- 
lated at the beginning of this section. Without doubt 
history will concur in the words used by Mr. Asquith 
on August 6th in speaking in the British Parliament in 
honour of his colleague, Sir Edward Grey: "I am 
certain that this House and this country — and I will 
add, posterity and history — will accord to him what is, 
after all, the best tribute that can be paid to any 
statesman : that, never derogating for an instant or by 
an inch from the honour and interests of his own coun- 
try, he has striven, as few men have striven, to maintain 
and preserve the greatest interests of all countries — 
universal peace." 



THE CRIME 289 

D 

RUSSIA 

The attitude of Russia in the European conflict has 
been indicated with sufficient clearness in the account 
already given to make it possible to form a judgment 
on Russia's guilt or innocence. 

What is the reproach which Germany throws against 
Russia ? 

I. Russia is supposed to have intervened without any 
reason and without any right in the conflict between 
Austria and Serbia, and is supposed thereby to have 
occasioned the European conflagration. I have already 
explained at length that Russia acted reasonably and 
within her rights in so intervening, and I have nothing 
to add to what I have said. No one in Europe could 
have been surprised at this intervention, which during 
the Balkan crisis had been clearly announced by Sazonof 
as inevitable in the event of an attack being made by 
Austria upon Serbia. The interest which Russia felt in 
Serbia was a fact with which European diplomacy was 
bound to reckon, and always has reckoned; above all, 
German diplomacy, as the White Book shows. It was 
"a commonplace in European diplomacy." 1 

II. It is further asserted that the Russian military 
party from the beginning wished for war and pressed 
for it. If such a party really exists in Russia, which is 
still to be proved, it is at least certain that it encoun- 
tered at the hands of the Russian Foreign Minister a 
more successful resistance than the German war party 
met in Herr von Bethmann. From the beginning to the 
end of the crisis Sazonof served the cause of peace in 
the most zealous manner: — 

x Blue Book, p. v. White Book, p. 406. 



290 I ACCUSE! 

1. He advised Serbia to assume an attitude of mod- 
eration, and his success may be seen in the submissive 
Serbian Note. 1 

2. In common with England and France he endeav- 
oured to obtain an extension of the time-limit prescribed 
in the Austrian ultimatum, but here he was unsuccess- 
ful. 2 

3. When the conflict began to assume a more acute 
form owing to the recall of the Austrian Ambassador, 
he claimed the assistance of Italy, in the hope that by 
refusing Austria support she might assist in moving her 
from her unaccommodating attitude. 3 

4. Notwithstanding the rupture in the relations be- 
tween Austria and Serbia, he entered into friendly dis- 
cussions with the Austrian Government. He pointed 
out in detail to Szapary, the Austrian Ambassador, the 
points in the Austrian Note which could be accepted by 
Serbia, but he also indicated those which could not be 
accepted by any independent State, at any rate, in the 
form desired. 4 

5. He gave urgent expression to the desire to diminish 
by further direct negotiations the tension existing 
between Austria and Russia, and he pleaded in Vienna 
that the Austrian Ambassador in Petrograd should re- 
ceive the authority necessary for this purpose. This 
was on July 26th. The answer to this was the Austrian 
declaration of war of July 28th, and the strict refusal 
of Count Berchtold to enter into any discussion what- 
ever on the Austrian Note. 5 

1 Orange Book, Nos. 4, 25, 23, 4°, A 2 - Blue Book, No. 55. 

2 Orange Book, Nos. 4, 5, 11, 12. 

3 Orange Book, No. 23. 

4 Orange Book, No. 25. 

5 Orange Book, Nos. 38, 45, 50, 54, 77. On the 28th July Berch- 
told declared to the Russian ambassador that he could "no longer 
recede, nor enter into any discussion about the terms of the 
Austro-Hungarian note." 



THE CRIME 291 

6. After the failure of this attempt Sazonof supported 
in every possible way Grey's proposal for a conference 
of the four Powers. 1 

7. He expressed himself as ready to stand aside, and 
submit to the proposals of the Powers. 2 

8. He induced the Emperor Nicholas to send to Prince 
Alexander of Serbia on July 27th a telegram urging 
upon him any solution designed to avoid the horrors 
of war. 3 

9. After the declaration of war against Serbia he 
urgently asked the English Government to use their 
influence in Berlin so that Austria might at least be 
induced to take part in further negotiations. 4 

10. He repeatedly and with increasing urgency sought 
the mediation of England in the sense of the proposal 
for a conference of the four Powers, and simultaneously 
he constantly expressed his readiness to take part in 
direct negotiations with Austria. The refusal of both 
these proposals in Vienna and Berlin did not deter him 
from constantly renewing them. 5 Particularly urgent 
were the attempts made by Sazonof in a conversation 
with Count Pourtales on July 29th, 6 in which he en- 
deavoured to obtain the support of Germany in one or 
other of these directions. He emphasised the expedi- 
ency of parallel discussions on the principle of having 
two strings to his bow, that is to say, a conference in 
London of the four Powers not directly concerned and 
simultaneously direct conversations in Petrograd be- 
tween Austria and Russia. He drew attention to the 

1 Orange Book, Nos. 32, 49, 55, 77. 

2 Blue Book, Nos. 55, 78. Orange Book, No. 32. 
s Orange Book, No. 40. 

4 Orange Book, No. 43. 

6 Orange Book, Nos. 25, 32, 34, 38, 39, 43, 45, 48 ("that Great 
Britain should take instant mediatory action"), 77. 
6 Orange Book, No. 49. 



I ACCUSE! 

favourable results which had followed such a double 
action during the last Balkan crisis, and he added that 
after the concessions made by Serbia it should not be 
difficult to arrange a settlement of the other points which 
still remained outstanding, if there were only the least 
goodwill on the part of Austria, and if all the Powers 
used their influence in the direction of conciliation. In 
reply to the earnest appeal of Sazonof, Pourtales could 
only reply that Germany had exerted a "moderating in- 
fluence" in Vienna, and that she would continue to do 
so. In Petrograd, London, and in Paris alike it was 
impossible to obtain more from Germany than such 
pretended efforts to exercise a moderating influence on 
Vienna; it was impossible to elicit from her any posi- 
tive concurrence in the practicable proposals of peace 
put forward by the Entente Powers. 

ii. Sazonof, along with the other Entente Powers, 
repeatedly urged the German Government, which raised 
apparently only formal objections against the confer- 
ence proposal, that she should herself propose a form 
which would be agreeable to her, and he accepted in 
advance any proposal of this nature. 1 

12. On July 29th he prompted the Tsar to propose 
in a telegram to the Emperor William that the Austro- 
Serbian conflict should be submitted to the Hague court 
of arbitration. 

13. On July 30th he dictated to the German Ambas- 
sador a formula of agreement, which aimed only at the 
protection of Serbia's sovereign rights, and which 
pledged Russia to stop her military preparations. 2 

14. After this formula had been rejected by Germany, 
he outlined, at the request of Grey, a new formula which 
went even further to meet Austria. This formula, in- 
deed, permitted Austrian troops to remain on Serbian 

1 Orange Book, Nos. 53, 55, 64. 
a Orange Book, No. 60. 



THE CRIME 293 

territory during the further negotiations, and obliged 
Russia to maintain a waiting attitude. 1 

15. On July 31st, when Austria at length declared 
herself ready to enter into discussions on the subject- 
matter of the Serbian question, Sazonof at once began 
these conversations in Petrograd, and in a telegram to 
London expressed the hope that a peaceful issue might 
yet be found. 2 

16. Even on August 1st, on the day of the German 
declaration of war, he declared himself ready to conclude 
an agreement in the sense of his second formula, pro- 
vided that German troops had not previously crossed 
the Russian frontier. In no case, he added, would Rus- 
sia begin hostilities first? 

17. Even at the last moment Sazonof moved the Tsar 
to give his solemn word to the Emperor William that 
the Russian troops would undertake no provocative ac- 
tion, so long as the negotiations on the Serbian question 
(resumed on July 31st) should continue with Austria. 4 

18. Even on the day of the declaration of war he 
moved his monarch to give a renewed assurance that the 
Russian mobilisation did not mean war, and to urge 
that the negotiations for the welfare of both countries 
and for universal peace should be continued. 5 

These were the exertions of the leader of Russian 
policy. Any impartial person may judge whether these 
exertions were directed to peace or to war. That these 
untiring efforts for peace had their origin in Petrograd 
proves that the so-called Russian war-party was power- 
less as against the responsible Minister. It is now a 
common reproach of all belligerent States to accuse their 

1 Orange Book, No. 67. 

"Orange Book, Nos. 69, 73, Blue Book, Nos. no, in. 

■Blue Book, No. 139. 

'White Book, p. 411. 

•White Book, p. 413. 



294 I ACCUSE! 

enemies of having been under the influence of a war- 
party; each denies his own, and places the responsibility 
on those of foreign countries. Here also it is true that 
by their fruits ye shall know them. The efforts of the 
Russian war-party — if such a party existed — remained 
fruitless; it was unable to influence the peace policy of 
the Tsar. The efforts of the German war-party, on the 
contrary, have yielded fruit only too abundantly — poison- 
ous fruit — which they succeeded in concealing under a 
charm of guile and seduction so that the deluded peo- 
ple in their intoxication reached out their eager hands; 
now they must devour the fruit in all its bitterness, 
even though it may bring with it the bitterness of death. 

III. A further reproach urged by the German Govern- 
ment against Russia is in effect that Russia by her mili- 
tary measures frustrated the negotiations for peace. 
This reproach also is without justification, for two rea- 
sons : — ■ 

i. because Russia concurrently with her military meas- 
ures of security, maintained uninterruptedly diplomatic 
efforts for peace, 1 and 

2. because these measures were merely measures of 
security, which, according to the solemn assurances given 
by the Tsar and his Government, had no aggressive 
character. It was impossible that they could have had 
an aggressive character, since, as I have already ex- 
plained, they served only to support a defensive policy, 
and there was no reason whatever for aggressive action 
on the part of Russia. The partial mobilisation of July 
29th, as well as the general mobilisation of the 31st, 
were the answer to previous mobilisations on the part 
of Austria, the dates of which I have already established 
from the documentary evidence. 2 Moreover, Russia 
was compelled to adopt military measures of security, 

1 Orange Book, Nos. 77, 78. 

2 Orange Book, Nos. 47, 49, 58, 77, 78. 



THE CRIME 295 

not only on account of Austrian mobilisation, but still 
more owing to the diplomatic attitude assumed by Aus- 
tria and Germany. The unaccommodating behaviour of 
Austria, and the frustration by Germany of all attempts 
at mediation, could not fail to arouse the overwhelming 
suspicion — which was, in fact, later confirmed — that Ger- 
many and Austria desired war under all circumstances. 
Against this menace Russia was bound to provide for 
her security, and the reproach, inferred from the Rus- 
sian mobilisation, is also shown to be baseless. 

The tales of the broken words of honour and of the 
crossing of the frontier before the declaration of war 
I have already characterised elsewhere by their proper 
terms. 

There is thus no charge fo be brought against Russia, 
and I can only conclude this section with the regret, 
which is certainly comprehensible in a German, that 
Russia is wholly blameless of the European war, and 
that the guilt rests exclusively on Germany and Austria. 



E 

FRANCE 

German utterances, spoken and written, on the re- 
sponsibility of France for the war are surprisingly re- 
strained, and are supported on very scanty material. The 
German White Book accuses France merely of "mili- 
tary preparations" during the diplomatic negotiations, 
and asserts at the conclusion of the account which it 
contains that France on the morning of August 2nd, 
that is to say, before the German declaration of war, had 
"opened hostilities." 

The Chancellor adheres to this reproach in his speech 



296 I ACCUSE! 

of August 4th, and cites in support of his assertion al- 
leged French incursions into German territory. In his 
speech of December 2nd he rides off on the old revanche 
idea, but here also he is unable to produce anything 
more substantial against France. 

I have already estimated the proper value of all these 
reproaches, and pointed out their flimsiness. In particu- 
lar I was able to prove that the most serious violations 
of the frontier before the German declaration of war 
were committed by German troops, that these were of 
frequent occurrence, and resulted in bloodshed, whereas 
the counter-accusations of Germany against France are 
not only improbable but self -contradictory, and are there- 
fore unworthy of credence. 

A new accusation against France has been given cur- 
rency for the first time in the recently published Note 
of the Chancellor dated December 24th, in which the 
participation of France in the diplomatic negotiations is 
subjected to criticism. We can only be grateful to the 
Chancellor that he has at length formulated a charge to 
which it is possible to submit a defence. This accusa- 
tion is supported on the following assertions: — 

1. France did not trust German assurances, and re- 
ceived all the steps of the German Ambassador with 
mistrust. 

2. Germany's wish for mediating influence in Petro- 
grad was not regarded. 

3. The French Government did not take a single posi- 
tive step in the interest of peace. 

What is the truth with regard to these accusations? 

It is true that the demarches of Herr von Schoen were 
received in Paris with a certain mistrust. This mistrust 
was, however, only too well founded. Herr von Schoen 
was called upon to play in Paris the same miserable 
role as fell to the lot of Herr von Jagow in Berlin. It 
was his task to thwart all the attempts of the Entente 



THE CRIME 297 

Powers to arrive at a peaceful solution of the conflict, 
and to put forward threadbare reasons in defence of the 
astonishing and ambiguous behaviour of the German 
Government. He dared not associate himself with the 
endeavours of France to obtain an extension of the time- 
limit allowed in the ultimatum, but, on the contrary, he 
had to offer to the French Government a blind defence 
of the Austrian Note, and of all the later actions taken 
by Austria. 1 Grey's proposal for a conference of the 
four Powers, which had been immediately accepted by 
France, and was agreeable to all the other Powers, he 
was bound to reject, and in place of this it was his duty 
to recommend as a panacea the impossible German pro- 
posal for localisation. 2 He was bound to assert the in- 
sufficiency of the Serbian Note, which had conceded all 
the material demands of Austria, and he had to repre- 
sent as justifiable the recall of the Austrian Ambassador; 
indeed, in compliance with Bethmann's instructions, he 
had to impress on the French Government the desirabil- 
ity of common Franco-German pressure on the Petro- 
grad Cabinet, whereas, on the other hand, he was bound 
to decline any kind of pressure from Germany on Vi- 
enna. He had to listen in silence or could give only 
inconsequent answers during his frequent visits to the 
Quai d'Orsay, when M. Bienvenu-Martin, the French 
Acting Foreign Minister, pointed out to him the illogi- 
cal nature of this proposal; for, as M. Bienvenu-Martin 
indicated, Austria, had in nearly every point achieved 
her will, but had nevertheless begun a military action 
against Serbia; a cessation might therefore be asked for 
from Austria, but not from Russia; pressure might be 
exercised on Vienna, not on Petrograd. 3 Russia was 
indeed ready to negotiate, either directly with Austria 

1 Yellow Book, Nos. 28, 36. 

'Yellow Book, Nos. 56, 57, 61. 

3 Yellow Book, Nos. 61, 62, 77, 78. 



298 I ACCUSE! 

or by the mediation of the four Powers not directly 
concerned. Russia was ready to accept any proposal 
made by the conference of the four Powers. What fur- 
ther pressure did he suggest shoidd still be exercised 
on Russia? Austria, however, was not ready either for 
direct negotiations or to accept proposals made by the 
four Powers. If, therefore, pressure had to be exercised 
in any quarter it must be in Vienna, and Berlin alone 
was in a position to accomplish this. An Ambassador, 
charged with the task of upholding the opposite view, 
is an object calculated rather to inspire compassion than 
to evoke condemnation. 1 

But he had to go even further in revealing his naked- 
ness. When in place of mediation he proposed direct 
negotiations between Vienna and Petrograd, and was 
asked by the French Ambassador what was really the 
aim of the Austrian operations in Serbia (July 29th), 
he had to give the mortifying answer that the German 
Government did not know, but that it hoped to learn 
from Austria. 2 This answer also, as is known, must be 
laid at the door, not of the wretched Paris Ambassador, 
but of his Government, which up to the present day 
has not explained to the world what Austria really 
wanted from Serbia. Meanwhile the Serbians have given 
the answer which Austria was asked in vain to furnish : 
they have driven the Austrians out of their country, and 
presumably this was what the Austrians wanted. 

Thus the whole action of Herr von Schoen in Paris 
is nothing but a continuous series of discomfitures which 
he personally had not merited. The constantly repeated 
request that he should indicate the form of conference 
agreeable to the German Government, which in principle 
had apparently been approved, he was obliged to leave 
unanswered, since no instructions in this sense had been 

1 Yellow Book, No. 85. 
"Yellow Book, Nos. 94, 97. 



THE CRIME 299 

sent to him from Berlin. 1 He had to maintain a passive 
attitude towards all Anglo-French attempts to arrive 
at a settlement between the conflicting standpoints of 
Austria and Russia by devising a formula of agree- 
ment, since his Government did not consider that such 
attempts were even worthy of a discussion. 2 

The worst role, however, did not fall to him until 
after the fruitless expiration of the ultimata; he had 
then to submit to further discomfiture at the hands of 
M. Viviani, who held up to him the criminal madness of 
the action taken by Germany, which shortly before the 
solution of the dispute had, without any reason, driven 
Europe into the most fearful of wars. Herr von Schoen 
was obliged to limit his answer to saying that he had 
received no official communication with regard to the 
favourable position of the negotiations, but that he was 
going to get information. 3 Two days later he had to 
hand to M. Viviani a declaration of war based on the 
fact that France had begun hostilities and also that she 
had violated Belgian neutrality 4 — assertions which he, 
more than anyone, knew to be false : had he not himself 
witnessed the sincere efforts made by France for peace? 
Wretched Ambassador! The mistrust with which he 
was received in France was certainly excelled by the 
mistrust which he felt towards his own actions. 

The further reproach put forward by Bethmann that 
the French Government had disregarded Germany's de- 
sire for mediating influence in Petrograd has already 
been deprived of all force by the previous discussion. 
Germany refused to exercise any influence on Austria, 
presumptuous beyond all measure and scoffing all con- 
siderations of European peace, and she demanded, on 

1 Orange Book, No. 55. 

2 Yellow Book, Nos. 101, 114. 

3 Yellow Book, No. 125. 

4 Yellow Book, No. 147. 



300 I ACCUSE! 

the other side, that pressure should be exercised by 
France on Russia, which had already shown in the good 
advice proffered to Serbia an extraordinary conciliatory 
attitude, and which was ready to take any further step 
necessary to meet her opponent. 1 

The demands addressed by Germany to France, and 
thus indirectly to Russia, were thus somewhat stiff, but 
nevertheless they were complied with by France up to a 
certain point. The French Yellow Book and the English 
Blue Book both bear witness to this. In a despatch 
of July 29th 2 Bienvenu-Martin declared it to be essen- 
tial that the Cabinet of Petrograd, whose peace inten- 
tions were manifest, should immediately give their ad- 
herence to the English proposal for a conference of the 
four Powers. This French initiative was at once at- 
tended by success. The French Ambassador in Petro- 
grad telegraphed on the same day to his Minister that 
Sazonof accepted the proposal for a conference of the 
four Powers without attaching any importance to the 
title officially given to the discussions, and that he would 
acquiesce in any measures taken by England in order 
to maintain peace. 3 

Another and much more striking instance of French 
influence on Russian decisions in the sense of modera- 
tion may be given. On July 30th, when the Russian 
partial mobilisation against Austria had taken place, and 
Germany was already threatening to carry out a counter- 
mobilisation, Viviani emphatically pressed for prudence 
in Petrograd; it would be well, he said, even in taking 
measures for security and defence, that Russia should 
take no step which might offer Germany a pretext for 
a counter-mobilisation. 4 Here also his efforts were 

1 Yellow Book, Nos. 77, 78. 
3 Yellow Book, No. 85. 
'Yellow Book, Nos. 86, 91. 
* Yellow Book, No. 101. 



THE CRIME 301 

crowned with success: Russia suspended further meas- 
ures of mobilisation 1 until she was compelled to act by- 
Austria's general mobilisation. 

A further instance of the success of French influence 
in Petrograd was seen on July 31st, when the efforts of 
the Entente Powers were directed to finding a middle 
path between the formulae of Grey and Sazonof, in 
order to gain Austria's consent even at the last moment. 
In a Note, 2 distinguished by its penetration and inspired 
by a sincere desire for peace, Viviani proposed such a 
middle path, which could not fail to be equally accept- 
able to Austria and Russia, and authorised his Ambassa- 
dor at Petrograd to make the following communication 
to Sazonof: 

"Please inform M. Sazonof urgently that the sugges- 
tion of Sir E. Grey appears to me to furnish a useful 
basis for conversation between the Powers, who are 
equally desirous of working for an honourable arrange- 
ment of the Austro-Serbian conflict, and of averting in 
this manner the dangers which threaten general peace." 

There then follows a more detailed explanation of the 
modifications in the proposal of Grey and Sazonof, and 
he adds in conclusion : — 

"I would ask you carefully to be guided by the fore- 
going considerations in earnestly pressing M. Sazonof 
to give his adherence without delay to the proposal of 
Sir E. Grey, of which he will have been himself in- 
formed." 

The French Ambassador, Paleologue, was able to re- 
port on the same day that Sazonof had accepted the pro- 
posals of Viviani, and that he had modified his original 
formula in the manner suggested by Grey. 3 This new 
proof of Fre nch intervention for peace and of Russia's 

1 Yellow Book, No. 104. 

2 Yellow Book, No. 112. 
8 Yellow Book, No. 113. 



302 I ACCUSE! 

conciliatory disposition was furnished, although during 
the preceding night and day Belgrade had been bom- 
barded by Austria and the whole of Russia had been 
brought to a high pitch of excitement by Austria's pro- 
vocative and unaccommodating action. 

Even after the German ultimatum was delivered in 
Paris on July 31st Viviani directed an urgent appeal 
to the Imperial Government in Petrograd that in the 
highest interests of peace they would do everything on 
their part to avoid anything that might render inevit- 
able or precipitate the crisis (Je ne doute pas que le 
Gouvernement Imperial dans l'interet superieur de la 
paix n'evite pour sa part tout ce qui pourrait rendre in- 
evitable ou precipiter la crise x ) . 

Many similar examples could be cited from the diplo- 
matic correspondence. But Herr von Bethmann says 
that France did not exert her influence in Petrograd for 
peace, and that in fact she did nothing in the interests 
of peace, and — Bethmann is an honourable man. 

When we survey the activity of French diplomatists 
during these critical days and compare them with those 
of other European Governments, it is impossible to avoid 
the conclusion that their utterances, as given in the Yel- 
low Book, excel the achievements of all other diplo- 
matists in elegance of form and in plastic strength of 
representation. To English diplomacy fell the leadership 
in the negotiations, and it discharged this task with the 
sober quietness and clarity which is peculiar to the Eng- 
lishman in all situations. Russian diplomacy also kept 
itself within the limits of fact, and expressed itself with 
moderation up to the last moment until the morning of 
August 1st, immediately before the German declaration 
of war. In this critical moment, however, Sazonof could 
not refrain from pouring out his heart to his French 
and English colleagues, and characterising in its true 
bellow Book, No. 117. 



THE CRIME 303 

light, without any varnish, the policy of Austria and 
Germany; 1 the policy of Austria had been both tor- 
tuous and immoral, that of Germany had been equivocal 
and double-faced, and she had been specially unfortunate 
in her representatives in Vienna and Petrograd. The 
former was a violent Russophobe, who constantly poured 
oil on the flame; the latter an ignorant person, who al- 
lowed his Government to believe that Russia would never 
go to war, no matter how much they trod on her feet. 

In contrast to these diplomatists of Russia and Eng- 
land, who, with few exceptions, remain sober in their 
views and confine themselves within the limits of fact, 
the genius of the French, their grace in form, their 
adaptability in ideas, their resource in devising new ways 
out of difficult situations, appears all the more brilliant. 
It is a pure pleasure for the literary connoisseur to read 
the French Yellow Book. What a brilliant type is repre- 
sented by the two Cambons! How dexterous and fas- 
cinating is the Prime Minister Viviani! And even 
Bienvenu-Martin, who appears less in the foreground, 
how precise are his antitheses, how effective his refuta- 
tion of German sophisms, how penetrating is his vision 
in framing a judgment on the tendencies of Austria and 
Germany ! 

And the diplomatists of Germany? O du lieber Gott! 
This is not a subject to speak about. Herr von Schoen 
was not the only one who was condemned to a tragic 
role. Herr von Tschirschky in Vienna, the Russophobe, 
Count Pourtales in Petrograd, Herr von Flotow in Rome 
— what a miserable part they all had to play ! There was 
Herr von Flotow, who knew so little of the mind of the 
Italian people and of the views of the Italian Govern- 
ment that he considered it possible that Italy might par- 
ticipate in an offensive war against Serbia and share 
in its further consequences — a view which one dared not 
1 Blue Book, No. 139. 



304 I ACCUSE! 

have attributed to the most inexperienced German com- 
mercial traveller in Italy without running the risk of 
an action for personal libel. There was Count Pourtales, 
who thought that a few manifestations of labour unrest 
in Russia was sufficient to cause the Russian Govern- 
ment to give way to Austrian efforts to establish a 
hegemony on the Balkans, and who had the thankless 
task of defending in Petrograd the ingenious theory of 
Bethmann that the conference of four Powers "required 
of the Austrian Empire just what they had not been 
willing to suggest to Serbia, namely, that she should 
give way under military pressure." This is a theory 
which affords Herr von Bethmann so much pleasure that 
he exhibits it once more in his most recent circular note, 
which, however, unfortunately, forgets two things: 
firstly, that Serbia had already given way beforehand, 
so that military pressure was an irresponsible piece of 
presumption, and secondly, that the conference of four 
Powers did not aim at any kind of pressure or any 
military measures, but that — as even the thickest head 
must have begun to realise after the countless explana- 
tions which were given — its intention was merely to ob- 
tain the friendly advice of the four Powers unconcerned. 
Herr von Tschirschky-Bogendorf in Vienna had also 
a truly thankless role to play, in that he had in appear- 
ance and outwardly to press for moderation at the Ball- 
platz; inwardly, however, in the room where Count 
Berchtold laboured, he could give free reins to the se- 
cret instructions of Herr von Bethmann, which at the 
same time Corresponded to his own personal inclinations, 
and could there press for war. Sir Maurice de Bunsen 
was right when he saw through this double play of our 
Ambassador at Vienna, and from all the acts of omission 
and commission of Herr von Tschirschky — especially 
from his industrious and suspicious refusal of all com- 
mon action for peace with the Ambassadors of the En- 



THE CRIME 305 

tente Powers — drew the certain conclusion that our Am- 
bassador at Vienna had from the beginning worked for 
war. 1 

Of Prince Lichnowsky in London — the only one 
among our Ambassadors — we must say this in his hon- 
our, that he earnestly desired peace, and that he was 
only the innocent victim of those above him. He also 
had to resort to a hundred evasions in order to con- 
ceal the intentions of Germany on Belgium, and so keejp 
England neutral, if this could in any way be achieved; 
he had to discuss with Sir Edward Grey the hypothesis 
that we might respect Belgian neutrality, 2 although he 
knew that our troops were already almost at the Bel- 
gian frontier, and that there was no longer any possi- 
bility of Belgian neutrality being respected. Again, two 
days later, after the ultimatum had been presented to 
Belgium, he had to run after Sir E. Grey — just as the 
latter was on the point of going to the decisive meeting 
of the Cabinet on the morning of August 3rd — and had 
to plead with him insistently to be so good as to be willing 
to remain neutral even if we should violate Belgian 
neutrality. 3 Even at the very last moment he attempted 
to make an impression on public opinion in England 
by an article in the Press, in which he emphasised Ger- 
many's readiness to refrain from making the Belgian 
coast a point oVappui for naval operations. 4 In all these 
desperate efforts at the eleventh hour the good will of 
our London Ambassador may indeed be observed, but 
even his best intentions could not prevent the representa- 
tive of a bad policy from necessarily appearing in a bad 
light. 

And now to come to the highest of all, to Herr von 

1 Blue Book, Nos. 141, 161. 

2 Blue Book, No. 123. 

8 Grey's speech of 3rd August, Yellow Book, No. 144. 

* Yellow Book, No. 144. 



306 I ACCUSE! 

Jagow! From this portrait gallery I omit the Chan- 
cellor, whom I have already sufficiently characterised. 
But Herr von Jagow! What a lamentable picture of 
pitiable helplessness! It is sufficient to observe how 
miserable he appears against his two chief opponents, 
the Englishman Goschen and the Frenchman Cambon; 
how he was constantly reduced to straits by their su- 
periority, like a mouse in a trap seeking in vain for a 
way of escape. It is true that in his case, as in that of 
his German colleagues, we must make allowance for the 
fact that they had to defend a bad cause, and their 
opponents a good one. They had to resort to loopholes 
and ambiguities, whereas the others could advance openly 
and honourably to the end in view. But the worse 
their cause was, the more skill and efficiency was needed 
to defend it. Anyone who defends a bad cause with dex- 
terity can at least, as they say in the East, "save his 
face." He, however, who by his inefficiency draws spe- 
cial attention to the weaknesses of his position makes 
his bad cause even worse, and forfeits all claim to per- 
sonal respect. On a big merchant being asked why he 
retained two barristers for his cases, and why he paid 
one better than the other, he answered with a sly smile, 
"The good one is for the bad cases, and the bad one 
for the good." The badness of our case demanded 
that we should have the best diplomatists, not to win, 
but at least to avoid revealing it publicly to the whole 
world in all its hideousness. 

In order not to appear unjust, I must support my 
judgment by a few examples from the diplomatic corre- 
spondence, although the whole course of the negotia- 
tions in its main features justifies in the fullest measure 
the most unfavourable judgment being passed upon our 
diplomacy. The present diplomatic publications give 
us for the first time an accurate insight into the activity 
of our Chancellories, which for the profanum vulgus 



THE CRIME 307 

has hitherto been a book with seven seals. Now for 
the first time we realise why we have suffered diplomatic 
discomfitures, when the rattling sabre did not make 
good what the pen had corrupted. Formerly we saw 
only the effects; now we see the causes. Formerly we 
saw the gentlemen only in their gold-laced uniforms; 
now they stand naked before us, and their failures and 
weaknesses are seen with appalling clarity. 

Let us take at random one of the conversations be- 
tween Herr von Jagow and M. Cambon. On July 27th 
Cambon supported, in the presence of Herr von Jagow, 
Grey's proposal for a conference of the four Powers. 
Jagow gave expression to the well-known view, which 
is even yet disseminated by Herr von Bethmann, that it 
was impossible to subject Austria against her will to the 
decisions of a conference. M. Cambon replied that the 
matter was too serious to allow it to be wrecked on any 
question of form. The question here was of a work of 
peace, which could be restricted to common demarches 
by the four Powers at Petrograd and Vienna. Herr von 
Jagow had often expressed to him his regret at seeing 
the two allied groups always opposed to one other. Here 
there was an opportunity of proving that there was a 
European spirit {esprit europeen) , if the four Powers 
belonging to the two groups succeeded in preventing a 
European conflict. Herr von Jagow, who was unable 
to make any reply to this illuminating explanation, took 
refuge in the vapid assertion that Germany had engage- 
ments with Austria. To this Cambon promptly replied 
that these obligations were no closer than those existing 
between France and Russia. Jagow attempted a new 
line of retreat : He was not refusing to act in keeping 
off an Austro-Russian dispute, but he could not inter- 
vene in the Serbian dispute. Whereupon Cambon ob- 
served : "The one is the consequence of the other, and 
it is a question of preventing the appearance of a new 



308 I ACCUSE! 

factor of such a nature as to lead to intervention by 
Russia." Jagow emphasised anew his engagements 
towards Austria. Thereupon Cambon asked him if these 
engagements were so far-reaching that he was bound to 
follow Austria everywhere with his eyes blindfolded? 
Had he, he asked, taken note of the reply of Serbia? 
"I have not yet had time to read it," replied Jagow on 
July 27th. (The answer had been handed to the Aus- 
trian Ambassador in Belgrade as early as July 25th.) 
"I regret it," said Cambon. "You would see that, ex- 
cept on some points of detail, Serbia has yielded entirely. 
It appears, then, that since Austria has obtained the satis- 
faction which your support has procured for her, you 
might to-day advise her to be content, or to examine 
with Serbia the terms of her reply." Jagow, driven 
more and more into difficulties, was unable to give any 
clear reply. Whereupon Cambon asked him point blank 
whether Germany wished for war. On Jagow pro- 
testing energetically, Cambon answered: "You must 
then act consistently. When you read the Serbian reply, 
/ entreat you, in the name of humanity, to weigh the 
terms in your conscience, and do not personally assume 
a. part of the responsibility for the catastrophe which 
you are allowing to be prepared." In the end the Ger- 
man Secretary of State condescended to return to the 
original subject of the conversation, the proposal of 
Grey; he considered, however, that it was necessary to 
find another "form" which he could accept. He based 
his hopes more on the "direct conversations between 
Vienna and Petrograd," which Cambon urged on him to 
further accelerate by appropriate pressure in Vienna. 

The direct negotiations between Vienna and Petro- 
grad proposed by Jagow were, as is well known, de- 
clined by Austria. It is, as I have already pointed out, 
open to serious doubt whether Berlin exercised any pres- 
sure on Vienna in the sense of these negotiations, The 



THE CRIME ' 309 

conference thus remained as the only expedient. Cam- 
bon put forward this proposal again on July 28th, 1 with 
the support of the English and Italian Ambassadors, 
Jagow, however, was even more inaccessible than on 
the previous day, and even the representations of his 
Italian ally could not prevent him from absolutely re- 
fusing the conference, although, as will have been gath- 
ered from what I have already said, he had meanwhile 
been clearly informed by Goschen (as had also Prince 
Lichnowsky by Grey) as to the true meaning and in- 
tention of the conference. M. Cambon was so much 
disconcerted by the passivity of Herr von Jagow that he 
again asked him if by any chance he wished for war. 
Renewed protest by Jagow, but also renewed passivity. 
After this ineffective conversation Cambon proposed an 
ingenious method of drawing Herr von Jagow out of 
his reserve by "putting him in a dilemma by asking him 
to state himself precisely how diplomatic action by the 
Powers to avoid war could be brought about." This 
proposal was, as is known, taken up by Grey, and was 
zealously pushed by the Entente Powers as well as by 
Italy, but it came to nothing, since the proposal which it 
was expected that Jagow would make, notwithstanding 
all the pressure put upon him, was never put forward. 

It is interesting to observe how Herr von Jagow had 
recourse to all possible subterfuges in the endeavour to 
avoid the moral obligation of making such a proposal. 
In most cases he took refuge behind inquiries in Vienna 
to which an answer had not yet been received. 2 This 
performance was constantly repeated like a musical 
theme with variations. Above all, Herr von Jagow was 
never in a position to answer any question as to what 
Austria really wanted after the opening of hostilities 
against Serbia. Until that was known it was, however, 

bellow Book, No. 81. 
"Yellow Book, Nos. 92, 109. 



310 I ACCUSE! 

in his opinion impossible to think of a "mediation" in 
any form. 1 Every time when he was closely pressed on 
the question he took refuge behind the Austrian screen, 
or to express the matter in what is perhaps a more 
appropriate metaphor, he withdrew from one trench to 
another, until finally he disappeared behind the fortress 
of the "Russian mobilisation," never to be seen again. 
For the quintessence of Berlin tactics consisted in post- 
poning as long as possible all proposals for peace until 
they could come out with the bogey of Russian mobili- 
sation, and were thus saved the trouble of giving any 
reason or answer to proposals for peace. 

The conversation between Jagow and Cambon on 
July 30th is characteristic of these tactics. 2 Cambon 
again inquired how the matter stood with regard to the 
formula of mediation which Germany desired to pro- 
pose. Jagow's answer was that "to gain time" he had 
acted directly, and "had asked Austria to tell him the 
ground on which conversations might be opened with 
her" (de dire sur quel terrain on pourrait causer avec 
elle). In other words, under the pretence of gaining 
time he pushed aside the Powers which were striving for 
peace, and commissioned the instigator of war, Herr von 
Tschirschky, to ask the Austrian Government on -what 
grounds she could be treated with. Can anyone believe, 
can anyone regard it as possible, that the German Secre- 
tary of State on July 30th did not even then know what 
Austria really wanted? Is it not shameful to see the 
diplomatic representatives of the German Empire play- 
ing such a part in an event which concerned the life 
and death of European civilisation, and indeed the fate 
of mankind? 

But to go further; scarcely had the proposal for a 
conference come to nought when Herr von Jagow, in the 

J Yellow Book, Nos. 94, 109. Blue Book, Nos. 98, 107, 112. 

"Yellow Book, Nos. 94, 109. 



THE CRIME 311 

course of the same conversation of July 30th, trotted 
out the Russian mobilisation, stating that it would lead 
as a consequence to German mobilisation, and in answer 
to an objection advanced by Cambon that the Russians 
had mobilised only against Austria, he replied that this 
was indeed quite true, but that the heads of the Army 
•were insisting on German mobilisation, for every delay 
was a loss of strength. This last observation is very 
significant, although in the mouth of the Secretary of 
State, at any rate, it was highly imprudent. It certainly 
proves, as is indeed apparent from many other facts, 
that the resolution to mobilise, which in the case of 
Germany was known to be "equivalent to war," had 
already been taken on July 29th in the meeting of the 
Council held at Potsdam under the presidency of the 
Emperor, in which the Generals had taken part. 1 The 
General Staff was indeed in a hurry. This also explains 
the special edition of the Lokalanzeiger, which an- 
nounced the mobilisation as early as July 30th, but was 
seized because it was not considered expedient that the 
mobilisation should be made known on that day. 2 Hinc 
illce lacrimce. Hence the subterfuges and the retreats 
of Herr von Jagow, who in a spirit of self-sacrifice threw 
himself, like a second Curtius, into the abyss which the 
military party had dug for him. 

Mention must still be made of an earlier episode, 
because it illustrates in an interesting way the intellec- 
tual and moral qualities of the diplomatists concerned. 
On July 29th 3 Cambon ventured to allow himself to 
make a modest inquiry as to the position of affairs with 
regard to direct conversations between Vienna and Petro- 
grad on which Herr von Jagow had built so great hopes. 

1 Yellow Book, No. 105. Cf. the remark quoted above of Count 
Pourtales to Sazonof. Red Book, No. 28. 
'Yellow Book, No. 105. Orange Book, No. 62. 
8 Yellow Book, No. 92. 



312 I ACCUSE! 

Jagow was in a position to give confirmation of the 
gratifying fact that Petrograd seemed well disposed, 
but that from Vienna "he was awaiting the reply." 
Meanwhile he had at least read the Serbian Note, and 
saw in it a basis for possible negotiation. Why, then, 
did Austria not negotiate, but break off relations in an 
incomprehensible manner? asked M. Cambon. "Be- 
cause, with Eastern nations," such was the view ex- 
pressed by Jagow, "one could never obtain sufficient 
guarantees for carrying out their promises." (This was, 
as is known, the only important point at issue between 
Austria and Serbia: the co-operation of Austrian or- 
gans in Serbian police and judicial investigations.) M. 
Cambon at once dexterously suggested the establish- 
ment of an International Commission — such as fre- 
quently exists in Balkan countries — charged with the 
duty of controlling the Serbian police inquiry. The 
Serbian answer, as he rightly held, was on this point 
also a suitable basis for negotiation. Herr von Jagow 
was unable to make any reply to this proposal of Cam- 
bon's, which was certainly ingenious and practicable. 
Had he accepted this proposal and followed it up — '■> 
there was no room to doubt but that Russia and Serbia 
would concur — we would not to-day have been involved 
in a European war. 

Like master, like man! On the day on which the 
above conversation took place between Jagow and Cam- 
bon the same performance was being transacted between 
Herr von Bethmann and Sir E. Goschen. 1 There were 
peaceful assurances in abundance, but the idea of a con- 
ference was declined; no declaration was given with re- 
gard to the intentions of Austria; "efforts" to induce 
the Government of Vienna to direct conversations with 
Russia were mentioned — be it observed it is never more 
than efforts with ineffective means which Herr von 
^lue Book, No. 75. Yellow Book, No. 92. 



THE CRIME 313 

Bethmann "poussait autant qu'il pouvait" — but above 
everything else there is a threatening reference to the 
Russian mobilisation. 

Even as late as the night between July 31st and 
August 1st x Goschen, the English Ambassador, made a 
pressing appeal to Herr von Jagow's feelings of hu- 
manity, to which the latter coldly replied that the mat- 
ter had then gone too far, and that they must now wait 
for the Russian answer to the German ultimatum. In 
reply to Goschen, who asked in astonishment why they 
had made their ultimatum completely impossible of ac- 
ceptance by asking that they should demobilise against 
Austria as well, Herr von Jagow gave the memorable 
answer "that it was in order to prevent Russia from 
saying all her mobilisation was only directed against 
Austria." Thus in order to bar the possibility of Rus- 
sia advancing an impossible objection — impossible be- 
cause the general mobilisation had been publicly an- 
nounced and admitted by the Tsar himself in his 
telegrams — they demanded the impossible, that is to say, 
demobilisation against a State which had itself already 
mobilised. 

On August 1st Goschen had again a long and pressing 
conversation with Jagow. 2 He pointed out to him, in 
concert with Cambon, the incomprehensible fact that 
Germany, a Power not directly interested in the whole 
dispute, had made war inevitable by despatching an ulti- 
matum, although Austria and Russia, the parties to the 
dispute, had just entered into negotiations with a view 
to effecting a settlement. In reply to this Jagow merely 
let it be seen that he considered that that was all very 
fine, but that since Russia had mobilised, war must 
come if the demand contained in the German ultimatum 
was not complied with. 

1 Blue Book, No. 121. Yellow Book, No. 121. 
2 Blue Book, No. 138. Yellow Book, No. 121. 



314 I ACCUSE! 

Thus we find the mobilisation as such put forward as 
the ground for war! We have already seen elsewhere 
how matters really stood with regard to the Russian 
mobilisation, by what it was occasioned and justified. 
In France and Russia, at any rate, a view different from 
that current in Germany prevailed with regard to the 
significance of the mobilisation on both sides. Neither 
of these countries would ever have declared war on 
account of German mobilisation, as they had not, in 
fact, done on account of Austrian mobilisation. "Mobi- 
lisation is not war" we find in a communication of Vivi- 
ani to Paul Cambon (Yellow Book, No. 127). "In 
the present state of affairs it is the best means for 
France of safeguarding peace, and . . . the Government 
of the Republic will redouble their efforts to bring the 
negotiations to a conclusion. . . . We shall not cease to 
work towards an agreement. . . . We will, in co-opera- 
tion with England, continue to work for the success of 
these pourparlers." These words we find elsewhere in 
the writings of Viviani on August 1st, that is to say, 
after the ultimatum, and after the French mobilisation. 1 

This is but a brief epitome of the history of French 
efforts for peace. All the diplomatic books are full of 
them, only Herr von Bethmann remains in ignorance. 
He has — if we may use his own words — "had the cour- 
age as the responsible statesman" to accuse the French 
Government of not having taken a single positive step 
in the interests of peace. We, however, and impartial 
history will concur, throw this reproach back on Ger- 
many, on the shoulders of the statesman who, whether 
driving or driven — the guilt remains the same — did noth- 
ing for peace, and did everything that was bound to 
make this war inevitable. While others hastened to the 

1 Yellow Book, Nos. 125, 127. I have already elsewhere pointed 
out that Austrian diplomatists also did not regard mobilisation as 
equivalent to war (Blue Book, No. 118). 



THE CRIME 315 

spot with fire engines and water-buckets to extinguish 
the beginnings of the conflagration, he poured oil on the 
flames and collected brushwood so that the smouldering 
spark might develop into a holocaust. And now that 
the fire of hell has broken loose, and the author of it 
all sees horror-struck the consequences of his fearful 
deed, he writes and talks and he talks and writes in 
order to charge others with his misdeed, like the burglar 
who runs down the street shouting out "Stop, thief." 
Fortunately no one in the whole world believes him, 
and the more excuses he offers the more does he in fact 
accuse himself. With all his sophisms and perversions 
he cannot abolish the facts which lie patent to all eyes. 
And the eyes of even the German people, who now de- 
ceived and deluded patiently submit to the unspeakable 
horrors of war, will gradually be opened. Over the 
trenches and across the frontiers it will reach out its 
hand to the neighbouring nation whose president said 
with truth: "The German Empire will bear before 
history the crushing responsibility for the war." 



APPENDIX 



The Austrian Red Book 

In the beginning of February, after the pages of this 
book were completed, there appeared an Austrian Red 
Book, which, consisting of an introduction and sixty-nine 
documents, gives an account of events from the murder 
of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand down to the outbreak 
of the European war. This book offers no surprises, but 
only a confirmation of the conclusions which could not 



316 I ACCUSE! 

but be drawn from the previously published diplomatic 
correspondence. It is a meritorious work, in so far as it 
unveils, by open self-confessions and with an appalling 
lucidity, the Austrian attitude, which hitherto could only 
be inferred indirectly from foreign publications. 

What the Austrian book yields in the way of positive 
facts confirms the conclusion that Austria-Hungary was 
guilty of the outbreak of the war in a way which must 
leave even for the well-disposed no further room for 
doubt. What it conceals in silence proves that the Aus- 
trian Government is completely aware of its guilt, but 
that it still endeavours — though vainly — to conceal it 
from the eyes of the world. 

As before the publication of this book, there is still 
a complete absence of any kind of evidence that the 
German Government, as is constantly emphasised in the 
White Book, pressed the Viennese Government to as- 
sume an attitude of moderation and conciliation. In 
the interval between July 28th and 30th, when all rela- 
tions between Vienna and Petrograd were completely 
broken off, the German Government, as I have already 
indicated, "handed on" to Vienna individual proposals 
of the Entente Powers ; they even got so far as to bring 
them before the Vienna Cabinet "for their considera- 
tion/' x but they never defended them, or gave them 
energetic support. The German Government, in the 
name of Austria and without any previous consultation 
with her ally, straightway declined certain other propo- 
sals. Others again she simply kept to herself without 
deigning an answer, and without transmitting them to 
Vienna. 

The proposals which did arrive at Austria were col- 
lectively so long refused by the Government in Vienna 
that in the end it was too late, and thus all the efforts 

1 Red Book, No. 43. 



THE CRIME 317 

of the Entente Powers to keep the peace of Europe 
failed. 

I will now take up the various points in the Red Book 
which deserve discussion, and first I will deal with what 
the Red Book contains, and then with what it does not 
contain. 



What the Red Book contains 

i. It is now demonstrated by the Red Book itself 
that Austria under all circumstances desired war against 
Serbia — a fact already proved by the revelations of 
Giolitti, and by many other circumstances which have 
already been indicated. In the report from the Austrian 
Ambassador in Belgrade, Freiherr von Giesl, dated July 
21st, 1 that is to say, before the presentation of the Aus- 
trian Note, the Ambassador expresses his conviction : 

"that a reckoning with Serbia, a war for the posi- 
tion of the Monarchy as a Great Power, even for 
its existence as such, cannot be permanently avoided. 
If we delay in clearing up our relations with Serbia 
we shall share the responsibility for the difficulties 
and the unfavourable situation in any future war, 
which must, however, sooner or later be carried 
through. . . . Half-measures, the presentation of 
demands, followed by long discussions and ending 
only in an unsound compromise, would be the hard- 
est blow which could be directed against Austria- 
Hungary's reputation in Serbia and her position in 
Europe." 

"Red Book, No. 6. 



318 I ACCUSE! 

This embodies the programme which governed all fur- 
ther developments. 

2. As early as July 23rd, simultaneously with the de- 
livery of the ultimatum to Serbia, Count Berchtold ex- 
plains in instructions sent to Count Mensdorff, his Am- 
bassador in London, that the short time-limit allowed in 
the ultimatum was necessary in order to make impos- 
sible the "dilatory arts" of Serbia, and that the Aus- 
trian demands "could not be made the subject of nego- 
tiations and compromise." 1 

The Entente Powers only received information of the 
Austrian Note on July 24th, and then without the addi- 
tion of the documentary evidence. Their representa- 
tions that the period of time allowed in the ultimatum 
might at least be lengthened, to afford them an oppor- 
tunity of studying the evidence and of bringing influence 
to bear on the Serbian Government, were flatly refused. 
It was indicated that an examination of the data was 
superfluous, and that the Austrian communication 
"merely bore the character of a statement for informa- 
tion," which was regarded "as a duty laid upon them 
by international courtesy," and that the Austrian action 
was one which concerned the monarchy and Serbia alone, 
on which the Powers were not invited "to make known 
their own views on the subject." Count Berchtold dis- 
appeared from Vienna in the critical days between July 
23rd and 25th, and issued his unaccommodating decla- 
rations from Lambach and Ischl. 2 

3. In an instruction despatched on July 25th to Count 
Szapary, the Austrian Ambassador at Petrograd, Berch- 
told already counted on the refusal of his demands by 
Serbia, and on the settlement of the conflict by force 
of arms at a time when the Serbian Note had not even 



*Red Book, No. 9. 
'Red Book, Nos. 20, 21. 



THE CRIME 319 

been received. 1 In another Note of the same day to 
Szapary he explains Point 5 of the Serbian Note in the 
sense that the collaboration in Serbia of Austrian of- 
ficials in the suppression of the subversive movement 
was intended to mean the "collaboration" of a "bureau 
de surete" in Belgrade, 2 but he omits to give any ex- 
planations on Point 6, which was much more important 
(participation of Austrian officials in judicial proceed- 
ings against accessories to the plot). Explanations on 
the latter point were only given on July 27th in the 
declaration published by the Austrian Government after 
the recall of the Austrian Ambassador; it was then stated 
that the intention was that Austrian officials should take 
part, not in the Serbian judicial proceedings, but in 
the preliminary police investigations leading up to such 
proceedings {recherche as opposed to enquete judici- 
aire). 

This raises the question why these explanations which 
were transmitted on July 25th to Petrograd, and were 
published on July 27th, could not have been included 
in the ultimatum, or at least communicated to Serbia, 
after the reception of the Serbian answer. It would 
certainly have been possible, and in view of the sub- 
missive attitude assumed by Serbia it was more than 
probable, that the Serbian Government, on the ground 
of these explanations, might have gone still further to 
meet the Austrian demands ; since Points 5 and 6 were 
almost the only reservations made by Serbia, Austria 
might have received full satisfaction in the further nego- 
tiations, and the peace of Europe might have been main- 
tained. Explanations were, however, omitted because 
war with Serbia was regarded as necessary, as so neces- 
sary, in fact, that they were resolved, if need be, to ac- 
cept a European war into the bargain. Austria acted 

"Red Book, No. 26. 
' Red Book, No. 27. 



880 I ACCUSE! 

according to the prescription of the man who. to get 
rid of bugs, burnt down his house. 

4. The answer of Serbia produced, as is well known, 
the greatest disappointment in Vienna. It had not been 
expected that the influence of the Entente Powers in 
Belgrade could induce an independent State to accept 
such a humiliation. At a stroke all hopes of the desired 
war appeared to have vanished. A Government which 
can condescend to a public apology in its official gazette 
inserted in a prescribed phraseology at a prescribed 
place on a prescribed day — a King who allows an order 
of the day to his army to be dictated by a neighbour- 
ing State — a Sovereign State which subjects its public 
education to the control of another State, which dis- 
misses and even arrests officers and officials at the com- 
mand of its neighbour, which dissolves national unions, 
and suppresses the liberty of the Press, &c, &c. — such 
a State and such a Government had never before been 
seen in the history of the world. Truly it required 
great dexterity (such as Austrian statesmen did not have 
at command) or an extraordinary evil will (such as they 
certainly did have at command) to deduce a reason for 
war from such an attitude on the part of their small 
neighbour. 

On July 27th, before he knew the Serbian answer, 
Sazonof himself in the course of a conversation with 
Count Szapary, held that at least three of the ten points 
in the Austrian Note could not be accepted, namely, 
points 4, 5, and 6, and there can be no doubt that he 
was much surprised when he learned later that point 4 
(removal of officers and officials) had been accepted by 
Serbia, and also that the two other points had not been 
flatly refused, but that it was suggested that they should 
be submitted for decision to arbitration. 1 

5. I have already dealt in an earlier passage with the 
* ' 1 Red Book, No. 31. 



THE CRIME 321 

process whereby the submissive Serbian reply was arti- 
ficially transformed by means of miserable quibbles into 
a Note of refusal. In Berchtold's Note of July 28th 
intended for the English Government the Serbian sub- 
mission was represented as being worthless, and as in- 
tended to deceive: "Serbia accepted a number of our 
demands, with all sorts of reservations, in order to im- 
press public opinion in Europe, trusting that she would 
not be required to ftdfil her promises." 1 This is sup- 
posed to justify the action of Austria in ignoring the 
Serbian answer. I have already suggested the question: 
What else, beyond making promises, could Serbia do in 
forty-eight hours? Was it expected that the fulfilment 
of the promises should also be carried out in forty-eight 
hours? After all, the Austrian Government had only 
demanded from the Serbian Government an obligation 
that she would perform certain actions. This obliga- 
tion was given in eight points, and in two points was 
made subject to further discussion. Clearly, in the 
first place, it was necessary to wait and see whether 
Serbia would fulfil her promises. 

Guarantees in the form that Austria should herself col- 
laborate in the fulfilment of the Serbian promises were 
asked for only in points 5 and 6. If Austria could have 
brought herself to discuss these points, these guarantees 
would presumably have been provided for in one form 
or another ; they could, for example, have been provided, 
as proposed by Jules Cambon, in the form of an Inter- 
national Commission of investigation and control, 2 and 
guarantees in this form would have been much more 
practicable and far more effective than in the form de- 
manded by Austria. The whole of this idea of collab- 
oration of Austrian officials in Serbian investigations 
was, in view of the strained relations between Austria 

a Red Book, No. 39. 
a Yellow Book, No. 92. 



322 I ACCUSE! 

and Serbia, an intellectual efflorescence, such as could 
only spring from the soil of Austrian diplomacy. Was 
it supposed that in this way peace could be established 
between Austria and Serbia? A perpetual daily state 
of feud would have arisen between Austrian and Serbian 
officials, numberless irritating incidents, perhaps involv- 
ing bloodshed, would have taken place; in short, there 
would have been a situation which would indubitably 
have led in the sequel to war (this was also the view of 
Sazonof, Red Book, No. 14). 

But notwithstanding all this, the alleged untrust- 
worthiness of Serbia had to suffice to make valueless the 
answer which in fact had conceded nearly all the de- 
mands. This untrustworthiness, in the opinion of Aus- 
tria, was supposed to be particularly confirmed by the 
fact that Serbia, as early as 3 o'clock on the afternoon 
of July 25th, had ordered a general mobilisation, that 
is to say, three hours before the answer was handed 
over to the Austrian Ambassador. 1 We find here that 
Austria, in connection with the question of mobilisation, 
plays the same game so successfully put into operation 
by Germany. Austria presented to Serbia demands 
which could not be complied with, and thereby gavi 
expression to her indubitable intention to make war. Ser- 
bia concurred in the greatest part of these demands, but 
feared, not without reason, that the few reservations 
made by her would furnish the Austrian Government 
with a pretext for war, and took steps to protect her- 
self against this possibility by timeous mobilisation, 
which had been carried out by Austria also, simultane- 
ously with the presentation of the ultimatum. This de- 
fensive mobilisation on the part of Serbia was then 
treated by Austria as trickery and as an offensive action, 
whereby Serbia "publicly proclaimed her hostility," and 
showed tha t she had "no inclination for a peaceful so- 
" ~~ 'Red Book, No. 39- 



THE CRIME 323 

lution," and thus Austria construed the desired ground 
for war. 1 

6. But the Austrian Government did not rest satisfied 
with this; she even raised the further reproach against 
Serbia — again in imitation of a celebrated example — > 
that her opponent had been the first to begin hostilities. 
In the telegram sent by Berchtold on July 28th to his 
Ambassadors in Petrograd and London it is expressly 
asserted that Serbia had opened hostilities on the Hun- 
garian frontier as early as July 27th, that is to say, 
before the Austrian declaration of war. 2 This assertion 
is, of course, unsupported by any facts or by any kind 
of evidence, and it is further much more incredible than 
the similar assertion which was later advanced by Ger- 
many against Russia and France. Why, indeed, should 
a small and weak country like Serbia intentionally pro- 
voke a war with Austria? The facts reported by Giesl, 
the Austrian Ambassador (removal of gold from the 
National Bank, withdrawal of troops from Belgrade, 
removal of official papers from the Foreign Office, &c.) 
prove — as, indeed, is in accordance with logic and rea- 
son, and requires no proof — that there was nothing 
which Serbia had less in her mind than an attack upon 
Austria; on the contrary, that it would have been glad 
if only her great neighbour would leave her in peace. 3 
But it appears to be the recognised custom in this war 
for the aggressor to accuse his victim of having fallen 
upon him. 

All these pretexts furnished the Austrian Government 
with priceless material to justify the negative position 
which they assumed with regard to the peaceful pro- 
posals of the Entente Powers. The grounds of these 
refusals may be summarised as follows : — 

1 Red Book, Introduction p. 444, No. 29. 

2 Red Book, Nos. 39, 40. 
"Red Book, No. 22. 



824 I ACCUSE! 

(a) Our dispute with Serbia concerns no one, and 
must remain localised. 

(b) Serbia, by her unsatisfactory answer, by her 
mobilisation, and by opening hostilities has herself 
provoked the war. 

7. I have already dealt in the previous sections of this 
book with the question of localisation. This subject, 
however, reappears in the Austrian Red Book with such 
definiteness and at the same time with so much naivete 
that a further short discussion appears necessary. 
Austria simply took as her starting point the thoi/ght 
which Count Mensdorfr" had openly expressed to Sir Ed- 
ward Grey on July 29th that Serbia belonged to the Aus- 
trian sphere of interest (Blue Book, No. 91). The fact 
that Russia, by a hundred years of history, by links of 
blood and religion, and also by her own interests was 
connected with Serbia by bonds more intimate than those 
between any other two allies, such, for example, as Ger- 
many and Austria, was intentionally ignored by the two 
Empires, and the ingenious distinction was constantly 
drawn that while they were quite prepared to negoti- 
ate with Russia on questions arising between Russia and 
Austria, they must be allowed to regulate the Austro- 
Serbian dispute as they thought fit. This artificial and 
meaningless interpretation is as if one party to a law- 
suit were to say to the other: "I am quite prepared 
to come to an understanding with you and have no evil 
intentions whatever against you, but we must absolutely 
refrain from speaking to each other about the subject 
in dispute; let us, therefore, talk about something else. 
What do you think about Russia ? Fine weather to-day ; 
very fine day to-day, indeed." The Serbian question 
was precisely the question at issue between Austria and 
Russia, and not, indeed, for the first time; it had been 
so for many years. Russia regarded her interests as 



THE CRIME 325 

being identical with those of Serbia, and declared that, 
in the interests of Serbia as well as of her own prestige, 
she could not tolerate that the Slavonic brother State, 
after the deep diplomatic humiliation she had under- 
gone, should also be crushed by Austria by force of 
arms and should be degraded into a kind of vassal 
State. 1 On this occasion the conflict had broken out 
more violently than ever, and threatened not merely to 
divide Austria from Russia, but also to set the whole of 
Europe in flame. Only this question was at stake — no 
other. If they were prepared to negotiate at all, it had 
to be on the Serbian question; if they were not prepared 
to discuss this question, it was superfluous and purpose- 
less to suggest further negotiations. In reality the Aus- 
trian proposal that they were willing to negotiate with 
Russia on Russian interests was nothing but a pretext 
in order to avoid negotiations which could serve any 
purpose. 

It was in vain that Grey and Sazonof endeavoured 
to convince the Austrian Government of their sophisms 
— sophisms which might be attended by the gravest con- 
sequences. Even Count Szapary, the Austrian Ambas- 
sador in Petrograd, could not refrain from observing 
that the instructions of Berchtold moved in a vicious 
circle. 2 All representations were in vain. Austria, sup- 
ported by Germany, stood firm in her refusal until it 
was too late and war had become inevitable. 

8. Proceeding from the fundamental principle that no 
one had any right to be heard in the Austro-Serbian 
dispute, Austria, in the first place, declined to permit 
any discussion of the contents of her ultimatum or of 
the Serbian answer. On July 27th a conversation, main- 
tained in a friendly tone, took place between Sazonof 
and Szapary, in which the former gave expression to the 

*Red Book, No. 47. Blue Book, Nos. 48, 91. 
2 Red Book, No. 47- 



326 I ACCUSE! 

desire to discuss the Serbian Note with the Ambassador. 
Szapary explained that he was ready to receive the ob- 
servations of Sazonof, but pointed out that he was not 
authorised either to discuss the text of the Note or to 
interpret it. 1 On July 28th Schebeko, the Russian Am- 
bassador, made a formal proposition to Count Berchtold 
asking him to furnish Count Szapary with instructions 
to continue with Sazonof the exchange of thought, and 
thus, if it were possible, to arrive at a direct under- 
standing with the Russian Government ; the latter would 
gladly meet them half-way with this object in view. 
Count Berchtold emphatically declined the proposal of 
the Russian Ambassador: No one in Austria could un- 
derstand negotiations with reference to the Serbian an- 
swer, which had been designated as unsatisfactory, and, 
moreover, war had already been declared against Serbia 
on the same day. By way of providing a further ground 
for the declaration of war, Berchtold did not fail to 
refer to the Serbian mobilisation and to the hostilities 
alleged to have been begun by Serbia. 2 

Thus, all connections between Austria and Russia were 
broken off until further notice. All attempts to effect 
an understanding could reach Austria only indirectly 
by the mediation of the Entente Powers and of Ger- 
many. 

9. On the same day on which Berchtold declined 
Sazonof 's proposal for a direct understanding, he also 
rejected Grey's proposal for a conference of the four 
Powers. As is known, this proposal had already been 
declined by Germany, without previous consultation with 
Austria, under the threadbare pretext that she could not 
summon her ally before a "European Tribunal." Aus- 
tria declined this proposal, which was simultaneously 
submitted by Grey to Count Mensdorff and by Bunsen 

" * Red Book, No. 31. 

8 Red Book, No. 40. Orange Book, No. 45. 



THE CRIME 327 

to Count Berchtold (July 28th) on quite different 
grounds, namely, that the proposal came too late, and 
that in view of the state of war which had arisen it 
had been "outstripped" by events. 1 This certainly is a 
remarkable procedure ! Germany, as Austria's guardian, 
considers that Grey's proposal is, so to speak, incon- 
sistent with her dignity. Austria, however, the .party 
chiefly concerned, is not sensible of this violation of 
her dignity, but only objects that the proposal was re- 
ceived too late, and apparently, therefore, she would 
not have been disinclined to consider it had it been sub- 
mitted earlier. This, again, furnishes an indication of 
the incredible confusion which reigned in the minds of 
German and Austrian diplomatists and in the Chancel- 
lories of the Empires. Both the reasons urged against 
the conference, that expressed by Berlin and that by 
Vienna, were, of course, merely pretexts. But it would, 
at any rate, have been more astute, in the first place, to 
have come to an agreement as to the reasons which 
they were to put forward to bring to naught one after 
the other the proposals of the Entente Powers for peace. 
It would then have been less easy to see through the 
game, and more difficult to establish guilt. 

10. In an earlier passage I have already pointed out 
how Germany answered Grey's proposal for a conference 
with the counter-proposal of a direct discussion between 
Vienna and Petrograd — a discussion which was then de- 
clined by Vienna. The German White Book naturally 
endeavours to conceal this position of affairs, which in 
itself offers a complete proof of the guilt of the two 
Empires; it was, however, possible to establish this fact 
beyond all doubt by reference to the other diplomatic 
books. The Red Book now presents us with the self- 
confession of Austria on this question in the crassest 
form, and, moreover, the statement contains highly ag- 
*~ » Red Book, Nos. 38, 41. 



828 I ACCUSE! 

gravating amplifications. Not only did the Government 
of Vienna decline on July 28th to discuss the Serbian 
question directly with Russia as proposed by Germany, 
but they had already given expression to this refusal 
with the utmost definiteness as early as July 23rd (Red 
Book, No. 9). This fact must have been, and was, 
known to the German Government. The Government 
of Berlin thus declined, with full knowledge of the facts, 
a promising proposal put forward by the English Gov- 
ernment in order to set in its place another, which, in 
view of the declaration made by Austria as far back 
as July 23rd, was known to them to be futile. Up till 
now it was possible only to show that the Berlin counter- 
proposal was, in fact, futile, and to infer that there 
was criminal collusion between the two Empires. Now 
— thanks to the Austrian publication — this collusion is 
proved, and the guilty are unmasked. // of the hundred 
proofs of guilt only this one existed, it would suffice to 
lay upon Germany and Austria alone the responsibility 
for the war. 

11. On July 30th Count Berchtold, as we know, at 
last resolved, in view of the increasingly dangerous 
aspect of the dispute, to discuss with Sazonof the details 
of the Austrian Note. With this object he sent on July 
30th two instructions to his Ambassador at Petrograd 
(Red Book, Nos. 49 and 50), and thereupon on July 31st 
negotiations in fact began officially for the first time in 
Petrograd on the contents of the Note. The conversa- 
tion of July 27th between Sazonof and Szapary was, as 
explained above, only an unofficial acceptance of Sazo- 
nof's observations. 

Even in this critical moment Berchtold could not re- 
frain from speaking of the Note as having been already 
"outstripped" by the outbreak of war, from describing 
the conversations in Petrograd as "subsequent explana- 
tions," and from emphasising that it had never been 



THE CRIME 329 

Austria's intention "to depart in any way from the points 
contained in the Note." 

The phrase about being "outstripped by the outbreak 
of war," which is ridden to death in the Red Book, de- 
serves special consideration. What is it really supposed 
to mean? A insults B; A offers humble and plaintive 
apologies; nevertheless, B raises his sword to run A 
through. A third, C, a near relation of A, intervenes 
to restrain the lethal blow, and points out in A's favour 
that he has already offered apologies. B, however, depre- 
cates this intervention with the observation that the 
discussion of the insult has been outstripped by events, 
and that the state of war which was produced by raising 
his sword must now pursue its course. 

This is the point of view of the Austrian Government. 
It is incredible, but true! But even if this point of view 
were as logical and reasonable as it is illogical and un- 
reasonable, it would not lead to the conclusion drawn 
by the Government of Vienna, that all attempts at medi- 
ation by third parties — which were promoted in the in- 
terest, not of Serbia, but of European peace — must give 
way. The state of war had been brought about by Aus- 
tria alone (the Serbian hostilities are, of course, an in- 
vention). This state of war, however, like every war, 
could and must sooner or later come to an end. The 
Entente Powers desired to bring about this end sooner 
rather than later, in order to prevent an extension of 
the conflagration throughout Europe. How, then, was 
it possible to urge as an objection against these efforts 
for peace that war had already broken out? It was 
precisely because war had broken out that efforts were 
made in the cause of peace. One is almost ashamed to 
have to devote so much space to matters which are so 
obvious, but when we find constantly repeated in all the 
Notes contained in the Red Book from July 28th on- 
wards the same idiotic ideas that all the efforts for peace 



330 I ACCUSE! 

made by the Powers had been outstripped by the Serbian 
war, needlessly and criminally brought about by Austria 
— as may be expected the German White Book also (page 
9) 1 is guilty of this idiocy — it is impossible to shirk 
the task of characterising such senselessness by its true 
name, as a criminal gamble with the highest interests 
of the unhappy nations whose destiny is entrusted to such 
men as these. 

The worst feature in the whole business is, however, 
that the assertion that the peace proposals were out- 
stripped by the outbreak of war is not even in fact true. 
The peace proposals — the Russian request for a direct 
understanding as well as Grey's proposal for a confer- 
ence of the four Powers — were in reality made and com- 
municated to the Government at Vienna before the out- 
break of the Austro-Serbian war. As early as July 24th, 
immediately after being informed of the Austrian Note, 
Sazonof expressed the wish that the period of time al- 
lowed in the ultimatum should be extended, and that 
he should receive the Austrian evidence in support of 
their charges in order that the Austrian complaints 
might be examined, pressure brought to bear on Serbia, 
and negotiations opened with Vienna with a view to 
arriving at an understanding. In the following days 
this desire was constantly repeated by the Russian Min- 
ister to Count Szapary, on the final occasion as late as 
July 27th. 2 As war was only declared against Serbia 
on July 28th, the assertion that the Russian proposal 
for an understanding was "outstripped" by the declara- 
tion of war is stamped as a lie. 

The same holds true of Grey's proposal for a confer- 
ence. The conference of the four Powers was recom- 
mended by Grey from the beginning of the crisis, as 
early as July 24th, and from that time the proposal 

I 1 Collected Documents, p. 409.] 
2 Red Book, No. 31. 



THE CRIME 331 

was constantly renewed. 1 As early as July 26th the 
proposal was submitted to the German Government, 
and was rejected under the well-known pretext that she 
could not call Austria before a European tribunal. 2 On 
July 27th Count Mensdorff reported at length on this 
proposal made and urgently pressed upon him by Grey. 2 
How, then, does Count Berchtold arrive at the conclusion 
that the proposal for a conference, which dated from 
July 24th, and which had since then been constantly re- 
newed, was "outstripped" by the declaration of war, 
which took place on July 28th? This assertion also is 
a conscious lie, intended to hush up Austria's unswerv- 
ing intention to make war. I resume as follows : — 

(a) even if the Austrian assertion that the pro- 
posals for peace only arrived after the declaration 
of war were correct, this would not, in logic or in 
reason, constitute any ground for rejecting these 
proposals ; 

(b) it is, however, proved that these proposals 
reached Austria before the declaration of war; there 
is thus no support in fact for the premises on which 
is based the conclusion — in itself false — drawn by 
the Vienna Government. 

12. On July 29th Sazonof rightly complained to 
Szapary that Austria had flatly refused any further ex- 
change of thought. This, however, did not prevent 
Count Berchtold from assuming a "stupid" air in con- 
versation with M. Schebeko on July 30th, and from 
speaking of a "misunderstanding" on the part of Sazo- 
nof, as he and Schebeko "had discussed the practical 
questions two days before," and Schebeko had reported 
this to Petrogra d (Red Book, No. 50). The exchange 

^lue Book, Nos. 10, 11, 24, 25, 36, 42, 43, etc. 

'White Book, p. 409. 

'Red Book, No. 38. Blue Book, No. 48. 



332 I ACCUSE! 

of thought of which Berchtold speaks consisted in the 
fact that Schebeko, in the name of Sazonof, desired the 
official continuation of the negotiations in Petrograd, 
whereas Berchtold flatly declined to concur in these. 
This is what Berchtold calls "discussing the practical 
question" ! 

13. The question of mobilisation was naturally also 
among the subjects discussed in the conversation on 
July 30th. Berchtold complained about the mobilisa- 
tion of the four southern Russian army-districts, which 
had taken place on the previous day, and repeated again 
the false assertion that Austria had only mobilised 
against Serbia (three army corps), but against Russia 
"not a single man." M. Schebeko could have answered 
to this : "Not a man, it is true, but a 'Beth-mann.' ' 
For Bethmann in his simplicity had chattered in the 
Reichstag on August 4th to the effect that Austria had 
mobilised, not only against Serbia, but also two army- 
corps against Russia at a time when Russian mobilisa- 
tion was not even spoken of. 

Noteworthy is the admission made by Berchtold in the 
conversation in question that Austria was now obliged 
"to extend her mobilisation too" — an admission which 
confirms the Austrian general mobilisation reported by 
the Ambassadors of the Entente Powers as taking place 
on the night from the 30th to the 31st July. That the 
Austrian mobilisation against Russia was, in fact, car- 
ried out during this night is also expressly admitted 
in the telegram sent by Count Berchtold on July 31st 
to his diplomatic representatives abroad (Red Book, 
No. 53). 

Both States — Austria and Russia — were, however, as 
I have pointed out elsewhere, at one in the view that 
mobilisation was in no way equivalent to war. Although 
both States had ordered general mobilisation on July 
31st, Berchtold telegraphed as follows to his diplomatic 



THE CRIME 333 

representatives : "Pourparlers between the Cabinets at 
Vienna and Petrograd appropriate to the situation are 
meanwhile being continued, and from these we hope 
that things will quieten down all round." They did, in 
fact, continue, or rather they only began at the moment 
when mobilisation on both sides had already taken place. 
They took place in Petrograd on July 31st and August 
1st, even after the German ultimatum, and were only 
finally broken off in consequence of the German declara- 
tion of war. 1 On an earlier occasion also, in a telegram 
of July 24th to Count Mensdorff, Berchtold expressly 
pointed out that Austria had already mobilised twice 
(1908 and 1912) because of Serbia. 2 Russia also had 
mobilised on each of these instances, and, nevertheless, 
peace had been maintained on both occasions by diplo- 
matic negotiations. This is a confession on the part 
of her own ally which is damaging to Germany! In 
spite of all mobilisations, peace could have been main- 
tained on this occasion also if Germany had desired to 
maintain it. 

14. In connection with the question of mobilisation 
there is one charming episode which I should not like 
to keep from the reader as it throws a ray of comedy 
into the dark tragedy; I refer to the history of Sazonof's 
broken word of honour which is dished up for us by 
Austrian diplomacy. Hitherto we have had knowledge 
of only three broken words of honour: the Russian 
Minister of War, the Russian Chief of the General Staff, 
and the Russian Emperor were the breakers of their 
word (see the German White Book). That was not 
enough for the Austrian gentlemen ; they felt constrained 
to add a fourth breaker of his word, M. Sazonof. Count 
Szogyeny, who appears in part to misunderstand all im- 
portant occurrences, and in part to slumber through 

*Red Book, Nos. 55, 56. 
2 Red Book, No. 17. 



I ACCUSE! 

them, as we shall see later, reported from Berlin on 
July 27th that Sazonof had given the German Ambassa- 
dor a "guarantee" that as yet no mobilisation had taken 
place, but only certain necessary military precautions 
(Red Book, No. 33). I have already shown that this 
declaration was in conformity with the truth. The 
declaration, however, was given, not by Sazonof, but 
by the Russian Minister of War, Suchomlinof (White 
Book, page 8). 1 It is amusing to observe how the 
imaginary declaration of Sazonof (of July 27th) de- 
velops in the Note of Berchtold (of July 28th) into a 
broken word of honour on the part of Sazonof, and in 
the Note of July 29th it is generously recognised that M. 
Sazonof "now no longer denies" what, in fact, he never 
had denied (Red Book, Nos. 42 and 48). Who can tell 
how many broken Russian words of honour might have 
been constructed had not the outbreak of war put an end 
to this criminal activity! 

15. The telegram sent by Berchtold to his Ambassa- 
dors at London and Petrograd on July 31st deserves 
special consideration (Red Book, No. 51). As the two 
telegrams of July 30th to Count Szapary (Nos. 49 and 
50) appeared at last to pave the way for the acceptance 
of direct negotiations with Russia, so the telegram of 
July 31st appeared at last to reveal a certain readiness 
to accept Grey's mediation. The superficial observer 
who does not keep sufficiently in view the secret connec- 
tions between Berlin and Vienna — and even the Entente 
Powers were such superficial observers until the be- 
haviour of Berlin opened their eyes — is, in fact, com- 
pelled to assume that Austria had at last, with the terror 
of a European war in her heart, repented, and was en- 
deavouring to maintain peace in both the ways proposed 
by the Entente Powers, by means of direct negotiations 

[ x Collected Documents, p. 408.] 



THE CRIME 335 

with Russia and simultaneously by the mediatory action 
of the Powers. 

Accurately viewed, the position is quite different. 
Austria was bound to know, and in fact did know, that 
in consequence of the question of mobilisation intention- 
ally pushed into the foreground by Germany the tension 
between Berlin and Petrograd had meanwhile become 
greater than that between Vienna and Petrograd, and 
in consequence that even an apparent concurrence by 
Austria in the peace proposals of the Entente Powers 
could no longer prevent the coming of war. 

This was one reason for Austria's sudden change of 
front. It was harmless; Berlin had already provided 
for all further developments. 

The other reason, however — and this explanation is 
given us for the first time by the Red Book — was that 
the Austrian declarations themselves were so restricted 
and limited that even without the ultimatum-policy of 
Berlin they could not lead to a peaceful settlement. 
From this side of the question Vienna herself provided 
for all further developments. I have already pointed 
out the reservations which the Government at Vienna 
made in resuming negotiations with Petrograd. When 
a negotiating party declares from the outset that she is 
only prepared to give "subsequent explanations," and 
that she had no "intention to depart" from her position, 
negotiations are superfluous and futile. 

Similar reservations were made by the Government 
of Vienna with regard to the English proposal of media- 
tion. This proposal had its origin in Sazonof's tele- 
gram of July 29th, which, having regard to the cate- 
gorical refusal of the Vienna Cabinet on the previous 
day to take part in further negotiations, asked the Eng- 
lish Government for mediation in the interests of peace 
in any form that appeared advisable. 1 In the Note from 
Grange Book, No. 50. Blue Book, No. 84. 



336 I ACCUSE! 

Vienna of July 31st we find the following surprising 
passage: "Sazonof has informed the British Govern- 
ment that after the declaration of war by Austria-Hun- 
gary against Serbia he is no longer in a position to deal 
directly with Austria-Hungary." Is the phraseology 
here used in any way intended to indicate that Sazonof, 
for his part, had refused to enter into further negotia- 
tions? Such an implication would have been a gross 
falsification, refuted by the Austrian Red Book itself, 
as well as by all the other diplomatic publications. 
Sazonof was, in fact, no longer in a position to negotiate 
with Vienna, not through any fault of his, but because 
Vienna had since July 28th refused to take part in any 
further negotiations. Whom did they really expect to 
deceive by this ambiguous phraseology? 

Grey at once communicated Sazonof's request to 
Prince Lichnowsky, and again put forward the proposal 
of a conversation a quatre in London, the form of which 
he left entirely to the German Government. The ob- 
vious presupposition of this, and of all other proposals 
for mediation, was naturally the preliminary suspension 
of hostilities against Serbia; it should, however, be ob- 
served that what was asked was only a cessation of op- 
erations, and not a withdrawal of Austrian troops from 
Serbia. 

What attitude did Count Berchtold assume with re- 
gard to this proposal? Now on July 31st he for the 
first time declared himself "quite prepared to entertain 
the proposal of Sir E. Grey to negotiate between us and 
Serbia," only, however, under the following condi- 
tions : — 

(a) the military action against Serbia should mean- 
while continue to take its course; 

(b) the Russian mobilisation must be brought to a 
standstill, whereupon the Austrian counter-measures in 
Galicia would also be cancelled. 



THE CRIME 337 

Was this an acceptance or a refusal of Grey's media- 
tion? It was a refusal in the form of an acceptance. 
Could it be seriously asked of the Russian Government 
that it was for them to begin demobilisation while Aus- 
tria was prepared to cancel partially in Galicia the gen- 
eral mobilisation which she had ordered in the previous 
night, only after the Russian mobilisation had been 
brought to a standstill? Could it be seriously asked of 
Russia that, during the proposed conference of Am- 
bassadors in London, of which neither the beginning 
nor the term could yet be determined, she should allow 
Austria to proceed with her measures against Serbia, 
and thus in the meantime crush the tiny State? In 
addition to this, Austria had merely expressed in gen- 
eral terms her readiness to "entertain" (naherzutreten) 
Grey's mediatory action, but had not accepted a confer- 
ence in this form or in that. Events might thus follow 
the same course as in Berlin during the preceding six 
days, that is to say, the Government of Vienna, on go- 
ing more closely into the question, might raise on their 
side all manner of difficulties as to the form, while neg- 
lecting, just as Berlin had done, to propose any practical 
or acceptable form. In short, the Austrian answer to the 
proposal of Grey which Herr von Tschirschky "com- 
municated in accordance with instructions," without in 
any way supporting it — this answer was so ambiguous 
and restricted that it was equivalent to a refusal of the 
proposal. 

The Allied Governments could thus feel sure on both 
sides that the desired war could not escape them. There 
was as little hope of a peaceful issue of the negotiations 
with Russia as of the success of the English mediatory 
action, in consequence of the clauses and reservations 
attached by the Government of Vienna to their accept- 
ance of both proposals. If, however, there was any 
danger of a peaceful issue, Berlin, by its ultimatum- 



338 I ACCUSE! 

policy, was taking the necessary measures to secure that 
under all circumstances war was bound to come. The 
cards were, in fact, shuffled with such dexterity that the 
game could not be lost — the game of war which had so 
often been played in peace, and which now they wished 
to carry through in earnest. 

So far our discussions have had reference to what is 
contained in the Austrian Red Book, and these have 
confirmed anew the points in the indictment framed 
against Austria. 

Austria criminally provoked the Serbian war, and, as 
a consequence of that, the European war: — 

by addressing to Serbia demands which were im- 
possible of fulfilment, 

by refusing an answer which accorded her almost 
complete satisfaction, 

by the recall of her Ambassador, and by the decla- 
ration of war against Serbia, 

by concealing her real objects in making war, 

by categorically declining all negotiations and all 
actions of mediation up to the last moment, when 
it was too late, 

by imposing conditions on her final consent which 
were necessarily bound to exclude from the out- 
set the possibility of success. 



II 

What the Red Book does not contain 

The above accusations may be inferred from the con- 
tents of the Red Book itself. 

Much more serious, however, are the accusations 



THE CRIME 339 

which may be inferred from what is not contained in 
the Red Book, accusations against Austria and Germany 
alike. The Red Book contains nothing, not so much as 
a syllable: 

(a) of the alleged pressure which Berlin is sup- 
posed to have exercised on Vienna in the sense of 
peace ; 

(b) of all the proposals for mediation which were 
made by the Entente Powers, apart from the con- 
ference of the four Powers. 

i. The White Book and the Blue Book are, as I have 
elsewhere shown, full of the emphatic assurances of the 
German Imperial Government that it had made every 
effort to exert a moderating influence on Vienna in the 
sense of arriving at a peaceful understanding. "Faithful 
to our principle that mediation should not extend to the 
Austro-Serbian conflict, which is to be considered as a 
purely Austro-Hungarian affair, but merely to the rela- 
tions between Austria-Hungary and Russia (this is the 
famous distinction dealt with above), we continued our 
endeavours to bring about an understanding between 
these two Powers. We further declared ourselves ready, 
after failure of the conference idea, to transmit a second 
proposal of Sir Edward Grey's to Vienna. . . ." &c. "In 
spite of this we continued our attempts to the utmost, 
and we advised Vienna to show every possible advance 
compatible with the dignity of the monarchy. ..." 
"Shoulder to shoulder with England we laboured inces- 
santly, and supported every proposal in Vienna," &c. 
"During the interval from July 29th to July 31st, whilst 
these endeavours of ours for mediation were being con- 
tinued with increasing energy, supported by English 
diplomacy," &c. — passages such as these are to be found 
everywhere in the White Book. In his speech of August 
4th the Chancellor assured his hearers that he had car- 



340 I ACCUSE! 

ried his task of mediation at Vienna "to the utmost 
point which was compatible with our position as an ally." 

Similar assurances were given in unfaltering succes- 
sion to the English diplomatists in Berlin and London. 
It is everywhere said, especially by the Chancellor him- 
self, that he had pressed the button in Vienna as hard 
as he could, that he had energetically preached peace 
and moderation, and that perhaps he had already gone 
too far. 1 Herr von Jagow even gives expression to the 
fear that the strong pressure which he had exercised on 
Vienna in favour of negotiations on the Serbian answer 
might have produced a contrary effect and hastened the 
Austrian declaration of war. 2 In short, Herr von Jagow 
and Herr Bethmann-Hollweg bubbled over with peace- 
ful assurances and alleged efforts in the cause of peace in 
Vienna, and posed before the German people and the 
English Government as angels of peace constantly flut- 
tering to and fro between Vienna and Berlin bearing 
the palm in their hand. 

Even in reading the German White Book one cannot 
fail to be surprised that these efforts for peace remained 
always and everywhere completely unsuccessful. It is 
everywhere the same story : Vienna had refused on this 
or that ground. Either Vienna was not prepared to 
negotiate, or it was too late to do so, or the Russian 
mobilisation had intervened, and so on. Everywhere 
the total result was nil. 

I have already pointed out that this negative result 
has in the highest degree a suspicious appearance; if 
Berlin had seriously wished, Vienna was bound to give 
way in everything without demur, for Vienna by herself 
was powerless in Europe. There was here a mysterious 
point in the relations between Vienna and Berlin which 
urgently called for an explanation. The assurances that 

^lue Book, Nos. 107, 108. 
8 Blue Book, No. 76. 



THE CRIME 341 

efforts were made for peace must be clearly proved if 
they are to command credence. The failure of the ef- 
forts alleged to have been made by Berlin was so sur- 
prising that the efforts themselves became in a high 
measure unworthy of belief. 

The matter assumed a more suspicious air in view of 
the personality of our Ambassador in Vienna, Herr von 
Tschirschky-Bogendorf. He had the reputation of being 
an outspoken enemy of Russia and Serbia, who, instead 
of advising moderation at the Ballplatz, goaded on to 
war. Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the English Ambassador, 
openly expressed the view that Herr von Tschirschky 
desired war from the first, and that he allowed his strong 
personal bias to colour his actions, that he was constantly 
dealing in secret with the Austrian Government, and that 
he never invited the co-operation of the Ambassadors 
of the Entente Powers. Sazonof also emphasised the 
strongly marked attitude of hostility towards Russia 
shown by the German Ambassador, who was suspected 
of having known the Austrian Note before it was de- 
spatched, and who openly declared to anyone who cared 
to listen that he endorsed every word of the Note, and 
regarded the Serbian answer as a sham. 1 When an 
Ambassador of this character receives instructions which 
in more than platonic form "transmit" English proposals, 
but neither support these proposals nor counsel energetic 
pressure, we can understand how matters stood with re- 
gard to the urgent efforts for peace of the Berlin Govern- 
ment in Vienna, and what the action of mediation looked 
like "which was carried to the utmost point which was 
compatible with our position as an ally." 

All these indications and, above all, the unconditional 
failure of the alleged efforts of Berlin, compel us to 
entertain doubts as to the veracity of the Berlin assur- 
ances. The certainty, however, that these assurances 
1 Blue Book, Nos. 32, 95, 139, 141, 161. 



Sm I ACCUSE! 

are untrue, and consciously untrue, has for the first time 
been furnished by the Austrian Red Book. It contains 
nothing, not so much as a syllable, about all that Beth- 
mann and Jagow so volubly claim to have done ; it con- 
tains in all only a few communications from Herr von 
Tschirschky to Count Berchtold which took place "in 
accordance with instructions," and which only rise on 
one occasion to the observation that a British proposal 
"was brought before the Vienna Cabinet for their con- 
sideration." 1 The question at issue here was the im- 
portant and urgent proposal put forward by Grey on 
July 27th (Blue Book, No. 46) to the effect that after 
Russia, by the exercise of her conciliatory influence in 
Belgrade, had obtained so favourable an answer from 
Serbia, Austria should at least accept the Serbian an- 
swer as a basis for discussion, seeing that it went far 
beyond all expectation in meeting the Austrian demands. 
Let anyone read this urgent request addressed by Grey 
to Prince Lichnowsky on such firm grounds, his warm 
appeal to Germany's love of peace, his desire to keep 
closely in touch with Germany, his emphasis on the fact 
that after the success which had attended Russia's ad- 
vice and the concessions made by Serbia it was now the 
turn of Vienna to show some spirit of accommodation, 
and that Berlin, in the first instance, could, and must, act 
in this direction. Let anyone read this, and compare it 
with the completely frigid manner in which Herr von 
Tschirschky brings Grey's proposal "before the Vienna 
Government for their consideration." No one will then 
be surprised that the proposal was declined with equal 
frigidity by the Government of Vienna on the ground 
that "after the opening of hostilities by Serbia and the 
subsequent declaration of war the step appears belated." 2 
Such is the appearance of the efforts which Berlin 

1 Red Book, Nos. 43, 44, 51. 

3 White Book, p. 409; Exhibit 16. 



THE CRIME 343 

made in Vienna in the interests of peace. Until to-day 
no instruction, no telegram, no note has been printed 
which offers the slightest proof that any such efforts 
were made in the cause of peace. The expectation that 
evidence on this point would be contained in the Austrian 
Red Book has been disappointed. Where are the proofs 
— we have the right to ask Herr von Bethmann — what 
evidence is there for your assertion that you earnestly 
used your influence in Vienna in the direction of peace? 
The German and the Austrian publications are silent on 
the question, if, indeed, they do not support a view di- 
rectly opposed to your assertions. A communication is 
no recommendation. To bring forward a matter for 
consideration is not the same as giving it support. Where 
is the pressure which you say you asserted at Vienna? 
When your printing press gives us a proof of the pres- 
sure you imprinted at Vienna we will believe you. Until 
then we will give to these assertions, as to so many 
others for which you are responsible, the name which is 
properly theirs, and declare them to be falsifications of 
the truth which have sprung from your guilty conscience 
in the hope of concealing your crime. 

2. I now come to a much more serious point. Where 
are the proposals for arriving at an agreement put for- 
ward by Grey and Sazonof which ought to have reached 
Vienna by way of London and Berlin, but which never 
elicited an answer from Vienna? 

Let us recapitulate briefly the position of affairs before 
we formulate the charge on this point. On July 29th, 
after the outbreak of the Austro-Serbian war and the 
rupture of direct negotiations between Vienna and Petro- 
grad, Grey proposed to Prince Lichnowsky, the German 
Ambassador, the well-known formula for agreement, 
which was to allow Austria to retain possession of Bel- 
grade and the neighbouring territory as a pledge for a 
satisfactory settlement of her demands, and from there 



344 I ACCUSE! 

announce to the four Powers not directly concerned the 
conditions under which she was prepared to arrive at an 
understanding. 1 This proposal of Grey's was forwarded 
to Berlin by Prince Lichnowsky, and from there it was- 
alleged to have been transmitted to Vienna. 2 To this 
proposal, however, no answer was ever made either by 
Germany or by Austria. The Berlin Government was 
repeatedly urged for an answer by Grey and Goschen, 
but it was constantly asserted that no reply had yet been 
received from Vienna. 3 The most varied reasons, or 
rather evasions, were produced to explain the absence of 
an answer, although the time was pressing and the fate 
of Europe hung on every hour. Grey's proposal, which 
represented the utmost conceivable point to which it was 
possible to go to meet Austria, which secured for her in 
the fullest measure her diplomatic and her military 
prestige — this proposal received no answer, and is not 
so much as mentioned in the Red Book. The actual ne- 
gotiations, so far as they are mentioned in the Red Book, 
come to an end with the conversation between Grey and 
Prince Lichnowsky on the morning of July 29th (Blue 
Book, No. 84), to which Berchtold's telegram of July 
31st (Red Book, No. 51) has reference. Later events 
are not mentioned in the Red Book, apart from the two 
conversations which Count Szapary had with Sazonof 
on July 31st and August 1st. 

Now there were two conversations between Grey and 
Lichnowsky on July 29th, the first in the morning — to 
which Berchtold's telegram of July 31st relates — and 
the second on the afternoon of the same day (Blue Book, 
No. 88). The Red Book comes to an end with the dis- 
cussion of the first conversation (Blue Book, No. 84), 

1 Blue Book, No. 88. Telegram of King George, 30 July [Col- 
lected Documents, p. 538]. 
2 White Book, p. 411. 
"Blue Book, Nos. 98, 103, 107, 108, 112. 



THE CRIME 345 

and not even a word is said of the second, or, for that 
matter, of any later events. The significance of this may- 
be gathered in figures from the fact that the English 
Blue Book contains 161 documents, of which only about 
a half, that is to say 84, are considered by the Austrian 
Government to be worthy of consideration or even of 
mention. All the events of decisive importance which 
took place between England, Russia, and Germany be- 
tween the afternoon of July 29th and August 1st, that 
is to say, during the four critical days of the Euro- 
pean conflict, have no existence for the Austrian Gov- 
ernment — apart from the two repeatedly mentioned con- 
versations between Szapary and Sazonof on July 31st 
and August 1st. The interchange of diplomatic tele- 
grams between the European capitals in these exciting 
days does not appear to have disturbed the composure 
of the gentlemen in the Ballplatz. They know nothing, 
or at least they wish to know nothing, of the untiring 
efforts of Grey, Sazonof, and Viviani to marshal whole 
series of formulae, each going further than its predeces- 
sor in the direction of meeting the wishes of Austria, 
and all intended to preserve the peace of Europe even at 
the last moment. The gentlemen in Vienna continue 
their slumbers, or at least affect a slumbering posture, 
and this drowsiness is so infectious, even on their for- 
eign representatives, that it is possible for Count 
Szogyeny, the Austrian Ambassador in Berlin, to report 
to Vienna on August 2nd that "the Secretary of State 
has just informed me that no answer has been received 
from Russia to the German demand; Russian troops 
have crossed the German frontier; Russia has thus at- 
tacked Germany. Germany, therefore, regards herself 
as at war with Russia." x This communication, remark- 
able both for its logic and style, was sent by the Aus- 
trian Ambassador to Vienna on August 2nd as the latest 
'Red Book, No. 57. 



346 I ACCUSE! 

sensational news, twenty-four hours after the delivery in 
Petrograd of the German declaration of war, which, how- 
ever, was not in any way based on an attack by Russia, 
but on ner failure to give an answer to the ultimatum. 
This is the only sign of life manifested by Berlin since 
the communication of the conversation between Grey and 
Lichnowsky on the morning of July 29th — this comedy 
of buffoonery lagging twenty-four hours behind the 
tragedy. This is the only proof of the superhuman ef- 
forts of the Imperial Chancellor to move Vienna to an 
attitude of compliance — the only proof of the strong 
pressure on the button which went to the utmost point 
compatible with an ally's position, which was, however, 
unfortunately insufficient to awaken the Austrian Am- 
bassador in Berlin from his righteous slumbers. 

3. Grey's formula of agreement was thus allowed to 
slip under the table undiscussed. But where are the 
formula of agreement put forward by Sazonof? Were 
they buried in Berlin, or transmitted to Vienna? If 
the second of these courses was taken, what attitude 
did Vienna adopt towards them? Were they ignored, 
refused, or amended? Nothing whatever is known on 
this point. Neither the German White Book nor the 
Austrian Red Book contains one iota about them. We 
are obliged to refer to the publications of the Entente 
Powers to trace the history of these formulae. This 
history always leads as far as Berlin; of the further path 
from Berlin to Vienna we know nothing. 

With regard to Grey's proposal, there is at least this 
much reported in the White Book, that it had been 
"forwarded to Vienna," and that Russia, as they "as- 
sumed," had accepted the proposal. 1 We are not told 
what attitude was assumed by Vienna towards this pro- 
posal; we only know from the publications of the En- 
tente Powers that up to the last moment Berlin main- 
1 White Book, p. 411 [See footnote on p. .] 



THE CRIME 347. 

tained that no answer had yet been received from 
Vienna. 

The White Book and the Red Book, however, make 
no mention whatever of the proposals of Sazonof; they 
simply do not exist for them. The first proposal of 
Sazonof (Orange Book, No. 60) was, as is known, 
verbally dictated to the German Ambassador on July 
30th; it was transmitted to the Berlin Government by 
their own and the Russian Ambassador; it was sup- 
ported by England and France, but was declined by 
Jagow without consulting Vienna on the ground that it 
was unacceptable to Austria. Among other points 
raised, we have a right to ask for a definite answer, 
Yes or No, to the question whether the Government of 
Vienna were informed of this formula of Sazonof which 
satisfied all their wishes. If so, what attitude did it 
assume? Why did not Austria accept the proposal, 
which required of her only what she had herself already 
promised, namely, that she should respect the sovereign 
rights of Serbia, and which, on the other hand, granted 
to her everything that she could in any way desire of 
Russia, namely, that Russia should stop her military 
preparations (La Russie s'engage a cesser ses preparatifs 
militaires). 

If, however, the Government of Vienna received no 
communication with regard to the proposal of Sazonof, 
how is the German Government to justify this, their 
omission? By what right does Herr von Jagow take it 
upon him to keep to himself and to decline in the name 
of Austria, without giving any reasons, a proposal which 
would assuredly have guaranteed peace? What reasons 
had he for this refusal, what inner grounds, if the rea- 
sons he had were not such as could be admitted to the 
world ? Out with them ! This is a serious, a desperately 
serious business. We are no longer dealing with a diplo- 
matic puppet play, but with the fatal game of dice in 



348 I ACCUSE! 

which the stakes are the destinies of nations. The White 
Book and the Red Book are silent, but the public con- 
science cries aloud, and calls on the guilty to give an 
account of their actions. 

4. The fate of the second proposal of Sazonof's was 
even worse than that of the first. We have seen that, 
after unending trouble and the despatch of countless 
telegrams, the diplomacy of the Entente Powers suc- 
ceeded in approximating to each other Grey's formula of 
July 29th and that of Sazonof of July 30th. The result 
was a second formula outlined by Sazonof on July 31st 
which, "in accordance with the English suggestion," 
expressly permitted Austria to leave her forces on Ser- 
bian territory, and only required her to stay the march 
of her troops (arreter la marche). In return for this, 
Russia undertook to maintain her waiting attitude (con- 
server son attitude expectante) , and the Great Powers 
would examine the satisfaction which Serbia could ac- 
cord to the Austro-Hungarian Government without in- 
jury to her rights as a Sovereign State or her inde- 
pendence. 1 This formula was at once telegraphed to 
the Russian Ambassadors accredited to all the Great 
States, including the Ambassador at Vienna, and re- 
ceived the most energetic support both from Grey and 
from Viviani. 

I have already pointed out that this proposal for 
agreement safeguarded in every way the military pres- 
tige of Austria, inasmuch as it allowed her, during the 
whole further course of negotiation with the Great 
Powers, to leave her troops in Serbia, and thus to retain 
the occupied territory as a pledge for the fulfilment of 
her demands. The proposal, in fact, contains precisely 
what the Austrian Government ask of the Entente 
Powers in the introduction to the Red Book (page 4), 2 

1 Orange Book, No. 67. Blue Book, Nos. 120, 132. 

2 [Collected Documents, p. 445.] 



THE CRIME 349 

namely, that they should assume a "waiting attitude.'* 
This waiting attitude was expressly provided for in the 
various formulae of agreement ; indeed, it represented the 
essential foundation of these proposals. 

Between the second formula of Sazonof and the form 
in which Austria on July 31st declared her readiness to 
negotiate (Red Book, No. 51), there was only one dif- 
ference, namely, that Austria desired to continue her 
military action against Serbia, whereas Sazonof desired 
that it should be brought to a standstill — a desire which, 
as is known, he later expressed in even more moderate 
form in stating that he regarded it only as "very im- 
portant that Austria should meanwhile put a stop pro- 
visionally to her military action." x Thanks to the Rus- 
sian spirit of compliance, the difference between the two 
points of view had been reduced to so trifling dimen- 
sions that with the least good will a settlement could 
not fail to be brought about if — and that is the question 
— if this good will in fact existed. In this, however, 
Germany and Austria were defective. We know noth- 
ing of the fate of the Russian proposal in Berlin and 
Vienna. The White Book and the Red Book again main- 
tain an attitude of silence on this point. Without doubt, 
the proposal got as far as Vienna and Berlin, but there 
is equally no doubt that in both places it remained un- 
answered. Only in one way can this silence be ex- 
plained ; it would have been impossible to accept the pro- 
posal, or even to discuss it, without bringing about the 
peace which they did not desire. It was, however, equally 
impossible to refuse the proposal, since it was much too 
conciliatory to make it possible to justify a refusal. 
And so it was decided that the proposal should simply 
be ignored, both then and now — then because peace 
was not desired, and to-day because they do not wish it 
to be recognised how criminally they avoided peace, 
^lue Book, Nos. 133, 139. 



mO I ACCUSE! 

These are the facts revealed by the Austrian publica- 
tion, the acts of commission and omission which are 
chargeable to the allied Empires. 

The Red Book and the White Book taken together 
constitute the gravest indictment which could be written 
against Germany and Austria; they confirm anew the 
judgment pronounced on the ground of the earlier pub- 
lications : that Germany and Austria are alone and ex- 
clusively guilty of having consciously and intentionally 
brought about the European war. 



These things being so, it ill becomes the Austrian 
Government to take the field with the heavy artillery 
of their moral indignation against the "self-seeking 
policy of Great Britain" and the "desire for a revanche 
of the French Republic," and the unscrupulousness of 
Russia, and to reproach the Entente Powers with the fact 
that they provoked the European war by "ranging them- 
selves beside the (Serbian) Kingdom with its load of 
guilt." 

It is untrue that the Triple Entente intervened exclu- 
sively on the side of Serbia. The opposite is the case, 
and this fact is confirmed, not only by the publications 
of the Entente Powers, but also by the Red Book itself. 
From the very beginning the Governments of England, 
France, and Russia did not restrain their sympathy for 
Austria's justifiable demand for satisfaction, nor did 
they fail to express their deep horror at the assassination 
of Serajevo. At the same time, after the unprecedented 
humiliation of Serbia they could not, and dared not, omit 
to urge on the Government of Vienna precepts of modera- 
tion, and to warn them of the consequences which would 
ensue from the continuance of an unaccommodating at- 
titude. The Entente Powers, by their moderating in- 



THE CRIME 351 

fluence in Belgrade, had already elicited the submissive 
Serbian answer. They were ready at the conference 
proposed by Grey to do everything in their power to 
accord satisfaction, even to those wishes of Austria 
which were of a more far-reaching character. Bunsen 
and Grey, Sazonof and Schebeko repeatedly assured the 
Government of Vienna of their readiness to give effect 
at the conference to the justifiable wishes of Austria 
by every means in their power. 1 Where, then, is the 
political selfishness of the Entente Powers? Where 
is the one-sided participation on behalf of Serbia? 
Where is the effort to humiliate the Austrian monarchy ? 
The history and the antecedents of the European con- 
flict clearly reveal which side was guilty of political 
selfishness, who it was who for her own interests gam- 
bled with the well-being of all civilised nations. Did not 
Austria annex Bosnia and Herzegovina in violation of 
the solemn obligations contained in the Treaty of Ber- 
lin, and thereby stir into full flame the Great Serbian 
national movement? Did not Austria, in pursuit of her 
selfish interests, push to such an extreme length the ques- 
tion of Skutari, the question of the Serbian harbour, 
the Albanian question, that on two or three occasions 
in the last ten years a European war, on account of 
Austria, was imminent? In August, 19 13, was not Aus- 
tria prepared to begin a war against Serbia, without 
any regard for the European consequences, and would 
have done so had not Italy refused to give her support? 
Austria, the accomplice and the tool of Germany in the 
present world-war, has indeed no reason to reproach the 
Entente Powers with the violation of "public morality 
and humanity." The accusation which the Austrian Gov- 
ernment brings against the Entente Powers : "It is they 
who must be made answerable before history for the 

1 See Blue Book, Nos. 5, 12. Orange Book, Nos. 4, 40, 42, 43. 
Yellow Book, Nos. 26, 27, 30. Red Book, Nos. 41, 47, 50. 



352 I ACCUSE! 

immeasurable suffering which has come upon the human 
race" — the full weight of this accusation falls back on 
Austria and Germany. To bring about a European war 
in order to rid herself of an inconvenient neighbour was 
at once a crime and a folly. The war against Serbia, 
whatever its issue, could only worsen Austria's position 
in the Balkans; it could in no way improve it. The 
European war, however, which Austria, at Germany's 
instigation and with her support, conjured up along with 
the Serbian war, could only be for Austria a case of 
driving out the Devil by Beelzebub, of decapitation as 
a cure for toothache ; c'etait plus qu'un crime, c'etait une 
faute. 

Like a bull with lowered horns, the Austrian Govern- 
ment plunged on against the red cloth of Serbia, with- 
out looking to the right or the left, without troubling 
about the consequences, which a blind man could not 
avoid foreseeing. 

And now the consequences have come — now already, 
before the war is decided. With the blood oozing from 
her heavy wounds the double eagle is lying on the 
ground. Serbia is free. But Galicia and part of Bukc- 
wina are in the hands of the enemy. On all the fron- 
tiers of the many-tongued empire the neighbouring peo- 
ples are stirring to draw over to them their oppressed 
kindred by peaceful pressure, or, if need be, by force of 
arms. In every joint the decayed building of the Haps- 
burg Monarchy is creaking, and already the process of 
decomposition is beginning, which, but for the suicidal 
policy of the Government of Vienna, might have been 
deferred for generations to come. With the cry of war: 
"Vivat Austria, pereat mundus," the struggle began; 
with the cry of peace, "Vivat mundus, pereat Austria" 
it will come to an end. 



IV 

THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEED 

I have arrived at the end of my task. The terrible 
thing, which for long hovered before the eyes of the 
nations of Europe, but which was never regarded as 
possible, has come to pass. Prosperous seats of the old 
civilisation of Europe have been transformed into heaps 
of rubbish and ruin. The earth, covered with the snow 
of winter, has drained the blood of millions of the chil- 
dren of men in the prime of life. In common graves, 
far from their wives, their children, and their mothers, 
hundreds of thousands are laid to rest together without 
cross and without memorial — friend and foe united in 
death. Unending trains, filled with wounded, traverse 
the country from east to west and from west to east, 
and inside there they lie, the poor men with mangled 
limbs, with bruised bodies, with disfigured countenances, 
moaning and sighing in their pains, many disfigured 
beyond recognition, with arms or limbs wrenched 
off; those denied the light of truth have lost the light 
of day; they still live whom death has claimed. 
They form one vast bleeding wound in the body of hu- 
manity. 

Millions of women and children weep out their eyes 
day and night for the dear ones whom they have lost, 
for the dear ones whom they receive back helpless and 
crippled for life. Countless dwelling-places of peaceful 
men, countless centres of industrial activity, countless 
memorials of the art of man have been burned down 

353 



354 I ACCUSE! 

and destroyed ! The labour of generations, of centuries, 
is transformed into dust and ashes. The fields are tram- 
pled, the corps annihilated, the castles of the great and 
the cottages of peasants are levelled with the earth; the 
unfortunate inhabitants, women and children, grey- 
headed men and women, wander along the country- 
roads without shelter, without a home, in rain and in 
wind, in snow and in hail, onward anywhere in the hope 
that somewhere there may be a corner where they may 
still their hunger and obtain a wretched shelter in their 
misery. 

And still onward goes the struggle and the task of 
murder. Like the ebb and the flow of the tide, the 
armies of millions move backwards and forwards, and 
every step forward and every step backward costs new 
hecatombs of human lives, inflicts new wounds and new 
pains, creates new widows and new orphans. 

And what sort of a life do they lead who are still 
living? They are buried in holes in the ground, day 
and night, weeks and months, like cave-dwellers of pre- 
historic times; indeed, their lot is worse than theirs! 
The water is up to their knees, often they are days on 
end without food, crouching down before the bullets of 
the enemy, overwhelmed by shrapnel and shells, which 
at a stroke destroy their earth-dwellings reared with so 
much labour, and cast them down in the trenches dead 
and wounded. And then from time to time there is the 
signal to attack! Out of the trenches! Fix bayonets! 
Then there is the rush across the open field, while ex- 
posed to the blattering machine-guns, which, the scythe- 
man of these days, mow down those who are advancing 
to the attack. And then comes the struggle of man to 
man! Then they throw themselves at each other with 
blows, with kicks, and thrusts with their sabres or with 
the butt-end of their guns, one peaceful man against 
another — peaceful, that is, until they have been turned 



THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEED 355 

to beasts under the influence and the incitement of their 
leaders, 

under the roll of the drums, the fanfare of trumpets, 
under the encouraging summons 

"How beautiful to die the death of a hero for the Father- 
land." 

And they die like flies. Hundreds, thousands of 
bodies fill up the trenches, and furnish a support across 
which those who are following may advance to the at- 
tack. And there are wounded lying among the dead. 
And the battle rolls past over their heads. And the 
horsemen tramp on them. And the cannons tear them 
to pieces. And there is no help. Often for hours and 
for days they must lie in the mud, exposed to the fire 
of the shrapnel, poor men who cannot move, to whom 
no help can be brought. How many bleed to death 
there! How many are there who are only lightly 
wounded, but who, in their helplessness, are delivered 
over to death! 

All reports agree that it is impossible to picture in 
words the horrors of modern battles. I have spoken to 
doctors, to people, that is, who are certainly, by their 
profession, accustomed to what is horrible, and they 
told me that the impression made by a battlefield and 
by a hospital behind the Front is enough to drive any- 
one mad. It can only be compared with a gigantic 
slaughter-house, many thousand times larger than the 
largest slaughter-houses in the world. It is impossible 
to give correct treatment to each of the thousands of 
wounded who are brought in at the same time, impos- 
sible on account of their gigantic number, impossible 
also on account of the interruption caused by the shells 
which constantly imperil those hospitals situated in the 



356 I ACCUSE! 

neighbourhood of the battlefield. What descriptions I 
received from other doctors who have received the 
wounded at the base hospitals or on their return home ! 
How many wounds, in themselves slight, end fatally or 
at least involve amputation because they cannot in time 
receive aseptic treatment! 

In a report of Surgeon-General Korte we find : — 

"In the recent fights on the Yser, on the canals as well 
as round about Ypres, the most of the wounds, often even 
those wounds caused by rifle-fire, are infected. The sol- 
diers lie in wet trenches, and in consequence of the violent 
artillery fire they can in many cases be picked up only after 
days have elapsed ; some have lain five or six days in turnip- 
fields or in deserted trenches before it was possible to bring 
them to the field hospital. Serious infections are then not 
uncommon, such as phlegmon and tetanus. ... I have 
seen some recover who have been lying for days (6-8) in 
stables, barns, or hay sheds in the most wretched external 
conditions. There was one who had been lying helplessly 
for five days in a turnip field and had kept himself alive by 
eating turnips. . . . The roads are broken up, and the 
villages have been so knocked to pieces in the battles which 
have been going on for weeks that we have difficulty in 
finding suitable rooms for hospital purposes." (Berliner 
Tageblatt, 13th December.) 

Another report, also from a doctor, says: — 

"It is a depressing rainy morning; in the bottom of the 
oozy bed of the canal there is the dirty water-channel and in 
the slime and the gurgling water lie our brave men, who 
died the death of heroes for the Fatherland. This picture 
has imprinted itself too deeply in our souls for it ever to 
be obliterated. I have them constantly before my eyes as 
they lay down below us in their neat uniform, stiff and pale 
with their bodies in the attitude in which death surprised 
them, down below in the muddy canal-bed with its miry 
clay." (Berliner Tageblatt, 24th December.) 



THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEED 357 

Life in the trenches is described in one report as fol- 
lows : — 

"One has to be listening all the time until at last we 
reach our own section of the trenches ; on the left and the 
right, before and behind, there is the terrible roar of artil- 
lery. Lucky for you if none of the shells burst in the 
trenches. Quite close to me two of my chums were lying 
quietly together under a blanket in the shelter. One was 
hit in the stomach by shrapnel : — dead ! The explosion was 
very defective; the other was only burned in the face and 
the hands. . . . Some days ago we stormed and took a 
village ; in the fields around about many of my chums are 
still lying unburied. They are within reach of the enemies' 
fire and we cannot get to them by day or by night. . . . 
Among our fallen chums there are heaps of dead cattle 
which are now swollen. In the farmyard the sows are eat- 
ing their own young; two children are lying among them, 
a boy and a girl. Everywhere the holes caused by the 
shells are gaping in the ground, some are so big that 30 to 
40 men could find room in them." {Berliner Tageblatt, 
23rd December.) 

A member of the Landwehr writes from Russian Po- 
land : — ■ 

"Necessity knows no law, and our provisions could not 
always be got after us quick enough in the country. But 
it was not only their victuals, etc., but often also the pro- 
tection of their roof and their cattle as well that the in- 
habitants lost when we advanced. The military flooded into 
the needy houses and into barns and lofts like a wild 
stream, and took possession of their rooms and their fire- 
sides, and often the population with all their youngsters 
wandered about outside in the pouring rain. ... I never 
learned what the family did that night, but for long I have 
been unable to forget that impression, for I have myself 
got children at home and I thought with horror that they 
also might some day be in the same position, unless we sue- 



358 I ACCUSE! 

ceeded in protecting the frontier. As though by chance the 
words turn up in my brain with an ironic sound: 'War is 
glorious, war is beautiful.' If I could only catch a sight of 
the writer of these lines, I would soon drive his theory out 
of him." (Vorw'drts, 8th December.) 

A First Lieutenant in the Reserve describes what hap- 
pened in the beautiful church at Becelaere, in Belgium : — • 

"On the evening of the same day I was lying in this beau- 
tiful Church along with hundreds of other wounded men. 
A bullet fired by English Infantry had gone through my 
breast and my lungs, broken some ribs, and pierced the 
pelvic bone. Mattresses were ranged alongside of each 
other on the stone floor of the Church, and on each there 
lay a wounded soldier. The doctors were binding up and 
examining the wounded. More and more came in, and by 
nightfall the Church was quite full. All night long there 
could be heard a subdued groaning and moaning and quiet 
prayers and supplication to God from every corner and 
from every shady nook. ..." A wounded man has just 
been bandaged by a doctor when a shell finds its way 
through the open Church door. The head of the wounded 
man sinks back, the shot has penetrated his forehead and 
killed him. "Two severely wounded soldiers are lying to- 
gether; both have wounds in their stomach and neither will 
come through with his life; the shadow of death already 
flits over their faces." The chaplain gives them the Holy 
Communion. The setting sun breaks with gentle radiance 
through the stained church windows and illumines the fea- 
tures of both the soldiers dying of their wounds. Then 
suddenly there is a deafening uproar. The walls fall down 
upon the wounded men. "Fragments of shells come whis- 
tling down. . . . Shrieking and groaning is heard. . . . 
There is a hopeless tangle of men, debris and mattresses 
. . . those who are slightly wounded creep out of the 
chaos on all fours; those who are severely wounded are 
brought into the open air by people belonging to the Med- 
ical Corps. Some of the dead are recovered. . . . The 



THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEED 359 

Church of Becelaere is left standing, lonely and deserted, 
a picture of desolation." (Berliner Tageblatt, of the 19th 
of December.) 

From a letter from the front written by an infantry 
officer : — 

"We suffered very serious losses in men, but also in offi- 
cers and in non-commissioned officers. It tugs at one's 
heart to remember all our dear comrades with whom we 
have so often been happy together. Often the bodies of 
those who fell could be buried only after many days, on one 
occasion not until 12 days after being hit. You can im- 
agine the condition in which they were then. But the enemy 
gave us no time and no peace to collect the bodies. Lieu- 
tenant S., with whom in our careless days we drank together 
in beautiful K. — you remember him, — and Lieutenant W. 
fell two weeks ago. They were found only a few days ago 
in a little wood, and their bodies were already completely 
decayed. . . . The harvest which death has reaped here 
from us and from our enemies reminds one of the fearful 
time which Ypres and the surrounding country experienced 
five hundred years ago, when the plague reduced the popu- 
lation from 200,000 to a tenth of that number." (Berliner 
Tageblatt, 14th December.) 

A soldier of the Landwehr from Charlottenburg re- 
ports as follows with regard to a fight at close quarters 
on the Yser Canal : — 

"The horrible groans of the wounded resounded through 
the night. In hunger and in cold we awaited the morning. 
One detachment lay in the trenches; the rest of us were 
standing in the entrance hall. In the grey of the morning 
a Belgian Major came out of the house with his bicycle. 
. . . He had just gracefully lit his cigarette, when a shot 
from the trenches put an end to his life. This was the 
signal for the fight in the streets. . . . We were only four 
metres distant from the enemy. The enemy wanted to press 
us back into the canal. The leaders of our company and the 



I ACCUSE! 

Dther officers soon fell. The command passes from one of 
us to the other. The enemy threw sulphur bombs, which lit 
up the whole canal, and poisoned the air for us. Our men 
fell one after the other. It was an unending struggle of 
man against man. The enemy pressed us more and more 
closely. It was no longer a fight, it was a mutual butcher- 
ing. . . . With the butt-end of the rifles we beat the 
enemy out of the trenches, and made the dust fly. The rage 
was indescribable. Every centimetre of ground was here 
bought with blood. . . . The dead and the wounded lay 
together in heaps ; those who could still walk sought to get 
back to the hospital over the bridge, but it was a sorrowful 
business for the poor fellows who had been shot in the legs, 
and who could not go with them. They had to put up 
with the heavy shrapnel fire of the enemy." {Vorwarts, 
24th December.) 

Here is a little genre picture from the Wiener 

A rbeiterzeitung : — 

A Reservist born in Warnsdorf had had both his feet 
frostbitten in the Carpathians ; he was brought back, and he 
asked his wife to meet him at the station at Reichenberg. 
As his wife was about to go up the stairs at the station she 
saw "an old, broken-down man with white hair painfully 
coming along the platform, supported on two sticks with a 
bundle in his arm. Out of pity she was going to take the 
bundle from the man and help him to walk." In this mo- 
ment she recognised him: "it was her own husband; the 
woman collapsed unconscious." 

A very interesting contribution to the solution of the 
question whether war "develops the noblest virtues of 
man" (Field-Marshal Moltke) or whether conversely, 
"it makes more bad people than it takes away" 
(Kant), is furnished by a report of a battle published 
in the Jauersche Tageblatt of October 18th, 19 14. The 
writer of this report is the subordinate officer Klemt, of 



THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEED 361 

the First Company of the 154th Regiment, and his state- 
ment is expressly confirmed at the conclusion by his 
Lieutenant and the leader of the Company, von Niem. 
The heading of the article is "A Day of Honour for Our 
Regiment, September 24th, 1914." As a human, or 
rather as a bestial, document the report deserves to be 
reproduced in extenso; I regret that for reasons of space 
I must content myself with an extract: — 

"The first Frenchmen were already discovered; we 
brought them down like squirrels, and gave them a warm 
reception with blows of the butt and bayonet: they no 
longer needed doctors ; we are no longer fighting loyal ene- 
mies, but treacherous brigands. By leaps and bounds we 
got across the clearing. They were here, there, and every- 
where hidden in the thicket. Now it is down with the 
enemy ! And we will give them no quarter. Every one 
shoots standing, a few, a very few, fire kneeling. No one 
tries to take shelter. We reach a little depression in the 
ground: here the red trousers dead or wounded lie in a 
heap on the ground. We knock down or bayonet the 
wounded, for we know that those scoundrels fire at our 
backs when we have gone by. There was a Frenchman 
there stretched out, full length, face down, pretending to 
be dead. A kick from a strong fusilier soon taught him that 
we were there. Turning round, he asked for quarter, but 
we answered: "Is that the way your tools work, you — ," 
and he was nailed to the ground. Close to me I heard odd 
cracking sounds. They were blows from a gun on the bald 
head of a Frenchman, which a private of the 154th was 
dealing out vigorously ; he was wisely using a French gun 
so as not to break his own. Tender-hearted souls are so 
kind to the French wounded that they finish them with a 
bullet, but others give them as many thrusts and blows as 
they can. Our adversaries had fought bravely, we had to 
contend with picked men ; they let us get within thirty, even 
ten metres of them — too near. ... At the entry into the 
screen of branches they lay groaning and crying for quarter, 



362 I ACCUSE! 

but whether wounded slightly or severely the brave fusiliers 
spare their country the cost of caring for many enemies." x 

The report concludes with a description of how the 
tired troops, after their labour of blood, lay down in 
slumber. "The god of dreams paints for one or the 
other a pleasing vision. With a prayer of thanks on 
our lips we slumbered on to the coming day." 

What makes this report so horrible is not so much the 
occurrences which it narrates as the brutal naivete with 
which they are represented as glorious actions of hero- 
ism, specially attested by their leader, and published in 
the most prominent place of the official newspaper of 
the district. It may be that brutalities have also been 
committed by the other side — when the beast is let loose 
in man it need cause no wonder if bestialities occur — 
but I have looked in vain for the publication of such 
"heroic" deeds in the foreign Press. That anyone should 
sit down in cold blood after his work of murder is 
over and vaingloriously narrate in glowing colours hor- 
rors of this sort to his townsmen at home, his friends, 
his own wife and children, makes the matter much more 
pitiful even than it is in itself. The "prayer of thanks" 
to God could not, of course, be wanting in a German 
report of battle. His Royal Highness Prince Oscar of 
Prussia is also quoted by the under-officer Klemt as an 
admirer of the heroic deeds narrated: "With these 
Grenadiers and with the 154th we could take hell by 
storm," exclaimed the Prince, and he assured both the 
regiments that they were worthy of the name of "Royal 
Brigade." 

The report in the Jauer newspaper unites in itself — > 
like the horse afflicted with every conceivable malady 
of which a picture appears in veterinary s chools — all the 

1 [As translated in the English edition of M. Bedier's German 
Atrocities.] 



THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEED 363 

"noblest virtues" which war can and must produce: 
bestiality, boastfulness, false piety, and so on. Whether 
the world "would stagnate and lose itself in Material- 
ism," if these qualities remained undeveloped, I leave 
to be decided by people who are cleverer than I am. 

The Russian poet Valerij Brjussow describes as fol- 
lows his impressions of the battlefield at Lowitz : — 

"The trenches are empty, but near them lie here and there 
the bodies of German soldiers on their backs, face down- 
wards, or on their side, their arms stretched out or held 
tight to their breasts, with strangely peaceful faces. The 
most of them are wearing their dark-grey uniforms, some, 
however, are in their soldiers' cloaks, which have clearly 
been used to protect them against the cold. Among the dead 
I see young men with soft faces, with the first down on 
their cheeks, but I also see older, graver men who have 
entered the forties, who have probably long ago established 
their life on a firm basis, and certainly never thought that 
it would be their fate to close their life on a snow-covered 
field in foreign lands, in far-off distant Russia. . . . Our 
soldiers accompany us in our walk along the side of the 
trenches, and look at the faces of the dead in solemn thought 
and contemplation. In war one becomes accustomed to the 
appearance of death. Death is so constantly before one's 
vision that it ceases to awake a feeling of terror." (Vor- 
w'drts, 16th December.) 

An infantry soldier thus describes the fearful battles 
in Flanders in which he took part : — 

"The soldiers were standing up to their ankles in water 
in their protected positions when they received the order to 
attack. The enemy belched against us their destructive 
shells from 20 mouths of fire. Many were literally torn 
to pieces. . . . All the time our rage grows more terrible. 
,., . . There was a thick black powder smoke; we thought 
we should choke; scarcely anything could be seen of the 



364 I ACCUSE! 

men. These were the shells from the English Navy, which 
was taking part in the battle. . . . Across the middle of 
the field eight horses were galloping, still attached to the 
gun-carriage, when a shell burst in the middle of them. A 
heartrending shriek followed from the animals, and then 
there was nothing to be seen but a quivering, tangled mass 
weltering in a puddle of blood. . . . Listen, what is that? 
A trumpet signal. The sound quivers, as if it also felt the 
pain. 'Fix bayonets.' The clean steel now shines on the 
barrels of the gun which spits out fire. ... A shell burst 
beside the third man on my right ; he was killed, my neigh- 
bour was thrown out and severely wounded. The same 
thing happened on my left. The drummer beat his drum. — 
Up ! Charge ! Hurrah ! I believe that our cheer drowned 
the thunder of the artillery. Then we went for the enemy 
with the bayonet. I will not describe to you the bayonet 
charge. It was a butchery. Twice we had to retreat; on 
the third attack we won. When you at home hear of the 
victory : 'Fall of Dixmuiden !' will you shout hurrah ? We 
thought of the sacrifices; many, many were lying on the 
field bleeding." (Vorwarts, nth December.) 



How Beautiful to Die for the Fatherland 

That is what war looks like, as it is, and as it is felt 
by those who are taking part in it. I seek in vain in 
all the hundreds of letters from the front, and in the 
war correspondence which daily fills the columns of the 
newspapers, for any expression of the sentiment : "How 
beautiful it is to die for the Fatherland." I find repre- 
sented everywhere merely the unspeakable horror and 
the barbarity of the struggle between men, who nourish 
against each other no sentiment of hostility, who have 
all left mothers at home; many, very many, wives and 
children; and who are all filled with the one thought: 
"Oh, that it were peace again! Oh, that you were but 
home among your dear ones, caressed and nourished by 



THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEED 365 

your children, in the arms of your wife and mother, free 
for ever from this horrible task of murder." 

The great men behind the front have, of course, dif- 
ferent views on the subject. Their bones are not broken. 
Their houses are not burnt down. Their wives and 
children are not driven out of house and home. Their 
castles and their domains are not destroyed. They hun- 
ger not, neither do they thirst. They sleep in their beds, 
not in holes in the earth like wild beasts. When they 
have a pain in their heart or their liver they can go 
home and get cured by a course at the springs or the 
baths; their wives and fathers and children can hasten 
to them, tenderly embrace and care for them, until after 
weeks and months they can return once more with re- 
newed vigour to their posts of security behind the battle- 
front. 

While in front of the enemy death and destruction are 
sweeping away the flower of the youth of all countries, 
the prosperity of many generations, the great men sit 
far behind 



1 Kant in Perpetual Peace (p. 145) censures as illogical and 
blasphemous the common conception of a co-operation or a con- 
currence (concursus) on the part of the Deity, as, for example, 
when we say that the physician has restored the sick with the help 
of God. "God created the physician as well as his means of heal- 
ing, and we must ascribe the result wholly to him." [This foot- 
note appears to refer to the censored passage.] 



366 I ACCUSE! 

"Forward! forward! Up and at them!" is the call 
. And those at the front answer with 
moaning and groaning, with pains and torments, with 
longing thoughts of peace and home, which still illumine 
their last faltering look. "Gee up! gee up!" calls the 
driver, and lashes the poor horses who are straining to 
move the heavy wagons forward on the clammy roads. 
They sink in the mud, but he knows no pity. Only 
forward, forward ! Hold on ! No slackening ! And he 
would drive the poor brutes to death if there were not 
a league for the protection of animals which shields the 
wretched beasts against their tormentors. But where is 
the league for the protection of men? It is high time 
that such a league were founded. 

Prestige 

What does a war mean to the great men of the earth? 
A new emotion added to countless others. A drama of 
chivalry played out in earnest, a question of ambition 
and of vanity, which they designate by the word "pres- 
tige"; a "great event in their life," 1 like the victory 
of their colours at the Hoppegarten or of their yachts 
at the Kiel Regatta. "The glory of the ruler consists in 
this, that, without his requiring to expose himself to 
danger, thousands stand at his command ready to let 
themselves be sacrificed for a matter of no concern to 
them. The difference between the savages of Europe 
and those of America lies chiefly in this, that, while 
many tribes of the latter have been entirely devoured 

1 See the telegram of the Crown Princess Cecilia to the Govern- 
mental President in Danzig after the battle of Longwy: "Please 
tell all our dear people in Danzig and West Prussia of my hus- 
band's victory north of Metz, knowing how much interest the 
Province which is so near to us will take in this great event in 
his life. God protect you all." 



THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEED 367 

by their enemies, Europeans know a better way of using 
the vanquished than by eating them; and they prefer to 
increase through them the number of their subjects, 
and so the number of instruments at their command 
for still more widely spread war. 1 

To sacrifice many thousands for a matter of no con- 
cern to them! That is the true meaning of this and of 
most other wars. What does prestige mean to these mil- 
lions of poor devils who are to-day called upon to lay 
down their lives on the battlefield of Europe? They do 
not even know the word, let alone the idea. Prestige is 
a luxury for him who is already surfeited with all the 
other gifts of life. It is the obstinacy which refuses 
to give way even when one feels oneself in the wrong, 
because one is strong enough not to need to give way. 
For the common citizen, however, for the peasant and 
the labourer, prestige is the daily bread which he must 
bitterly earn in the sweat of his face, his health which 
renders it possible for him to achieve his labour, his 
family which brings sweetness and light into his hours 
of his leisure. That is his prestige, and for it he would 
fight voluntarily and with enthusiasm if these blessings 
were imperilled. 

It is for this reason that they try to persuade him that 
they are in danger. The "cunning of a policy that shuns 
the light" exercises the arts of Probabilismus: it "at- 
tributes evil intentions to others, or even the probability 
of their possible superiority." 

"It will be well to put an end to this sophistry, and 
to bring the false advocates of the might of the earth 
to confess that it is not right but might in whose in- 
terest they speak. ... In order to do this, we must 
first expose the delusion by which they deceive them- 
selves and others" (Kant, Perpetual Peace, p. 174, 175). 

Does that not read as if it had been written to-day? 

a Kant: Perpetual Peace, p. 130. 



868 I ACCUSE! 

Is not every word applicable to our position to-day and 
to our present-day leaders? And if the gentlemen who 
signed the "Appeal to the civilised world" do, in fact, 
"hold the inheritance of Kant as sacred as their hearth 
and their soil," then they should read this wonderful 
essay on Perpetual Peace, which, amid all the storms of 
the French revolutionary wars and under the dominance 
of a Prussian military autocracy, dared to utter revo- 
lutionary truths which to-day would be suppressed as 
seditious, and exposed to the persecution of blood at the 
hands of the supreme commanders in the Mark of Bran- 
denburg. 

It is for a phantom that millions to-day are bleeding, 
that millions are hungering, and that inestimable wealth 
is being destroyed. It is for the phantom of prestige, 
of world-power, which has been tricked out in the guise 
of the deliverer of the Fatherland. The gesta Dei per 
Francos are from now to be transformed into the gesta 
Dei per Teutones. The "worshipful" German people — 
as a privatdocent writes (how will he express himself 
when he becomes a professor?) — is, in fact, to be wor- 
shipped by all others as the super-nation. The Germans 
are to advance "to the front of the world," and all 
these hallucinations of an endemic swollen-headedness 
are then designated "defence against the enemy's attack," 
in order thereby to make them palatable to the sound 
sense of the simple people. 

Proletarians of All Countries, Massacre Each 

Other ! 

To beguile the labouring classes to change their peace- 
ful battle-cry, "Proletarians of all countries, combine 
with each other!" into the bloody battle-cry, "Prole- 
tarians of all countries, massacre each other!" is a po- 
litical tour de force which demands careful preparation, 



THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEED 369 

great dexterity, and a fabulously brazen forehead. I 
must admit that our leading men possess these qualities 
in the fullest measure. Here, indeed, their achievement 
is brilliant, unsurpassable. 

The attitude of the Social Democratic party on August 
4th in approving the first war credit of £250,000,000 has 
rightly been subjected to sharp criticism abroad, and 
especially by allied international parties. It ought to 
be emphasised that in the meeting of the party, which 
decided on concurring in the war-credit, there was a 
minority distinguished, not in numbers, but by the im- 
portance of its members. The attitude of the majority 
is explicable by reference to those reasons which have 
been active in drawing the whole of the German people 
into this war, to the false illusion produced by the Gov- 
ernment that this is a war of defence, and not of of- 
fence. Ever since July 31st Germany has been barred 
from all communication with foreign countries. No 
one knew what took place in the world, and especially 
in Germany, in the four days between July 31st and 
August 4th. The German White Book which was laid 
before the members of the House maintained that the 
Russians and French had fallen upon us from the east 
and the west, and that they had already penetrated into 
Germany. The same assertion recurred in the speeches 
of the Emperor and the Chancellor. No one was in a 
position to establish what was true and what was false. 
Under the impression that Germany was compelled to 
fight for her security and her independence, the major- 
ity of the Social Democratic Party supported the war- 
credit, and, according to the statutory regulations of the 
party, compelled the minority to adhere to this de- 
cision. 

The second approval, given on December 2nd, was 
merely the consequence of the first, and since "it is the 
curse of evil deeds, That to all time they still engender 



370 I ACCUSE! 

evil," the group in the party which had approved the 
first credit again secured a majority. Nevertheless, the 
struggle within the party was more violent, and the 
minority had grown stronger. As is well known, Lieb- 
knecht alone had the courage and the strength of char- 
acter to refuse to subject himself to Party-discipline and 
to record his dissentient vote in the sitting of the 
Reichstag. 

This action has very properly met with the approval 
of all comrades in the whole world, with the unfortunate 
exception of the Social Democratic Party in the Reich- 
stag. I regard as extremely regrettable the vote of cen- 
sure passed by the Party on February 2nd. It is uni- 
versally regarded abroad, not as a disciplinary measure 
due to an offence against the internal order of the party, 
but as a condemnation of the substantial point involved 
in the dissension of Liebknecht, and therefore as an 
emphatic approval of the war-credit and of the whole 
war policy of the Government. As a matter of fact, it 
would have been more expedient, having regard to the 
future reconstruction of the international party, if in 
this fundamental question party discipline had been ig- 
nored ; such a course would have avoided the appearance 
that it was unworthy of a member of the German So- 
cial Democratic Party to vote against the war-credit. 

It would appear that in Berlin no account was taken 
of the effect which such a party resolution was bound to 
exercise on their comrades abroad. Above all, they do 
not appear to realise that the sympathy of all foreign 
comrades are on Liebknechfs side, and not on the side 
of the nationalist majority of the Social Democratic 
Party. By his action on December 2nd Liebknecht has 
become the most popular German socialist abroad, and 
in saying this I have in mind neutral countries rather 
than enemy countries, whose approval might appear sus- 
pect. The reconstruction of the International Party 



THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEED 371 

will be built on the attitude of Liebknecht, not on the 
attitude of those members of the house who, once de- 
ceived, were not possessed of the insight or the courage 
to acknowledge or confess their error, and who have 
gradually rolled down the slippery slope of opportunism 
into the camp of the Nationalists and the Imperialists. 
They have entangled themselves so strongly with the 
"National," that they will not again find their way back 
to the "International," and the International Party her- 
self will not, as I hope and trust, later on spread out 
her motherly arms and exclaim : "Bring back my bonny 
to me." The prodigal sons — and it is better so — will 
hereafter also remain in a far country. 

It is, however, necessary to compliment the German 
Government on the fact that they have understood in 
a masterly manner — at least for the present, the conse- 
quences will be revealed later — how to put in operation 
the policy of "divide et impera" "That is to say, if 
there are certain privileged persons among the people 
. . . bring about a quarrel among them, and make mis- 
chief between them and the people" (Kant, p. 171). 
They have succeeded in bringing about a quarrel among 
these leaders, but it is to be hoped that the people will 
be one when the day of the great reckoning comes, the 
"day of judgment," when. all guilt will be uncovered, 
and every crime will find its expiation. 

Political Morality — Moral Politics 

As in matters of foreign policy the German Govern- 
ment appears to have taken the instructions of Bern- 
hardi as their guiding principle, so, in internal affairs, 
they have chosen as their model Kant's description of 
what a politician shoidd not be. Where moral politics 
cease, says the sage of Konigsberg, political morality 
begins. Political morality, however, which is equivalent 



372 I ACCUSE! 

to non-morality, acts according to the following "So- 
phistical maxims" : — 

"i. Fac et excusa. Seize the most favourable oppor- 
tunity for arbitrary usurpation — either of the authority 
of the State over its own people or over a neighbouring 
people; the justification of the act and extenuation of 
the use of force will come much more easily and grace- 
fully when the deed is done than if one has to think out 
convincing reasons for taking this step, and first hear 
through all the objections which can be made against 
it. . . . Besides, this show of audacity in a statesman 
even lends him a certain semblance of inward conviction 
of the justice of his action; and once he has got so far 
the god of success {bonus eventus) is his best advocate." 

"2. Si fecisti, nega. As for any crime you have com- 
mitted, such as has, for instance, brought your people 
to despair and thence to insurrection, deny that it has 
happened owing to any fault of yours. Say, rather, 
... in the case of your having usurped a neighbouring 
State, that human nature is to blame; for if a man is 
not ready to use force and steal a march upon his neigh- 
bour, he may certainly count on the latter forestalling 
him and taking him prisoner." x 

Is that not a photographically true, almost prophetic, 
picture of Bethmann's method of action, which, more- 
over, has been characterised, not merely by the philos- 
opher in his chair, but also by the philosopher on the 
throne? "When Princes desire war they begin it, and 
then summon an industrious lawyer to prove that they 
were right" (Frederick II). You begin a war and then 
prove that the other side began it, or at least that he 
was on the point of beginning it, and that it was neces- 
sary to anticipate him. In adopting such a course your 
external honour can never be injured — that is, if you 
are believed — for either you are compelled to be the 
^ant, p. 170. 



THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEED 373 

defender of the Fatherland or else you are the prudent 
guardian of the peace, who anticipated the certain at- 
tack. Morality, however, which ought to govern the 
actions of States as well as of individuals, thereby comes 
to grief, and no words appear to the philosopher of 
Konigsberg to be sufficiently strong to characterise the 
perniciousness of such politicians. "But it seems that 
by no theodicy or vindication of the justice of God can 
we justify Creation in putting such a race of corrupt 
creatures into the world at all. . . . Politics in the real 
sense cannot take a step forward without first paying 
homage to the principles of morals. And, although 
politics, per se, is a difficult art, in its union with morals 
no art is required." He who subordinates moral poli- 
tics to political morals, that is to say, the principles to 
the end, puts the cart before the horse, and acts against 
the categorical Imperative. 1 

That is the "inheritance" of Kant, and anyone who 
exalts this inheritance thereby utters a condemnation of 
the policy which has led to this, the most horrible of 
all wars, a policy which has perhaps acted according to 
"political morality," but which certainly has not been 
an instance of moral politics. 

Meanwhile, however, the work of blood, the hated 
task, goes on, and the life blood of our nation is being 
sucked dry as though by gigantic leeches, and drained 
in the insatiable vengeance of the moloch of war. "To 
visit a battlefield is a horrible business," wrote the Em- 
peror Frederick III. "It is impossible to describe the 
fearful wounds presented to the eye. War is, in spite 
of everything, a terrible affair, and those who, sitting 
round a council table, conjure it up by a stroke of the 
pen, do not know what they are doing." "The most 
horrible side of war should, however, be seen by those 
who have frivolously brought it about, by those diplo- 
1 Kant, pp. 182, 175. 



374 I ACCUSE! 

matists who regard it as a factor in their calculations, 
with the same lightness of heart with which a merchant 
allows in his calculations for the possibility of a chance 
of gain; these men should themselves help to storm such 
a canal-bridge exposed to the enemy's shell fire" ; these 
are the words of a doctor writing from the scene of 
operations. 1 

How do you feel, Herr von Bethmann, when you read 
such things as these? How did you express it in your 
last circular note? 2 The "idea of a conference," you 
say, was not "sympathetic" to you; the "form" of a 
conference was "disagreeable." And now — are the fear- 
ful consequences which have sprung from your refusal 
more sympathetic to you? Do you find them less dis- 
agreeable? Do you still dare, even to-day, to speak 
of your sympathies and your antipathies, of your scruples 
as to this or that form, when your antipathies and your 
scruples have plunged Europe in a sea of blood, and 
have made our famous European civilisation the laughter 
of savage nations ? "We savages are, after all, the better 
men!" may be the rightful boast of the Red Indian to- 
day. And if, as I recently saw in an allegorical picture, 
all the yellow, black, and brown primitive nations were 
to assemble on the edge of Europe, and, seeing the 
scenes of murder and destruction, the smoking villages 
and towns, were to exclaim in derision: "Voila voire 
celebre civilisation" Europe could only hide her head 
in shame, and in justice admit the higher culture of 
savage peoples. Have we, the nations of Europe, still 
any legal title — such a title has, indeed, never been recog- 
nised by morally thinking men — to embark on colonial 
conquests when the only pretence that we can advance 
for our predatory excursions, that we are the bearers 

1 Berliner Tageblatt, 24th Sept. 

a See Circular Note of the Chancellor of 24th December (Ap- 
pendix III). 



THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEED 375 

of culture and civilisation, has so miserably come to 
nought ? 

It is to you, Herr von Bethmann, that we owe all 
this. Parturiunt monies, nascetur ridicuhts mus. The 
mountains are in travail, and a little mouse is born. 
Here it is the other way about; from the little mouse 
of your antipathies and scruples there have arisen gi- 
gantic mountains of human unhappiness. Go to the 
battlefields, go to the hospitals; see the wounded, the 
dead, and the dying; go into the wasted cities, and pray 
before the ruined altars, entreating your Saviour for 
forgiveness, that you, in place of the words "Peace on 
earth, goodwill to men," have brought about "Murder 
on earth, and for men fire and destruction." Then beat 
your breast and confess aloud and in public, so that all 
the world may hear it : " I am the guilty , I alone i" This 
would not bring you righteousness, but it would be the 
first step towards it — the penitence which in itself is 
half atonement. 



If the Emperor had not found a Chancellor to make 
this "war of liberation," Germany would have 

remained unliberated, that is to say, peaceful, molested 
by none, developing her culture and her well-being in 
the labour of peace. And what is now our position? 

still happy if we can keep 
from our frontiers the enemy, whom we ourselves called 
into being; we should be fortunate if we could to-day 
occupy the position we held half a year ago, possessed 
of our colonies, our wealth, and the youth of our coun- 
try, now murdered, and daily wasting away. 



376 I ACCUSE! 

Q'UIDQUID DELIRANT REGES, PLECTUNTUR ACHIVI 

But just for this purpose men are needed, 
not courtiers; men full of character, who can oppose 
the royal will, who can take the side of the Achseans 
against the King. "Immunity from punishment is a 
special privilege of the kingly dignity, but it in no way 
excludes the possibility of deserving punishment." The 
task of men who stand beside kings as their responsible 
advisers is to keep them from deserving punishment. 
"Nor can there be a worse service either to the prince 
or his people than enabling a monarch to rule in his 
own person, dictating the commands of his own violence 
or caprice through servants who disapprove of his meas- 
ures, and yet suffer themselves to be made instruments 
for carrying them into execution." * 

What in the case of a prince is, at any rate, explic- 
able becomes in the 
case of a responsible statesman an unpardonable crime. 
The prince who from his early youth is brought up in 
the mystery of statecraft by the grace of God is sur- 
rounded by flatterers and panderers, by courtiers and 
parasites, who are apparently his servants, but are in 
reality his masters, a prince who seldom hears the truth, 
and who never desires to hear it, notwithstanding the 
words of Mirza Schaffy: — 

"The sage needs not the smile of those in high estate, 
The wise man's sage advice is needed by the great." 2 

— a prince who regards the constrained silence of the 
people as a token of unprecedented harmony, because 
no one tells him what is living and stirring in the depths 
of the nation's soul — such a prince is more easily ex- 

1 Brougham. Statesmen [Essay on Lord North]. 
a "Der Weise kann des Machtigen Gunst entbehren, 
Doch nicht der Machtige des Weisen Lehrea" 



THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEED 377 

cused than a Chancellor, if he confuses his ambition for 
wider fields of conquest for fame and glory with the 
well-being and the happiness of his people. The coun- 
sellors of a prince exist, however, for the express purpose 
of protecting him against the consequences of his own 
passions, and of reminding him in the words of Junius : 
"Before your Majesty subdues the hearts of your sub- 
jects, you must gain a noble victory over your own." 1 

They must be, not the servants of their lord, but 
the first servants of the State. A personal attachment 
to the monarch can furnish no reason or defence for the 
public behaviour of a minister; for the former rests on 
sentiment, but the latter on duty, on the categorical 
imperative. In the choice between sentiment and duty 
the latter only must be decisive. The alternative, "se 
soumettre ou se demettre" can only be decided in favour 
of the latter resolution. 

Worst of all, however, is when a minister, not only 
covers with his shield the 

actions of his monarch, but endeavours to justify them 
by Machiavellian manoeuvres. We have become almost 
more Machiavellian than Machiavelli himself, and we 
have quite forgotten that our great ancestor Frederick 
II. wrote the Antimachiavel. "The promise given was 
a necessity of the past; the broken word is a necessity 
of the present." Does it not sound as if the clever 
Florentine had expressly coined this phrase for the Bel- 
gian question? "A Prince must have no other object, 
and no other thought, and he must make nothing else 
his study than war, its preparation and conduct." Has 
this not been from time immemorial the policy of the 
Kings of Prussia? "Let the Prince take care to con- 
quer and to maintain his domination; the means will 
always be declared honourable, and praised by every- 
one." Is that not the thread of Ariadne, by which we 
1 [Letter 35. 19th December, 1769.] 



378 I ACCUSE! 

hope to escape out of the labyrinth of our present situa- 
tion, that we may not fall victims to the Minotaur of 
universal condemnation? Machiavelli has usurped the 
place of Kant, and in our case also the end justifies the 
means. 

Dreams of World Power 

What is the object and the aim of this war? I have 
already repeatedly pointed out that the object of our 
rulers is the establishment of a new dominium mundi. 



The Prussian Eagle is to spread his pinions over every 
sea; a new age in history is to dawn; the Roman, the 
Spanish, and the English world-empires are now to be 
followed by the German. 1 The saying of Virgil is 
adapted for German use: "Tu regere imperio populos 
Germane memento." As Aristotle expected a trans- 

1 Now, of course, when the grapes have become sour, everyone 
denies the existence of these plans of world power; here again 
"it was nobody." On the same day, however, on which it was 
declared from a high quarter that the supposed intention to found 
a world-empire was "nonsense," an "Imperial Journal of the East- 
em Army" was issued by the Press Authorities of the German 
Military Government in Lodz, in celebration of the Emperor's 
birthday. In this we find the following: — 

A victorious war — and God be thanked, no one in our Ger- 
man Fatherland, from the oldest Field Marshal down to the 
youngest cobbler's apprentice, has any doubt that such will 
be the issue — will create for us a German Colonial Empire by 
the annexation of Belgian and French Congo, and if Portugal 
should transform into action her hostile attitude towards us, 
the Portuguese Colonies on the East and West Coasts of 
Africa as well. This will be an empire such as our fathers 
who sneered in laughter at our first colonial beginnings could 
never have imagined. . . . The most important point, however, 
in this not improbable division of the African Continent is 



THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEED 379 

formation of the Eastern world, a domination of Hel- 
lenic culture, as a result of the expedition of Alexander 
the Great, so we expect from this war the transforma- 
tion of the Western world, a domination of German 
culture. What a childish, unhistoric view! If wars in 
long forgotten ages, wars between civilised nations and 
barbarians, may at times have been the means of bring- 
ing culture, their effect to-day among peoples of equal 
culture is precisely the opposite; they are destroyers of 
culture, promoters of atavistic barbarism. The future 
of the human race to-day can lie only in the nations 
of the world living peacefully together. All plans of 
world-domination, which even in earlier times bore 
within them the seeds of their own destruction, must 
to-day, even before they achieve realisation, be wrecked 
on the feeling of equality among all nations, on the 
common consciousness that all are striving after the 
same ends in culture and well-being, on the intimate re- 
lations which bind corresponding classes of different 
nations with each other. As geological strata and veins 
of iron and mineral are not directed to the surface ac- 
cording to the dividing lines between properties, but un- 

that we shall thereby have given the final stroke to English 
efforts to establish a sole dominion in Africa, from the Cape 
to Cairo; for between Egypt and East Africa and the Anglo- 
Boer South Africa (which to-day are still English), there will 
then lie the unending girdle of our gigantic colonial positions 
from the Indian Ocean to the Central African Lakes, and from 
the Congo to the Atlantic. Of North-East and South Africa 
we say that to-day these are still English; but who knows 
what will happen if the word of the poet is fulfilled : "For 
the world will one day find Healing in the German mind." 
(Denn es muss am deutschen Wesen, einmal noch die Welt 
gene sen.) 

The Newspaper which contains the foregoing remark is officially 
published by the military authorities as a birthday-present for the 
Emperor: sapienti sat. 



380 I ACCUSE! 

derneath these boundaries pass from one property to 
another, so the strata of modern human society are not 
broken up by territorial frontiers, but pass from one 
country to another. Horizontal interdependence has 
taken the place of the vertical line of division. And if" 
there is only one truly organised International, there 
exist beside it a hundred others unorganised, held to- 
gether by equally firm internal bonds. Of such are the 
Internationals of trade, of industry, of the technical 
and moral sciences, and of literature and art, all of 
which constitute the indestructible spiritual bond con- 
necting the nations; we may say that even crime has 
become international. Wars may loosen, but they can- 
not destroy these bonds. Nature itself, as Kant once 
said, "through the natural course of human propensi- 
ties guarantees the coming of perpetual peace, the future 
of which we are not, indeed, enabled to prophesy, but 
for which it is the duty of mankind to labour." The 
path to perpetual peace lies, not in the domination of 
one over others, but in a life lived together with equal 
rights. 

The dreams of our world-dominion will thus remain 
dreams, even if we had the power to subject other 
nations to our will. The aims which a Bismarck kept 
in view were reasonable and attainable, because they 
lay within the limits of the historical development of 
our age. The formation of national States must first 
be achieved before humanity is ripe for other more 
comprehensive formations. The effort of the German 
people to attain unity was a logical historical develop- 
ment, and was therefore successful. The effort of recent 
Germany, however, to attain world-dominion represents 
historical retrogression, a falling away from the aims 
set before civilised nations, and is, therefore, neces- 
sarily bound to end in failure. 

Our aim is therefore unattainable, and the means 



THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEED 381 

adopted to attain it are criminal. Military success alone, 
even if it were probable (which it is not), would not 
bring us nearer to our aim by so much as a hairbreadth. 
In the twentieth century there can no longer be a world- 
dominion, and if one were possible we would be the last 
to be recognised as rulers of the world. Any peace 
which might more or less accord to us such a dominion 
would be but an armed truce, and, as in the case of the 
treaties of peace between Greeks and Persians, would 
be concluded only with the clause "for the time being." 
One war would continuously give birth to another, and 
Europe unrestrainably and inevitably would be driven 
into the abyss. 

There is still time to avoid the worst fate; it is still 
possible to 

"Bind up the wounds inflicted on your country, 

Rebuild the devastated homes of men, 

And raise once more the pride of lofty towns 

From smoky ruins. Spring will return again 

And clothe the wasted fields with lushy green. 

But they who fell the victims of your quarrel, 

The dead, rise up no more ; the bitter tears 

Shed in the issue of your controversy 

Will be for ever shed. Another race 

In God's own time will prosper, but the past 

Will still remain the prey of misery. 

The joys of generations still unborn 

Cannot recall to life the long-gone dead." l 

1 "Des Landes tief e Wunden heilen 

Die Dorfer, die verwusteten, die Stadte 
Aus ihrem Schutt sich prangender erheben, 
Die Felder decken sich mit neuem Griin — 
Doch die das Opfer eures Zwist's gefallen 
Die Toten stehen nicht mehr auf ; die Thranen 
Die eurem Streit geflossen sind, sie bleiben 
Geweint ! Das kommende Geschlecht wird bliihen 
Doch das Vergangene war des Elends Raub. 
Der Enkel Gluck erweckt nicht mehr die Vater.** 



382 I ACCUSE! 

The dead rise up no more. But even the wounds, 
which have been inflicted on the economic life of all 
nations will only be slowly healed in many decades. 

Who Will Fay the Cost of the War? 

The cost and the damage caused by the war during 
the first six months have been estimated by authorita- 
tive writers at more than four thousand million pounds, 
apart from all private expenditure and losses, apart 
from the value to the nation of the dead and the muti- 
lated, and apart from the labour lost to the State repre- 
sented by the soldiers who are under arms. There 
can be no question of compensation being paid for these 
costs and losses of war by the defeated party to the 
conqueror — if, indeed, a victory of one side or the other 
is conceivable. In Germany, apart from the Empire, 
the individual States and communes have also incurred 
millions of debts. Who is to pay these gigantic sums? 
Who is to labour and pay even the interest on them? 
"When I see Princes and States fighting and quarrel- 
ling, it always brings to my mind a match of cudgel- 
playing fought in a china-shop" (Hume). 1 The fellows 
with the cudgels are the belligerent nations; the china- 
shop is the economic organisation of the world, and it 
will not be long before all the china in the world is 
broken into fragments. 

Quousque Tandem ? 
How is it to go on? How is it to end? 



1 [In the Essay Of Public Credit] 



THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEED 383 

Every victory is a Pyrrhic victory. "One more such 
victory and I am lost." Among the sixty-seven millions 
of Germans is there not a single soul who will dare 
to brave the thunderbolts of Jupiter and exclaim, as 
Themistocles did to Eurybiades : "Strike, but listen !" 
Must subservient newspaper writers continue to let their 
scandalous reports run through the Press, 



— while outside on the snow-covered fields, in the damp 
earth-huts, the children of their country perish and 
bleed to death, while the widow and the fatherless pour 
forth a rising flood of tears? 

How long will all this still go on? How is it to end?' 
The nations are not advantaged if after peace the "right 
trusty cousins" fall into each other's arms in emotion, 
embrace each other, and once more assume each other's 
uniforms which they have discarded in the interval. 
The nation is not advantaged by solemn entrances 
through the Brandenburger Tor, 



with crowns of laurel and the blare of trumpets. 

It is peace the people want; peace they are craving 
for, peace for which they hunger and thirst. There 
are enough dead and mutilated; there is enough mis- 
ery and ruin. The conscience of the world is stirring; 
the words now being raised in accusation will find the 
sword of fulfilment if the stern accents of the voice of 
the people remains unheard. Vivos voco, mortuos 
plango, fulgura frango; I call the living, I lament the 



384 I ACCUSE! 

dead, I defy the lightning — such is the call of the bell 
of the world's conscience to the mighty ones. 

And on your head 
Turns he the widows' tears, the orphans' cries, 
The dead men's blood, the pining maidens' groans 
For husbands, fathers and betrothed lovers, 
That shall be swallow'd in this controversy. 1 

They have suffered enough, the Achseans 

The nations have never been 
enemies. From all letters written at the front it is 
clear that the feelings of hatred and of revenge are 
unknown in the trenches. These are the dragon's eggs 
which are hatched at home at the writing-tables in the 
coziness of editors' rooms. From trench to trench 
friendship and brotherhood are concluded. They visit 
each other, make each other small presents, and shake 
hands in friendship. And then they return to the 
trenches, and shoot at each other on commands from 
above. Is that not unspeakable, incredible? 

If we had not known long ago that none of the bellig- 
erent nations desired war, that a few hundred, at the 
most a few thousand, criminal men had desired and 
engineered this murder of the nations, the fraternisa- 
tion between the trenches would prove that between the 
nations no enmity exists. But just because it proves 
this, just because it might be prejudicial to the energy 
of murder, and gradually make it clear to those who 
are fighting that they are fighting for nothing which 
concerns them, that they are urged on against each 
other by higher powers who are pursuing their interests 
— for this reason, just as I am writing these lines, a 
strong prohibition against these scenes of fraternisation 
has been issued by the supreme German Command. 

1 Shakespeare, Henry V. 



THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEED 385 

There must be no fraternisation, no hand-shaking, there 
must be no pause in the firing, for God's sake, no ! The 
task of murder must go on without loss of time. Nulla 
dies sine linea, there must be no day without murder 
and arson. 

But all army commands will be of no avail. La 
verite est en marche. Every hour, every day, brings 
the illumination nearer. And if they will not — the gen- 
tlemen behind the front — in the end they must. 

Peace will come — soon, as quickly as possible, for it 
must come. Woe to the generals who still throw their 
sword into the balance — woe to those rulers who will 
still refuse to hear the subdued, forcibly restrained voice 
of the nations! Under the placid surface of internal 
peace x the seething waters are in agitation, boiling and 
bubbling. Woe to those who refuse to hear the subter- 
ranean noises, and who still confide their bark to the 
treacherous waters. They will be devoured by the 
waves ! — Discite moniti! Learn, you have been warned ! 

1 [Burgfrieden.] 



V 

THE FUTURE 

What should Peace bring us? 

The matter is not ended on the mere conclusion of 
peace. What should peace bring us? What will peace 
bring us? 

It ought to bring what for centuries has been the 
object striven after by most enlightened minds: not an 
armed truce, but an enduring state of peace, founded 
on a sure basis of law. The system hitherto in force 
whereby peace was balanced on the bayonet's point has 
gone bankrupt, bankrupt for ever. The insanity of mili- 
tary preparation, which in 1910 cost the States of 
Europe, in direct expenditure alone, provided for in 
the Budgets — apart, that is to say, from indirect expen- 
diture not so provided — a sum of approximately 500 
million pounds, and which since then has become at 
least 20 per cent, more costly each year, this insanity 
has not fulfilled the purpose which was supposed to 
justify its existence. The fact that the States of Europe 
endeavoured to outbid each other in an unholy emula- 
tion in armaments by land and by water, in the air and 
under the sea, constituted a menace to peace, not a se- 
curity against war. A perpetually increasing feeling of 
distrust has sprung from this iron seed. All diplomatic 
negotiations became to the nations of Europe an object 
of fear and anxiety on account of the distant clang of 
arms, and everyone was swayed by the oppressive feel- 

386 



THE FUTURE 887 

ing that this condition of affairs could not continue, 
that at length we would be compelled to alter our course 
or be driven to disaster. 

The catastrophe has now arrived, the catastrophe 
which has been so long the object of prophecy and of 
dread. But it has dragged into its whirlpool not merely 
the life and the well-being of nations; it has engulfed 
also the system, which, it was imagined, afforded to the 
nations a deceptive security. 



THE SYSTEM OF ARMED PEACE 

On the system of armed peace judgment has been 
passed. In peace it devoured the marrow of nations, 
and it has failed in preventing war. The system of 
European equilibrium has revealed itself to be even 
more fatal than the previous system, when individual 
States, armed to the teeth, confronted each other. The 
Franco-Prussian War of 1870 was mere child's play in 
comparison with the struggle of the nations in 19 14. 
A mistaken system cannot be corrected by being drawn 
on a large, instead of a small, scale. On the contrary, 
the weaknesses and the defects inherent in it must thereby 
be made more patent. The guarantee of peace supposed 
to be afforded by military armaments must work with 
more fatal effect the greater the number of States allied 
with each other in the two scales of the balance. What 
in the ratio of 1 : 1 was already unreasonable and per- 
nicious must be thrice as unreasonable and pernicious 
in the ratio of 3 : 3 — pernicious in peace, even worse 
in war. By the concatenation of alliances and ententes 
a position has now been reached which enormously sur- 
passes all the visions of horror foretold by far-seeing 
sociologists. 

The prophecies of Johann von Bloch with regard to 
the character, the extent, and the horror of a future 



3S8 I ACCUSE! 

European war have all been realised — only the realisa- 
tion is far worse than the gifted Russian statesman 
could possibly have foreseen. He could not have imaged 
to himself the development of aeronautics, of subma- 
rines, of the gigantic siege-artillery, and of all the other 
recent triumphs of culture. But in his monumental 
work of 1899 he already prophesied that on the occa- 
sion of the next European war there would be shown 
to have taken place in the years since 1870 a greater 
progress in the mechanism of war than that represented 
by the development from the age of bows and arrows 
down to the Franco-Prussian War. Even then he had 
prophesied that the new artillery would exercise such 
a murderous effect that it would scarcely be possible 
to speak of a battle in the former sense of the word or 
of personal bravery, and that war must develop into 
a continuous fortification-war between trenches. He 
characterised in all its details the horror and the terror 
of the modern war of machinery, and he expressed 
doubts — and his doubts have to-day been frequently 
confirmed — whether modern civilised Europeans could 
bear all these fearful impressions on their mind, on 
their senses of seeing and hearing, without giving way to 
insanity. In such a war — so prophesied Bloch — there 
would no longer be a conqueror and a conquered, there 
would no longer be any possibility of giving proper at- 
tendance to the gigantic number of the wounded, unless 
the Army Medical Service was made almost as strong 
numerically as the combatants. There would be no pos- 
sibility of obtaining sufficient supplies in the exhausted 
countries in which the battles took place. There would 
be no possibility of the belligerent States raising for 
any length of time even the bare daily cost involved in 
the maintenance of such enormous armies. All this was 
foreseen by the pacifist Johann von Bloch, not in virtue 
of any special gift of second sight, but merely by rea- 



THE FUTURE 389 

son of his profound study for many years of these 
questions of so vital importance to the civilisation of 
Europe. 

And now we are experiencing what he foresaw — a 
swaying backwards and forwards of these armies of 
twenty million men — without end, without result, with- 
out even the possibility of a final decision, notwithstand- 
ing all the inspiring appeals of kings and of the leaders 
of armies. Forwards ! Backwards ! Backwards and 
forwards! Such are the constantly changing rallying 
cries. Only for the dead is there no retreat. A village, 
a farmyard, a trench, a hillock demands thousands of 
sacrifices. A single well-directed shrapnel can — with 
luck — kill or mutilate a hundred men. The worst of 
all, however, is that this massacre en masse represents 
a suicide of the nations, which must gradually perish 
from loss of blood and from exhaustion; it has but one 
favourable consequence, in so far as it is at the same 
time a suicide of the political system out of which the 
war was born — a suicide of this system, not only in 
internal, but also in foreign affairs. 

After the war it will not be possible — as even the most 
infatuated militarist will admit — to effect an increase in 
armaments. Even in the past the burden of European 
armaments had become an intolerable weight. Emile 
de Girardin was right when he said forty years ago: 
"Misery could be abolished with the half of present-day 
European expenditure on war." The insanity of this 
system may be illustrated by the following example : In 
the primitive ages of human society, two neighbouring 
occupiers of the soil, when each had to provide his own 
protection, become suspicious of each other. Each fears 
that he will be attacked by the other, whereas in reality 
neither entertains evil intentions against his neighbour. 
Instead of tilling their fields and increasing their herds, 
they call upon all their people, their women and chit- 



890 I ACCUSE! 

dren, their peasants and servants, to devote their whole 
time, day after day, month after month, year after year, 
to the preparation of entrenchments and barricades 
against their neighbour, to the forging of arms, to the 
creation of bows and arrows and slings. Their supplies 
are gradually used up. The means of obtaining such 
supplies elsewhere are exhausted. Both are on the verge 
of starvation. At last, in the moment of supreme need, 
the distrusting neighbours resolve to discuss matters with 
each other, and, behold! neither of them has ever had 
any intention of attacking the other, and all the time 
each has dreaded only that the other was going to 
attack him. At a stroke the shadows of distrust dis- 
appear. But the dark shadows of the insane dissipa- 
tion of their strength will long hover about their house 
and their home, and for long years to come will prevent 
them from regaining their former state of prosperity. 

The nations of Europe have not been able to discover 
in time the pathway to reason, and consequently in 
the nature of things the other solution of the intolerable 
tension was bound to come about — the solution of un- 
reason, the substitution of an open for a latent state 
of war. We have already seen in the course of this 
discussion who is responsible for the fact that this so- 
lution by force had to come, that all attempts to bring 
about an enduring state of peace were bound to fail. 
But even the guilty party will now realise that all his 
military preparations, all his opposition to every pro- 
posal to bring about an understanding, have brought him 
no advantage, and that there has to come to pass what 
we pacifists have always prophesied : the relative strength 
of the various nations — notwithstanding the ruin of 
them all — has in essential matters remained unaltered. 

And so judgment is passed on the system. The possi- 
bility of resuming or strengthening this condemned sys- 
tem is excluded, and — after the final wreck of anarchy 



THE FUTURE 391 

based on force — the only course open to the European 
system of States is to return to the thought which for 
centuries the most distinguished minds in Europe have 
preached as the only means of salvation, whereby the 
old world of our culture can be preserved from complete 
destruction. 

That thought is: 

A COVENANT OF PEACE BETWEEN FREE NATIONS 

based on a mutual recognition of their rights and on 
mutual confidence — a federation of free States, as Kant 
calls it. This would be a federation of nations, not a 
State of nations (Ein Volkerbund, kein Volkerstaat), a 
covenant which would leave to the States enjoying mem- 
bership their full sovereignty with only the one limita- 
tion, that they should not abuse this sovereignty by mak- 
ing war against any of the covenanting States. This 
federation would be based, not on force, but on mutual 
confidence, on the feeling of duty, on the categorical 
imperative. The sage of Konigsberg considered that 
even in his time such a covenant of peace between Euro- 
pean States was possible, without internal political or- 
ganisation, without a supreme law-giving power, since 
it corresponded to the interests of all alike, and since it 
was for all alike a command of duty. True, the higher 
and stronger unity, the positive idea of a world-republic, 
hovered before his vision as an ideal worthy to be pur- 
sued, but, seeing that the world was not ripe for that 
great ideal, the man of "practical reason" contented him- 
self with the "negative substitute for it, a federation 
averting war, maintaining its ground, and ever extend- 
ing over the world." Kant had no doubt about the 
practicability of this Covenant of Peace (fa?dus pacifi- 
cum), and he only longed for the moment when a "pow- 
erful and enlightened people" would make themselves 



392 I ACCUSE! 

the central point of such a federal union, and by the 
further adhesion of other nations would extend this 
federation more and more among civilised nations. 1 

This Kantian thought, apparently so simple, is the 
most profound ever conceived on the subject of the for- 
mation of a European family of States on a basis of 
international law. This is not the offspring of an ideolo- 
gist dwelling in the clouds, but of one who knew his 
fellow-men and looked with undimmed vision on the 
world around him, drawing practical conclusions from 
the experiences of history and from the conditions of 
his own time — the references to contemporary political 
affairs may often be traced ironically between the lines. 
He expressly states that he is not concerned with theo- 
retical constructions, but he only desires that the philoso- 
pher should be heard by the King, because "the pos- 
session of power is inevitably fatal to the free exercise 
of reason." He is, it is true, content with the role which 
statesmen, with their worldly skill, commonly assign to 
philosophy — the role of a handmaid — but he indicates 
that this handmaid's role should be to bear the torch be- 
fore her mistress, not to carry the train behind her. 
For the time being he renounces his more far-reaching 
ideal, and contents himself, in the first place, with ends 
which are practically attainable. 2 

These ends are to-day infinitely more desirable than 
they then were, and at the same time they are infinitely 
more easy of attainment. They are infinitely more de- 
sirable because the condition of lawlessness and anarchy 
which Kant even then deplored must necessarily involve 
to-day much more fatal consequences, in view of the 
present-day greatness and the development of strength 
of the States of Europe. If the consequences of war 
could imperil the existence even of .States of a few mil- 

^ant, p. 134- 
2 Kant, p. 160. 



THE FUTURE 393 

lion inhabitants, such as then existed, economically or- 
ganised in essential matters on a national basis, with 
production and consumption of goods taking place for 
the most part within the territorial limits of the country, 
what suicidal catastrophes await the European States 
of to-day involved in the war, comprising as they do, 
within and without Europe, a population of 890 million 
souls, or 53 per cent, of the whole population of the 
world, indissolubly linked together as they are like the 
organs of a vast body by thousands of the finest nerves 
and sinews of a spiritual and material nature! What 
Kant regarded as necessary for the world of his time 
to preserve it from gradual destruction is to-day a mil- 
lion times more necessary; for then each of the belliger- 
ent nations could at need still continue to pursue its own 
independent life — like the separate sections of a lizard 
— whereas to-day the gigantic body of modern civilised 
humanity is struck to the heart by a world-war, and the 
whole organism perishes. 

While it is thus true, on the one hand, that the con- 
dition of the modern world infinitely increases the evils 
of war, it must, on the other hand, be remembered that 
it offers infinitely more possibilities, in comparison with 
the past, of meeting these evils. To-day preparations 
have already been made in very great measure in all 
fields of international relations for the realisation of 
the Kantian federation of free States. Apart from what 
are properly regarded as treaties between States, there 
exist innumerable international organisations in all 
spheres of intercourse, trade, agriculture, and learning, 
ranging from the Postal Union to the agreement for 
the protection of seals in the Behring Sea ; and there are 
innumerable international institutions for carrying out 
and supervising the agreements in question. Arbitra- 
tion treaties in very great number are already in exist- 
ence, with and without the obligatory duty of summon- 



394 I ACCUSE! 

ing the court of arbitration, and these are in part so 
far-reaching that even so-called questions of life and 
honour have to be submitted to the decision of arbitra- 
tion. There exists in the Hague an international court 
of arbitration, the constitution, procedure, and jurisdic- 
tion of which have been approved by the signatures of 
all civilised States in the world. In short, in every 
possible sphere the bonds of international community 
are already being drawn more closely together; only 
in one province, the most important of ail, affecting all 
vital interests of the nations alike, only on the one 
question of war and peace between the great States of 
Europe, Anarchy and Lawlessness still hold sway; here 
Dame Diplomacy still rules with her out-worn methods, 
with her tricks and intrigues of unregenerate days, 1 with* 
her antiquated devotees, who instead of keeping in view 
the common interests of all, seek Only by all the means 
of political morality — that is to say, immorality — to make 
petty profits for those from whom they receive their in- 
structions. This diplomacy is a fossil from long-gone 
ages of history, an anachronism which is as much at 
home in these present times as an Indian medicine man 
is in a modern hospital. As the medicine man stands 
helplessly before the sufferer with his hocus-pocus (not- 
withstanding that he may perhaps create the appearance 
of being able to help him), so the diplomatists, as has 
again been proved, stand helplessly before the danger- 
ous malady of the nations, incapable of preventing the 
outbreak of the fatal evil. This is unaffected by the 
personal efficiency of many individuals in diplomatic 
circles (belonging to foreign nations!); it is a conse- 
quence of the system on which diplomacy is based. 

For hundreds of years now, from the Outline of Per- 
petual Peace (1713), written by the Abbe de Saint 

1 [aus vormarzlicher Zeit: before the Revolution of March, 1848, 
hence reactionary.] 



THE FUTURE 395 

Pierre, down to Rousseau and Kant, and on to the 
voluminous modern literature of peace, an organisation 
of modern States has been sought for, which would, in 
effect, render superfluous the activity of diplomacy in 
the former sense. When the possessions of the contract- 
ing States are mutually guaranteed, when their spheres 
of interest are apportioned by friendly agreements, 
when their commercial relations are regulated by treaties, 
and when international intercourse is ordered in accord- 
ance with the march of progress, and when any dis- 
putes that may arise are submitted to arbitration — when 
mutual confidence takes the place of former distrust, and 
on this sure basis military preparations are first brought 
to a standstill, and then gradually reduced in all na- 
tions alike — all points which in the interests of all par- 
ties concerned are desirable and attainable — then the 
old diplomacy may be peacefully allowed to rest in the 
cabinet of curiosities, and in its place a new diplomacy 
can be established, corresponding to the needs of the 
time, a diplomacy which needs no secret arts, no spies 
in uniform, no palace and back-stairs-intrigues, to ful- 
fil its useful purposes. Then diplomatists will discharge 
almost the same functions as those fulfilled to-day by the 
plenipotentiaries to the Bundesrat in Berlin. In saying 
this, however, I desire expressly to guard against any 
misunderstanding which would be involved in the as- 
sumption that I consider that the Covenant of Peace of 
Free Nations should in any way be comparable with the 
political organisation of the German Empire. This Cove- 
nant of Peace is to be nothing more than a kind of 
union for an end, a union whose end is the maintenance 
of peace and the promotion of common interests, but 
without the slightest sacrifice of sovereign rights. 1 
Common interests are already in existence to-day. 

*See also Fried: Kurze Aufkl'drungen iiber Wesen und Ziel 
tyes Poeifismus (Berlin, 1914). 



396 I ACCUSE! 

They are regulated by international agreements, and 
protected by international Commissions. The circle of 
common interests will automatically extend ever wider 
under the logical compulsion of the development of civili- 
sation, of technical science, of the conquest of time and 
space, in spite of the present world-war, and in spite of 
those of limited vision who shriek themselves hoarse in 
acclaiming Germany as the mistress of the universe in 
the realms of intellect and of science, or those who de- 
sire to repress Germany into an antediluvian national 
State. The international relations between the nations 
may be for a time interrupted by the criminal short- 
sightedness of their leaders and rulers, but they will 
again revive like the earth in spring-time when the snow 
has melted and the storms of winter have passed away. 
The links which already exist to-day between the 
nations, and which after peace will sooner or later be 
strengthened anew by the might of facts, can only be 
extended in one direction; the contracting Powers must 
pledge themselves to the maintenance of peace and to 
mutual respect for the independence and the possessions 
of each other. 

Is This a Utopia? 

Is this impracticable ? Is this a Utopia ? 

Bertha von Suttner once said : "There are three 
phases through which every spiritual movement has to 
pass; in the first men scoff at it, in the second they fight 
against it, in the third the reproach is hurled at it that 
it is forcing an open door." 

If anyone 400 years ago had said to the Italians of 
the sixteenth century : "The day will come when there 
will be a united Italian Fatherland, no longer Florence 
nor Pisa, nor Genoa, nor Venice," they would have 
scoffed at the speaker as a Utopian, or would probably 
have shut him up in an asylum. If anyone had said in 



THE FUTURE 397 

the Middle Ages to those living in the fortresses or cities 
of Germany that there would come a time in which they 
would no longer possess the right to look after their in- 
terests according to their own strength and their own 
caprice, they would with a shrug of the shoulders have 
left the foolish visionary to his own dreams. But if any- 
one had gone further and said that not only they, the 
lords of the castle and the town, but even the lords 
of wide territories, of whole kingdoms, would one day 
lose their right of declaring war, and that only the whole 
German Empire would possess such a right as against 
foreign countries, they would have had doubts as to the 
sanity of the speaker, or, what is even more probable, 
they would have chopped off his head for high treason. 
What! Were they one day to lose the right of declar- 
ing war, the most important and the most essential part 
of their sovereignty? Would they have to lay aside their 
darling plaything, their soldiers, or place them under 
the command of a supreme lord? Impossible! Such a 
thing could not possibly be. Sovereignty without the 
right of arms does not exist. 

And yet it has come to pass, and the world has not 
perished in the process. And the small and the great 
lords in Italy and Germany and elsewhere are all still 
in existence — except in so far as they have disappeared 
for other reasons. And they lead a better and happier 
existence than they did then, when they were obliged to 
expend a large part of their income on their personal 
security, and, notwithstanding this, were constantly 
threatened by the presumptuous pride of evilly-disposed 
neighbours. The community of peace in which they have 
taken their place has afforded them greater security and 
increased well-being, and what they have lost in sovereign 
rights is abundantly outweighed by what they have 
gained. The Utopia has become a commonplace, and if 
the prophet who saw these things afar off would then 



398 I ACCUSE! 

have been the object of mockery and condemnation, 
to-day the laudator temporis acti would be regarded as 
a person of irresponsible judgment. 

Countless instances of similar cases of development 
may be found in history. It may, indeed, be said that 
history is in reality nothing more than a continuous chain 
of evidence that the impossibilities of yesterday become 
the possibilities and the realities of to-day. 

Why, then, should a Covenant of Peace, corresponding 
to the interests of all nations alike, be regarded as am 
impossibility? If it was possible for the States included 
in the present German confederation, after being opposed 
to each other in 1866 in an embittered civil war, to 
conclude four years later "a perpetual alliance in de- 
fence of their territory, and of the law in force within 
their frontiers, and for the promotion of the well-being 
of the German people," why should it be impossible to 
fashion a league of nations with much more restricted 
ends, without any organisation between the States, only 
with the external aim of preserving the peace? Is such 
a league not reasonable? Does it not correspond to the 
vital interests of all the nations concerned, of all in 
equal measure? Is a league resting on the immovable 
foundation of the need for peace, common to all after so 
fearful a world-war, not infinitely more tenable than any 
organisation based on force? What would be sacrificed 
by the signatories to a treaty establishing such a cove- 
nant of peace? They would lose merely the right to 
wage war amongst each other, nothing more. They have 
truly allowed this right sufficient exercise in the course 
of the present war, and have become acquainted with 
its unspeakable consequences. Has this right brought 
them, or any one of them, any advantage whatever? 
Has it not brought them all, conqueror and conquered 
alike, to the verge of ruin, and inflicted on them wounds 
yphich will not be healed for generations to come ? What, 



THE FUTURE 399 

then, do they surrender in renouncing this right? They 
surrender the possibility of ruining themselves and 
others — nothing more. 

And what do they gain in exchange? In the first place, 
vn return for the surrender of his right, each one will re- 
ceive a corresponding duty from the other parties. 
Rights and duties are compensatory, and to this extent, 
then, a balance is effected. But now comes the credit 
side. Everyone will be secure from hostile attack. For 
an unlimited time each nation will be able to allow full 
play to its energies in trade and commerce, in art, litera- 
ture, and science ; it will be able to develop without re- 
striction and without opposition all the capacities given to 
it by nature ; in common with the allied States it will be 
able gradually to reduce expenditure for military pur- 
poses, which can no longer serve for attack and is no 
longer needed for defence ; and it will be able to apply 
the money so economised to education, the general well- 
being, and to social purposes. A new world would arise 
within the old. Millions of pounds will gradually be 
liberated each year for the struggle against poverty, to 
ameliorate the condition of the working classes, to dis- 
seminate well-being and happiness on all sides ; and thus 
by the creation of a general spirit of contentment, Eu- 
ropean society would be assured against inner catas- 
trophes. 

It is impossible to describe the measure of the bless- 
ings which such a league of nations would pour out on 
all peoples. With material well-being, with the feeling 
of security against a repetition of such fearful events 
as this war has brought in its train, with the enormous 
means which would be set free for the objects of culture 
and social reform, a nightmare would simultaneously be 
removed from the spirits of our European world of 
culture. In every country a new day of spiritual life 



400 I ACCUSE! 

would dawn. Hatred and revenge would disappear from 
the hearts of men, and all nations, sharing in what would 
now have become a true community of European cul- 
ture, reconciled and made brothers, would go forward 
to meet their future lot with pride in their eyes and with 
gladness in their hearts. 

I hear myself hailed as a Utopian, as a visionary. 
Naturally; the Utopian of to-day is the realist of to- 
morrow. There is" nothing Utopian in my proposal, 
which has the advantage that it is merely a revival and 
an extension of Kantian ideas; even then it was no 
Utopia; to-day it is more practicable than ever. 

A treaty of peace which rejects every idea of annexa- 
tion, of security based on force! The fulfilment of this 
condition will come about automatically, since the war 
will remain indecisive, and in the most favourable issue 
will lead only to the exchange of the objects pledged 
on both sides; each side will be glad if it can only get 
back its former possessions. Thank God that it is so; 
for if a decisive victory of the one side or the other 
— but especially of the one! — were conceivable, the vic- 
tor would certainly merely annex as much territory as 
possible inside and outside Europe, crush his enemies 
to the utmost extent from a military, political, and eco- 
nomic point of view, and on the ruins of the other 
States rear a hegemony based on force. Such a result 
would inevitably contain the germs for constantly re- 
newed wars; such a treaty of peace would be con- 
cluded with the stipulation "until later," and then — • 
Farewell, League of Nations! Adieu, Guarantee of 
Peace ! 

Fortunately, however, for the blessing of mankind 
such a result cannot ensue. The struggle will end with 
a non liquet. And what reason would not have dictated 
to the great the power of circumstances will force upon 
them. It will be impossible for them — for any of them 



THE FUTURE 401 

—to dictate the conditions of peace, and thus the record 
of the treaty will at least not place in the way of Euro- 
pean peace obstacles on which it could not but stumble 
straightway. 

This result, however, is unfortunately, only a negative 
one. If nothing more than this is attained, the whole 
tale of tribulation will recur. Armaments and distrust, 
distrust and armaments in a perpetual vicious circle — 
further exhaustion of the nations, already completely 
anaemic, a renewal of diplomatic tricks and dodges, to 
enable each to get by stealth as many fat scraps as 
possible out of the great soup-dish of the world. There 
will be new conflicting interests, new causes of friction, 
and in the end new explosions, each worse than its 
predecessor. 

In the event of the victory of one side, the policy of 
force and oppression would lead to the new explosion. 
In the event of the struggle being indecisive, the revival 
of competing interests, the renewal of the competition 
in armaments will result in a new state of tension and 
new discharges. 

The result will remain the same, unless one thing is 
added. In addition to a renunciation of any new order 
of things based on force, there must be a fcedus paciHcum, 
a covenant of peace of free nations, honourably and sin- 
cerely intended, and as the most important consequence 
of this Covenant there must be a gradual proportionate 
reduction in the strength of the existing armies and 
navies so far as is compatible with an assurance of 
the requisite security against those nations still standing 
outside the Covenant of peace. The more this Covenant 
is externally extended and internally strengthened, the 
more possible will it be to make progress with the dimi- 
nution of armaments, and to take in hand the transforma- 
tion of the standing armies into militias. The develop- 
ment in this direction will take place with logical neces- 



ffi% I ACCUSE! 

sity. Since the league will correspond to the interests of 
all, without doing violation in any way to the character 
of their sovereignty, since the sovereignty of each in- 
dividual member will remain absolutely unimpaired in 
its true and essential content, and thus all the advantages 
of the league of peace would be bought gratuitously b> 
each, it is logically inevitable that the league should be- 
come more intimately knit together, that confidence iri 
its existence should constantly increase, and that the 
good example thus given should more and more evoke 
imitation throughout the world. 

The only right given up on every side, the right to 
wage war against others, appears in the new organisa- 
tion as a Right to commit Wrong, and cannot, there- 
fore, be regarded as a true right, and thus its loss can- 
not be regarded as a true loss. Thus the league with 
every year of its existence will become stronger inter- 
nally and more comprehensive externally. From a league 
of four or five it will grow to be a league of six or seven, 
and finally a multiple-entente, embracing the whole civil- 
ised world. What the wise men have dreamed, what the 
nations have constantly striven after, will at last become 
the Truth — not at a stroke, but in the consciously directed 
course of historical development, and a new golden age, 
which has hitherto appeared to us only as the dream of 
a distant past, will blossom into reality in a future, which 
it may be hoped is not far removed from us. 

The pathway to this beneficent goal is neither new nor 
difficult. If it has hitherto been possible to conclude such 
a league of peace between two or three States, it must 
also be possible to do so between four or five or more 
States. That the hitherto existing alliances have only 
served the purpose of creating an enormous war ap- 
paratus for common use is entirely due to the fact that 
they were not sufficiently comprehensive, and that the 
allied groups as collective communities were opposed to 



THE FUTURE 408 

each other in a hostile, or, at least, in a distrusting atti- 
tude. The moment this opposition disappears and the 
groups as such become members of a greater community, 
every ground for further military preparations disap- 
pears, just as it has already ceased to exist within the 
various groups. 

If we assume that Germany and Austria, closely allied 
with each other, had existed alone in the world without 
having the Triple Entente or any other group of Powers 
in opposition to them, further military preparations on 
the part of these two empires would have been void of 
purpose even from the military point of view, since 
neither of the allies had any reason to expect that she 
would be attacked by the other. The same holds good 
in the case of the Powers of the Triple Entente, if we 
assume that Germany and Austria had not been opposed 
to them. Thus if all five Powers had been united to- 
gether in a league of peace, such as now exists within 
the two groups, competition in armaments would have 
been deprived of all reason and purpose, and in the logic 
of things would have automatically ceased. German 
principalities and kingdoms, so long as they were not 
united to the "perpetual league" of the German Empire, 
were obliged to be armed against each other. With the 
creation of the German Empire this military preparation 
disappeared at a stroke, and now only exists in so far as 
it is directed against the outside world in the interests of 
the protection of the German Empire and of its various 
constituent members. Italy also has passed through the 
same development in various stages in the course of its 
transition from the sovereignty of the individual city- 
territories to the more comprehensive sovereignty of the 
individual kingdoms, and finally to the all-comprehensive 
kingdom of Italy. The same process can be traced in 
Switzerland and in the United States of America. 

In this discussion it is irrelevant whether the alliances 



404 . I ACCUSE! 

concluded led to a unified State, to a federate State, or 
only to a federation of States. It is equally irrelevant 
whether such an alliance remains at the stage represented 
by the loosest form of a union which would serve to pre- 
vent war. The central point, which we are here dis- 
cussing, is everywhere the same : the exclusion by treaty 
of every war between the allied States. Whether be- 
yond this immediate object the league should fulfil a 
greater or smaller number of other objects as well, or 
whether it will even develop into a unified State, depends 
on innumerable factors, which vary according to the vari- 
ous forms of the league, and which will thus lead to dif- 
ferent results. It is unnecessary here to discuss these fac- 
tors (community of speech, of race, of historical de- 
velopment, of culture, &c). Our idea of a union in the 
service of peace represents a minimum, which appears 
worthy of our endeavour ', and appears also attainable, 
even if all the other factors which lead to a more in- 
timate union may not be present. This minimum is 
attainable, no matter how greatly the various States as- 
sociated in the union may differ in race, language, de- 
velopment of culture, and historical growth. For this 
minimum of an international union all modern civilised 
nations are ripe, no matter how greatly they may di- 
verge from each other in the character of their civilisa- 
tion. 

The more limited the aim and content of such a league 
of peace, the more easy must it be to call it into being. 
If it has been found possible to weld together sovereign 
States into unified States, confederated States, and fed- 
erations of States, and if in this process they were obliged 
to make a greater or less sacrifice of their sovereign 
rights, it follows that it must be a much easier matter 
to unite sovereign States into a union created with a 
certain end, in which, apart from the right to wage war 
against each other, they are not required to make any 



THE FUTURE 405 

surrender of their sovereign rights. Quod erat demon- 
strandum. 

In my opinion these are all practical considerations 
which it may be hoped are not diminished in value be- 
cause they are firmly supported by logic. And let no 
one again speak to me here of Utopias and perpetual 
peace, and so on. The question is not of perpetual 
peace, since the idea of perpetuity is not applicable to hu- 
man things, but is a reservation of God himself. Even 
the German Imperial Constitution, which is designated as 
a perpetual alliance, will succumb to the fate of human 
transitoriness. The question is to create human insti- 
tutions which as far as possible will avoid human evils. 
The institution represents the ideal postulate ; human life 
furnishes the exceptions. It is no argument against the 
necessity or the usefulness of a political constitution that 
a king may indulge in a coup d'etat, or that the people 
may carry out a revolution. It is no argument against 
the necessity of a criminal code that crimes are com- 
mitted. The prevalence of immorality is no contradiction 
of the moral law. Hygiene does not signify the abolition 
of death; education does not imply the production of 
saints and angels. 

The Covenant of Peace between the nations, then, is 
not intended to guarantee, and cannot guarantee, per- 
petual peace; it should, and can, prevent wars as far as 
possible, and it will exercise this effect because abstinence 
from war corresponds, not only to a moral requirement, 
but also to the true vital interests of the nations. 

The Coercive Force. 

This at once disposes of the usual question as to the 
coercive force which is to bind the league together. This 
coercive force is in the first place, duty, and in the sec- 



406 I ACCUSE! 

ond place, interest. What is the coercive force which 
keeps the German Empire together? Who could prevent 
Prussia from overrunning Bavaria and putting it in her 
pocket? Could the other States in the federation, in 
union with Bavaria, by any chance prevent her from 
doing so? What these States could accomplish against 
Prussia was seen in 1866, when Prussia, moreover, had 
to fight against Austria, her present ally, as well. If, 
therefore, the King of Prussia observes the Treaty of; 
German Federation, he does so, not because he is con- 
strained by any force, but because his duty and his 
interest demand that he should do so. On the same 
grounds all treaties between States or nations, howso- 
ever wide or restricted be their subject-matter, are ob- 
served so long as duty and interest alike demand that 
they should be respected — interest, not, indeed, in the 
base sense of a momentary gain, but in the higher sense 
of a permanent advantage, such as can spring only from 
respect for Right and Morality. Who could prevent the 
strong and prosperous cantons of German Switzerland 
from falling upon and annexing the weaker Italian can- 
tons, which, further, belong to another community in 
race and speech, and therefore, in the "nationalist" view, 
are inferior, and therefore destined to subjection? No 
physical force would stand in the way of such an un- 
dertaking; nevertheless, only a madman would entertain 
such an idea, since reason, duty, and interest impose 
on the Swiss people the necessity of remaining true to 
their Treaty of Federation. Why are commercial, cus- 
toms, and shipping treaties observed, even in those cases 
in which they run counter to the interests of one of the 
contracting parties? Why does not the stronger party 
denounce a treaty which is unfavourable to him instead 
of waiting till it expires or is terminated? Because the 
duty of fidelity to engagements demands it, and be- 
cause even a transitory loss would not outweigh the 



THE FUTURE 407 

greater disadvantage involved in the fact that no one 
would ever again conclude a treaty with one who had not 
observed his engagements. Such examples could be mul- 
tiplied indefinitely. Analogous cases are further to be 
found, not only in the external, but also in the internal 
life of a State. If a private citizen gains his case 
against the authorities in an administrative action, what 
physical force compels the authorities to submit to the un- 
favourable verdict? There is none. The authorities 
alone possess the physical force, but the moral power of 
the verdict, and the higher interest of the State, the in- 
terest of a State based on law, compel acquiescence in 
the judgment. 

Exactly the same will hold in the case of the obliga- 
tions imposed on its members by the League of Peace. 
Duty and interest will impose on the members the neces- 
sity of observing their obligations, and if, notwithstand- 
ing, these should be violated, the close relations existing 
between modern States will offer innumerable means 
whereby without having recourse to bloodshed the treaty- 
breaker may be recalled to a sense of his duties. Among 
such methods we may note the discontinuance of com- 
mercial relations, boycott of wares, exclusion from the 
existing international organisations; stoppage of post- 
office, railway, and financial intercourse, &c. All these 
means will not, however, be necessary; for the inter- 
est of continuing to be a member of the league and of 
enjoying its advantages, and, on the other hand, the 
dread of the public stigma, which would make it im- 
possible for the breaker of the peace to have ever again 
any other relation of alliance, will prevent even the most 
powerful member of the league from frivolously acting 
contrary to his duties as a member. 

The justice of this view is proved by what has actu- 
ally happened in the case of awards of arbitration. Of 
the 212 decisions in the course of the nineteenth cen- 



408 I ACCUSE! 

tury, not one remained unobserved, although there was 
no compulsion making it necessary to submit to these 
awards, and although many of these decisions were only 
accepted with disapprobation by the public opinion of the 
country concerned, 1 on no occasion has a State opposed 
an arbitration award and refused to give effect to it. 
Here, again, the moving considerations have been the 
duty of submitting to the decision which had been vol- 
untarily sought, and the interest of accepting an unfa- 
vourable award rather than risking a war, and being 
revealed to the world as a breaker of one's word. 

So also the Covenant of Peace of Free Nations which, 
after the horrors of this war, is intended to guarantee 
a true and enduring peace and not merely a cessation of 
hostilities, will rest securely and immovably on the mu- 
tual confidence of the contracting nations, on the holi- 
ness of the pledged word, and on the common interest 
which has welded the league together. 

What Will Peace Bring Us? 

Is such a large-hearted peace policy to be expected of 
Germany? Is it possible, having regard to the internal 
conditions of Prussia and Germany? In my view it is 
not. So long as Prussia continues to live under the most 
reactionary constitution which is to be found in any 
civilised country in the world, so long as a laborious, pa- 
tient, and intelligent people still continues to be ruled as 
it has been for centuries by reactionaries, Junkers, sol- 
diers, and priests, who find their profit, not in peace- 
ful development, but in military adventures, so long will 
it be impossible to think of a sincere and upright peace 
policy on the part of Prussian Germany. A family 
of soldiers, like the Hohenzollerns, put in the equiv- 
alent of i line, whose rise was due to their 
1 Fried, Vol. i, p. 156. 



THE FUTURE 409 

military efficiency, will be convinced only by a 
strong counterpoise in the people that the age of mili- 
tary conquests is past, and that to-day it is only in the 
peaceful competition of the nations that laurels are to 
be gained. As is known, this counterpoise in the peo- 
ple does not exist. The absolutism which dominates in 
Prussia, which is only imperfectly masked by an outworn 
constitution — a constitution without even a lawful origin, 
having merely been granted to the people — this Prus- 
sian absolutism extends its influence even to the Ger- 
man Empire, notwithstanding the democratic imperial 
electoral law and the presence of confederated States 
which are governed on democratic principles. The pre- 
ponderance of Prussia in the Government of the Em- 
pire and in the Bundesrat, the fact that the offices of 
the Imperial Chancellor and the President of the Prussian 
Ministry are held by one person, the exclusive military 
power of the Prussian King in his capacity of German 
Emperor, and, above all, his right to declare war and 
conclude peace in the name of the Empire — in certain 
circumstances even without the consent of the Bundes- 
rat — all these facts operate in such a way as to make the 
German Empire in reality only a branch-establishment 
of the Prussian Kingdom. 1 

1 Amongst the minimum demands to be insisted on in the domain 
of constitutional law must be included the amendment of Article 
ii of the Imperial constitution. In future it must be made impos- 
sible for the fate of the German people to rest on the resolutions 
of one individual man. Even if the concurrence of the Bundesrat 
were required before war could be declared, this would be insuffi- 
cient to guarantee a people, who are of full age, against a repeti- 
tion of catastrophes such as we are now experiencing in horror. 
Even to-day it has not become publicly known whether the Bun- 
desrat was consulted with regard to the declaration of war against 
Russia and France. Reasoning from the false assumption that an 
attack on the territory of the Union had been committed, the con- 
sent of the Bundesrat would not have been in any way required. 
Nevertheless in future it will and must be arranged that war will 



410 I ACCUSE! 

All the defects and the faults inherent in the Prussian 
constitution exert their influence, like contagious dis- 
eases, on the body politic of the Empire. The privileges 
of the governing social classes, which from time imme- 
morial have skimmed the cream from the milk in Prussia, 
have been extended to the German Empire. Here, also, 
the nobility is dominant in the military and official world ; 
or if the crown of nobility is wanting, its place is taken 
by those of trustworthy conservative views. The agra- 
rian classes from the provinces east of the Elbe have 
left their imprint on the laws of Germany dealing with 
agriculture and taxation, and have most ruthlessly made 
them subservient to their interests at the cost of the other 
classes of the population. The Prussian land-councillors, 
whose influence before 1870 was dominant only in 
Prussia, have pressed over the Elbe, the Weser, and the 
Rhein as far as the Vosges, and Herr von Koller and 
Herr von Dallwitz * have been called to impart true 
Prussian discipline and efficiency of thought to the in- 
habitants of Alsace-Lorraine. The Chancellor shows to- 
wards the resolutions of the Reichstag the same sovereign 
indifference which Presidents of the Prussian Council, in 
accordance with an ancient tradition, have always shown 
towards Parliamentary resolutions — although they have 
had no reason whatever to complain of Parliamentary 
resolutions in Prussia, at least since the time of the 
conflict; here, also, the Chancellor means to be nothing 
more than the faithful servant of his lord. 

Thus, then, there is Absolutism in both cases — in Ger- 
many, Absolutism ashamed; in Prussia, unashamed. 

Be declared in the name of the Empire only by an Imperial law, 
'that is to say, by concurrent resolutions of the Reichstag and of 
the Bundesrat. 

1 [E. M. von Koller, a native of Pommern, Staatssecretaris fd* 
'Alsace-Lorraine 1901-8; Johann von Dallwitz, born in Breslajft 
became Minister of the Interior in 191°.] 



THE FUTURE 411 

There is only this difference, that Prussian absolutism, 
with its complaisant majority, achieves evil according to 
its arbitrary will, whereas German absolutism, face to 
face with a majority of a different character, is obliged 
in most cases to restrict itself to preventing the good. 

Equal rights of religious confessions is, in Prussia and 
in Germany alike, merely a provision on paper, whicli 
is daily violated ! 

Ministerial responsibility in Prussia has not yet been 
introduced, notwithstanding solemn promises for sixty-: 
four years; in Germany it has not even been prom-? 
ised! 

The Prussian electoral law is still unaltered, nothwitK-i 
standing a solemn promise in a speech from the throne;; 
and no effective alteration can be hoped for, if we arei 
to judge from the most recent utterances of conservative 
party-leaders and ministers ! On the other hand there is 
the imperial electoral law, which is already undemocra- 
tised by an atrociously unjust arrangement of constit- 
uencies, and which is constantly in danger of being as- 
similated to the Prussian law, so that in thia respect also 
Prussia and Germany may, as far as possible, pursue the 
same paths ! 

It is superfluous and impossible to enumerate here 
all the points in which Prussia is behind the times ; they 
are only too well known to all the world. The only 
question which is of interest to us in this connection is 
whether a State which is still politically in a primitive 
condition is capable of grasping great aims, which ex- 
tend far beyond its black and white frontier posts, and 
are designed to bestow a blessing on the whole of civil- 
ised humanity, and whether its leaders will be prepared 
unerringly to pursue such aims as may be recognised as 
true, in opposition to all the internal resistance of the 
governing classes and cliques. 

These aims could have been attained before now with- 



412 I ACCUSE! 

out the policy of the mailed fist, without the insanity of 
military preparations, and without the outbreak of the 
present world-catastrophe. They could have been at- 
tained by a radical change in those views which have 
hitherto controlled Prussian-German policy. The Ger- 
man Government had only to grasp the hand so often of- 
fered by England — from the first Hague Conference 
down to the last proposals of Grey at the end of July, 
1914 — and all that we are to-day hoping, longing, and 
striving for would have been gained before now without 
shedding a drop of blood, without kindling a spark of 
fire, without spreading death and destruction. Europe 
would have stood in unity to-day, prosperous, wealthy, 
and happy, with a brilliant present, a still more brilliant 
future, if it had only pleased the German Chancellor to 
listen to the English Minister's exhortations to peace, 
and to consider that the proposed alliance of peace at 
least merited a trial. 

This alliance of peace which was proposed by Grey 
was the embryo out of which the Kantian League in 
the service of peace would have issued, without the pains 
and the dangers of travail, in the normal course of de- 
velopment. 

It was not to be so. The itch for world-power had 
seized our leaders and governors; the aims of their am- 
bition — which were at the same time the aims of our 
privileged classes, since they held out to these classes a 
prospect that their privileges, endangered through the 
rise of new national forces, would be maintained intact 
— these aims could only be achieved by force, and on this 
"rocher de bronze" all the barks of peace were bound to 
encounter hopeless shipwreck. 

Those, however, who by their lack of comprehension 
or their evil will, by their madness or their criminality, 
prevented the work of peace before the outbreak of this 
war must take care, after the fearful storm is overpast, 



THE FUTURE 413 

that they do not deny the sunshine of a lasting peace 
to the nations panting for rest and happiness. Let 
him who bears the responsibility of having provoked 
this war, let him who has committed a crime for which 
no punishment on earth or in heaven offers sufficient 
reparation, be warned against taking upon his head the 
further curse of having denied unhappy nations the bless- 
ings of an enduring peace — a peace which, no matter who 
is victorious or defeated, can never be built on force, but 
only on the free mill of free peoples. 

The man who treads this pathway to an enduring 
peace cannot recall the past, but he can at least make 
the unfading palm of peace spring from the blood- 
drenched fields; he will not free himself from his guilt, 
but many will think in extenuation of his offence that 
he at least showed himself to be a "part of that force 
which aye wills evil, but brings forth the good." 

Should it Happen Otherwise 

Should, however, it happen otherwise, should those 
who counsel the German Emperor again fail, should the 
hopes and expectations of the nation once more be de- 
ceived and the reaction within begin anew, perhaps 
stronger than ever — and of this there are already many 
indications — should peace without once more be sup- 
ported on cannons and bayonets, then — we may safely 
say — as Bebel prophesied, the great general march will 
be followed by the great crash, then the death-knell will 
have struck, not for the Government alone, but also 
for the monarchy. 

"Destruction and blood have ne'er blessed a nation ! 
The curse of the down-trodden vanquished — appalling — 
Will rest on the victor, exalted in station, 
His forehead adorned with the green laurel wreath. 



414 I ACCUSE! 

But the strong arm of vengeance is not swift in falling, 
To smite and destroy the misguided mortal ; 
She waits long and watches, and stands at his portal 
And appears to his eyes as he wrestles with death." x 

The nations have long seen the horrible thing drawing 
near, they have long urgently warned the mighty ones 
of the earth against the crime of a European war of the 
nations, which, for those guilty of the outrage, must 
necessarily bring in its train the punishment of destruc- 
tion. This warning was nowhere uttered so insistently 
and so passionately as in the great peace manifesto of 
the International Party, adopted at Basel on November 
25th, 1912, in which it is stated: — > 

"The great nations of Earope are constantly on 
the point of being urged against each other, while 
it is impossible to advance the slightest pretext of 
national interests in justification of these attacks 
against humanity and reason. 

"The Balkan crisis, which has already produced 
such a terrible tale of horror, would, if extended 
still further, constitute the gravest danger for civili- 
sation and for the proletariate. It would also be the 
greatest crime in history in view of the glaring 
contrast between the magnitude of the catastrophe 
and the insignificance of the interests involved. 

"The Congress therefore notes with satisfaction 
the complete unanimity of the Socialist Party and 
of the working classes of all countries in conducting 

i*mm mm 

1 ["Kein Volk noch begliickten 
Blut und Pliind'rung! der Fluch fallt entsetzlich, 
Auf den machtigen, lorbeergeschmiickten 
Sieger von dem Besiegten Zuriick! 
Wohl ergreift den Bethorten nicht plotzlich 
Eh'rnen Armes die ewige Rache, 
Doch sie wartet, sie folgt, sie halt Wache 
Sie tritt ernst vor des Sterbenden Blick"] 



THE FUTURE 415 

War against War. ... A war between the three 
great leading civilised nations on account of the 
dispute about a harbour between Serbia and 
Austria would be an act of criminal madness. . . . 
The Governments should not forget that in the pres- 
ent condition of Europe, and in view of the attitude 
of the working classes, they cannot, without danger 
to themselves, embark on a war. ... It would be 
madness if Governments should fail to realise that 
the mere thought of the enormity of a world-war 
must in itself arouse the horror and the indigna- 
tion of the working classes. The proletariate feel 
it as a crime to shoot against each other in the 
interests of the profits of capitalists, the ambition 
of dynasties, and for the greater honour of diplo- 
matic secret treaties. 

"If the governing powers cut off the possibility 
of normal continued development, and thereby in- 
cite the proletariate to desperate measures, they 
would themselves have to bear the whole responsi- 
bility for the consequences of the crisis provoked 
by them." 

The speeches delivered to the assembled multitude in 
the venerable minister at Basel by the representatives 
of the working classes of all countries, Germany, Austria, 
England, France, with Jaures at their head, were in 
agreement with the spirit of this manifesto. It was 
not merely socialist leaders, but also strictly orthodox 
preachers, and Swiss Government officials, who uttered 
earnest words of warning against the folly of a Eu- 
ropean war, against this inexpiable crime against hu- 
manity. It was urged that no treaty of alliance could 
oblige Germany to shed even a drop of German blood 
for the foolish and ambitious policy of certain Austrian 
cliques. All the consequences would recoil on the heads 



416 I ACCUSE! 

of those guilty of engineering a butchery such as the 
world had never seen. Jaures clearly prophesied that 
the more terrible the European war, the greater and 
more terrible would be the revolution which would 
ensue. 

The Twilight of the Gods 

And now that has come to pass against which the 
representatives of the people of all countries raised such 
insistent warnings. Then the warning could still achieve 
success; to-day, however, it must fail because their 
tongues are paralysed, their hands are bound, their foot- 
steps are hampered. It is not because of a squabble 
between Austria and Serbia about a harbour, but 
because of other trifles, which are far more petty in 
character, that twenty million men in the flower of their 
age are to-day rending each other's flesh. It is because 
of a misunderstanding, a question of legal interpreta- 
tion, which could have been solved by half an hour's 
consultation between experts. Had we not experienced 
all this, it would have been regarded as the insane product 
of a brain in the last stages of advanced paralysis. 
Whether it was to be an enquete judiciaire or policiere, 
whether the Austrian should be allowed to collaborate 
in Serbia in judicial or police investigation — these and 
similar world-shaking questions — according to the asser- 
tion of the guilty parties themselves — for they do not 
yet acknowledge their secret intentions to make war — 
it is such "vital" questions as these which have enabled 
death to reap her harvest to-day and to pile up moun- 
tains and mountains of bodies. Confronted with such 
a situation, even the most placid of our "contempo- 
raries" cannot fail to become revolutionary. Even a 
Philistine must say that a political or social organisation 
which leads to such results is ripe for destruction. Even 
his love for the governing powers must be transformed 



THE FUTURE 417 

into hatred; even in his atmosphere Herwegh's words 
of a "Living Man" must penetrate : — 

" Love cannot help us ! Thrust behind 
Love's vision of salvation! 
Hatred ! Break thou these chains that bind ; 
Judge, and speak forth damnation! 

And if proud tyrants still hold sway, 
We'll hurl them to disaster. 
Love long enough has had her day; 
Now, Hatred, be our master." 1 

From the International of Labour there was bound to 
arise, and there must now arise, the International of 
hatred, hatred against imperialism and the doctrine of 
the blood, hatred against the policy of blood and con- 
quest. The voices of the people are still paralysed and 
suppressed, the sparks are still glowing under the ashes, 
but the tongues will be released, the flames will leap up, 
and the corrupt building of our present-day State will 
perish in fire, like so many other glorious works of man 
which have been less deserving of a fiery destruction. 
The blessing will come, not, however, from above, but 
from below, and there will pass into fulfilment Bebel's 
prophetic word, the swan song which he uttered shortly 
before his death : "They will reap what they have sown, 
the twilight of the gods of the civil world is breaking." 
Once before in the history of mankind deliverance came 

1 ["Die Liebe kann uns helfen nicht, 
Die Liebe nicht erretten; 
Halt Du, O Hass, Dein jiingst Gericht, 
Brich Du, O Hass, die Ketten! 

Und wo es noch Tyrannen gibt, 
Die lasst uns keck erfassen; 
Wir haben lang genug geliebt 
Und wollen endlich hassen."] 



418 I ACCUSE! 

from the depths of the people in Jesus of Nazareth, the 
Carpenter's son, the Preacher of Love and of Compas- 
sion in a time of bloody conquest and oppression, the 
protector of all the weary and heavy laden, the great 
revolutionary of peace; to-day He also would have stood 
in the ranks of those righting for peace, and would have 
turned away with sorrow and indignation from those 
who call themselves by His name and yet so contemptu- 
ously despise all His commands. 

If the prophecy of Bebel has not yet been realised 
to-day, will it be realised to-morrow? It will the more 
certainly be realised the more our leaders con- 

tinue to pursue, after the war is over, the criminal blind- 
ness which has misled them to this war. Radical re- 
pentance within, organised assurance of peace without, 
these are the means which perhaps may even yet post- 
pone the day of vengeance and of retaliation. But as 
matters are with us in Germany it is impossible to im- 
agine such a repentance or such a change. The system 
which has led to the war, the consequences of which 
were prophesied, not only by representatives of the la- 
bouring classes, but also by many men of penetrating 
vision from other social ranks — this system will be pur- 
sued with increased energy, and will not end until the 
people utters its word of might 

Then, indeed, and only then, will an enduring condition 
of peace be assured among the nations, as the presup- 
position of which the sage of Konigsberg stated a hun- 
dred and twenty years ago that the civil constitution 
in each State must be republican. For him the institu- 
tion of a monarchy was necessarily and inevitably con- 
nected with the danger of ever-renewed holy warfare. 
The grounds for this thought hold to-day with undimin- 
ished force: — 



THE FUTURE 419 

"Now the republican constitution, apart from the 
soundness of its origin, since it arose from the pure 
source of the concept of right, has also the prospect of 
attaining the desired result, namely, perpetual peace. 
And the reason is this. If, as must be so under this 
constitution, the consent of the subjects is required to 
determine whether there shall be war or not, nothing is 
more natural than that they should weigh the matter 
well before undertaking such a bad business. For in 
decreeing war they would of necessity be resolving to 
bring down the miseries of war upon their country. This 
implies: they must fight themselves; they must hand 
over the costs of the war out of their own property; 
they must do their poor best to make good the devasta- 
tion which it leaves behind; and finally, as a crowning 
ill, they have to accept a burden of debt which will 
embitter even peace itself, and which they can never 
pay off on account of the new wars which are always 
impending. On the other hand, in a Government where 
the subject is not a citizen holding a vote (i.e., in a 
constitution which is not republican), the plunging into 
war is the least serious thing in the world. For the ruler 
is not a citizen, but the owner of the state, and does not 
lose a whit by the war, while he goes on enjoying the 
delights of his table or sport, or of his pleasure palaces 
and gala days. He can, therefore, decide on war for the 
most trifling reasons, as if it were a kind of pleasure 
party. Any justification of it that is necessary for the 
sake of decency he can leave without concern to the 
diplomatic corps, who are always only too ready with 
their services." 

So said Kant. . . . 

Was he right? It is for the German people to decide. 

But if he was right, what follows? 



EPILOGUE 

"They who do not feel the darkness will 
never look for the light." — Buckle. 

The man who wrote this book is a German. 

He is not a Frenchman, a Russian, or an Englishman. 
He is a German who is uncorrupted and incorruptible; 
who is not bought, and is not for sale. 

A German who loves his Fatherland like anyone else; 
but, just because he loves it, he wrote this book. 

Born on German soil,- trained in German culture, 
German in his ancestry, his speech and his thought, he 
knows all the virtues of the German people, but he also 
knows their failings and their weaknesses. In the Ger- 
man people, as everywhere, virtues produce weaknesses. 
From the virtue of fidelity there springs the blind con- 
fidence which does, not inquire whether the good faith 
of the nation has been deceived, and from the virtue of 
attachment there springs the unconditional adherence 
which does not ask whether the path pointed out leads 
to guilt and destruction. 

The confidence of the German people has been basely 
abused by its leaders and rulers. Their eyes, which once 
saw so clearly, have been wrapped in the gloom of igno- 
rance. Her citizens who loved peace have been trans- 
formed into combatants full of hatred and vengeance; 
the representatives of high culture and of intelligence 
have been changed into blind and benighted worshippers 
of success; men whose vision comprehended the uni- 
verse have become narrow-hearted, clinging to the soil 
of their country; the lights of art and of science have 

420 



EPILOGUE 421 

been replaced by "the spirits of the barrack-yard tricked 
out in academic freedom." 

The German people has been corrupted and blinded 
that it might be driven into a war which it has never 
foreseen, never intended, and never desired. In order 
that it might be liberated, it has been put in chains. 

It was to break this charm, to liberate the people from 
its "liberators," to fight against falsehood, that I wrote 
this book of Truth. 

From the populo male informato I appeal to the popu- 
lum melius informandum. 

A true son of Germania, I see my blinded Mother 
tottering to the abyss; I leap forward to save her from 
the fatal plunge. 

May truth still be spoken in the Germany of to-day? 
Or have things already advanced so far that it is counted 
moral to utter falsehood, but immoral to speak the 
truth? Does the good old song, which we used to sing 
to the sound of the rapier, no longer hold : 

"A pitiable wretch is he 
Who knows the truth and yet can silent be." x 

Has this ancient glory for ever departed? Should it 
now read : 

"A pitiable wretch is he 
Who knows what's false and cannot silent be." 2 

Do you dispute what I have declared to be the truth? 
First let me speak, and then disprove what I say. If 
you can do so, so much the better for you! But bear 
this well in mind : the spoken word is sometimes dan- 

1 Wer die Wahrheit kennet und saget sie nicht 
Der ist furwahr ein erbarmlicher Wicht. 

' Wer die Luge kennt und verheimlicht sie nicht 
Der ist furwahr ein erbarmlicher Wicht. 



422 I ACCUSE! 

gerous; more dangerous at all times is the suppressed 
word. 



Your security within ? 1 Must the peace within endure 
until it becomes the peace of a churchyard? "Not now 
— later," you exclaim. "Precisely now — only now," I 
tell you. What is later but a word, an unavailing word, 
is now an act, an act of salvation. Hundreds of thou- 
sands could be saved from death, the German people 
could be saved from destruction — even now, even at 
this very moment — if Truth could but force her way into 
the German people, for Truth would mean a pause, but 
Falsehood is an advance on the path that leads to 
destruction. 

You say that the Truth helps our enemies? You great 
children, who shut your eyes to escape danger. Long 
ago the enemy knew the truth; there is no one in the 
whole world who does not know it. It is everybody's 
secret. 

But you, Germany, you incorrigible, trusting dreamer, 
you alone still slumber, you alone continue to sleep, in 
all your unrighteousness, the sleep of the righteous. It 
is long since the sun rose and spread her beams. But 
you see it not, in the stillness of your night, behind the 
closed shutters of your citadel. 2 . . . How long must 
Truth stand outside begging and shivering before the 
doors of your castle, entreating in vain for admission, 
while within Falsehood sits at the garish table? Open 
the doors J Long enough has Truth been waiting. It 
is time to admit her, and to prepare for her the place 
of honour. In admitting such a guest, you would hon- 
our yourself. 

1 [Burgfriecien. See footnote p. 108.] 
a [Burgfrieden.] 



EPILOGUE 423 

Make peace without, and within you will not need 
peace. Open the doors to the free word, to the light 
that it may illumine your darkness, to the air that it 
may blow away the unclean vapours ! You are choking 
within. Throw open the doors ! 

Do you believe that the sun would not rise if you were 
to wall up your windows ? Do you believe that the day- 
star would not shine, because your bat's eyes cannot 
bear its radiance? Be sure that Truth, in spite of all 
obstacles, will penetrate into your closed dwellings, 
through chinks and crevices, like motes of dust; she will 
force her way into the house by the chimneys or the 
keyholes ; she will gnaw the floor from under your feet ; 
she will strike away the roof from over your head. Open 
and let her in; thus at least your house will be saved. 

If, however, you do not hear, if you will not hear — >. 
even now — your house will fall, and you will be buried 
under the ruins. For I tell you that if Germany con- 
tinues to gain "victories" such as she has attained up 
till now, her victories will lead to her death. . . . 

To prevent this I wrote my book, a book of enlighten- 
ment for the German people. 

History, which weighs guilt and innocence in its iron 
scales, will, I am firmly convinced, confirm the judg- 
ment which, with pain and shame, I as a German have 
been compelled to pass on Germans, in honour of truth 
and for the well-being of the German people. History 
also with letters of flame will inscribe the verdict: 
weighed in the balance and found wanting. 

So I finish my book as I began it, with a clean con- 
science, with the sure feeling of having done a good 
work, and, if justice is done, of having deserved the 
thanks of my country. 



APPENDICES 

I 

Speech Delivered by the Chancellor, Dr. voisr 
Bethmann-Hollweg, in the Sitting of the 
German Reichstag, on August 4th, 19 14. 1 

A stupendous fate is breaking over Europe. For 
forty-four years, since the time we fought for and won 
the German Empire and our position in the world, we 
have lived in peace and have protected the peace of 
Europe. In the works of peace we have become strong 
and powerful, and have thus aroused the envy of others. 
With patience we have faced the fact that, under the 
pretence that Germany was desirous of war, enmity has 
been awakened against us in the East and the West, and 
chains have been fashioned for us. The wind then 
sown has brought forth the whirlwind which has now 
broken loose. We wished to continue our work of peace, 
and, like a silent vow, the feeling that animated every- 
one from the Emperor down to the youngest soldier was 
this : Only in defence of a just cause shall our sword 
fly from its scabbard. 

The day has now come when we must draw it, against 
our wish, and in spite of our sincere endeavours. Russia 
has set fire to the building. We are at war with Russia 
and France — a war that has been forced upon us. 

Gentlemen, a number of documents, composed during 

1 [As translated in Collected Diplomatic Documents.] 
424 



APPENDICES 425 

the pressure of these last eventful days, is before you. 
Allow me to emphasise the facts that determine our 
attitude. 

From the first moment of the Austro-Serbian conflict 
we declared that this question must be limited to Aus- 
tria-Hungary and Serbia, and we worked with this end 
in view. All Governments, especially that of Great 
Britain, took the same attitude. Russia alone asserted 
that she had to be heard in the settlement of this matter. 

Thus the danger of a European crisis raised its threat- 
ening head. 

As soon as the first definite information regarding the 
military preparations in Russia reached us we declared 
at Petrograd in a friendly but emphatic manner that mili- 
tary measures against Austria would find us on the side 
of our ally, and that military preparations against our- 
selves would oblige us to take counter-measures; but 
that mobilisation would come very near to actual war. 

Russia assured us in the most solemn manner of her 
desire for peace, and declared that she was making no 
military preparations against us. 

In the meantime, Great Britain, warmly supported by 
us, tried to mediate between Vienna and Petrograd. 

On July 28th the Emperor telegraphed to the Tsar 
asking him to take into consideration the fact that it was 
both the duty and the right of Austria-Hungary to de- 
fend herself against the pan-Serb agitation, which threat- 
ened to undermine her existence. The Emperor drew 
the Tsar's attention to the solidarity of the interests of 
all monarchs in face of the murder of Serajevo. He 
asked for the latter's personal assistance in smoothing 
over the difficulties existing between Vienna and Petro- 
grad. About the same time, and before receipt of this 
telegram, the Tsar asked the Emperor to come to his aid 
and to induce Vienna to moderate her demands. The 
Emperor accepted the role of mediator. 



426 I ACCUSE! 

But scarcely had active steps on these lines begun 
when Russia mobilised all her forces directed against 
Austria, while Austria-Hungary had mobilised only those 
of her corps which were directed against Serbia. To 
the north she had mobilised only two of her corps, far 
from the Russian frontier. The Emperor immediately 
informed the Tsar that this mobilisation of Russian 
forces against Austria rendered the role of mediator, 
which he had accepted at the Tsar's request, difficult, if 
not impossible. 

In spite of this we continued our task of mediation 
at Vienna and carried it to the utmost point which was 
compatible with our position as an ally. 

Meanwhile Russia of her own accord renewed her as- 
surances that she was making no military preparations 
against us. 

We come now to July 31st. The decision was to be 
taken at Vienna. Through our representations we had 
already obtained the resumption of direct conversations 
between Vienna and Petrograd, after they had been for 
some time interrupted. But before the final decision 
was taken at Vienna, the news arrived that Russia had 
mobilised her entire forces, and that her mobilisation 
was therefore directed against us also. The Russian 
Government, who knew from our repeated statements 
what mobilisation on our frontiers meant, did not notify 
us of this mobilisation, nor did they even offer any ex- 
planation. It was not until the afternoon of July 31st 
that the Emperor received a telegram from the Tsar in 
which he guaranteed that his army would not assume 
a provocative attitude towards us. But mobilisation on 
our frontiers had been in full swing since the night of 
July 30th-3ist. 

While we were mediating at Vienna in compliance with 
Russia's request, Russian forces were appearing all along 
our extended and almost entirely open frontier, and 



APPENDICES 427 

France, though indeed not actually mobilising, was ad- 
mittedly making military preparations. What was our 
position? For the sake of the peace of Europe we had, 
up till then, deliberately refrained from calling up a 
single reservist. Were we now to wait further in pa- 
tience until the nations on either side of us chose the 
moment for their attack? It would have been a crime 
to expose Germany to such peril. Therefore, on July 
31st we called upon Russia to demobilise as the only 
measure which could still preserve peace of Europe. The 
Imperial Ambassador at Petrograd was also instructed 
to inform the Russian Government that in case our 
demand met with a refusal, we should have to consider 
that a state of war (Kriegszustand) existed. 

The Imperial Ambassador has executed these instruc- 
tions. We have not yet learnt what Russia answered to 
our demand for demobilisation. Telegraphic reports on 
this question have not reached us even though the 
wires still transmitted much less important informa- 
tion. 

Therefore, the time-limit having long since expired, 
the Emperor was obliged to mobilise our forces on 
August 1st at 5 p.m. 

At the same time we had to make certain what atti- 
tude France would assume. To our direct question, 
whether she would remain neutral in the event of a 
Russo-German War, France replied that she would do 
what her interests demanded. That was an evasion, if 
not a refusal. 

In spite of this, the Emperor ordered that the French 
frontier was to be unconditionally respected. This or- 
der, with one single exception, was strictly obeyed. 
France, who mobilised at the same time as we did, as- 
sured us that she would respect a zone of 10 kilometres 
on the frontier. What really happened? Aviators 
dropped bombs, and cavalry patrols and French infantry 



428 I ACCUSE! 

detachments appeared on the territory of the Empire! 
Though war had not been declared, France thus broke 
the peace and actually attacked us. 

Regarding the one exception on our side which I men- 
tioned, the Chief of the General Staff reports as fol- 
lows : — 

"Only one of the French complaints about the cross- 
ing of the frontier from our side is justified. Against 
express orders, a patrol of the 14th Army Corps, ap- 
parently led by an officer, crossed the frontier on August 
2nd. They seem to have been shot down, only one man 
having returned. But long before this isolated instance 
of crossing the frontier had occurred, French aviators 
had penetrated into Southern Germany and had thrown 
bombs on our railway lines. French troops had at- 
tacked our frontier guards on the Schlucht Pass. Our 
troops, in accordance with their orders, have remained 
strictly on the defensive." This is the report of the 
General Staff. 

Gentlemen, we are now in a state of necessity (Not- 
wehr), and necessity (Not) knows no law. Our troops 
have occupied Luxemburg and perhaps have already en- 
tered Belgian territory. 

Gentlemen, that is a breach of international law. It 
is true that the French Government declared at Brussels 
that France would respect Belgian neutrality as long as 
her adversary respected it. We knew, however, that 
France stood ready for an invasion. France could wait, 
we could not. A French attack on our flank on the 
lower Rhine might have been disastrous. Thus we were 
forced to ignore the rightful protests of the Govern- 
ments of Luxemburg and Belgium. The wrong — I speak 
openly — the wrong we thereby commit we will try to 
make good as soon as our military aims have been at- 
tained. 

He who is menaced as we are and is fighting for his 



APPENDICES 429 

highest possession can only consider how he is to hack 
his way through (durchhauen) . 

Gentlemen, we stand shoulder to shoulder with Aus- 
tria-Hungary. 

As for Great Britain's attitude, the statements made 
by Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons yester- 
day show the standpoint assumed by the British Gov- 
ernment. We have informed the British Government 
that, as long as Great Britain remains neutral, our fleet 
will not attack the northern coast of France, and that 
we will not violate the territorial integrity and inde- 
pendence of Belgium. These assurances I now repeat 
before the world, and I may add that, as long as Great 
Britain remains neutral, we would also be willing, upon 
reciprocity being assured, to take no warlike measures 
against French commercial shipping. 

Gentlemen, so much for the facts. I repeat the words 
of the Emperor : "With a clear conscience we enter the 
lists." We are fighting for the fruits of our works of 
peace, for the inheritance of a great past and for our 
future. The fifty years are not yet past during which 
Count Moltke said we should have to remain armed to 
defend the inheritance that we won in 1870. Now the 
great hour of trial has struck for our people. But with 
clear confidence we go forward to meet it. Our army is 
in the field, our navy is ready for battle — behind them 
stands the entire German nation — the entire German na- 
tion united to the last man. 

Gentlemen, you know your duty and all that it means. 
The proposed laws need no further explanation. I ask 
you to pass them quickly. 



430 I ACCUSE! 



II 

Speech Delivered by the Chancellor, Dr. von 
Bethmann-Hollweg, in the sitting of the 
German Reichstag on December 2nd, 19 14. 

Gentlemen, His Majesty the Emperor, who is at the 
front with the Army, has requested me to convey his 
best wishes and heartiest greetings to the representa- 
tives of the German people, with whom he knows that 
he is at one until death, in storm and danger, and in 
the common care for the well-being of the Fatherland, 
and he has asked me at the same time to express to the 
whole nation in his name and from this place his thanks 
for the unexampled sacrifice and devotion, for the stu- 
pendous task which is being achieved at the front and at 
home, and will still further be achieved, by all ranks 
of the nation without distinction. Our first thought, also, 
turns to the Emperor, to the Army, and the Navy, to 
our soldiers who on the battlefield and on the high seas 
are fighting for the honour and the greatness of the 
Empire. We look upon them full of pride and with firm 
confidence, but at the same time we look upon our Aus- 
tro-Hungarian brothers in arms, who faithfully united 
with us fight the great fight with brilliantly maintained 
bravery. In the struggle which has been forced upon 
us we have recently been joined by a new ally, who 
knows quite well that with the destruction of the Ger- 
man Empire her political independence also will come 
to an end; I refer to the Ottoman Empire. If our ene- 
mies have summoned up against us a powerful coali- 
tion, it is to be hoped that they will also have learned 
that the arm of our courageous allies reaches to the 
weak points in their world-position. On August 4th 
the Reichstag showed the unyielding will of the whole 



APPENDICES 431 

people to take up the struggle forced upon us, and to 
defend our independence to the uttermost. Since then 
great things have happened. Who will count the acts 
of glory and of heroism of the armies, the regiments, 
the squadrons, and the companies, of the cruisers and 
the submarines, in a war which flings its battle-line 
over the whole of Europe and over the whole world? 
Only a later age will be able to tell of these things. For 
to-day it must suffice that in spite of the enormous su- 
periority of our enemies, the war is being carried on 
in the enemies' country, thanks to the unconquerable 
bravery of our troops. There we stand firm and strong, 
and we may with all confidence look to the future. But 
the enemy's power of resistance is not broken. We 
are not yet at an end of our sacrifices. The nation will 
continue to bear these further sacrifices with the same 
heroism which it has hitherto shown, for we must, and 
we will, conduct to a happy end the struggle which, 
surrounded as we are by enemies, we are waging for 
right and freedom. Then, also, we will remember the 
wrongs, some of which have been in violation of all the 
dictates of civilisation, done to those of our defence- 
less countrymen living abroad, for, Gentlemen, the 
world must learn that no one can touch unavenged so 
much as a hair of a German. 

When the meeting of August 4th was at an end, the 
British Ambassador appeared here to deliver to us an 
ultimatum from England, and, in the event of a refusal, 
a declaration of war. I was not then able to express 
myself on the position finally assumed by the British 
Government, and I propose to-day to offer some obser- 
vations on the point. 

Where the responsibility rests for this, the greatest 
of all wars, is, for us, clear. The external responsibility 
is borne by those men in Russia who inspired and car- 
ried out the mobilisation of the entire Russian Army. 



432 I ACCUSE! 

The inner responsibility, however, lies on the Govern- 
ment of Great Britain. The Cabinet of London could 
have made this war impossible by declaring without 
ambiguity in Petrograd that England was not prepared 
to allow a continental war in Europe to develop out of 
the conflict between Austria and Serbia. By speaking 
thus, France would also have been compelled energeti- 
cally to advise Russia to desist from measures of war. 
This would have smoothened the path for our action 
of mediation. England did not do so. England knew 
the intrigues for war of a small clique, of an irrespon- 
sible but powerful group about the Tsar. England saw 
how things were moving, but did nothing to spoke the 
wheel. In spite of all protestations of peace London 
gave it to be understood in Petrograd that she was 
taking her stand on the side of France and Russia. This 
is proved clearly and incontestably by the publications 
of the various Cabinets, and especially by that of the 
English Blue Book itself. Then, indeed, it was impos- 
sible to hold things back in Petrograd. 

On this question we possess a witness who is entirely 
above suspicion, the report of the Belgian charge 
d'affaires in Petrograd, written on July 30th. He re- 
ports: "To-day in Petrograd the people are firmly con- 
vinced, indeed they have assurances, that England will 
stand by France. This support has an extraordinary in- 
fluence, and has done not a little to gain the upper hand 
for the war party." 

Up to this summer the English statesmen have re- 
peatedly assured Parliament that there was no treaty, 
no convention, no alliance which bound the freedom of 
action of the English Government in the event of war 
breaking out. England could freely decide whether it 
would or would not take part in such a war. It was, 
then, no fraternal obligation, no compulsion, not even 
a menace to their own country, which caused the Eng- 



APPENDICES 433 

lish statesmen to stir up war and then participate in it 
themselves. There thus remains only one other possi- 
bility: the Cabinet of London allowed this world-war, 
this enormous world-war, to arise because it appeared 
a favourable opportunity, with the help of her comrades 
in the Entente, to destroy the vital nerve of her greatest 
economic competitor. Thus, then, England and Russia 
bear the responsibility for this world-war, for this catas- 
trophe which has broken over Europe and over the world. 
And Belgian neutrality, which England professed to pro- 
tect, is a mask. At 7 o'clock in the evening on August 
2nd we communicated in Brussels the fact that the 
French plans of war, which were known to us, com- 
pelled us in self-defence to march through Belgium. 
But even on the afternoon of the same day, August 
2nd, that is to say, before our demarche was or could be 
known in London, England had promised France her 
support, unconditionally promised it in the event of an 
attack by the German Fleet on the French coast. There 
was no mention of Belgian neutrality. This fact is es- 
tablished by the declarations made by Sir Edward Grey 
on August 3rd in the House of Commons, and which was 
not known to me on August 4th. This fact is confirmed 
by the English Blue Book itself. 

How could England maintain that she had seized the 
sword because Belgian neutrality was violated by us? 
This is said by English statesmen to whom the past his- 
tory of Belgian neutrality was known. When on August 
4th I spoke of the wrong that we were doing in invading 
Belgium, it was not then clear whether the Govern- 
ment in Brussels might not in the hour of need agree 
to spare their country, and to withdraw under protest 
to Antwerp. You will remember that after Liegfe was 
taken, on the proposal of the Army Authorities, a re- 
newed request in this sense was directed to Brussels. 
On military grounds the possibility of such a develop- 



434 I ACCUSE! 

ment had, in all circumstances, to be kept open on August 
4th. We had, indeed, indications that the neutrality of 
Belgium had fallen to pieces, but positive proof in writ- 
ing was lacking. English statesmen, however, knew 
these proofs quite well. As a result of the documents 
found in Brussels it has been established how and how 
far Belgium gave up her neutrality in favour of England, 
and two facts, consequently, are now well known to 
all the world. When our troops marched into Belgium 
in the night of August 3rd to 4th they were in a coun- 
try which had long ago riddled its neutrality, and the 
further fact is clear that it was not on account of Bel- 
gian neutrality, which she had herself broken long ago, 
that England declared war against us, but because she 
believed that with the help of two great military con- 
tinental Powers she could become our master. Since 
August 2nd, since she promised to support France in 
war, England was no longer neutral, but was, as a mat- 
ter of fact, in a state of war against us. The reasons 
advanced by English statesmen for this declaration of 
war were of the nature of a spectacular show, intended 
to confuse their own country and neutral States with 
regard to the true grounds of the war. Now that the 
Anglo-Belgian plans of war have been unveiled in all 
their details, the policy of English statesmen is char- 
acterised for all time in the history of the world. Eng- 
lish diplomacy has, indeed, accomplished one other 
achievement. On her summons, Japan tore from us 
the heroic Tsingtau, and thereby violated Chinese neu- 
trality. Did England take any steps with regard to the 
violation of this neutrality? Has she shown in this 
case her concern for the maintenance of the rights of 
neutral States? Gentlemen, when I was called to my 
present office five years ago, the Triple Entente stood 
firmly opposed to the Triple Alliance. This was the 
work of England, intended to assist in giving effect to 



APPENDICES 485 

the fundamental principle of English policy, pursued for 
centuries, that is, to oppose the strongest Power on the 
continent for the time being. In this fact lay from the 
outset the aggressive character of the Triple Entente 
as opposed to the purely defensive significance of the 
Triple Alliance; for a nation as great and as strong as 
the German cannot be hampered in the free develop- 
ment of its forces. In view of this political constellation 
the way to be followed by German policy was clearly 
indicated. We had to endeavour, by arriving at an un- 
derstanding with the individual Powers of the Entente, 
to banish the danger of war; we had at the same time so 
to strengthen our defensive forces that, if war should 
come, we would be strong enough to carry it through. 
As you know, we have done both. In the case of France 
we always encountered the old thoughts of revenge. 
Nourished by ambitious politicians, these thoughts 
showed themselves to be stronger than the desire for 
neighbourly relations with us which was doubtless en- 
tertained by a part of the French people. In the case 
of Russia it is true that we arrived at particular agree- 
ments, but the firm alliance between Russia and France, 
the opposition of Russia to our ally Austria-Hungary, 
and a hatred of Germany nourished on Pan-Slav am- 
bitions prevented any understanding designed to avoid 
the danger of war. The freest position, comparatively 
speaking, was occupied by England. Speaking in Par- 
liament, English statesmen have again and again with 
the greatest emphasis defended and boasted of the free- 
dom enjoyed by the British Government in arriving at a 
decision. This was the first place in which an under- 
standing could be sought, which would then, in fact, 
have guaranteed the peace of the world. In this di- 
rection I was bound to exert my efforts, and I did so. 
The way was strait, as I well knew. In the course of 
centuries the insular manner of English thought has es- 



436 I ACCUSE! 

tablished a political principle with the force of an ax- 
iomatic dogma, the principle that an arbitrium mundi 
belongs to England, which can only be maintained by 
the uncontested control of the seas on the one hand, 
and on the other by the balance of power on the con- 
tinent, which has been so often mentioned. I never 
hoped to be able to break this ancient English princi- 
ple by force of persuasion. What appeared to be possible 
was that the increasing strength of Germany, the increas- 
ing risk involved in a war, would have enabled England 
to see that this principle, so long represented by Eng- 
lish policy, had become out of date, and was no longer 
practicable, and that a peaceful settlement with Germany 
was to be preferred. This dogma was, however, so 
firmly rooted that it paralysed all efforts to arrive at a 
decisive understanding. The negotiations received a new 
impulse in the crisis of 191 1. The English people recog- 
nised overnight that it had been standing before the 
abyss of a European war. Compelled by popular sen- 
timent, the English statesman desired to approach Ger- 
many. By long and painful labour it was possible to 
arrive at agreements with regard to economic interests, 
which, in the first place, affected Asia Minor and Africa, 
and were intended to diminish possible sources of politi- 
cal friction. The world is wide, it has room enough for 
the free development of both nations side by side, if 
only the attempt is not made to hinder and restrict them 
in their free development. That is the principle which 
our policy has always defended. But, Gentlemen, while 
we were so negotiating, England was incessantly intent 
on drawing closer her relations to Russia and France. 
The most decisive point in this is that, apart from the 
sphere of politics, closer military agreements were being 
concluded to meet the case of a continental war. Eng- 
land conducted these negotiations as far as possible in 
secret. When anything of this nature trickled through 



APPENDICES 437 

to the public, as has happened more than once, the Eng- 
lish Government endeavoured to represent the matter to 
Parliament and in the Press as entirely innocent. We 
did not remain ignorant of these agreements of England. 
I have laid papers on the subject. The whole situation 
was, in fact, that England was ready to come to an 
understanding with us on particular questions, but the 
chief and the first principle of English policy remained 
unaltered : in the free development of her powers Ger- 
many had to be kept in check by the balance of power. 
That represents the frontier line of friendly relations 
with Germany. For this purpose the Triple Entente was 
elaborated to the utmost. As her friends desired mili- 
tary assurances, the English were at once ready to give 
them. The ring was thus completed. England is sure 
of France's adherence, and therefore of Russia's also. 
But as a result of all this, England also binds her will. 
If France or Russia, where the existing chauvinistic 
circles find their strongest support in the military con- 
nivance of England, if France or Russia desire to strike, 
England is morally delivered into the hands of her 
friends. And what is the object of all this? Germany 
must be kept down. We have not been remiss in warn- 
ing the English Government. Even at the beginning of 
July of this year I indicated to the English Government 
that their secret negotiations with Russia with regard 
to a naval convention were known to me. I drew their 
attention to the serious dangers which this policy on the 
part of England involved for the peace of the world. 
Fourteen days later my prophecies were fulfilled. From 
all these facts bearing on the general situation of affairs 
we drew the consequences. In rapid sequence I brought 
before you the greatest defence proposals known in Ger- 
man history, and in full knowledge of the dangers which 
surrounded us you have willingly and in a spirit of self- 
sacrifice granted to our country what was needed for 



438 I ACCUSE! 

her defence. As soon as the war had broken out, Eng- 
land threw aside all external show. It was openly and 
loudly proclaimed that England would fight until Ger- 
many was crushed economically and by force of arms. 
The hatred of Germany nourished by the Pan-Slavs 
exultingly applauds the sentiment; France, with the 
whole strength of an old soldierly nation, hopes to be 
able to wipe out the stain of 1870. Gentlemen, on this 
we have only one answer to give to our enemies: Ger- 
many cannot be annihilated. 

Like our military forces, our financial forces also have 
given a brilliant account of themselves, and have with- 
out any reservations placed themselves in the service 
of our country. Our economic life has been maintained; 
unemployment is relatively small. Germany's power and 
skill in organisation constantly seek in new ways to avoid 
coming evils, and to wipe out existing injuries. No man 
and no woman seeks to avoid sharing in the common 
and voluntary task ; no recruiting drums need to be beat 
for this purpose. Everything in life and in wealth is 
surrendered for the only, and the great object, for the 
land of our fathers, for the hope of our children and 
descendants. A spirit is being manifested, a moral great- 
ness of the nation, such as has hitherto never been known 
in the history of the world. If this spirit of sacrifice 
shown by millions of our nation in arms against a world 
of enemies is despised by our opponents as militarism, 
if they abuse us as Huns and barbarians, if they scatter 
cursed lies throughout the whole world — we are proud 
enough to remain unconcerned. This wonderful spirit, 
which glows through the hearts of Germany in unprec- 
edented unity, in the unquestioning surrender of each 
to each, this must and will be victorious. When a glori- 
ous and a happy peace has been achieved, we will main- 
tain this spirit as the holiest inheritance from this fear- 
fully earnest and great time. As if by the power of 



APPENDICES 439 

magic the barriers have disappeared which during a bar- 
ren and dull age have separated the various parts of our 
nation — the barriers which we reared together in mis- 
understanding, in envy, and distrust. It brings a sense 
of freedom and of bliss that at last the whole of this 
rubbish and trash has been swept away, that only the 
man counts, each equal to the other, each holding out 
his hand to the other in a single and a holy cause. I 
again use the words of the Emperor on the outbreak of 
war : "I no longer know any parties. I know only Ger- 
mans." Gentlemen, when the war is past parties will 
return; for without parties, without political struggle, 
there can be no political life, even for the freest and 
the happiest nation; but, Gentlemen, we will struggle to 
see — and I for my part promise to do so — that in these 
struggles there may be only Germans. 

I bring to a conclusion my few observations; — this is 
no time for words — I cannot discuss all the questions 
which move most profoundly the nation and myself. 
One word more : faithfully and with a feeling of warm 
gratitude we think of the sons of Germany who on the 
battlefields in the east and the west, on the high seas, 
on the shores of the Pacific, and in our colonies have 
given up their life for the Fatherland. Before their 
heroism, which is now stilled, we unite ourselves in the 
vow to endure till the last breath, in order that our de- 
scendants and our sons may be able to labour in the 
service of the greatness of the Empire in a stronger 
Germany, free and assured from foreign menace and 
force. This vow will ring out to our sons and brothers 
who are still fighting against the enemy, to the heart- 
blood of Germany which springs up in countless and 
nameless acts of heroism, for which we are prepared to 
give up all that we have ; it will ring out to our country- 
men abroad, to those kept back, to those in peril, to 
those who care for us afar off, to those who are in prison 



440 I ACCUSE! 

and to those abused. We will persevere, Gentlemen, 
and I ask you to confirm this by accepting these meas- 
ures. We will persevere, until we have the assurance 
that no one will again disturb our peace, a peace in 
which we mean as a free nation to tend and develop our 
German character and our German strength. 



Ill 

Circular Note of the Chancellor, Dr. von Beth- 
man-hollweg, to the imperial ambassadors, 
dated December 2<±th, 1914. 1 

Headquarters, 

December 24th, 1914. 
In the speech made by Minister President Viviani in 
the French Chamber is contained a passage that France 
and Russia had on July 31st agreed to the English pro- 
posal to stop military preparations and to begin negotia- 
tions in London. If Germany had given her assent, 
peace could have been maintained even at this last hour. 

As I cannot at the present moment contradict from 
the Tribune of the German Reichstag this false state- 
ment made in the French Parliament, I see myself com- 
pelled to send the following exposition to you with the 
request to make an extensive use of it. 

The British proposal for a conference which is printed 
in the English Blue Book, No. 36, arises on July 26th. 

Its contents say that representatives of Germany, 
France, and Italy should meet with Sir Edward Grey 
in London for the purpose of discovering an issue from 
the difficulties which had arisen in the Serbian matter. 

1 [As translated in the Appendix to Mr. J. W. Headlam's His- 
tory of Twelve Days.] 



APPENDICES 441 

From the beginning Germany took its stand on the point 
that the Serbo-Austrian conflict was an affair which 
only concerned the two States immediately indicated. 
Sir Edward Grey himself also later recognised this point 
of view. 

Germany was obliged to reject the English proposal 
for a conference, for it could not allow that Austria- 
Hungary should be subjected to a tribunal of the Great 
Powers in a question which concerned its national exist- 
ence and which only concerned Austria-Hungary. It is 
clear from the German White Book that Austria-Hun- 
gary looked on the proposal for a conference as unac- 
ceptable. By the declaration against Serbia it gave evi- 
dence of its firm will to regulate the Serbian question 
alone without the intervention of the Powers. At the 
same time, however, it declared, in order to satisfy all 
just claims of Russia, its complete territorial disinterest- 
edness as regards Serbia. As Russia was not satisfied 
with this assurance, European questions sprang out of 
the Serbian question, and this first found its expression 
in a difference between Austria-Hungary and Russia. 
In order to prevent a European conflict developing out 
of this difference, it was necessary to find a new basis 
upon which immediate action of the Powers could be 
begun. It was Germany to whom belongs the merit of 
having first trod this ground. 

The Secretary of State, von Jagow, in his conversa- 
tion with the British Ambassador on July 27th pointed 
out that in the wish of Russia to negotiate directly with 
Austria-Hungary he saw an improvement of the situa- 
tion and the best prospect for a peaceful solution. From 
the day on which it was first expressed, Germany sup- 
ported in Vienna with all the energy which stood at its 
command this desire by which the English conference 
idea was according even to the Russian opinion for the 
time put aside. No State can have striven more honestly 



442 I ACCUSE! 

and with more energy to maintain the peace of the world 
than Germany had. 

England also now gave up the idea of pursuing her 
conference idea and on her side supported the concep- 
tion of direct negotiations between Vienna and Petro- 
grad (Blue Book, No. 67). 

These negotiations, however, met with difficulties, and 
difficulties which did not arise from Germany and Aus- 
tria-Hungary, but from the Entente Powers. 

If Germany's endeavour was to be successful, it re- 
quired good will on the part of the Powers who were 
not immediately engaged; it required also that those 
who were principally engaged should hold their hand, 
for if either of the two Powers between whom mediation 
was to be made interrupted by military operations, ac- 
tion which was proceeding, it was from the beginning 
clear that this action could never attain its end. 

Now how did it stand with the good will of the 
Powers ? The attitude of France is clearly shown in the 
French Yellow Book. She did not trust German assur- 
ances. All the steps of the German Ambassador, 
Freiherr von Schoen, were received with mistrust. His 
wish for mediating influence of France at Petrograd 
was not regarded, for they believed that they must as- 
sume that the steps taken by Herr von Schoen were 
intended "a compromettre la France au regard de la 
Russie." The French Yellow Book shows that France 
did not take a single positive step in the interest of peace. 

What attitude did England take in the diplomatic 
conversation ? She gave the appearance of mediating up 
to the last hour, but her external actions were directed 
to a humiliation of the two Powers of the Triple Al- 
liance. England was the first Great Power which or- 
dered military preparations on a great scale and thereby 
created a feeling, particularly in Russia and France, 
which was in the highest degree adverse to mediatory 



APPENDICES 44S 

action. From the report of the French Charge d'Af- 
f aires in London on July 22nd (Yellow Book, No. 66), 
it follows that as early as July 24th the Commander 
of the English Fleet had discreetly taken steps for the 
collection of the Fleet at Portland. Great Britain, there- 
fore, mobilised sooner even than Serbia. Moreover, 
Great Britain refused just what France did, to act in a 
moderating and restraining manner at Petrograd. 

On the warning from the English Ambassador at 
Petrograd from which it was clearly to be seen that 
only a warning to Russia to hold back her mobilisation 
could save the situation, Sir Edward Grey did nothing 
but let matters go their own way. 

At the same time, however, he believed that it would 
be useful to point out to Germany and Austria-Hun- 
gary, if not quite clearly, still sufficiently so, that Eng- 
land could also take part in a European war. At the 
same time, therefore, when England, though letting drop 
the idea of a conference, gave the appearance of wish- 
ing that Austria-Hungary should show itself conciliatory 
under the mediation of Germany, Sir Edward Grey di- 
rects the attention of the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador 
in England to the mobilisation of the English Fleet 
(Blue Book, 48), gives the Russian Ambassador to un- 
derstand that England also could take part in a war, and 
at once informs the Ambassadors of the Triple Entente 
of this warning which he had addressed to Germany, by 
which action the victory of the war-party in Petrograd 
was sealed. 

This was just the attitude, which according to the 
better informed opinion of the English Ambassador 
Buchanan was the worst adapted for bringing about good 
feeling between the Powers. 

Under these difficulties it would be regarded as a spe- 
cial success that Germany succeeded in making Austria- 
Hungary inclined to follow the wish of Russia and enter 



444 I ACCUSE! 

into separate conversations. Had Russia, without on 
"her side taking military measures, continued the negotia- 
tions with Austria-Hungary which had only mobilised 
against Serbia, the complete prospect of maintenance of 
the world's peace would have been maintained. Instead 
of this Russia mobilised against Austria-Hungary, by 
which Sazonof was quite clear (see Blue Book, 78) that 
with this all direct understanding with Austria-Hungary 
fell to the ground. The laborious result of the German 
negotiations for mediation was thereby overthrown by a 
single blow. 

What happened now on the part of the Entente 
Powers in order to preserve peace at this last hour? 

Sir Edward Grey again took up his conference pro- 
posal. In accordance also with the view of M. Sazonof, 
the suitable moment had now come in order, under the 
pressure of Russian mobilisation against Austria-Hun- 
gary, again to recommend the old English idea of quad- 
ruple conversation (German White Book, page 7). 

Count Pourtales did not leave the Minister in doubt, 
that according to his view the Entente Powers thereby 
were requiring from Austria-Hungary just what they 
had not been willing to suggest to Serbia, namely, that 
she should give way under military pressure. 

Under these circumstances the conference idea could 
not possibly be sympathetic to Germany and Austria- 
Hungary. Notwithstanding this, Germany declared in 
London that she accepted in principle the proposal for 
the intervention of the four Powers, but that it was 
merely the form of the conference which was disagree- 
able to her. At the same time the German Ambassador 
at P'etrograd pressed Sazonof on his side also to make 
concessions in order to render a compromise possible. 
It is well known that these efforts remained fruitless. 

Russia herself seemed to take no more interest in the 
further mediatory activity of Germany at Vienna, which 



APPENDICES 445 

was continued until the last hour. She ordered the 
mobilisation of all her forces in the night between July 
30th and 31st, which must have the mobilisation of Ger- 
many and the later declaration of war as its consequence. 

In view of this course of events it cannot be under- 
stood how a responsible statesman can have the courage 
to maintain that Germany, who found herself confronted 
by Russian mobilisation, military preparations of France, 
and the mobilisation of the English Fleet, could on July 
31st still have saved peace by the acceptance of a con- 
ference which wy« to be conducted under the arms of the 
Entente Powers. 

It was not Germany, who continued to mediate up 
Vienna up to the last hour, who made the idea of media- 
tion by four Powers impossible; it was the military 
measures of the Entente Powers who spoke words of 
peace while *bey determined to make war. 

v. Bethmann-Hollweg. 




O M O « VJ 





Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide 
Treatment Date: ^AY ^ 

PreservationTechnologies 

A WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVATION 

111 Thomson Park Drive 
Cranberry Township, PA 1 6066 
(724)779-2111 




s-r v/\ 












'.\<v<^/>.% >j> So •V&J&V. "V <; 



